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Chapter I 
LATIN AMERICAN EXPORTS AND THE MARKETS 
FOR BASIC PRODUCTS 
A. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 
Economic expansion continued in the industrialized part of the 
world in 1962, although the degree of expansion was quite different in 
each region. In the countries that had been affected by a slight re-
cession in 1960/61, economic activity recovered ir. the first half of 
1962. Although this movement slowed down in the second half of 1962 
. and the first quarter of 1963» the increases for the year as a whole in 
• the various countries were generally higher than those for the previous 
, year. The opposite occurred in the European Eoonomic Community, where 
the rate of growth of economic activity continued to decline; the annual 
percentages of increase in the national product of the various countries 
of the Community were lower than those for 1961, and much lower than 
those during the accelerated expansion of 1959/60. 
The over-all demand increase in the industrialized regions contrib-
uted to the progress of imports from the underdeveloped areas. However, 
the intensity of this phenomenon varied a great deal from one industrial 
country to another, not only because the rates of growth of the total 
expenditure were not the same in the various countries but also because 
the component parts of that expenditure did not increase in the same 
maimer everywhere. In addition, in certain countries, specific faotors 
affected the amount of purchases from the developing regions. 
In the United States, the recovery of economic activity, begun 
after the 1960/61 recession, continued in 1962 and the first half of 
1963{ but it tapered off in the second half of 1962. The real gross 
national product, which had increased 7.7 percent, in the first quarter 
of 1962 and 6 percent in the second quarter of that year over the levels 
for. the same quarters of 1961, grew only 4.7 percent and 3*1 percent in 
the last two quarters.1/ 
This relatively small increase in the volume of the total demand , 
was essentially the result of the increase in private consumption ex- i 
penditures and investment by business. The change in consumption ex-
penditures refleoted simultaneously a constant increase in expenditures 
for services, the import content of which is insignificant, and a strong 
1. These percentages were computed on the basis of the seasonally 
adjusted index of volume of the gross national product at 1954 prices 
(see Table l). 
/Table 1 
Table 1 
UNITED STATES: VARIATIONS IN CERTAIN COMPONENTS OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 


































































































































a. Seasonally adjusted quarterly totals at annual rates. 
b. Includes gross domestic formation of fixed capital plus changes in stocks. 
Source; U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business. February I963. 
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recovery in purchases of durable goods, which were 8,6 percent higher than in 
1961. Purchases of automobiles increased 20 percent over the previous year, 
reaching a particularly high level in the last quarter of 1962, Moreover, the 
gross formation of private capital increased 9.5 percent over 1961, but did 
not reach the high proportion of gross national product attained in 1955 and 
1959» Its most dynamic component was investment in fixed capital, which increased 
13 percent over the previous year, while construction and the policy of private 
enterprise regarding stocks progressed at an uneven rate. In effect, private 
business increased its reserves of goods in the first two quarters of 19&2, in 
the expectation of a strike in the steel industry, and then maintained them at 
a relatively constant level, so that the increase in stocks for the whole year 
was slightly above that for 1961. This fact is particularly important because 
it had an unfavorable effect on the volume of imports from the lesser developed 
countries. 
Parallel to the increase in private consumption expenditures and invest-
ments by private enterprise, a slightly higher rate of growth was noted in 
governmental expenditures than in the previous year. In addition, the volume 
of exports rose 3.9 percent instead of 1,6 percent in 1961, but this phenomenon 
did not have any appreciable effect on the level of economic activity since 
foreign sales constitute a marginal element in United States total expenditures. 
The recovery to a relatively satisfactory rate of total demand helped 
stimulate production, especially industrial production. Actually, in the 
second half of the year, industrial production did not increase at the same 
accelerated rate as in the first half, and the rate of increase continued to 
diminish in the first half of 1963, However, the total increase for 1962 was 
8,3 percent, as compared with only 0,8 percent in 1961, and in the first half 
of 1963, it continued growing at an annual rate of nearly 4 percent 
(see Table 2), 
Progress in the manufacturing industry was considerable—8,5 percent 
higher than in 1961—and was even greater in basic metals—8,4 percent—and in 
the other metals industries whose activity is directly connected with the 
automobile industry. Expansion was also rapid in the chemical industries and, 
although to a lesser degree, in the textile industry. Production in the food-
stuff industries increased at the same rate as during the previous year. This 
distribution of the percentages of growth of the various industrial sectors 
undoubtedly favored the expansion of imports of minerals and hydrocarbons, which 
are traditionally supplied largely by certain Latin American countries. 
In Canada, in general, the recovery was more or less the same as that of 
the United States. The gross national product increased 6,2 percent in 1962 
as compared with 2.6 percent in 1961 (see Table 3)• The various components 
of total expenditure increased in widely differing proportions. Governmental 
expenditures increased more slowly than in the previous year—3.3 percent in 
1962 as compared with 4,6 In 1961—and the same phenomenon was noted with 
respect to the volume of exports of goods and services, which increased 4.4 
percent in 1962 as compared with 7*5 percent in 1961. The increase in consumer 
/Table 2 
Table 2 
INDICES OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN CERTAIN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
. (Base of previous period - 100) 
United 













1961 100.8 103.1 106.4 104.6 104.8 • 105.5 109.9 101.3 101.5 100.8 
1962 108.3 IO7.5 • • • 105.9 • • • * 104.7 111.0 103.8 • • • 100.0 
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105.5 • »> 101.0 ... 
100.5 
... 
101.9 • • 105.4 • • • 100.5 ... 
97.4 • • • 
a. Seasonally adjusted. 
Source: OECD, General Statistics. March I962. 
Table 3 
CANADA: VARIATIONS IN CERTAIN COMPONENTS OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
(In millions of dollars at 1957 prices) 
Consumer Government Gross 
expendi- expendi- domestic Exports Imports 
G.N.P. tures for tures for formation of goods of goods 
goods and goods and of private and and 
services services capital b/ services services 
i960 3*f Ikk 22 357 6 255 6 576 6 88if 8 020 
(Indices: for preceding p sriod = 100) 
Years 
1961 102.6 103.2 104.6 90.9 107.5 101.2 
1962 106.2 103.7 103.3 113.8 104. if 101.3 
Quarterŝ / 
) I 98.4 102.0 104.1 78.7 99.9 97.7 
) II 103.0 103.5 106.1 91.0 110.0 98.7' 
1961)III 103.6 103.7 102.6 95.2 108.7 103.̂  
) IV 95.0 103.5 105.7 100.7 111.9 105.0 
) I 108.5 105.9 101.1 115.6 105.9 102.1 
) II 106.3 103.6 107.5 110.6 105.9 . 105. ** 
1962)III 106.0 102.2 103.5 127.2 101.8 101.7 
) IV 104.7 103.1 101.2 103.5 104.1 96.ff 
a. Totals seasonally adjusted quarterly at annual rates. 
b. Includes gross domestic formation of fixed capital plus variations in stocks. 
Scèurce: Canadian Statistical Review, April 1963. 
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expenditures was scarcely more rapid than in previous years, since the ex-
pansion in purchases of certain durable goods (automobiles) was counteracted 
by the decrease in the rate of growth in service expenditures. In contrast, 
very rapid progress was made in the gross formation of private capital, which 
rose 14 percent in 1962 as compared with the previous year when it declined 
slightly. This renewal of activity in private investment resulted essentially 
from the increase in purchases of capital equipment, while stocks remained 
near the relatively low level of I96I. 
In the United Kingdom, the measures adopted by the Government, in July 
1961, in order to meet the crisis in external payments and to reduce the 
pressure of domestic • demand on productive capacity had halted the increase 
in the gross domestic product at the end of 1961. In the first half of 1962, 
some recovery was noted, but it was of short duration, since the economic ex-
pansion was again interrupted in the last quarter. In short, the gross 
domestic product for 1962 as a whole scarcely reached a level above that of 
1961. 
Actually, the rate of growth of almost all the components of total demand . 
decreased (see Table 4). This trend was not very significant in the area of 
private consumption since, although the expenditures for non-durable goods and 
services increased at a lower rate, there were more substantial increases in 
the purchases of certain durable goods, especially automobiles. Government ex-
penditures increased less than in the past and the same was true of exports. 
Above all, gross capital formation decreased, by 5*8 percent compared with the 
1961 figure. The vigorous growth in public investment, which increased 5 
percent over 1961, did not compensate for the sharp reduction in private 
investment in fixed capital, which in the last quarter of 1962, was 18 percent 
less than the previous year. Moreover, the pronounced quarterly variations 
in stocks represented only a slight increase for the year as a whole. 
As is natural under such conditions, the expansion of industrial produc-
tion was interrupted. In the first five months of 19&3, it remained stationary 
at the level reached in the same period of the preceding year. In 1962, only 
the chemical industry registered a relatively favorable rate of growth. In 
all the other sectors, production remained stationary (manufacturing industry) 
or declined (metalurgical and textile industries). 
In the European Economic Community, the rate of growth of the economy 
continued to decline. In fact, the gross national product increased only 
4.5 percent in 1962, while in 1961 it had increased 5.2 percent, and in i960 
7»1 percent. 
The causes of this unusual development have been fully analyzed.in reports 
by the Community Commission, and are therefore mentioned here only bríèfly. 
/Table 4 
Table 
UNITED KINGDOM: VARIATIONS IN CERTAIN COMPONENTS OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(In millions of pounds at 1958 prices) 
CONSUMER EXPENDITURES 
Current 


















I960 24 616 1 4?4 12 747 2 313 16 534 3 850 4 717 5 093 5 578 
(Indices: previous period = 100) 
Years 
1961 102.9 95.4 102.3 102.1 101.7 105.8 101.1 103.1 99.9 

















































































a. Seasonally adjusted quarters. 
® b. Includes gross domestic formation of fixed capital plus variations in stocks. 
g ' , 
® Source: Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics, London, March, 1963. 
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On the one hand, foreign demand ceased to stimulate the economic cycle, 
since Community exports increased little from 1961 to 1962. The renewal of 
economic activity in the United States was actually insufficient, and that of 
Great Britain did not last long enough to compensate for the impact of previous 
recessions on world trade. In addition, the developing countries could not 
increase further their purchases from the European Common Market because of 
their difficult foreign payments situation and the less liberal policy of the 
Six regarding medium-term financing of exports* 
On the other hand, certain components of the domestic demand progressed 
less rapidly than in the past. First of all, the gross formation of fixed 
capital rose only 5»5 percent in 1962 compared with a rise of 9 percent in 
1961. Actually, the more rapid expansion of public investment was sufficient 
to make up for the decrease in private investment, for which there were various 
causes, such as the results of the last recession in the United States; the 
not too favorable outlook for exports to the underdeveloped countries ; the 
sharp increase in production capacity; the decline in profits resulting from 
higher wages and salaries that were not always matched by a real improvement 
in productivity; and credit restrictions in certain countries. In the second 
place, the trend in inventories did not contribute to an expansion of total 
demand, despite a small increase in the stocks of raw materials at the end of 
the year. 
The moderate expansion of demand contributed to lowering the rate of 
growth óf the total industrial production of the Community, which increased 
only 5 percent in 1962, as opposed to 7 percent in 1961. However, this 
occurred only in France and Germany; in Belgium, Netherlands, and Italy, 
progress was somewhat greater than the preceding year. In the first quarter 
of 1963« the rate of expansion of most of the oountries of the Community : 
continued to decline. 
The behavior of several sectors of the industrial activity was quite 
diverse. Expansion was relatively weak in certain basic industries—iron and 
steel, non-ferrous metals industries—in those producing capital equipment, or 
those that are affected by a structural trend toward recession—extractive 
industries. In contrast, there was a sharp increase in the chemical and 
electrochemical industry and in certain sectors of the production of durable 
goods. In the Community, as in the United States, 1962 was an excellent year 
for automobile production, which increased 15 percent oompared with 2 percent 
in the preceding year» 
It is olear that the decline in the rate of growth of exports—only 1 
percent in the first quarter of I963--domestic demand, and industrial produc-
tion could endanger the long-term expansion of Community purchases abroad, 
especially from the developing countries. 
Despite these dangers in Continental Europe and the uncertainties of the 
economic cycle in other industrialized countries, 1962 was generally character-
ized by an increase in imports by the more developed areas (see Table 5)« 
/Table 
Table 
IMPORTS OF INDUSTRIALIZED ABEAS: TOTAL WORLD AND FROM LATIN AMERICA. (MONTHLY AVERAGES) 
United States European Economic European. Free 







I960 (millions of dollars) 1 221.0 291.8 2 467.7 151.2 1 923.4 106.3 
Indices of previous period = 100 
1961 98.0 90.0 108.6 99.8 102.0 9 2.2 
1962 113.2 106.7 111.2 117.1 104.5 104.1 
1961 I 88.6 95.1 107.4 99.9 105.7 102.4 
II 90.2 82.0 111.0 103.3 103.5 93.0 
III 103.3 86.7 106.6 97.0 100.0 87.3 
IV 111.3 96.9 109.1 99.0 99.0 85.9 
1962 I 115.9 104.6 113.4 115.4 102.7 99.9 
II 118.2 105.1 108.4 118.6 103.7 107.8 
III 110.3 107.3 111.6 119.4 107.0 115.8 
IV 109.2 110.1 111.0 115.0 106.3 113.2 
1963 I 99.5 93.6 105.1 104.1 ... • • • 
Source: OECD, Foreign Trade, Series A, December 1962, July 1963. 
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B. THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR BASIC PRODUCTS 
The year 1962 brought about a halt In the downward trend of recent years ( 
for many Latin American export products.2/ In the first half of 1963, a marked 
increase began to be noted in several markets, including sugar, cacao, and 
wool, while the rise in the price of silver continued (see Table 6). If the 
total index for export prices continued to decline, it was because the two most 
important products of the region either remained stationary (petroleum), or 
continued to decline, and did not become stabilized until the first quarter in 
1963 (coffee). 
In 1962, the impaot of prioe changes even caused a slight fall, but this 
was not refleoted in the income from exports in the region, since the volume 
exported increased markedly. Thus, the value of exports rose for the first 
time above the 1957 level and exceeded the 1961 level by more than $500 million, 
on about 7 percent. 
In short, the increases In prices for manufactured products caused the 
terms of trade of the region to remain stationary in 1962» The analysis of 
specifio products that follows will illustrate the degree in which this is the 
result of opposing trends in several products and countries (see Table 7)• The 
preliminary estimates for the first and second quarters of 1963 point to the 
possibility of some improvement in the terms of trade although, as will be 
shown later, continued improvement for certain products is uncertain. 
The study of the problems relating to exports of basio products continued 
actively in the various international agencies that have been examining the 
subject. At the regional level, activities in this field were concentrated 
chiefly on implementing resolutions adopted by the Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council at its 1961 and 1962 meetings. These activities included the 
following: 
a. A meeting of the Group of Experts on the Stabilization of Export 
Proceeds, was held in the first quarter of I962. At that meeting, the bases of 
a proposal for the establishment of an international fund for the stabilization 
of export proceeds were adopted,̂ / This proposal was submitted to the United 
Nations Commission on International Commodity Trade for consideration, and 
that Commission decided to assign a technical working group to examine the 
proposals of the OAS Group of Experts and of the United Nations Group of Experts. 
2. For a detailed analysis of the market trends in these products between 
1957 and 196l, see OAS/ECLA Economic Survey of Latin America. 1961. Pan American 
Union, Washington, D.C., 1962. 
3. Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Stabilization of Export 
Proceeds. (OEA/Ser.H/X.3. Doc. 7). 
/Table 
Tabla 6 
BASIC PRODUCIS! PRICES ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR SELECTED COMMODITIES, 
ANNUAL AVERAGES 1960-19621 QUARTERLY AVERAGES 1962 AND 1963 
Commodity Market Unit 1960 1961 1962 
1962 1963 
I n III IV I 
Crude sugar F.O.B. New Tork U.S. oents per lb. 5.35 5.36 5.56 5.51 5.56 5.57 5.61 5.96 
Crude sugar F.O.B. world free Market m m m m 3.10 2.91 2.97 2.44 2.64 3.11 3.74 6.03 
Chillad seat (Argentina) London Pence per lb. 29.0 27.4 28.5 29.7 28.6 30.3 26.7 — 
Copper " Pounds per long ton 246 230 234 233 234 234 234 234 
Tin m m m m m 797 886 897 954 915 856 863 853 
Silver New Tork U.S. oents per ounoe 91. 4 92.4 107.8 102.7 101.8 106.7 119.9 124.2 
Wool (Uruguayan, 58-60's, clean basis) Boston Dollars per lb. 0.95 0.88 0.97 0.90 0.98 l.OO 1 . 0 0 1.5 
Coffee (Santos No. 4) New Tork U.S. cents per lb. 36.6 36.0 34.0 34.1 34.4 34.0 33.3 33.4 
Coffee (ManÍzales) New Tork m m m m 44.9 43.6 40.8 42.5 40.4 40.2 39.9 39.9 
Caoao (Bahía) m m m m m 26.6 22.4 21.3 21.2 20.9 21.2 22.1 26.2 
Cotton (Mexican, Mataaoros S.M.I—l/16w) Liverpool « m m m 29.4 30.2 29.3 29.7 29.6 28.7 28.6 29.8 
Cotton (Sio Paulo type 5) v " m m m m 26.3 28.0 26.7 27.9 26.6 25.7 26.2 26.7 
Cotton (Peruvian Pima No. 1) " m m m m 46.2 42.7 40.0 41.8 40.0 38.6 38.4 39.4 
Corn "La Plata" (Argentina) C.I.F. London Pence per lb. 21.6 21.1 20.8 21.0 21.0 20.3 21.1 — 
Lead London Pounds per long ton 72.1 64.2 56.3 59.5 59.3 52.2 54.2 54.9 
Zinc " m m mm 89.3 77.8 67.5 69.5 68.3 64.9 67.1 69.6 
Wool (Argentina, 40-36'a, clean basis) Boston Dollars per lb. 0.80 0.77 0.66 0.72 0.67 0.63 0.64 0.73 
Bananas United States Dollars per owt. 6.48 6.29 6.03 6.29 6,16 5.41 6.27 — . 
Crude petroleua (35.0-35.9, gravity API) F.O.B. Venezuela Dollars per barrel 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 
Wheat ( A r g e n t i n a , " u p - r i v e r " ) C.I.F. London Pence per lb. 24.7 25.8 25.9 25.8 26,2 26.1 25.1 24.6 
Sourcei United Nations, Boletín Mensual da Estadística! FAO, Boletín Mensual de Economía y Estadlstioa Agrícolas. 
c i-1 a 
- 1 3 -
Table 7 
LATIN AMERICA: VALUE, VOLUME, AND UNIT PRICE 
OF FOREIGN TRADE, I96O-I963 
(Indices: 1961 = 100) 
Exports Imports 
Value Unit price Volume Value Unit price Volume Terms of Trade 
I960 98 101 97 ¡ 9 7 100 97 101 
1961 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1962 1C7 99 108 104 102 102 97 
¿261 
I 100 100 100 92 99 93 101 
II 101 101 100 98 101 97 100 
III 98 101 97 103 101 102 100 
IV 100 98 102 108 101 107 97 
1262 
I 107 102 105 98 102 96 100 
11 107 101 106 99 102 97 99 
III 106 97 109 107 102 105 95 
IV 106 97 109 110 102 108 95 
i 109 98 111 91 102 89 96 
11 ... 101 ... ... • • • 102 99 
Notes: The unit prices for exports, with the exception of the figures for Peru and 
Venezuela, have been computed on the basis of the figures for value and the Laspeyres 
de quantum indices of the Monetary Fund, thereby obtaining Paasche indices for 16 ~~ 
countries. The unit values for imports are based on figures for nine countries. The 
quarterly variations for these nine countries were obtained by making an adjustment, 
on the basis of the unit value of world exports of manufactured products shown in the 
June 1963 edition of the above-mentioned Bulletin. 
The 1963 export indices show the variations in the International quotations for 
l6 principal products, weighed according to their exported value in 1961. These 
variations were incorporated in the last quarter of 1962. 
Sources: Official information in the cases of Peru and Venezuela; in the others, infor-
mation published by the United Nations in Monthly Bulletin of Statistics and by the 
International Monetary Fund in International Financial Statistics. Although mentioned 
in the sources, Cuba is not included in this table. 
/This development 
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This development was noted particularly in the United States whose imports 
rose 13.2 percent over the previous year, whereas they had decreased 2 percent 
in 1961 over those for i960, However, the imports coming from Latin America 
increased to a lesser extent than those from the world as a whole, and so the 
Latin American proportion of foreign purchases made by the United States 
dropped slightly (from 21.9 percent in 1961 to 20 percent in 1962). Imports 
from the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Chile, and Venezuela increased, while 
those from certain other coijintries, such as Peru and Brazil, declined. 
The increase in imports was smaller in Canada than in the United States 
as a result of the devaluation of the Canadian dollar (May 1962) and of the 
levying of temporary surcharges on imports in the second half of the year. A 
similar development occurred in the countries of the European Free Trade 
Association, with the difference that imports by those countries from Latin 
America increased more rapidly than from the rest of the world (see Table 5)* 
In the European Economic Community, the expansion in foreign purchases 
continued to rise despite the slower economic growth. In 1962, imports 
increased 11.2 percent as compared with 8.6 percent in 1961. This growth did 
not affect raw materials, because the drop in prices did not induce buyers to 
increase their stocks. However, it affected considerably finished industrial 
products and foodstuffs. It should be noted, however, that purchases of 
foodstuffs were heavy, especially in the first half of 19&2, as a result of 
the poor harvests in 1961 in several European countries, but that, in the 
second half of 1962, they declined as the 1962 harvest was particularly good 
in those countries. Therefore, it is likely that the more rapid increase in 
imports by the Six resulting from purchases of foodstuffs will be of short 
duration. At its Eleventh Meeting, United Nations Commission on International 
Commodity Trade decided that, in view of the prospects for a possible solution 
of the problem through the action adopted by the International Monetary Fund 
on compensatory credits 4/ and the difficulties in adopting any of the 
proposed stabilization solutions, it would not recommend any of them to the 
governments for approval for the time being .¿/ This naturally does not exclude 
the possibility that the Latin American countries may continue considering 
the desirability aAd possibility of creating such a fund as the one proposed 
on a regional basis; however, the OAS also decided to postpone any action until 
the efficaoy of the Fund's new policy can be evaluated in practice.̂ / 
WÍ See International Monetary Fund, Financiam!ento compensatorio de las 
exportaciones. 
5. United Nations, Economic and Sooial Council, Commission on International 
Commodity Trade, Report of the Eleventh Session. April 29-May 10, 1963, 
(Doc. i/3763). 
6. See Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., 1963 (Doc. UP/G.35/2). 
/b. The IA-ECOSOC 
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b. The IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on BaBic Products held its first 
meeting from July 16 to August 15, 1962 at which time is examined various 
aspects of the situation of the international commodities markets, especially 
with respect to those subject to discriminatory restrictions and tariffs by 
the countries of the European Economic Community. The Committee recommended 
that the IA-ECOSOC set up Action Groups for meat and bananas, to make overtures 
to the countries of the Community in order to eliminate or reduce restrictions 
placed on the imports of these products from Latin America.2/ On the basis of 
these recommendations, the First Annual Meeting of the Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council at the Ministerial Level in October 1962 approved the estab-
lishment of Action Groups for meat, bananas, and cacao, as well as a special 
group of experts to examine the problems of marketing sugar at the Hemisphere 
and world levels.8/ 
c. The Committee to negotiate the elimination of restrictions on coffee 
consumption, established by the IA-ECOSOC by a resolution annexed to the Punta 
del Este Charter, held several meetings in the first half of 1962, at which the 
nature of the restrictions applied by the countries of the European Economic 
Community to coffee imports from Latin America was studied and a plan of action 
was adopted. By virtue of the recommendations of this Committee, the Secretary 
General of the OAS made overtures to the member countries of the Community 
requesting the elimination or reduction of such restrictions; these efforts 
were supported jointly by the government of all the member countries of the 
OAS through their diplomatic representations to the EEC. 
d. The Meat Action Group held its first meetings in December 1962. 
First, it examined the draft regulations on the beef market, which had been • 
pending approval by the Council of Ministers of the EEC, and then it studied 
the implications the entry of the United Kingdom into the Community would have 
for Latin American exporters .£/ 
7. Final Report of the First Meeting of the Committee on Basic Products, 
Pan American Union, Washington, D. C., August 16, 1962. 
8. First Annual Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council 
at the Ministerial Level, Final Report, Pan American Union, Washington, D. C., 
1963. 
9. See First Annual Meeting of the IA-ECOSOC at the Expert and Ministerial 
Levels, The Effects of the European Economic Community on the Latin American 
Economies (OEA/CIES, Doc.lO), 
/With respect 
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With respect to the first point, the Group pointed out that the draft 
regulations could have restrictive effects on Latin American exports of beef 
to the Community, but that such effects could be reduced if the so-called 
"guiding prices" and the corresponding "sluice-gate prices" were fixed at 
levels close to the lowest prevailing prices in the Community at the time. 
Accordingly, the Group decided to promote consultation at the governmental 
level with the authorities of the EEC regarding the draft regulations. The 
approval of the regulations has been postponed because of the disagreement 
that developed among EEC members regarding the suspension of negotiations 
with the United Kingdom. 
e. The Banana Action Group held its first meetings in January 1963 
and made a detailed examination of existing regulations on imports of 
bananas in several European countries, especially in the markets of France, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom where quantitative or other restrictions on 
imports of Latin American bananas are the most severe. A document prepared 
by the Secretariat, The Impact of Trade Restrictions in Europe on Latin 
American Banana Producers was submitted and discussed during recent meetings 
of GATT; this was the first time that GATT had concerned itself extensively with 
this product. In another significant event, brought about through the support 
of OAS member countries, the Commodities Committee of the FAO, at its meetings 
in May 1963, agreed to ask the Secretariat of the FAO to prepare a study on the 
banana market problems and at the same time to ask the Director of the FAO 
to call a meeting of the Ad Hoc Banana Group to consider said study at the 
beginning of 1964. 
f. The Cacao Action Group, whose meetings were held in March 1963t 
concentrated its efforts on an analysis of the preliminary draft of the 
international agreement prepared by the FAO Cacao Study Group, especially in 
a discussion of certain aspects of this preliminary draft about which there 
has not been price unanimity among the Latin American countries. This group's 
final report incorporated a declaration by Ecuador proposing certain rules in 
relation to export quotas and the election of directors; however, these did 
not obtain the unanimous approval of the delegates to this meeting. The Cacao 
Group agreed to hold a second meeting before the meeting of the conference 
convoked by the United Nations Secretary General to negotiate the International 
Cacao Agreement, scheduled for the end of 1963» 
g. The Group of Experts on Sugar, which was charged with studying the 
sugar marketing problems at the Hemisphere and.world levels held its meetings 
between the end of April and the middle of July 1963, 
This Group's final report will be suhmitted to the member governments 
before the meeting of the authorities charged with formulating the sugar 
policy, which is scheduled for the end of 1963.10/ 
10. For further details regarding the above developments, see IA-ECOSOC 
Special Committee on Basic Products, Final Report of the Second Meeting. Doc. 
CIES/Com. VI11/17, Rev. Washington, D.C., August 21, 1963. 
A. The activities 
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h. The activities of the various commodity groups were examined by the 
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Basic Products at a second meeting (August 5-12, 
1963) during which the Committee agreed to give its full support to the work 
carried out and to recommend that it be intensified. Other topics examined 
in detail by the Committee included the activities of GATT; trade relations 
with the European Economic Community; the position of the member countries with 
respect to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; and the 
policy of compensatory credits announced by the International Monetary Fund 




The quotations for raw sugar on the free world market having declined in 
the first quarter of 1962 to the lowest levels recorded since 1941, later 
began a slow recovery which picked up a certain momentum in the final months 
of 1962, Nevertheless, the average I962 price, which was 2.98 cents (United 
States) a pound, was barely 2.4 percent above the 1961 average price, which 
was 2.91 cents a pound. 
However, in the first months of 1963, the recovery process continued, 
fnd in the course of a few weeks, prices exceeded those for previous years, 
including the maximum prices reached during the Suez crisis in the first 
half of 1957. At the end of May 1963, the quotations on the New York market 
for sugar going to the free market had already risen above 11.0 cents a pound, 
the maximum figure for any previous period, as compared with the maximum 
price of 4.64 cents at the end of December 1962. After reaching a maximum of 
13.5 cents a pound, the quotations began to decline slowly at the beginning of • 
the second half of 1963. 
The radical change that occurred in the market conditions was due basi-
cally to the declining trend in production in the two preceding years and the 
prospects for a greater shrinkage in stocks for the free market area in 1963» 
In the figures for world production are studied it is seen that the reduction 
last year was only 5*3 percent with respect to the maximum level reached in 
I960/6I. However, in examining production figures by region, it is noted that 
the drop in production in Western Europe—the most important importing region 
in the free market area— was 26.4 percent in the period under discussion, 
while Cuban production dropped 33»5 percent in the same period (see Table 8). 
That is to say that,Nalthough the drop in world sugar production has not been exceptionally great, sugar trade in the free market area has declined consider-
ably. The countries where sugar production has continued to Increase 
(Phillipines and the Latin American countries, with the exception of Cuba) ship 
their exports to the preferential market of the United States, and the same 
thing has ocurred with the countries that supply the preferential market of 
the United Kingdom, chiefly Australia. 
Added to the impact of the drop in production in certain exporting 
regions and the increased import requirements of Western Europe are the 
effects of a substantial drop in stocks in most of the exporting countries. 
It should be stressed again that the changes that have occured in the level 
of stocks in Cuba have been one of the most important factors in the recent 
price development. The Cuban sugar stock, which previously amounted to more 
than one million tons, dropped at the end of 1962 to 91 000 tons (see Table 9)• 
A sharp drop in the stocks of countries such as Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and 
others outside the Latin American region is also noted. 
On the United States market, 1962 quotations for sugar imports remained 
at levels slightly above those for the previous year, although the premium 
prices granted by this market over free market prices dropped sharply at the 
end of the year owing to a more rapid increase in prices in the free market 




CENTRIFUGAL SUGAR: WORLD PRODUCTION BY PRINCIPAL REGIONS 
(1000 metric tons) 
Indices = 1959/60 =100.0 
1959/60 1960/61 196I/62 1962/63* 
Cuba 5 860 115.5 82.2 76.8 a/ 
Other Latin American 
Countries 8 586 99.1 102.3 107.7 
All of Latin America • 14 446 105.7 94.1 95.1 
Western Europe 7 967 135.5 105.0 99.8 
Eastern Europe and 
Soviet Union 9 kOl 110.9 116.4 112.9 
Africa 2 646 90.3 106.7 112.1 
Taiwan 798 118.8 90.7 95.2 
Philippines 1 387 9̂ .9 105.8 117.0 
Australia 1 271 107.3 107.0 141.4 
Total world production 50 084 110.5 103.5 104.6 
a. Colombia had no exports in i960. In 1961» it exported 46 000 tons, and in 
1962, 65 700 tons. 
Sources: Estimates by F. 0, Licht, reproduced in International Sugar Council, 




CENTRIFUGAL SUGAR: STOCKS IN PRINCIPAL EXPORTING COUNTRIES2̂  
(1000 short tons) 
1 Indieeá = 1959/60 = 100.0 
1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63* 
Argentina 142 264.1 246.5 62.0 
Brazil 572 106.6 67.5 105.4 
Colombia 24 154.1 304.2 145.8 
Mexico 456 110.1 67.8 35.3 
Peru 96 116.7 40.6 48.9 
Cuba 1 222 89.5 84.1 7.4 
Australia 171 119.3 117.5 81.9 
Philippines 249 125.7 50.6 70.7 
Taiwan 141 70.9 66.0 92.2 
Total of countries enumerated 3 265 105.0 82.4 48.2 
a. At the Btart of the respective production year. 




arose that had a very temporary effect  on United States market prices due to 
the fact  that the supply shortage that was noted at the end of  the first 
quarter of  1963 sti l l prevailed. These circumstancesvere (l) the so-called 
Cuban crisis of  October 1962, and (2) the increased demand for  imports in order 
to provide a stockpile in anticipation of  the longshoreman strike which did 
ocurr at the end of  the year. The rapid rise in prices in the free  market area 
affected  the price level in the United States market. Nevertheless, the 
increases in this market hav.e been smaller, and consequently the prices of 
imported sugar in the United States have not included a premium, but rather 
a discount with respect to prices on the free  world market since February 
1963. 
United States sugar legislation was amended in the middle of  1962. Even 
though the system of  basic import quotas assigned by country was retained, 
each government was authorized to suspend quotas for  countries with which i t 
does not have diplomatic relations (at present, Cuba). Unused quotas are 
pooled to form  a global quota and are assigned to other countries, but the 
imports thus redistributed are subject to a duty equal to the difference  between 
United States market prices and world free  market prices. Since this legisla-
tion went into effect,  imports charged against the basic quotas assigned by 
country have been subject to a duty equal to 10 percent of  the total fixed  duty 
for  imports charged against the global quota.11/ This percentage of  the duty 
on imports charged against the basic quotas would rise to 20 percent in 1963» 
and to 30 percent in 1964 (always based on the complete duty levied on 
imports charged against the global quota). 
As established, the effect  of  the operation of  these duties is to 
decrease the margin of  preference  enjoyed by Latin American sugar exports to 
the United States market over exports to the rest of  the world. However, the 
development of  the world free  market at the end of  1962 and the beginning of 
1963 has, for  the time being, reduced the significance  of  these duties. The 
exclusion of  Cuba from  the United States market acted as a stimulus to 
increase production and the exports of  a good number of  Latin American countries. 
Actually, production in the rest of  Latin America increased in the last two 
years by 3 percent and 5 percent, respectively (see Table 10). Total exports 
declined by 2 percent in 1961 and l8 percent in 1962. This is chiefly  a 
reflection  of  the decreases that had ocurred in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
the Dominican Republic and Peru, which furnish  the largest percentage of  the 
region's exports. 
The geographic distribution of  Latin American sugar exports underwent 
important changes in the last two years which, as has already been pointed out, 
were caused by the exclusion of  Cuba from  the United States market. Part of 
the import quota that had been allocated to Cuba was redistributed to other 
Latin American countries. When these countries increased their exports to the 
United States, they decreased those they shipped to the free  market region 
(in this case, the rest of  the world). At the same time, the Cuba trade 
shifted  toward the market of  the Soviet Union, the countries of  Eastern 
Europe, and Continental China (see Table 11), 
11, For example, if  in 1962 the existing premium between the United 
States market prices and world free  market prices had been 2 cents per 
pound, the duty on imports charged against the global quota would be 2 cents 
per pound and the duty on imports charged to the basic quotas would be 
0,2 cents per pound, /Table 10 
Table 10 
a / 
SUGAR. PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS-' OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(1000 metrio tons) 
/ 






Argentina Production 991 86.1 71.4 eau 
Exports 113.0 165.1 88.5 
Brazil Produotion 3 052 106.8 110.9 110.9 
Exports 854.8 87.1 56.0 
Colombia Produotion 336 108.3 122.0 125.0 
Exports - b/ b/ 
Costa Rioa Produotion 60 116.7 153.3 158.5 
Exports 20.4 148.0 137.2 
Cuba Produotion 5 860 115.5 82.2 76.8—̂  
Exports 5 634.5 113.8 91.1 
Dominioan Produotion 986 88.5 91.5 101.4 
Republio Exports 1 O99.I 72.2 77.0 
Ecuador Production 488 108.2 131.3 145.1 
Exports 14.2 335.9 457.7 
El Salvador Produotion 51 96.1 Í25.5 129.4 
Exports 10.9 126.6 183.5 
Guatemala Produotion 71 116.9 174.6 176.0 
Exports 6.1 114.7 442.6 
Haiti Production 60 123.3 116.7 IO8.3 
Exports 30.1 131.9 116.3 
Hexioo Produotion 1 620 92.0 95.5 101.8 
Exports 462.4 132.3 75.7 
Nicaragua Production 64 98.4 128.1 120.3 
Exports 34.9 80.2 106.0 
Perü Produotion 807 99.0 94.2 104.1 
Exports 513.7 107.5 97.3 
Subtotal Produotion 8 586 99.1 102.3 107.7 
Exports 3 159.6 98.1 80.9 
Total Latin Produotion 14 446 105.7 94.1 951 
America Exports 8 794.1 108.2 87.4 
a. In all oases, the exports are for the second calendar year mentioned in each 
ooluan heading. 
b. Colombia had no exports in i960. It exported 46 000 tons in I96I and 65. 700 
tons in 1962. 
o. Later data indicate an even sharper drop, and it is considered probable that 
the orop will yield no more than 2.9 million tons. 
Souroea» International Sugar Council, Statistioal Bulletin! Press Summary, London, 
September 14, 1962{ April 3, 1962. 
/Table 11 
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CENTBIFUGAL SUGAR: EXPORTS OF SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 














Europe a / 
Japan Others Total 
Brazil I960 (1000 Tons.) 103.4 130.1 49.8 10.2 288.3 273.0 854.8 
1961 Index b / 283.6 6.0 67.1 - 89.7 55.6 87.1 
1962 11 349.6 - 76.3 - 7.3 21.2 56.0 
Cuba I960 (1000 Tons.) 1 948.6 315.3 215.6 2 260 204.6 690.3 5 634.5 
1961 Index - 24.1 66.7 212.0 206.9 141.8 113.8 
1962 11 - 12.6 72.9 162.1 210.9 121.3 91.1 
Dominican I960 (1000 Tons.) 424.9 102.2 348.9 _ 84.8 138.3 1 099.1 
Republic 1961 Index b / 81.1 2 .5 67.9 - 131.1 71.1 72.2 
1962 11 192.9 4 .4 - - 10.5 9 .2 77.0 
Mexico I960 (1000 Tons.) 382.4 43.1 4 .1 — 32.8 462.4 
1961 Index b / 159.7 _ _ - _ 3 .0 132.3 
1962 11 91.6 - - - - - 75.7 
Nicaragua I960 (1GCC Tons.) 34.9 _ _ — _ _ 34.9 
1961 Index b / 80.2 _ _ - _ _ 80.2 
1962 11 106.0 - - - - - 106.0 
Peru I960 (1CCC Tons.) 285.4 15.8 49.9 - 80.6 82.0 513.7 
1961 Index b / 191.3 6.3 4 .0 - 3.1 - 107.5 
1962 11 "" 175.2 - - — - - 97.3 
Total I960 (1000 Tons.) 3 179.6 606.5 668.3 2 270.3 658.3 1 216.4 8 599.4 
six 1961 (Index b / 57.3 14.4 62.3 211.0 120.8 101.2 IO6.3 
countries 1962 11 64.9 7.3 29.2 161.4 70.1 74.7 85.3 
a. Includes Continental China. 
b. Index: I960 = 100.0 
Source: International Sugar Council, Statistical Bulletin. 
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2. Bananas 
Banana prices on the most important markets for Latin American exporters 
have exhibited different tendencies in the past three years. In the United 
States, which absorbs'most of the Latin American exports,there was a moderate 
but persistent decline accompanied by a slight decline in the total volume of 
imports. In the Federal Republic of Germany—the second largest market for 
Latin American bananas—the average 1960-62 prices were practically stable 
despite the fact that the monthly averages showed rather sharp fluctuations. 
Latin American exports to that country in 1962 reached a level similar to i960, 
but dropped 4.5 percent from the volume in I96.I. 
These developments in the markets of the two countries that absorb most 
of Latin American banana exports justify the concern with which the immediate 
outlook for the foreign market of this product is being viewed in these coun-
tries. In the case of the United States, all of whose imports come from Latin 
America and are free of restrictions and duties of any kind» the problem is related 
to changes in consumer habits, which are diminishing the per capita consumption: 
supply restrictions and price increases have played no part in this development. 
Rather, banana prices have remained relatively stable for long periods, and in 
recent years have tended to decline. The problems are more complex in the case 
of the European markets. In some cases, the Latin American product faces quanti-
tative reetrcitions and discriminatory practices while in other, the level of 
tariffs makes the price of the fruit to the consumer excessive* Furthermore, 
bananas were practically the only tropical product excluded from the reductions 
in the common external tariff of the European Economic Community for imports 
from "third countries," whereas the "duty free quota" authorized for imports 
of the Federal Republic of Germany from countries not members of the Community 
remained unchanged.12/ 
This means that the highly discriminatory treatment given imports coming 
from Latin America was not liberalized with respect to bananas as it was for 
other tropical products. 
These problems of Latin American banana exports to the European countries, 
particularly the countries of the Community, were studied by the Banana Action 
Group—created by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council—at meetings 
of the Group held at the beginning of 1963. In the conclusions adopted by the 
countries making up this Group (Costa Rica, Ecuador, United States, Honduras, 
and Panama).13/ it was pointed out that the present structure of the European 
banana markets is unfavorable to the development of Latin American production. 
The opinion was expressed that existing regulations can have a negative effect 
of considerable magnitude on the income derived from these exports. At the same" 
time, the conclusions indicate that the restrictions adopted will reduce 
12. However, both in 1961 and 1962 as a special dispensation the Com-
munity granted Western Germany an increase in the amount of this quota, 




consumption levels and will lead to complete exclusion of the more efficient 
producers from some of the most important European markets,lV 
In most of the Latin American countries, the volume of banana exports 
dropped in 1962 from previous years, but due to a lack of complete statistics 
on production, the extent to which these, exports reflect a decrease in production 
or a contraction in foreign demand cannot be measured accurately (see Table 12). 
In certain markets, such as that of United States, it is obvious that the 
contraction in demand must have been the cause of the reduction in imports, 
since in this country, as already stated, there are no quantitative restric-
tions or duties on such imports. In the European markets, the situation is 
different. In countries such as France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, the 
Latin American producers are practically excluded from the market because of 
the preferential treatment granted to other suppliers (see Table 13). In other 
importing countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland), purchases 
from Latin America continued to increase, but the volume of their total imports 
is relatively small compared with that of the other European countries men-
tioned above. 
TIÜ See The Impact of Trade Restrictions in Europe on the Banana 
Producing Countries of Latin America, Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., 




BANANAS: EXPORTS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, VALUE AND VOLUME a/ 
1960 
Index: I960 » 100.0 
1961 1962 
Brazil Value 4.6 82.6 • • • 
Volume 241.9 103.1 « • • 
Colombia Value 13.7 102.9 77.4 
Volume 209.9 107.1 79.9 
Costa Rica Value 20.3 IO3.O 103.9 
Volume 225.5 91.3 106.5 
Dominican Value 11.2 100.9 • • • 
Republic Volume 180.4 90.1 • • • 
Ecuador Value 88.9 91.0 94.7 
Volume 1 149.1 93.8 90.8 
Guatemala Value 19.9 82.4 42.7 
Volume 251.3 81.9 42.8 
Honduras Value 28.7 116.0 119.2 
Volume 379.5 117.5 105.0 
Panama Value 18.2 109.9 96.2 
Volume 263.3 115.6 100.0 
a. Value in millions of dollars; volume in thousands of tons. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and 




BANANAS: IMPOSTS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES BY REGION OF ORIGIN 




lands I t a l y 
Fed .Rep. 
of  Germany 
United 
Kingdom A u s t r i a 
S w i t z e r -
land Canada 
United 
S t a t e s T o t a l 
B r a z i l 
1960 (1000 t o n s ) 
1961 I n d i c e s a / 




1 . 0 - 4 . 7 
110 .6 
1 1 0 . 1 
- - - - 5 . 7 
9 1 . 2 
Colombia 
1960 (1000 t o n s ) 
1961 I n d i c e s a / 
1962 " " 
1 1 . 9 
109.2 * * • 
— 15 .6 
1 2 8 . 2 
7 4 . 4 
-
147 .2 " 
110 .0 
8 8 . 6 
-
2 . 4 
9 1 . 7 
5 4 . 2 
9 . 6 
1 1 7 . 7 
7 5 . 0 
0 . 2 4 . 3 
7 9 . 1 
1 0 7 . 0 
1 9 1 . 2 
110 .8 
Cos ta fiica 
1960 (1000 t o n s ) 
1961 I n d i c e s a / 




2 3 . 3 
9 2 . 3 
2 5 6 . 3 
8 6 . 9 
9 5 . 1 
2 7 9 . 6 
8 7 . 3 
Dominican 
R e p u b l i c 
1960 (1000 t o n s ) 
1961 I n d i c e s a / 
1962 " " 
4 . 2 
211 .9 • • * -
7 . 9 
177 .2 
2 0 6 . 3 
— 5 6 . 4 
9 6 . 1 
114 .2 
3 . 5 
1 1 7 . 1 
105 .7 
1 . 0 
3 0 3 . 0 
660 .0 
4 . 4 
113 .6 
2 5 9 . 1 
3 . 6 
4 4 . 4 
7 7 . 3 
4 6 . 4 
2 6 . 0 
1 5 8 . 3 
8 0 . 2 
Ecuador 
1960 (1000 t o n s ) 
1961 I n d i c e s a / 
1962 " " 
2 2 . 5 






1 0 2 . 2 
9 8 . 3 
-
2 1 . 2 
8 7 . 7 
7 7 . 8 
1 9 . 4 
117 .0 
7 8 . 4 
6 8 . 1 
7 2 . 2 
6 1 5 . 1 
86.5 
113 .7 
9 5 9 . 3 
9 0 . 4 
Guatemala 
i 
1960 (1000 t ons ) 
1961 I n d i c e s a / 
1962 " " 
3 . 4 
20 .6 
— 6 . 4 
5 6 . 3 
159 .4 
- 15.9 
1 1 7 . 0 
206 .9 
- 1 . 1 
6 3 . 6 
163 .6 
3 . 6 
2 5 . 0 
197 .2 
1 1 . 2 
6 1 . 6 
1 3 7 . 0 
7 8 . 7 
3 3 . 8 
178 .6 
7 7 . 9 
Honduras 
1960 (1000 t o n s ) 
1961 I n d i c e s a / 
1962 " " 
5.9 59.3 • • * 
- 6 . 3 
5 7 . 1 
7 3 . 0 
-
I5.I 
8 6 . 0 
5 3 . 0 
- 0 . 4 
175 .0 
650 .0 
2 . 4 
5 8 . 3 
154 .2 
2 0 . 9 
202 .9 
291 .6 
1 2 4 . 3 
112 .6 
3 4 2 . 6 
1 2 4 . 7 
Panama 
1960 (1000 t o n s ) 
1961 I n d i c e s a / 
1 9 6 2 " " 
y 







- 4 1 . 5 
9 6 . 1 
2 5 5 . 5 
9 6 . 8 
7 8 . 6 
2 9 7 . 0 
9 7 . 7 
S u b t o t a l 
1960 (1000 t o n s ) 
1 9 6 1 I n d i c e s a / 
1962 » 
V7.9 
109.6 • • • -
4 8 . 6 
1 1 3 . 0 
117 .7 
1 . 0 435.2 
104 .5 
1 0 0 . 1 
8 . 2 
113.4 
103 .7 
2 6 . 1 




1 1 3 . 2 
168 .8 
9 5 - 7 
1637 .1 
9 2 . 3 
9 5 . 6 
2412 .3 
9 5 . 8 
Others 
1960 (1000 t o n s ) 
1 9 6 1 I n d i c e s a / 
1962 " " 
1 7 . 2 




1 0 . 1 
120 .8 
120 .8 
8 4 . 5 
119 .6 
157 .0 






1 . 6 
137 .5 
9 3 . 8 
4 . 7 
117 .0 
161 .7 
0 . 2 
5 0 . 0 « • • 
- 8 1 1 . 3 
1 0 6 . 2 
T o t a l 
1960 (1000 t o n s ) 
1961 I n d i c e s a / 
1962 " " 
6 5 . 1 




5 8 . 7 
114 .3 
1 1 8 . 2 
8 5 . 5 
1 1 8 . 2 
1 5 5 . 2 
4 4 5 . 2 
104 .6 
1 0 3 . 3 
2 4 4 . 1 
106 .0 
107 .8 
2 7 . 7 
1 0 0 . 0 
109 .4 
4 4 . 1 
1 0 6 . 1 
118 .4 
169 .0 
9 5 . 6 
1 6 3 7 . 1 
9 2 . 3 
9 5 . 6 
3223 .6 
9 8 . 5 
a . I n d i c e s : I960 = 1000. 
b . Imports o f  300 tons in 1961. 
c . Imports o f  800 tons i n 1961 and 1700 tons i n 1962. 
d . Imports o f  2100 t ons i n 1961 and 2700 t ons i n 1962. 
S o u r c e s : Commonwealth Economic Committee, F r u i t I n t e l l i g e n c e , e d i t i o n s January-May 1963, London; U.S. Department o f  A g r i c u l t u r e , Fore ign 
Crops and Markets , ( v a r i o u s i s s u e s ) . 
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3. Cacao 
After a decline that lasted three years and which in 1962, brought the 
price of cacao beans to the lowest levels recorded since 19̂ 9, the market 
began to recover in the first months of 196? as a result of the change that 
occurred in the general outlook for production and consumption. 
The period of price decline reflected principally the sharp growth in 
world production between 1958/59 and 196O/61. In the same period, consump-
tion expanded less than production and,to a certain extent, represented only 
a recovery from the 1957/58 decline. Consequently, during the period 
1958/59 - I96O/6I very large stocks were accumulated chiefly in the consumer 
countries. However, in the past two years, although world production re-
mained above the 1959/60 level, there was a downward trend with respect to 
the maximum volume reached in I96O/6I. Moreover, as since that time ex-
pansion in consumption continued at a higher rate than in the two preceding 
years, a deficit of approximately 77 000 tons between world production and 
consumption is predicted for 1962/63. Between 1958/59 and 1961/62, an excess 
of world production over total consumption was recorded (see Table 14). 
Within this general picture, the position of the Latin American countries 
was particularly critical during the 1960/62 period, since, in some, added 
to the effects of the drop in cacao prices was a contraction in production, 
especially in Brazil—the chief cacao exporter of the region (see Table 15 ) . 
Accordingly, both Latin American production and exports developed quite 
differently from the trend observed in the African countries. Although 
there has also been a certain decline in production in the African countries 
in the last twc years, the total volume continues to be considerably higher 
than that of 1959/60. 
The decrease in Latin American exports was primarily due to a decrease 
in exports to the United States and secondarily to a decrease in exports to 
the European Economic Community and countries having centrally planned 
economies (see Table 16). Since the decrease in exports to those regions 
was due to smaller stocks in the Latin American countries and not to a 
contraction in foreign demand, African exports of cacao to the above-
mentioned regions increased substantially. 
The possibility of concluding an international cacao agreement continued 
to be discussed in 1962. The Cacao Study Group held its Fifth Meeting 
(Switzerland, May 1962) and studied the draft agreement prepared the year 
before by a group of experts. However, at these meetings as well as in others 
held later by the Executive Committee of the Study Group, it was decided 
merely tc continue the preparatory work and to postpone until the middle of 
1963, 15 ' the decision to hold an international conference to negotiate the 
Agreement. 
15. See Situación de los productos básicos 1963, FAO, Rome, 1963. 
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Table l4 • 
CACAO BEANS: PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND STOCKS 
(Thousands of metric tons) 
1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63* 
Production s/ 1 045 1 172 1 131 1 109 
Consumption b/ 939 1 04l 1 110 1 186 
Surplus or deficit + 106 + 131 + 21 - 77 
Stocks in consumer 
countries b/ 326 446 466 390 
a. According to the source cited above, the production figures were re-
duced one percent for weight loss. 
b. The consumption figures refer to the calendar year and the stocks to 
the end of the second calendar year indicated in the column heading. 
Source: Gill & Duffers, Ltd., Cocoa Market Report, London, May 6, 1963. 
/Table 
Table 
CACAO BEANS: PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES a / 
Thousands o f 
metric tons 
1959/60 
Ind ices : 1959/60 * 100 

































































Other Latin America 
Production 14 100.0 92.8 107.1 



















































Production 57 108.8 108.8 110.5 
Total Africa 
Production 
















a . Production f igures  re fer  to the crop year , while those for  exportB re fer 
to the second calendar year indicated in the column. 
b . Includes only those countries l i s t e d . 




CACAO BEANS: EXPORTS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES, BY PRINCIPAL 









































1961 Indices a / 
1962 ' 1 
Nigeria 
1960 (Tons) 




























































































a . Ind i ces : i960 = 100.0 
b . In 1961, 524 tons were exported to th i s group o f  countr ies . 
Source: Commonwealth Economic Committee, Tropical Products Quarterly, London, March 1963} 
QUI & Duffers,Ltd. ,  Cocoa Market Report London, Apri l 5, 1963, No. 159. ' 
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Coffee 
The decline in international prices for green coffee, rather moderate in 
I960 and 1961, continued in 1962 and did not appear to halt until the first 
months of 1963I despite certain events that pointed to greater firmness of the 
market and a relative degree of stability in the foreign prices for this 
product. In fact, world production in 196O/6I-I962/63 remained at much lower 
levels than in 1959/60 and in the producing countries both consumption and 
exports increased slightly in the past two years. However, the accumulation 
of stocks continued at an increasing rate, since, in absolute terms, total 
production, continued to exceed the demand of domestic consumption and export 
demand, despite recent drops (see Table 17). Thus, at the beginning of the 
1962/63 commercial year, stocks were double what they were in 1959/60 and rep-
resented the equivalent of approximately two yeavs of world exports. 
The new International Coffee Agreement which, it was hoped, would have a 
certain stabilizing effect on prices, does not appear to have helped alter the 
market behavoir as of yet, although the last quarter of 1962 was already 
covered by the Agreement. It is clear, however, that this new agreement is, 
to a certain extent, a continuation of previous agreements, reinforced now by 
the participation of importing countries to give greater effectiveness to 
strict compliance with export quotas; accordingly it does not constitute a 
completely new element in the market. Moreover, unlike the other international 
commodity agreements (sugar and tin, for example), the Coffee Agreement does 
not provide for a mechanism for altering export quotas in direct ratio to a 
certain price level, and so the quotas do not perform a strictly price stabili-
zing function, but rather a function of regulating competition between producers. 
Finally, since the accumulation of stocks has continued to increase, the market 
could in practice "ignore" recent drops in production. 
From the standpoint of foreign demand, the development in the coffee market 
was more active, and this has been expressed in an increase of 6 percent in 
1962 world imports over those of the previous year. Most of this increase was 
due to United States imports brought about in part, by increased consumption and, 
in part, by an accumulation of stocks in that country in anticipation of a long-
shoremen's strike, which actually occurred at the end of December 1962. 16/ 
In connection with the increased import volume, and despite the fact that 
imports from Latin America shared in the increase, it should be noted that the 
rapid growth in imports from Africa continued to take place (see Table l8). 
In I960, Latin America furnished 80 percent of total United States imports, 
but this figure dropped to 75.8 percent in 1962. In contrast, imports from 
Africa represented 17.3 percent of the total imports in I960, and 20.9 percent 
in 1962. Imports by most of the European countries also reflected increases 
of varying percentages, especially those of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
while the imports of the countries having a centrally planned economy dropped 
slightly (see Table 19). 
l6.Stocks of green coffee in the United States at the end of December 
1962 totalled k million bags, as compared with 2.8 million bags at the end 




GREEN COFFEE: WORLD PRODUCTION, STOCKS, AND EXPORTS 
(Commercial year July-June) 
i 




Index: 1959/60 = 100.0 
1960/61 1961/62 1962/63* 
Initial stocks 40.4 156.2 169.6 a/ 200.2 
Production 78.9 83.0 90.2 83.0 
Total amounts 
available 119.3 107.8 117.1 122.7 
Exports 43.8 101.4 103.9 • • • 
Consumption in 
106.4 Producer Countries 12.5 101.6 • * * 
a. Reduced by 3 million bags distributed in Brazil. 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Circular. 
December 1962, FCOF 4-62. 
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Table 18 
TOTAL UNITED STATES GREEN COFFEE IMPORTS, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
(Thousands of bags 
of 60 kilos) 
I960 
Index: i960 a 100.0 
1961 1962 
Brazil 9 261 92.6 98.2 
Colombia 4 254 95.9 101.8 
Costa Rica 271 136.1 142.1 
Dominican Republic 403 65.3 103.7 
Ecuador 317 63.7 116.4 
El Salvador 4l6 l40.l 202.6 
Guatemala 798 118.9 121.2 
Haiti . 64 118.8 240.6 
Honduras 332 43.4 48.2 
Mexico 1 097 114.3 122.3 • 
Nicaragua 170 132.4 111.8 
Panama 16 37.5 5.0 
Peru 347 110.1 134.6 
Venezuela 345 99.7 78.6 
Subtotal 18 091 96.5 105.0 
Africa 3 824 119.7 133.7 
Others 186 162.9 209.1 
Total 22 101 101.0 110.8 
Sourcet U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture Circular. 




COFFEE BEANS: WORLD IMPORTS BY SELECTED 





Index: I960 = 100.0 
1961 1962 
Canada 995 112.5 119.3 
United States 22 101 101.0 110.8 
Western Europe 15 247 104.8 108.5 
European Economic Community 10 479 103.4 106.0 
Federal Republic of  Germany 3 323 105.1 116.6 
Belgium-Luxembourg 1 109 93 .4 75.4 
France 3 477 98.0 100.0 
Netherlands 917 125.1 115.9 
Italy 1 653 106.0 112.2 
Free Trade Association 4.208 105.0 113.8 
Austria 203 107.4 112.8 
Denmark 698 10*1.2 111.5 
Norway 1+83 93.2 106.8 
Portugal 185 113.5 104.3 
United Kingdom 919 106.̂  125.6 
Sweden 1 222 106.0 113.4 
Switzerland 498. 108.4 106.8 
Other Western Europe a/ 560 130.2 115.5 
Eastern Europe, 861 133.1 128.3 
Eastern Germany 289 106.9 108.0 
Czechoslovakia 133 136.1 
Hungary 55 72.7 103.6 
Poland 65 107.7 115.4 
Soviet Union 319 155.2 150.5 
Latin America b/ 602 118.8 108.8 
Japan 178 141.6 133.1 
Other Countries 2 392 103.3 104.8 
Total World Imports if2  440 103.9 110.1 
a. Includes Spain, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. 
b. Includes Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. 
Source: George Gordon Paton, Complete Coffee  Coverage. New York, March 4, 1963. 
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It should be mentioned, with respect to imports by the Federal Republic 
of Germany, that it submitted a proposal to the Commission of the European 
Economic Community to replace the ad valorem duty on imports of green coffee 
from third countries with a specific duty, thereby decreasing the proportion-
ally more restrictive effect the ad valorem tariff has on imports of more 
expensive grades of coffee, but without injuring imports from the associated 
countries of the Community since, in any case, such imports are duty free; 
to date, no decision has been reached on that proposal. 
The Latin American countries increased their exports to Western Europe 
and Canada, in some cases in larger proportions than shown in the import 
figures for those areas, while they decreased their exports to those countries 
having centrally planned economies, almost all of whose exports come from 
Brazil and Colombia (see Table 20). The figures for Latin American exports 
to the United States do not agree with the figures for United States imports 
in 1962, especially in the list by country. The 9 percent increase shown in 
the figures for 1962 United States imports from Latin America appears as only 
one percent in the figures for Latin American exports to that country. 17/ 
The decline in world' coffee production reflects above all the changes 
that have been occurring in Brazilian production; these have been aggravated 
by the decline in Colombian production and, at times, by that of other smaller 
producers (see Table 21). Most of the Latin American countries had registered 
increases in their exports, with Brazil the main exception, although, as has 
been stated, this was not due to a decline in production, since Brazil has 
large surpluses from previous harvests. However, although the volume of ex-
ports of most Latin American countries increased over the previous years, the 
drop in internal prices in 1962 was expressed in a decrease in the value of cof-
fee exports, or in a lower increase than that recorded by the volume of exports. 
For the region as a whole, in 1962 the value of exports felt 2 percent below 
that of 1961, despite an increase of 4.3 percent in volume (see Table 22). 
17» The discrepancy is especially noticeable in countries such as Brazil, 
Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Mexico. This difference is due, in part, to the lag 
that occurred in recording the export and import statistics in the various 
countries, and, in part, to the fact that the 1962 figures are only tentative. 
It is possible, however, that there are other causes that cannot be determined 
for the moment. Therefore, the differences between Table 18 and 19, on the 
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a. Indices! i960 = 100.0 
b. Exports of 4000 bags in 1962. 
c. Exports of 10C0 bags in 1963 
d. .Exports of 2000 and 5000 bags in 1961 and 1962, respectively. 
9. Exports of 1000 bags in 1961 and 1962. 
f. Exports of 2000 bags in 1962. 
Source: Pan American Coffee Bureau, Coffee Statistics. New York, 1962. 
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Table ¿1 
GREEN COFFEEI WORLD PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS, 
BY COUNTRY AND REGION a/ 
1959/60 
(1000 bags) 
Index! 1959/60 a 100.0 

































































































































































a. Exportable production for commercial years July-*June. 
b. Exports refer to the second calendar year Indicated in the column. 
Sourcei U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture Circular. Maroh 





GREEN COFFEE: VALUE a/ AND VOLUME b/ OF EXPORTS 
OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
• 
I960 
Index: i960 = 100.0 
1961 1962 
Brazil 
Value 713.0 99.6 90.2 
Volume 16 819 100.9 97.4 
Colombia 
Value 333.5 92.3 99.5 
Volume 5 938 95.2 110.5 
Costa Rica 
Value 98.9 103.1 
Volume 766 109.0 117.8 
Dominican Republic 
Value 22.6 61.1 88.0 
Volume 48l 68.0 105.6 
Ecuador 
Value 21.9 65.3 95.4 
Volume 539 70.7 102.0 
El Salvador 
Value 76.7 91.5 83.7 
Volume 1 178 121.5 125.5 
Guatemala 
Value 78.6 88.0 86.8 
Volume 1 329 94.4 116.8 
Haiti 
Value 17.3 77.5 119.7 
Volume 394 . 88.3 130.5 
Honduras 
Value 11.8 75.8 97.0 
Volume 258 81. k 102.3 
Mexico 
Value 71.7 100.0 100.7 
Volume 1 384 107.2 105.3 
Nicaragua 
Value 19.2 90.6 80.2 
Volume 371 93.5 96.0 
Total 11 countries 
Value 1 411.7 95.0 93.1 
Volume 29 447 99.3 103.5 
a. Millions of  dollars. 
b. Millions of  bags. 
Source: Values. International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics; Volumes: G. Gordon Paton, Complete Coffee  Coverage. New York, 
May 23, 1963. 
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5. Wheat 
World wheat production in 1962/63 stood 3 and 2 per cent higher respec-
tively, than the shortfall levels of the two previous years. Australia, 
Canada, and Western Europe led this recovery, while the production of both the 
United States and Argentina again declined (see Table 23). 
Because of the reduction in the stocks of the principal exporters, owing 
to previous production drops, and the increase in the import needs of Western 
Europe—especially the Common Market—and Continental China, prices rallied 
slightly for Argentine wheat, and much more markedly for Canadian and Australian 
wheat. In view of the recovery in production in the importing regions, it is 
to be expected that the rising trend in the world market will not continue. 
At the beginning of the 1962/63 crop year, stocks in the United States 
were lower than in the two previous years, but they remained at levels slight-
ly above those of 1959/60. It is estimated that 1962/63 production will be 
approximately 13 per cent less than that of the preceding year, but a decrease 
in exports is also anticipated, so that, on the whole, the change in total 
stocks may be very slight. Of greater importance—but as yet unpredictable 
consequences—is the fact that United States wheat production controls will be 
eliminated in 1964, as a result of the defeat of the referendum conducted at 
the end of May 1963 by the farmers of the United States. Since the elimination 
of production controls means also the elimination óf the guaranteed prices at 
80 percent of parity, it is believed that a sharp drop in wheat prices on the 
domestic market is likely. Wheat prices on the export market are subject 
to minimum and maximum limits, fixed in the 1962 International Wheat Agreement,18/ 
so that the effect of an eventual drop in the domestic prices of the United 
States will not necessarily lead to a drop in export prices. 
The largest export increases in both I96O/6I and 1961/62 occurred in the 
United States, Canada, and Australia; in 1961/62 they also occurred, in lower 
percentages, in Argentina and France (see Table 24). The Soviet Union was 
therefore the only exporting country that did not contribute to the increase 
in the world wheat trade. It should benoted, also, that the increase in ex-
ports was concentrated chiefly in those going to the EEC countries, Eastern 
Europe and Continental China, with a considerable increase in 1961/62 in ex-
ports to Latin America, chiefly Brazil, whose production declined in 1961/62. 
157" It should be mentioned, in this connection, that the Soviet Union 
participates as an exporting member in the new International Wheat Agreement, 
thereby somewhat strengthening the position of this Agreement in the regu-
lation of the world wheat market. 
/Table 3 
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Table 23 




Index: 1959/60 = 100.0 
1960/61 1961/62 1962/63* 
A. Production 
United States 30 512 121.1 110.1 97.4 
Canada 11 25k 125.4 . 68.5 134.8 
Western Europe a/ k2 665 92.8 88.2 110.6 
Eastern Europe 13 955 92.7 97.1 97.4 
Soviet Union 69 101 93.0 96.2 102.2 
Australia 5 402 137.9 124.5 151.1 
Latin America 9 386 83.2 94.6 • • • 
Argentina (5 837) (67.8) (87.4) (83.9) 
World Total 249 200 98.2 95.0 104.5 
B. Stocks b/ 
Argentina 1 633 100.0 58.3 21.7 
Australia 1 851 94.1 41.2 26.5 
Canada 14 941 109.3 110.7 72.1 
United States 35 244 101.5 108.9 100.8 
Total 53 669 103.3 105.6 87.8 
a. Includes Yugoslavia. 
b. At the beginning of the crop year of each country. 
Sources; FAO, Boletín Mensual de Economía y Estadística Agrícolas; 





















































































































































































































a. Index 1959/60 = 100.0. 
b. 98 700 tons in 1961/62. 
c. 700 tons in 1961/62. 
d. Exports of 1.20 and 1.95 million tons in 1960/61 and 1961/62, respectively. 
e. Exports of 1 700 tons in 1961/62. 
f. Exports of 29 bCO and 200 100 tons in 196O/6I and 1961/62, respectively. 
g. Exports of 150 000 tons to Cuba and 186 200 to Brazil in I96O/61 and 330 000 tone to Cuba 
and 282 900 to Brazil in 1961/62. 
Sources: FAO, World Trade Grain Statistics 1959/60, 1960/61} U.S. Department of Agriculture, The Wheat 




World corn trade represents a small proportion of world production. 
Most of the corn exports are concentrated in the United States, and most of 
the corn imports in the countries of Western Europe. The quotations for this 
product in the United Kingdom have fluctuated relatively little in the past 
three years, although a downward trend in that period has been evident,, espe-
cially if the prices are compared with those for the 1950-1957 period. The 
high level of stock in the United States has undoubtedly affected this 
situation. 
In 1961/62, world production remained almost at the same level as the 
previous year, although there were significant changes in certain countries. 
Western Europe, and particularly Yugoslavia—the largest exporter in the 
region—registered considerable decreases. The production of Thailand, South 
Africa, and other countries in those areas increased moderately. The greatest 
expansion occurred in the Soviet Union. The production of the United States, 
the largest world exporter, dropped in I961/62, and is expected to remain at 
almost the same level in 1962/63 (see Table 25). 
There were certain increases in Latin American production, especially in 
Argentina, Brazil, and other minor producers. In this region, Argentina is the 
only exporting country of any significance, and although its production in-
creased in the past two years, exports decreased in relation to the volume 
reached in 1959/60. Apparently, the drop was caused by a decrease in the total 
production of other cereals, owing to severe droughts, which made it necessary 
to hold back a part of the exportable balances of corn for domestic consumption. 
The sharp rise in corn exports in I961/62 in relation to previous years 
was caused by increased import requirements in the EEC countries .and other 
countries of Western Europe. Another considerable part was derived fro/n an 
increase in world imports from Japan. The United States, which almost doubled 
its exports between 1959/60 and 196l/62, supplied a large part of these .In-
creased needs. 
Argentina was unable to profit from the expansion in the international 
demand for corn, and its exports to Western Europe and Japan have, in the past 
two years, been considerably below those of 1959/60 (see Table 26). 
In the first quarter of 1963* the situation of the international corn 
prices continued practically the same as the previous year. In the first half 
of the 1962/63 commercial year, United States exporta continued at the high 
level of the previous year, and, although at the beginning of 1963 its stocks 
were lower than at the beginning of 1962, the volume of the stocks insures an 




CORN: WORLD PRODUCTION, BY SELECTED REGIONS AND COUNTRIES 
(1 000 metric 
tons) 
Index: 1959/60 » 100.0 
1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63* 
Western Europe Ik  2$k 103.8 96.5 • * • 
Eastern Europe 11 456 98.1 91.6 • • • 
Soviet Union 12 020 155.6 200.2 • • • 
United States 97 1̂ 9 102.2 94.8 93.9 
Asia 10 950 106.1 106.2 • • • 
Africa 10 950 113.3 • • • • • • 
Latin America 
Argentina k 108 118.1 127.1 • • • 
Brazil 8 554 105.2 • • • • • • 
Mexico 5 563 93.5 100.0 • • • 
Total World 
Production 207 700 103.1 102.7 • • • 





CORN: EXPOÜTS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES, BY PRINCIPAL 
KEGION OF DESTINATION 
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a . Exporta of  4 700 tons in 196o /6 l . 
b . Exports o f  37 900 and 59 200 tons in 1960/61 and 1961/62, r e spec t i ve ly . 
c . Exports o f  1 600 and 7 000 tons in 1960/6l and I96I/62, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Sources I FAO, World Trade Qrain S t a t i s t i c s . 1959/60 - I96O/6I; US Department of  Agriculture , World Agr icul tural 




CORN i STOCKS IN SELECTED EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
ON JANUARY 1 OF EACH YEAR 
(1 000 metrio 
tons) Index I960 » 100 .0 
I960 , 1961 1962 1963* 
Argentina 1 397 45.4 81.8 63.6 
United States 110 344 107.9 103.5 97.2 
Total 2 countries 111 741 107.1 103.2 96.8 
Source» US Department of Agriculture, World Agricultural Production and 




In 1962, the developments in beef  prices on the international market 
showed certain erratic fluctuations.  Within these fluctuations,  in the first 
nine months of  the year prices remained above those in the previous year, but 
in the final  months of  19̂ 2 there was a sharp price fall,  which continued in 
the first  quarter of  1963» In May 1963, another price recovery began. However, 
the average price in the first  four  months of  the year was almost 20 percent 
below the level for  the corresponding period of  1962. 
From the standpoint of  the Latin American exporters, certain circumstances 
created a climate of  uncertainty in the immediate outlook for  the foreign  meat 
market: l) the import regulations adopted by the countries of  the European 
Economic Community, and 2) the effects  that would result from  the eventual entry 
of  the United Kingdom into the Community. To study the possible implications 
of  this market development, the member countriss of  the Meat Action Group held 
a meeting in Buenos Aires at the end of  1962. During that meeting, it was 
agreed to encourage negotiation at the governmental level in the member countries 
of  the Community so that the regulations finally  adopted on meat imports would 
not have an excessively severe effect  on Latin American exports. 
In 1962, total Argentine exports were higher than in the two previous 
years, partially as a result of  increased imports by the EEC, the United Kingdom, 
and Spain. In Uruguay, exports to other markets increased more, but there was 
also an increase in the total value. In the first  quarter of  1963, there was 
a marked expansion in Argentine exports to Great Britain and Italy resulting 
partly from  the drought in the exporting, country; at the same time, British 
imports of  refrigerated  beef  from  Uruguay recovered. 
Despite the increase in 1962, total imports of  beef  and other cattle on 
the hoof  by the EEC countries did not remain at the i960 level. This decline, 
which v/as relatively serious if  the net imports of  this group of  countries 
is considered, was due chiefly  to the expansion of  French production and exports. 
However, this market development was not unfavorable  to the Latin American 
exporting countries, since their total 1962 beef  exports to the Community were 
higher than those in the two previous years 19/ (see Table 28), due chiefly  to 
the recovery of  Italian imports. Italy not only increased its purchases from 
Argentina by almost 10 000 tons but also imported more than 3 000 tons from 
Brazil. However, it should be remembered that there is no assurance that the 
position of  the Latin American countries on the Community market will remain 
unchanged in the immediate future  due to the fact  that the common agricultural 
policy regulations on meat have not been effected  as yet. 
Total exports to the United Kingdom, which before  1962 had been the most 
important single market for  Latin American exporters, increased considerably, 
19. Latin American countries do not supply cattle on the hoof  to the 




EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF BEEF 
AND CATTLE ON THE HOOF 
Beef Cattle on the hoof 
(Thousand tons) (Thousand head) 
I960 I96I 1962^ I960 1961 
V * i—1 
A. Imports, by origin 
Belgium-Luxembourg 2 1 2 8 7 7 
France 44 58 58 116 77 50 
Federal Republic of Germany 14 3 4 - - -
Italy - - - - - 1 
Netherlands 22 iZ 22 42 ¿22 
Subtotal 92 79 91 166 217 113 
Argentina 52 66 82 _ 
Brazil 4 3 5 _ _ Uruguay I1* 9 7 - - -
Other countries Jfe. _22 44 680 659 zã 
Total 247 180 229 846 876 687 
B. Total exporter/ 122 137 200 225 273 166 
C. Net imports, (A - B) 125 43 30 621 603 521 
a. The figures for Germany and Italy cover 11 months, and those for Belgium-
Luxembourg, 10 months. 
b. Including exports to the member countries of the Community. 
Source: Commonwealth Economic Committee, Intelligence Bulletin, London, April 1963. 
/although the 
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although the I960 levels were not reached, especially of beef imports. To a 
great extent, this decline in imports was due to an increase in domestic 
production. However, Latin American participation within that reduced import 
volume improved in relation to that of the United Kingdom's other suppliers 
(see Table 29). The continued increase in imports at the beginning of 1963 
led to an official British statement that consideration was being given to the 
possibility of applying quantitative restrictions. If this were done, it could 
have very grave consequences for Latin American exporters. 
The demand for imported meat continued to expand in the United States, 
This increased demand was chiefly for fresh, chilled and frozen beef, items 
of trade in which Mexico alone among the Latin American countries has a share 
of any importance (see Table J>0). This trade continued to expand rapidly in 
the first quarter of 1963. Imports from Argentina, Uruguay and from other 
Latin American exporters are primarily in the form of canned meats, whose 
total importation in 1962 declined in relation to the preceding year, but 
continued at a higher level than in i960. However, another of the important 
products in the meat trade—imports of cattle on the hoof—again showed a 




UNITED KINGDOM: TOTAL MEAT IMPORTS, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
I960 = 
1 000 long Indices (i960 = 100.0) 
tons 1961 1962 
A. Beef5 / 
Argentina 185.6 77.5 88.3 
Brazil 0.8 157.3 168.6 
Uruguay ?2.6 61.9 52.4 
Subtotal 216.9 75.4 83.2 
Australia 64.6 49.8 54.1 
New Zealand 23.2 74.4 50.3 
Ireland 14.7 223.7 146.3 
Other countries 125.5 235.7 
Total 352.8 81.6 92.7 
B. Lamb^ 
Argentina 30.5 65.4 69.3 
Chile 1.8 181.6 . 47.1 
Uruguay - - -
Australia 30.9 83.1 71.9 
New Zealand 300.0 96.5 97.3 
Others 12.0- 69.3 134.2 
Total 375.3 92.4 93.9 
C. Canned Beef 
Argentina 19.8 116.8 129.5 
Brazil 4.1 100.9 49.5 
Paraguay 4.7 115.1 134.5 
Uruguay 3.3 54.0 102.0 
Australia 19.0 80.8 53.6 
New Zealand 0.8 112.7 118.9 
Ireland 9.2 94.1 62.8 
Others 16.4 142.1 150.5 
Total 77-3 106.9 102.1 , 
a. Beef  and veal. 
b. Mutton and lamb. 
Source: Commonwealth Economic Committee, Intelligence Bulletin, London, 
February 1963, March 1963. 
/Table 50 
Table 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF BEEF AND CATTLE ON THE HOOF, BY ORIGIN 
I960 Indices (i960 = 100.0) 
Tons 1961 1962 
Fresh, chilled, and frozen  beef: 
Australia 63 670 155.5 315.0 
New Zealand 58 824 113.7 160.0 
Canada 8 751 148.1 100.2 
Ireland 23 763 128.7 126.9 
Mexico 17 408 135.5 152.6 
Others 15 075 98.0 159.3 
Total 187 491 132.2 204.9 
Beef,  cured 
Canada 100 28.0 51.0 
Argentina 537 74.3 43.8 
Brazil 87 125.3 100.0 
Paraguay 22 - -
Uruguay - 3/ -
Others _22_ 173.3 135.5 
Total 856 95.6 58.9 
Beef,  processed 
Argentina 2 448 154.4 180.3 
Brazil 272 244.8 436.8 
Paraguay - - y 
Total 2 720 163.4 207.7 
Beef,  canned 
Argentina 21 775 110.2 91.5 
Brazil 3 911 147.6 153.2 
Paraguay 4 021 105.8 96.6 
Uruguay 4 400 139.6 171.7 
Others ^ 144.9 166.3 
Total 
hoof^ 
34 641 118.1 110.4 
Beef  cattle on the 
Canada 273 I83.I 182.4 
Mexico 221 138.9 192.3 
Total 664 157.1 188.2 
a. Il l tons. 
b. 48 tons. 
c. Thousands of  heads. 
Source: Commonwealth Economic Committee, Intelligence Bulletin, London, March 1963? 
U.S. Department of  Agriculture, Livestock and Meat Situation, May 1963. 
/8. Cotton 
8. Cotton 
On the international cotton market, a relatively significant drop in world 
exports and a moderate price decline, especially for extra-long staple cotton 
were noted. During the period 1959/60 to 1961/62, world production remained 
practically stable, but an increase of approximately 4 percent is forecast for 
1962/65» This probable increase, added to the stock increases of the importing 
countries in the two previous years is one of the chief causes for the weakness 
of the market, especially during the second half of 1962. In addition, United 
States stocks, which had declined in i960 and 1961, again increased in 1962, 
the same occurred in other exporting countries (see Table 31). 
Nor have the developments in world consumption been very encouraging, 
since, in 1959/60 and 1963/62 it remained practically stationary. However, 
within this world situation, the Latin American position has been improving, 
in relation to both production and exports. Brazilian production, which 
continued its long-term recovery of recent years, despite a slight decline in 
1962/63, is significant. The production of Mexico and Colombia increased 
substantially in the same year. The increased importance cotton has acquired 
in Central America where, in recent years, it has become the second most 
important export product, is also significant. 20/ The production of the 
Latin American countries as a whole has increased more rapidly than total 
world production (see Table 32). With respect to exports, it is interesting 
to note that, despite the I96O/6I and I961/62 decline in world exports, Latin 
American exports increased in both periods, an increase to which practically 
all the countries in the region contributed. 
The decrease in world exports occurred chiefly in the United States, 
Egypt, and Pakistan (see Table 33). The drop in exports coincides with a 
decrease in production in 1961/62 only in the case of Egypt. In the United 
States, production has remained relatively unchanged in the last three years. 
However, world production fluctuated significantly in 1959/60 and 1963/62. 
It can be concluded that the decrease in world exports was caused principally 
by decreased demand in the chief importing areas which had already large stocks 
This contraction in demand had already reached significant proportions in 
I96O/6I and acquired greater intensity in 1963/62 in the two European regional 
economic groups, and in the same year spread to Japan and to those countries 
having a centrally planned economy (see Table 33). It should be noted, however 
that in 1963/62 Latin American exports to the European Economic Community, 
countries having a centrally planned economy, and other markets, continued to 
be higher than in the two previous years, thereby compensating for the decline 
in exports to the European Free Trade Association, Japan, and the United States 
20. See Part II, Chapter I, of this Survey 
/Table 31 
Table 31 
COTTON: WORLD STOCKS, PRODUCTION, AND CONSUMPTION 
(Crop years August/July) 
Millions of 
bales a/ 
Indices (1959/60 = 100.0) 

















































countries ç/ 16.0 87.5 86.2 86.2 


















countries c/ 17.1 95.9 91.8 93.0 
World total 48.3 99.4 99.8 97.7 
a . B a l e s of 478 pounds net weight,, 
b. Preliminary estimates» 
c. Includes Soviet Union, Continental China, and the countries of  Eastern 
Europe. 
Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee, Cotton, Monthly Review of 




COTTON! PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Thousands 
o f  bales o f 
Indices (1959/60 = 100.0) 
4?8 l b s . 













































































































Latin American percentage 









a . Preliminary f igures . 
Source» International Cotton Advisory Committee, Cotton, World S t a t i s t i c s , 
Washington, D.C., Apri l 1963. 
/Table 33 
Table 33 
COTTON: EXPORTS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES AND REGIONS, BY DESTINATION 














































































































































a. Includes Continental China. 
b. Indices 1959/60 = 100.0 
c. Includes Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, EL Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru. The difference  from  the total for 
Latin America in the preceding table is due to the exclusion of  Guatemala and Paraguay, for  which figures  on country 
of  destination are not available, 
d. Other countries include E^ypt, Pakistan, Syria, Sudan, and Turkey. 
Source; International Cotton Advisory Committee, Cotton, World Statistics. April 1963® 
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One thing that in the near future, will have definite implications on 
the progress of cotton fiber trade is the Agreement on International Trade 
in Cotton Textiles, which entered into force in October 1962 for a period 
of five years, and was signed by a number of industrialized countries. 21/ 
This Agreement is an important instrument for regulating trade in a branch 
of the manufacturing industry that is in a stage of full development in 
Latin America, and one to which the countries of the region do not want 
any conditions to be applied that could limit possibilities for diversifying 
the export structure» However, no Latin American country took part in the 
negotiations that led to the Agreement. 
21. See United Nations Commission on International Commodity Trade. Hechos 




In the past two years wool prices have varied somewhat, depending on the 
type of fiber. Prices for coarse wools, in general, dropped sharply, while 
those for fine wools, which had declined less sharply in 1961, rose to levels 
slightly above those of i960. 
These price tendencies appear to reflect chiefly qualitative changes in 
demand, since there have been no major changes in world production and con-
sumption as compared with i960. Figures for wool consumption in a rep-
resentative group of countries show that, although there have been signifi-
cant changes, in the recent period among the various countries, total con-
sumption has remained stable (see Table 34) . 
For several years now, competition between the cotton and wool industries 
and artificial fibers has been a factor restricting the expansion of consump-
tion of natural fibers, and progress in research in recent years has improved 
even further the competitive position of artificial fibers by reducing market 
prices (the most recent reductions have been for rayon and orlon) and by 
improving the quality of the various fibers and the ways of using them in the 
manufacture of articles that previously contained natural fibers. For 
example, the rayon fiber being used now, unlike that of the past, does not 
shrink, has greater resistance, and its appearance remains unaltered after 
several washings. A new fiber of polypropylene is being used in the man-
ufacture of rugs, curtains, sweaters, bathing suits, and other articles of 
clothing, because it combines the qualities of wool and nylon. Rayon pro-
duction in the United States, for example, increased from 314 million pounds' 
in i960 to 400.5 million pounds in I96I (27.5 percent), and it is estimated 
that it will reach 510 million pounds in 1962. 
The International Wool Study Group, at the request of the Government of 
the United States met in London in mid-December 1962 to study the problems of 
the wool textile industry. The meeting was exploratory in nature and did 
not adopt recommendations of any kind, however, it agreed to meet again at the 
beginning of 1964.22/ 
The exports of the chief wool producers increased 4 percent in both 1961 
and 1962. However, in the case of Argentina and Uruguay, 1962 exports were 
lower than in the preceding year; this was reflected in an increase in the 
stocks of those two countries, but not in a significant proportion, because 
production dropped that year (see Table 35)• 
The distribution of exports by regions of destination shows that the 
increase in exports in the past two years was concentrated in the United 
States, the EEC countries, and Japan (included in "other countries" in Table 
36). Exports to the Soviet Union—where production has been increasing--and 
to the countries of Eastern Europe decreased substantially, as did those to 
the United Kingdom and to other countries of Continental Europe, where the 
textile industry has been in a period of decline. 
22. See: Hechos recientes en materia de productos básicos, Memorandum 




WOOL: CONSUMPTION OF VIRGIN WOOL IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Millions of 
pounds a/ 
Indices: (i960 = 100) 
I960 1961 1962 
1. Federal Republic of 
Germany 151 99.3 97.3 
2. Australia 74 87.8 98.6 
3. Belgium 86 95.3 109.3 
4. United States 415 100.7 105.I 
5. France 301 100.0 96.7 
6. Netherlands 22 95.4 100.0 
7. Italy 198 94.4 100.5 
8. Japan 301 116.3 106.3 
9. United Kingdom 481 98.1 93.1 
10. Sweden .12 91.7 83.3 
Total 10 countries 2 04l 100.8 100.0 
a. Clean basis. 
Source: Commonwealth Economic Committee, Wool Intelligence, 




WOOL: STOCKS IN PRINCIPAL EXPORTING COUNTRIES AT THE BEGINNING 
OF THE RESPECTIVE COMMERCIAL YEAR a / 
Millions of 
pounds 
Indices:(I960 = 100) 
I960 1961 1962 
Argentina 50 50.0 60.0 
Uruguay 30 36.6 50.0 
Australia 31 112.9 . 96.8 
New Zealand 10 100.0 100.0 
South Africa 1 400.0 b/ 100.0 a / 
Total 5 countries 122 69.7 70.5 
a. To October 1 in Argentina and Uruguay and to July 1 in the other 
countries. 
b. To May 30. 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Crops and Markets, 




WOOL: EXPORT OF PRINCIPAL PRODUCER COUNTRIES, BY 
REGION OF DESTINATION 
United 






A s s o c i a t i o n c / 
S o v i e t 
Union 
and Eas t -
ern Europe d / 
Others Tota l 
1959 /60 ( m i l l i o n s o f l b s . ) 69 103 53 27 28 280 
Argentina a / 1960/61 I n d i c e s b / 82 .6 1 4 0 . 8 132 .1 8 8 . 9 1 5 7 . 1 121 .4 
1961 /62 I n d i c e s 9 ^ . 2 1 1 5 . 5 1 2 4 . 5 8 8 . 9 1 1 4 . 3 109 .3 
1959 /60 ( m i l l i o n s o f l b s . ) 13 21 20 6 5 65 
Uruguay a / 1960/61 I n d i c e s b / 169.2 233 .3 3 2 5 . 0 8 3 . 3 180.0 230 .8 
1961 /62 I n d i c e s 1 4 6 . 1 161 .9 1 5 5 . 0 2 0 0 . 0 2 4 0 . 0 1 6 6 . 1 
1959 /60 ( m i l l i o n s o f l b s . ) 39 ^95 327 139 396 1 396 
Aust ra l ia a / 1960 /61 I n d i c e s b / 9 2 . 3 9 1 . 3 8 2 . 3 7 7 . 0 1 2 4 . 7 9 7 . 3 
1961/62 I n d i c e s 143 .6 98.6 77 .^ 8 7 . 0 129 .3 102 .4 
1959 /60 ( m i l l i o n s o f l b s . ) 66 203 l 8 0 ^5 34 528 
New 1960 /61 I n d i c e s b / 107 .6 9 4 . 1 9 3 . 3 6 2 . 2 1 5 5 . 9 96 .8 
Zealand a / 1961 /62 I n d i c e s 1 2 5 . 7 123 .6 1 0 0 . 5 2 2 . 2 152 .9 109 .3 
1959 /60 ( m i l l i o n s o f l b s . ) 33 . 131 64 19 19 266 
South I960/6I I n d i c e s b / 1 0 3 . 0 1 1 3 . 0 1 1 7 . 2 2 1 . 0 8 9 . 5 1 0 4 . 5 
Afr i ca  a / 1961 /62 I n d i c e s 145 .4 131 .3 101 .6 2 1 . 0 142 .1 118 .8 
1959 /60 ( m i l l i o n s o f l b s . ) 220 953 644 236 482 2 535 
T o t a l s 1960/61 I n d i c e s b / 1 0 0 . 0 103 .3 1 0 0 . 5 7 1 . 2 1 2 8 . 0 1 0 4 . 0 
1961 /62 I n d i c e s 1 2 3 . 2 111 .6 9 2 . 5 7 2 . 4 1 3 1 . 7 1 0 8 . 0 
a . Crop y e a r s , October-September f o r  Argentina and Uruguay, and July-June f o r  the other c o u n t r i e s . 
b . I n d i c e s 1959 /60 = 1 0 0 . 0 . 
c . Most o f  the amounts correspond t o the United Kingdom. 
.• d . Inc ludes Cont inenta l China. 
S o u r c e s : U.S. Department o f  A g r i c u l t u r e , Foreign Crops and Markets, World Summaries, Dec . 28, 1961; 




Price trends in the group of non-ferrous metals varied considerably. New 
York prices for copper in 1962 remained at the level reached in the second half 
of 1961, that is to say, they continued to be lower than in 1959-1960. Quota-
tions on the London metals exchange also remained stationary at a level slightly 
above that of the preceding year, although in reliable trade circles it is main-
tained that this stability resulted largely from the purchases made by the 
Rhodesian Selection Trust. Actually, market conditions were not very satisfac-
tory, and price stability was influenced somewhat by measures to reduce produc-
tion, announced by the large producers in Africa, the United States, and Chile. 
Such announcements did not mean, however, an actual reduction in world copper 
production in 1962 as compared with the previous year, but it did constitute a 
decline relative to total installed productive capacity, which increased slight-
ly more than 100 000 tons with respect to 1961.25/ World production of primary 
copper increased slightly in 1962 above the level of the two previous years, 
while consumption remained almost at the same level as 1961 (see Tables 37 and 
38). Accordingly, stocks of refined copper in the importing countries at the 
end of 1962 had increased l6 percent over the previous year. 
Copper production in Chile increased in 1962 as compared with 1961, de-
spite the reductions announced by the large mining concerns in that country. 
Peruvian production decreased, however, as a result of a strike of mine workers 
and because of the damage caused by a plant explosion. The total exports of 
these two countries showed the same trends as their respective production, that 
is to say, an increase in Chile and a decrease in Peru. 
Imports remained rather stable, except in the case of Italy and Japan, ' 
which continued their vigorous industrial expansion. However, Japan increased 
only its imports of concentrates while its imports of refined copper declined 
appreciably (see Table 39)• 




COPPER: PRODUCTION BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
(1 000 
short tons) 
Index: i960 = 100.0 
I960 1961 1962 
United States 1 092.5 106.1 112.0 
Canada 439.3 100.0 105.9 
Chile 586.6 102.9 110.1 
Mexico 66.5 81.8 78.0 
Peru 200.3 109.0 91.3 
Republic of the Congo 
(Leopoldville) 
332.9 97.4 97.0 
Northern Rhodesia 635.3 99.7 97.6 
Australia 117.7 82.2 92.4 
Centrally planned countries 602.2 104.2 108.7 
Total world production 4 541.6 102.3 105.7 





COPPER: CONSUMPTION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
AND TOTAL WORLD CONSUMPTION 
(1 000 
short tons) 
Index: i960 = 100.0 
I960 1961 1962 
United States 1 279.7 111.4 118.6 
Canada 117.6 120.6 128.8 
France 261.0 102.9 103.0 
Federal Republic of Germany 593.3 106.1 91.6 
Italy 212.2 102.9 124.6 
Netherlands 62.5 75.5 46.9 
Belgium 96.5 97.1 76.4 
Sweden 87.O 90.6 97.4 
Switzerland 40.4 141.8 107.2 
United Kingdom 617.6 94.4 93.9 
Centrally planned countries 729.7 103.8 105.1 
Total world production 4 843.7 104.6 104.0 
a. Primary and secondary copper. 
















































































a. Refined and blister copper. 
b. Refined copper only. 
c. Copper ore and concentrates, gross weight. 
Source: British Bureau of Non-Ferrous Metals, World Non-Ferrous Metals 
Statistics. March 1963. 
/II. Lead and 
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11. Lead and Zinc 
Prices for lead and zinc, which had been declining since the middle of 
1957, dropped even further in 1962, despite increases of 4 percent and 3 per-
cent, respectively, in world consumption of the two metals. In 1962, the aver-
age prices for these metals on the London metal market were 12.3 percent and 
13.2 percent, lower, respectively, than the 1961 levels. In the second half of 
1962, they dropped sharply when British industrial expansion came to a halt. 
This weakness continued during the first quarter of 1963» but the prices for 
both metals began to rise in the second quarter, exceeding the levels for the 
corresponding period of I962 by 3 and 11 percent, respectively, for lead 
—whose drop in price had been greater—and for zinc. 
In the United States market, which is protected by the quotas established 
on commercial imports of these two metals, zinc prices remained unchanged in 
the two years cited and lead prices dropped 12 percent until October 1962. 
Later, a trend toward price recovery was noted, which continued throughout the 
first half of 1963, partially influenced by the increased demand in the United 
States as a result of the high production level of the automobile industry. 
Moreover, there was a certain reduction in stocks of the metals, partic-
ularly lead, whose world production registered certain increases between i960 
and 1962. Zinc production, although also higher in the past two years, increas-
ed at a slower rate (see Tables 40 and 4l). The meetings of the International 
Lead and Zinc Study Group in 1962 did not result in an agreement to give greater 
effectiveness to the recommendations for production restrictions, up to now an-
nounced voluntarily and unilaterally by certain countries, but apparently with-
out strict compliance. 
In addition to increased demand, already mentioned as one of the factors 
that helped soften the trend toward price depression in the second half of 1962, 
the announcement made by the representatives of the Soviet Union before the 
International Lead and Zinc Study Group to the effect that in 1962 the Soviet 
Union would maintain its exports at lower levels than in 1961 also had an 
effect.24/ 
In 1962, exports of lead and zinc from Mexico and Peru declined by rather 
high percentage from the levels reached in 1961. With the exception of Mexican 
lead, the production of these metals in these two countries was less than that 
of 1961 (see Table 42). 
Soviet Union exports in i960 and 1961 were: lead, 69 800 tons and 
102 3OO tons, respectively; zinc, 90 400 and 116 200 tons, respectively 




LEAD AND ZINC: STOCKS IN THE UNITED STATES 








Smelters and refiners 277  A 102.2 77.3 
Consumers 88.3 101.8 92.5 
Total 365.7 102.1 81.0 
United Kingdom: 
Consumers 21.6 98.1 107.5 
Others 50.3 110.9 _69.1 
Total 71.9 107.1 80.6 
Zinc 
United States: 
Producers 189.O 80.1 86.5 
Consumers 66.0 139.7 112.8 
Total 255.0 95.6 93.3 
United Kingdom: 
Consumers 20.5 100.5 86.1 
Others 38.4 140.2 149.2 
Total 58.9 126.2 127.1 





LEAD AND ZINC: PRODUCTION BY SELECTED COUNTRIES 




Indices: (i960 = 100.0) 
1961 1962 
Lead 
United States 223.8 106.2 96.2 
Canada 186.6 112.0 102.7 
Argentina 23.6 114.2 121.9 
Mexico 190.7 95.1 101.4 
Bolivia 21.4 94.9 86.9 
Peru 131.6 103.7 95.0 
Total world production 2 299.8 102.1 105.6 
Zinc 
United States 395.0 106.7 116.1 
Canada 390.1 103.0 116.7 
Mexico 271.4 • 99.1 92.3 
Argentina 28.6 105.7 115.5 
Peru 178.1 97.7 90.1 
Bolivia 4.0 132.4 90.6 
Total world production 3 215.0 101.8 104.4 
a. Metallic content of the ore production. 









Indices: (i960 = 100.0) 
1961 1962* 
Lead 
Mexico 148.6 115.8 92.8 
Peru 117.8 121.0 110.5 
Zinc 
Mexico 408.5 105.1 85.5 
Peru 157.8 130.9 II3.O 
Sources: Banco de Comercio Exterior, Me'xico, Revista de Comercio Exterior; 




Contrary to what happened to the metals examined above, the international 
tin market continued to be dominated by a situation in which consumer demand 
exceeded current production. This imbalance, which caused a susbtantial price 
recovery in 1961 after the decline of the previous three years, permitted prices 
to remain in 1962 at levels slightly higher than those for the previous year, 
even though the relative deficit in the stocks decreased considerably. As a 
matter of fact, whereas world tin production increased moderately between i960 
and 1962, total consumption declined in the next two years (see Table kj). 
Even more significant, however, is the fact that world production in 1962 
continued to be 16 percent below that of 1956 and was exceeded by world con-
sumption; this is why the market continued to show signs of an upturn in the 
first half of 1963. 
One of the aspects of the international tin market that created an 
uncertainty regarding price outlock in 1961 and the first half of 1962—the 
decision of the Government of the United States to sell part of its strategic 
reserves—was finally cleared up in July 1962 when the Congress of the United 
States authorized the sale of 150 000 tons of its reserves. According to 
official statements, this amount, the equivalent of one year's world production, 
will be sold over the course of several years, and in a manner that will not 
disrupt the market. At the end of August 1962, the Government of the United 
States announced that the total amount of tin that it would put on sale by the 
end of 1962 would be 5 000 tons, distributed at the rate of 200 tons a week. 
According to preliminary reports, the amount actually sold was less than the 
fixed limit. However, the possibility that the amounts put on the market— 
which constitute a potential supply of great significance—may be altered by 
administrative decision, has had a certain influence on prices, causing them 
to drop moderately in the second half of the year from those in the first half. 
In the first six months of 1963» the sales of tin from such reserves continued 
to be within the limits fixed in 1962, but later it was announced that in the 
third quarter of 1963» ^0 tons a week would be put on sale; this increase was 
adopted at the suggestion of the International Tin Council. 
In the United States, the stocks in the hands of tin consumers at the end 
of 1962 were substantially lower than at the end of the previous year. In the 
United Kingdom, stocks in authorized warehouses were only 4 000 tons as 
compared with 16 600 tons at the end of 1958. Moreover, the Stabilizing Reserve 
administered by the International Tin Council exhausted its stocks in the first 
quarter of 1961., and therefore now has the necessary financial resources to 
participate in the market, if it should become necessary. 
Tin production and exports of Bolivia continued the process of recovery 
noted in the tv/o previous years. The total exported in 1962 (almost 4 percent 
higher than that of 196l) was affected adversely only by a rail strike, in 
November, that lasted 20 days. 
/Table 43 
Table 43 
TIN: WORLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION, 1900-1902 
(1 000 
long tons!1 Indices i960 = 100.0 
I960 1961 1962 
A. Production^ 
Rep. of the Congo 8.9 74.2 81.0 
Nigeria 7.7 101.3 106.5 
Indonesia 22.6 82.3 77.9 
Malaya 52.0 107.7 112.7 
Thailand 12.1 109.9 121.5 
Bolivia 19.4 106.7 112.4 
Total world production^ 135.5 101.1 105.5 
B. Consumption 
United States 51.5 96.5 103.7 
France 11.2 90.2 . 100.0 
Italy 4.6 113.0 117.4 
Federal Republic of Germany 27.7 93.1 42.2 
United Kingdom 21.8 92.7 98.2 
Other Western European 
countries 14.1 114.2 99.3 
V 
Total world consumption-' 
167.7 98.4 93.6 
a. Metallic content of concentrates. 
b. Excludes centrally planned countries. 
Source: International Tin Council, Statistical Bulletin. May 1963. 
/The consumption 
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The consumption decline referred to above was reflected in decreased demand 
in the importing countries. In the United States, decreased imports in the past 
two years were in ore concentrates, while imports in metallic tin increased 
moderately. This tendency, however, may change in the near future, since in the 
middle of 1962 Bolivia signed a contract to supply ore concentrates to the Texas 
refining plant. 
In the principal European countries, 1962 imports showed a slight recovery 
over the low levels of 1961, but in most cases they continued to be lower than 
those of i960 (see Table 44). The most important exception was the Federal 
Republic of Germany, whose 1962 imports were substantially lower than .those for 
the two previous years. 
One of the aspects of the international tin market that should be examined 
is the role played by Soviet imports and exports. The large volume of exports 
from the Soviet Union was one of the factors that had a preponderant effect on 
the drop in international prices in 1953. Most of these exports went to Western 
European markets. In the years to follow, exports declined markedly and in 1962 
they were scarcely a quarter of the volume attained in 1953. Although initially 
that was the result of the informal agreement between the International Tin 
Council and the Soviet Union to limit exports to the markets of Western Europe, 
the substantial drop in Soviet exports in 1961 and 1962 was the result of 
decreased imports of tin from Continental China by the Soviet Union (see Table 
45). In 1962, Soviet tin exports to the rest of the world were reduced to a 




TIN: IMPORTS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(1 000 
long tons) Indices I960 = 100.0 
I960 1961 1962 
A. Concentrates^ 
United States 14.0 
Belgium 7.4 
Netherlands 6.1 
United Kingdom 24.8 
Malaya 21.5 
Total of these five 75.8 
B. Metal 
United States 59.5 
France 11.7 




United Kingdom 2.9 




























a. Metallic content. 




SOVIET UNION: TIN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
(1 U00 
long tons) Indices 1958 = 100. 0 
1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 * 
Imports 
Total̂ / 19.1 107.3 91.6 58.1 • • • 
Exports 
Eastern Europe 3.8 110.5 78.9 97.4 • • • 
Other countries 18.1 75.1 45.9 10.5 • « • 
21.9 . 81.3 51.6 25.6 10.0 
a. Almost all from Mainland China. 
Source: International Tin Council, Statistical Bulletin, May 1963. 
A3. Silver 
13. Silver 
Silver prices followed the rather significant course of non-ferrous metals 
on the international market in 1962. In the 1950's silver prices fluctuated only 
slightly on the New York market, owing to the intervention of the United States 
Treasury in the market of this metal. There has been a certain expansion in the 
use of silver for industrial purposes in recent years, but silver production has 
not increased to the same extent due, in part, to the depression that has affected 
the mining production of copper, lead, and zinc, which furnish part of the total 
silver production (see Table 46). Increased commercial demand for silver in the 
United States, in recent years, made the "free stocks" (that is to say, stocks 
not required as backing for the money in circulation) of the Treasury to drop 
from 222 million fine ounces, in April 1959 to 22 million in November 1961. This 
caused the Government of the United States to suspend sales of silver from that 
month on; this meant an elimination of the "ceiling" price established by the 
Treasury in commercial transactions of this metal. Accordingly, silver prices 
began a spiraling process that continued practically uninterrupted until the 
first months of 1963. Simultaneously with the suspension of silver sales by the 
United States Treasury, the Government proposed to Congress certain amendments 
in the laws, intended to eliminate (1) the price support that the Treasury main-
tains on silver produced in the United States, and (2) the use of silver as a 
monetary reserve (except for the minting of coins)25/. In the course of 1962, 
no decision was adopted on these proposals, and therefore, silver prices have 
been approaching (in the first months of 1963) the value of silver as a metal 
reserve for the "silver certificates" in circulation in the United States. 
Between December 1961 and December 1962, the average silver prices in New York 
rose from 103.3 to II9.9 cents per fine ounce, that is to say, an increase of 
16 percent. 




SILVER! WORLD PRODUCTION BY SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Millions of 
fine ounces) Indices: 1958 = 100.0 
1958 i960 1961 1962 
Bolivia 6.0 81.7 65.0 83.3 
Canada 51.2 109,0 100.0 99.4 
Mexico 47.6 93.5 84.7 87.2 
Peru 25.9 118.9 129.7 123.6 
United States 35.7 112.3 118.5 89.6 
Other s 58.3 95.7 93.7 98.6 
Total world 
production a/ 204.7 102.6 100.6 97.2 
a. Countries having a centrally planned economy not included. 
Source: Handy & Harman, New York, El Mercado de Valores, (Nacional Financiera 




Prices for Venezuelan crude petroleum for export have been unchanged 
since i960, even though, on several occasions, this price stability has 
been distorted by the granting of discounts from the producers' list prices. 
This practice, which the Venezuelan producers followed rather freely in i960 
and 1961, has apparently been abandoned partly owing to the opposition to it 
manifested by the Venezuelan Government and partly to the relative strengthen-
ing of demand for petroleum on the world market in the recent period. 
World production of crude petroleum has continued to expand in practi-
cally all of the principal producing areas. In 1962, production rose 8 percent 
over that of the previous year, chiefly in the Soviet Union, the Middle East, 
and Venezuela. United States production, subject to controls, has increased 
to a relatively minor extent in recent years (see Table 47). 
In Latin America, with the exception of Venezuela, the greatest increase 
in production was in Argentina, this permitted that country to increase its 
degree of self-sufficiency in petroleum products. There were small increases 
in other countries (Chile, Mexico, and Peru), while in Colombia—which has a 
small export surplus—Brazil, and Ecuador production dropped, production in 
the region as a whole increased 8.6 percent (see Table 47), 
From the standpoint of the foreign market, the development in Venezuelan 
production and exports are the most significant. Venezuelan production in 1962 
rose 9.3 percent over that of 1961. Exports of crude petroleum and petroleum 
products increased 8 percent between the two years cited (see Table 48). This 
result can be termed favorable if the condition prevailing on the world market 
are taken into account. In fact, the restrictions on the importation of crude 
petroleum and petroleum products into the United States, a country that absorbs 
a large part of Venezuelan exports, have raised a barrier to the expansion of 
Venezuelan sales, if not in absolute terms, at least regarding its percentage 
share of the increased consumption. In this connection, it should be pointed 
out that import controls put into effect in the United States for 19&3, tend 
to restrict importation even more by changing the formula that was used in 
fixing import quotas. From 1963 on, import quotas will be fixed at the equiv-
alent of 12.2 percent of domestic production of crude petroleum and natural gas, 
but imports from Canada and Mexico (which are not subject to controls) are added 
to controlled imports in computing the 12.2 percent. Thus, theoretically, 
Canada and Mexico may furnish constantly increasing proportions of imports, caus-
ing the quotas available for imports from Venezuela to decline.26/ 
As shown in Table 49, Canadian production registered a high growth 
rate in recent years. In Mexico, expansion was much lower, and,beginning in 
1962, it established a maximum  limit on exports to the United States. As a 
result, whereas the amount supplied by Canada increased from 11 percent in 
i960 to 21 percent in 1962, that of Latin America dropped from 51 percent to 




CRUDE PETROLEUM: WORLD PRODUCTION BY SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(1,000 metric 
tons) Indices: (i960 = 100.0) 
I960 1961 1962 
Argentina 9 1̂ 6 132.8 • 147.6 
Bolivia 415 85.3 94.0 
Brazil 3 871 117.4 111.1 
Chile 945 127.7 156.6 
Colombia 7 821 95.3 92.1 
Ecuador 361 108.3 91.4 
Mexico 14 125 107.7 114.7 
Peru 2 530 101.5 114.6 
Venezuela 148 831 102.2 111.9 
Total ( 104.2 113.2 
United States 347 121 101.8 103.4 
Canada 25 827 115.1 131.6 
Middle East 264 994 107.? 117.3 
Soviet Union 147 900 112.2 125.8 
.Total world 
production 1 052 042 106.4 115.1 




CRUDE PETROLEUM AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS: EXPORTS OF 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
Units 
I960 
Indices: (i960 - 100.O) 
1961 1962 
Venezuela: Crude petroleum 116.2 a/ 101.9 111.0 
Petroleum products 40.0 a/ IO5.5 111.3 
Total 156.2 a/ 102.8 111.1 
Colombia Total 31 332 b/ 87.9 77.6 
Mexico Total 2 256 ç/ 133.1 185.1 
Peru Total 786 ç/ 87.2 79.3 
a. Millions of cubic meters. 
b. Thousands of barrels. 
c. Thousands of metric tons. 
Sources: Banco Central de Venezuela, Boletín Estadística; Departamento 
Nacional de Estadística, Boletín Mensual, Bogota, Colombia; Banco de Comercio 





UNITED STATES: FOREIGN TEADE IN CRUDE PETROLEUM AND 
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 
(Millions of Indices: i960 = 100 
barrels) 
I960 1961 1962 
A. Exports 
Crude petroleum 3.1 103.2 58.1 
Petroleum products 70.8 85.2 84.o 
Total 73.9 85.9 82.9 
B. Imports 
Crude petroleum 371.6 102.7 110.6 
Petroleum products 292.5 108.7 119.0 
Total 664.1 105.3 n't.3 
C. Origin of Imports a/ 
Colombia lk.8 67.6 58.1 
Mexico 0.9 400.0 too.o 
Venezuela 172.9 90.1 97.7 
Latin America b/ 188.6 90.8 96.8 
Canada kl.3 161.3 206.3 
Middle East c/ 113.2 105.2 95.9 
Others 28.5 86.3 121.7 
Total 371.6 102.7 110.6 
D. Percentage of Imports from: 
Latin America 50.8 44.9 44.4 
(Venezuela) (46.5) (to. 8) (41.1) 
Canada 11.1 17.5 20.7 
a. Imports of crude petroleum only. There is no information available 
on the origin of imports of petroleum products. 
b. In 1961 and 1962, includes 1.8 and 1.3 million barrels imported 
from Brazil. 
c. Includes imports from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
the Neutral Zone. 
Source: American Petroleum Institute, Annual Statistical Bulletin. 
New York, April 1963. 
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Another important aspect of the growing change in the international petro-
leum market is Soviet exports. The rapid expansion in that country's produc-
tion—in 1961 and 1962 it exceeded Venezuelan production, becoming the second 
largest producer of crude petroleum in the world—has been accompanied by a 
definite effort to penetrate the markets of Western Europe. The most recent 
figures available on the volume of exports from the Soviet Union go only as 
far as 1961, but by then its total exports of crude petroleum and petroleum 
products were 155«5 percent and 95«6 percent, respectively, higher than the 
figures for 1958. 
Relatively speaking, the development of greatest significance within the 
Latin American region was with Mexican exports, which were 59 percent higher 
in 1962 than in 1961. This is a result of the exemption from the above-men-
tioned United States controls on imports from Mexico. Colombian and Peruvian 
exports, however, declined sharply in the last two years, partly due to the 
tendency for domestic consumption to grow more than production capacity. 
/C. TOTAL 
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C. TOTAL EXPORTS AND THEIR GEOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE 
The total value of latin American exports in 1962 increased 6 percent 
over the figure for the previous year, and for the first time exceeded that 
reached in 1957 (see Table 50). The study of the foreign market conditions 
of the chief export products appearing on preceding pages, provides certain 
facts for determining the prevailing trends in the exportation of each of the 
countries, but undoubtedly, in addition to the external factors, there are 
other domestic factors that play an important role under certain circumstances. 
As has already been pointed out, generally, it should be noted that in most 
cases the increased value of exports reflects increases in the volume of 
products exported, more than an improvement in price level. Only in two 
cases, sugar and tin, was the improvement in foreign prices more important 
than the volume exported in the total contribution to the value of the exports 
of the various countries. 
Thus, it is obvious that, although the 1962 exports show a marked im-
provement over the conditions of the immediately preceding years, they have 
not yet recovered the dynamic growth trend of the years prior to 1956/57» 
This is particularly evident if it is noted that the over-all improvement 
that occurred in 1962 in four countries-'̂ Argentina, Mexico, Peru and Vene-
zuela— exceeded that of the region as a whole.27/ 
Within this group of countries, the increase in the exports of Peru is 
a singular case. In I960, large-scale exploitation of new copper deposits 
was begun; copper exports were three times the amount of the previous years. 
To that was added, in 1961 and 1962, the transfer of sales of sugar from the 
free market to the United States market, at higher prices. Moreover, there 
has been a considerable expansion in exports of fishery products in the past 
three years. Finally, the rise in silver prices in 1962 also increased 
income from exports of lead and zinc that year. This combination of sub-
stantial increases in the volume of exports of certain products and improved 
prices in others, which has occurred in practically no other Latin American 
country in recent years, explains the high rate of expansion in Peru's export 
value since 1958. 
In Mexico, whose basic exports are not very different,in over-all terms, 
from those of Peru, the copper, lead; and zinc mines have not contributed to 
the increase in exports in recent years. The improvement in silver prices in 
27. In absolute terms, these four countries obtained the largest in-




LATIN AMERICA: EXPORTS BY PRINCIPAL REGIONS OF DESTINATION, 1960-1962 
Millions of 
dollars 
Indices Percentages of the total 
I960 = 100 
I960 1961 1962 1962 I960 1961 
United States 3 600 90.8 93.9 41.8 37.7 37.7 
Canada 145 110.3 120.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 
Western Europe 2 720 101.5 112.5 31.6 31.8 33.3 
European Economic Community 1 58O 101.3 114 6 18.3 18.5 19.7 
European Free Trade Ass'n. 1 010 97.0 102.0 11.7 11.3 11.2 
Other Western European 
Countries 130 138.5 169.2 1.5 2.1 2.4 
Japan 240 141.7 139.6 2.8 3.9 3.6 
Other Asian countries 36 197.2 161.1 0.4 0.8 0.6 
Soviet Union 135 255.6 277.8 1.6 4.0 4.1 
Eastern Europe 130 123.1 146.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 
Continental China 41 185.4 243.9 0.5 0.9 1.1 
Africa 75 101.3 122.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 
Latin America 680 • 83.8 91.2 7.9 6.6 6.7 
Others a/ 808 104.2 100.9 9.4 9.7 8.9 
T o t a l 8 610 100.7 106.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a. Most of these figures are for exports of crude petroleum from Venezuela to the 
Netherlands Antilles. 
Source: United Nations, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, June 1963. 
A962 was 
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1962 was a stimulus to the exportation of silver, whose production had been 
dropping since 1958. Just as Peru, Mexico benefited from the change that 
occurred in the United States sugar market, since its exports to that country 
increased substantially, along with exports of cattle on the hoof and petro-
leum products. Finally, cotton exports—which declined in I960 and 1961— 
reached, in 1962, the highest level in the past five years. Mexico, moreover, 
is one of the countries that has succeeded in increasing its trade with other 
countries within the region, especially with some of the other members of 
the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). 
Argentine exports, which declined in 1961 because of the substantial 
drop in grain production caused by a prolonged drought, recovered in 1962, reach-
ing levels not attained since 1953• The principal export products of this 
country were not subject to excessive price fluctuations on the foreign markets 
in 1962, although at the end of that year and in the beginning of 1963, there 
were sharp drops in meat prices. Wool was the only important exception. To 
a large extent, the changes in the value of total exports have reflected 
changes in the volume of available surplus for export. 
Finally, Venezuela is one of the few countries where the relative price 
stability of its principal export product—petroleum and petroleum products— 
has coincided with an increasing volume of production and exports, despite 
certain unfavorable aspects brought about by the conditions on the international 
petroleum market. 
The trend in Latin American exports by principal region of destination 
showed certain changes in 1961-62, which were largely due to the interruption 
of trade between Cuba and the United States and the shift in Cuban exports 
to countries having a centrally planned economy. This partially explains 
the reduction noted in exports to the United States and, at the same time, the 
increase in exports to the centrally planned countries. Other Latin American 
countries have also succeded in expanding their exports to centrally planned 
countries, chiefly in products such as coffee, cacao, cotton, wool, and cow-
hides, although the absolute values continue to be relatively low 28/ (see 
Table 50). 
A significant development, however, is that of exports to the European 
Economic Community. In 1962, these exports increased markedly, as a result, 
as has already been seen, of the expansion—and in certain cases, the recovery— 
of sales of cotton, beef, corn, wheat, coffee, and certain other products. It 
Both Argentina and Brazil—which supply about 85 percent of non-Cuban 
latin American exports to the Soviet bloc— sell three times as much to Eastern 




is obvious, however, that the preferential arrangements with the African 
countries that are associated to the Community, and the regulations of the 
common agricultural policy have not been completed, and that, therefore, 
the expected restrictions have not yet been fully manifested. 
In 1962, there was a 12 percent increase in Latin American intra-
regional exports over those of 1961, representing a partial recovery from the 
1961 decline. However, within the totals for these last two years, there are 
certain changes that should be examined. First, the drop in I96I reflected 
chiefly a decline in exports from Argentina and Venezuela, which, in turn, 
resulted from widely differing causes. In the case of Argentina, it was 
caused by a reduction in the exports of grain owing to a short harvest; and 
in Venezuela, a decrease in exports of petroleum and petroleum products, owing 
to the disappearance of markets such as those of Cuba and Argentina. 29/ Owing 
to the high proportion of Venezuelan and Argentine exports in the total regional 
exports (34 percent and 25 percent, respectively, in I960), the drop in these 
two countries affected considerably the total figures for the region, despite 
the fact that other countries — Brazil, Chile and Mexico, principally--increased 
their exports to the region in that year (see Table 51)• 
Argentine and Venezuelan exports recovered partially in 1962 from the 
decline of the previous year. The same thing happened to Peruvian exports, 
which exceeded substantially those of the two previous years. This situation, 
combined with the increases in the exports of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Fàraguay, 
and Uruguay was the reason for the favorable result already mentioned in Latin 
American intraregional trade as a whole. 
Of special interest is the development of LAFTA trade. Unfortunately, 
as yet, only fragmentary data are available. In 1962, Latin American intra- />, 
regional exports increased in seven of the nine member countries, the 
exceptions being Brazil and Ecuador. However, if account is taken of the fact 
that in Argentina the 1962 figures reflect only a partial recovery and that, 
to a certain extent, this is also true of Peru, it would appear that actually 
the expansion in Latin American intraregional exports has not yet acquired a 
sustained growth rate. However, it is significant that it is the LAFTA member 
countries that, in 1962, exceeded, as a whole, the i960 figures. In short, 
exports from Mexico to Brazil increased considerably (from 1.8 million dollars 
in 1961 to 7.6 million dollars in 1962), a trend that apparently continued 
during the first half of 1963.30/ 
29. In Cuba, supplies from the Soviet Union replaced those from Venezuela, 
and in Argentina, expansion of domestic production decreased import requirements. 
30. See Banco de Comercio Exterior, Comercio Exterior, Mexico, July 1963. 
/in the Central 
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In the Central American countries, trade with the rest of Latin America 
declined in 1962. An increase was recorded in intra-area trade, according 
to the over-all figures 51/ (see Table 51)• 
31. For a more detailed analysis of Central American intraregional 




LATIN AMERICAN INTRAREGIONAL EXPORTS, 1960-1962 a/ 
! - • Millions of 
dollars Indices: i960 = 100.0 
I960 1961 1962 * 
Argentina 171.1 65.8 89.2 
Brazil 89.0 109.6 88.4 
Chile 38.2 118.6 134.8 
Colombia 8.9 105.6 125.8 
Ecuador 9.1 91.2 68.1" 
Mexico 24.2 124.8 158.7 
Paraguay 8.9 110.1 121.3 
Peru 43.3 88.7 120.3 
Uruguay 4.0 157.5 227.5 
Subtotal 396.7 90.3 103.5 
Costa Rica 4.8 104.1 79.2 
El Salvador 12.6 119.8 103.2 b/ 
Guatemala 6.0. 145.0 58.3 ~ 
Honduras 12.9 89.9 121.7 b/ 
Nicaragua 4.1 . 87.8 114.6 ~ 
Subtotal 40.4 108.9 100.7 
Bolivia 8.4 78.6 83.3 
Dominican Republic 0.8 175.0 187.5 
Haiti - - — 
Panama 0.1 100.0 100.0 
Venezuela 231.8 72.2 82.0 0/ 
Subtotal 241.1 72.8 82.4 
Total 678.9 85.2 95.8 
a. The totals given in this table for 1961 and 1962 are slightly higher 
than those in Table 50, because they include revisions and estimates that 
came after the publication of the total figures for the region. 
b. Estimates based on nine months. 
c. Estimates based on seven months. 
Source: United Nations, Direction of International Trade. The 1962 figures 
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CHAPTER I I 
LATIN AMERICA'S CAPACITY TO IMPORT, AND ITS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS^ 
A. TOTAL CAPACITY TO IMPORT, ITS UTILIZATION, AND THE 
NET BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Changes during 1962 in total capacity to import have varied so widely be-
tween individual Latin American countries2/ that most generalizations about the 
region as a whole can be dangerously misleading. Total foreign exchange receipts 
from current and non-compensatory financial sources rose in 12 countries of the 
region between 1961 and 1962 (see Table 52); in eight—Bolivia, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru—the 
rate of increase was particularly high. On the other hand, sharp declines in 
total capacity to import were recorded in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. As a 
combined result of these different trends from one country to another, the to-
tal of Latin America's import capacity was lower in 1962 than in 1961, but did 
not exceed 2.2 percent, however, even if the rising, negative errors and omis-
sions item in the balance of payments is considered to be related mainly to 
the movements of non-compensatory capital. 
1. The terminology and the tools of analysis used throughout this chapter 
are the same aè those used and defined in details in Chapter II of the Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 1961, (Pan American Union, Washington 1962). The ca-
pacity to import is the algebraic sum of the export of goods, the net service 
balance and the net balance of donations and non-compensatory capital movements. 
The net service balance includes remittances of profit and interest but excludes 
gross foreign exchange expenditures for transportation and insurance of imports. 
That is, the import capacity and the imports referred to in this chapter are on 
a c.i.f. basis. The expenditures for transportation and insurance in practice 
are inseparable from imports. In addition, for certain Latin American countries 
chronological series of f.o.b. import values are not available. While compen-
satory accounts are defined as financing operations carried out by monetary 
authorities for the exclusive purpose of equalizing the credits and debits of 
the balance of payments, the movements of non-compensatory (or autonomous) cap-
ital correspond to a commercial operation or a specific investment. More de-
tails on the composition of non-compensatory and compensatory movements are 
given in sections B and C, respectively. According to the general definition 
given above, the difference between total capacity to import and actual imports 
represents the over-all deficit or surplus in the balance of payments. This 
deficit or surplup generally differs from the net balance on compensatory ac-
counts due to errors and omissions which would be related mainly to capital move-
ments induced by speculative or extra-economic motives. In some countries, 
however, overvaluation or undervaluation of exports, imports or foreign tourism 
transactions seems to be another source of errors and omissions. Official data 
from the IMF's Balance of Payments Yearbooks include adjustments for contraband. 
2. Because of the lack of data on Cuba's balance of payments in i960, 
1961 and 1962, this country is not included in the analysis except where 
specific indication is made to the contrary. 
/Table 52 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL CAPACITY TO IMPORT, 1961 AND 1962 
(in millions of dollars) 
1961 1962* 
Countries whose total capacity to import 
increased • 
Bolivia 86 114 
Chile 530 556 
Colombia 424 519 
Costa Rica 100 114 
Dominican Republic 108 195 
Ecuador 105 142 
El Salvador 120 129 
Honduras 71 81 
Mexico 1 343 1 448 
Nicaragua 65 95 
Panama 180 212 
Peru 492 549 
Countries whose total capacity to import 
decreased 
Argentina 1 239 1 059 
Brazil 1 563 1 224 
Guatemala 133 122 
Haiti V? 41 
Paraguay 59 52 
Uruguay 190 140 
Venezuela 1 185 1 133 
Total for Latin America 8 040 7.925 
Sources and Method of Estimates; For 1961: International Monetary Fund, 
Balance of Payments Yearbook, Vol. 14. For 1962; 
Provisional balance of payments data from IMF's, International Financial 
Statistics, August 1963 and Balance of Payments Yearbook Vol. 15. July 
and August 1963. For the following countries; Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Paraguay. 
In estimating total capacity to import of the other countries—Argentina, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela—the following method was used: the value of 
imports was known as well as the net balance of payments through the varia-
tions in the compensatory accounts, and the approximate value of the total 
capacity to import was obtained by subtraction. Next, by subtracting the 
value of commodity exports--which also were known—the over-all net 
balance for service and capital accounts was obtained. An estimate of the 
/net service 
(cont. Table 52) 
net service balance was made, taking into account the relative stability of 
this item as well as the changes in the service transactions shown by the 
United States balance of payments with Latin America. Finally, the net 
balance for donations and non-compensatory capital accounts was calculated 
as a residual figure. These calculations were based on data from the IMF's, 
International Financial Statistics and from the following non-official 
sources: Economic Survey, Buenos Aires, March 1963 for Argentina; and; 
Memoria del Banco Central de Venezuela for the year 1962 for Venezuela. 
/There was 
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There was, however, a considerable shift in the distribution of the region's 
foreign exchange receipts between current income and financial receipts. While 
Latin America's total exports rose by approximately five percent, the net inflow 
of capital and donations registered a sudden downturn during the past year (see 
Table 53). The improvement in export trade, which took place in lb out of 19 
Latin American countries was the main factor responsible for the strength-
ening of the total capacity to import in EL Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua and 
Peru.5/ In some other countries—Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and 
Honduras—there also were favorable changes in the total net balance of dona-
tions and capital transactions. Only in Bolivia, however, did the rise in im-
port capacity result almost exclusively from an increase in the net inflow of 
external financial resources. On the other hand, a net outflow of capital took 
place in Argentina, Haiti and Venezuela in 1962. As a result, the import 
capacity of these three countries declined during the past year in spite of the 
sizeable increment recorded by their exports. Guatemala, Brazil and Uruguay 
suffered from both a fall in their exports and a worsening in the capital ac-
count of their balance of payments; the latter two countries were those regis-
tering the greatest declines in import capacity. 
Changes in the value of imports also differed from one Latin American 
country to another. In only four out of 19, however, was there a decline in 
1962 over 1961 (see Table 54)} and in only two of these—Argentina and Chile-
could the drop be described as large. In the aggregate, Latin America's 
imports increased but slightly between 1961 and 1962. 
For several consecutive years in the recent past, Latin America's over-
all balance of payments has shown a deficit. Since in 1962 there was a slight 
decline in the region's import capacity and an increase—also small—in its 
imports, the negative balance of external transactions rose in relation to 1961. 
It amounted to approximately 10 percent of non-compensatory foreign exchange 
receipts available for financing purchases abroad, against 7.5 percent in the 
previous year. This worsening of the region's external disequilibrium mainly 
reflected the shift from a surplus to a deficit in Brazil's balance of pay-
ments (see again Table 54). In 1962 a total of 10 Latin American countries 
registered imports in excess of non-compensatory foreign exchange receipts. 
Moreover, although the nine remaining countries recorded surpluses in their 
3. Due to an increase in the negative balance of errors and omissions 
it is doubtful that capacity to import actually improved in Chile, although 
export value was greater than in 1961. 
/Table 5 
Table 53 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL CAPACITY TO IMPORT AND PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS, 1960-62 
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Sources: See Table 52 
Table 5» 
LATIU AMERICA: CAPACITY TO HPORI t IMPORTS9 AH D BALAHCE-OF-PAIHEHTS POSITION, 1960-62 
( in mi l l i on» of  d o l l a r s ) 
I960 1961 1962» 
t o t a l oapaeity Imports j l e t t o t a l Errors and Total oapaeity laports Het t o t a l Errors and Total oapaeity laports Met t o t a l Errors and 
to iaport CIF balance o a i s s i o a s to iaport CIF balance Omissions t o iaport CIF balance omiss ions 
Argentina 1 589 1 249 140 4 1 239 1 460 _ 221 11 1 059 1 350 291 
Bol ivia 75 80 - ' 5 3 86 as 4 - 2 114 104 10 14 
Brazi l 1 09* 1 462 - '368 - 43 1 563 1 460 103 _ 2 1 224 1 475 _ 251 _ 157 C h i l . 444 540 - 96 34 530 614 - 84 - 47 556 554 2 71 
Coloabia 515 542 - 27 - 15 424 580 _ 156 _ 9 519 586 _ 67 _ 3 Costa Rica 102 112 - 10 - 1 100 109 - 9 - 2 114 116 _ 2 6 Doainiean Republio 129 97 32 - 25 108 81 27 _ 41 195 152 43 _ 31 Ecuador 128 126 2 - 4 105 117 - 12 - 3 142 133 9 3 
El Salvador 103 123 - 20 - 2 120 109 11 - 18 129 125 4 4 
Guatea*la 144 142 2 4 133 137 _ 4 - 2 122 140 _ 18 1 Haiti 51 43 8 - 6 47 42 5 - 3 41 45 _ 4 _ 2 Honduras 73 73 - - 1 71 73 - 2 _ 1 81 83 _ 2 2 Mexico 1 143 1 192 - 49 - 32 1 343 1 143 200 - 248 1 448 1 155 293 _ 221 Nioaragua 65 66 - 1 - 3 65 69 - 4 _ 1 95 88 7 _ 2 Panana 160 171 - 11 5 180 200 - 20 13 212 224 _ 12 11 Paraguay 48 50 - 2 - 1 59 55 4 - 1 52 47 5 _ 6 Peru 386 368 18 - 4 492 461 31 4 549 533 16 _ 3 Uruguay 201 229 - 28 1 190 208 - 18 - 36 140 230 _ 90 Veneaiela 1 366 1 305 61 — 370 1 185 1 218 - 33 - 11 1 133 1 178 - 45 • •• 
Total for  Latin 
Aaerioa 7 616 7 970 - 354 - 456 8 040 8 218 178 - 417 7 925 8 318 - 393 - 463 
Sources» See Table 52. 
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1962 balance of payments; only Peru, however, enjoyed a truly favorable ex-
ternal position during the last three years. 
Even though Brazil's deficit in 1962 was somewhat lower than in i960, it 
represented no less than 30 percent of total import capacity. The resumption 
of such a basically unfavorable trend in the Brazilian economy resulted from, 
the downward inflexibility of imports and the fall in total import capacity. 
It is noteworthy that for three consecutive years imports have been almost 
constant in spite of considerable differences in current internal conditions 
and in the annual rate of real economic growth. On the other hand, the 
chronic deficit on current account increased considerably because the great 
improvement registered by merchandise exports in the preceding year was not 
repeated (see Table 55)» While in 1961 the freely fluctuating rates of 
exchange had helped to foster minor Brazilian exports, the introduction of a 
fixed rate in January 1962 apparently had the opposite effect.k/ Further-
more, current earnings from coffee exports diminished by approximately ¡¡>80 
million. Had Brazil's net inflow of capital been as large as in 1961, it 
would have sufficed to cover the deficit on current account, but it was 
actually much lower in consequence of the combined influence of a decline in 
foreign direct investment, heavy amortization payments of the external debt, 
and some capital flight.5/ 
The most conspicuous feature of Uruguay's external position during the 
last three years has been a chronic and very large deficit on current account. 
Both the low level of receipts and the high level of expenditures have been 
responsible for this situation. In 1962 a new decline in exports raised the 
deficit up to approximately 4-3 percent of the current capacity to import. At 
the same time, the capital account registered a growing outflow of funds, 
which was most likely caused in part by the basic disequilibrium affecting 
Uruguay's current foreign transactions. In any case, the balance of payments 
crisis tended to become aggravated in a cumulative way during the first 
months of 1963, and in May, for the second time within four years, the 
Uruguayan peso was devalued, this time by 50 percent. 
See Bank of London and South America, Quarterly Review, April 1963, 
page 82. The coffee export rate and the free rate were as follows (in 
cruzeiros per dollar): 
i960 1961 1962 
Coffee export rate 90 135 3-82 
Free rate 205 3l8 Vf5 I'F-S. 
July 1963 
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Argentina and Chile have also experienced recurrent and serious 
difficulties in their foreign payments, hardly less acute than those of 
Brazil and Uruguay. Argentina's export returns in 1962, however, not only 
exceeded their exceptionally low level of 1961 but also each of the annual 
figures since 1956. Since the stagnation of exports has been a basic weakness 
of the country's external position during the last decade, the experience 
of 1962 can certainly be regarded as favorable.6/ Moreover, a simultaneous 
decline in purchases abroad helped to reduce by more than two thirds the 
negative balance on merchandise account (from $496 million in 1961 to $140 
million in 1962). On the other hand, the next outflow of funds on capital 
account contrasted sharply with the huge inflow of external financial re-
sources that took place in 1961. The improvement in the trade balance has 
its negative aspects, however, insofar as the downturn in imports resulted 
from an absolute decline in over-all economic activity and from a serious 
lack of liquidity within the country. For several years, as in the case of 
Brazil, a large portion of Argentine imports have been financed with short-
and medium-term  loans (see Table 53)» In 1962, payments made for the amorti-
zation of these credits, as well as remittances of profits and interest, 
exerted strong pressures on the availabilities of foreign exchange. Further-
more, the maintenance until April 1962 of an overvalued exchange rate,2/ and, 
later, the growing political instability, certainly played a role in the 
flight of domestic and foreign capital.8/ 
While Chile's exports increased much less than those of Argentina and 
only regained their i960 level, the external transactions recorded on capital 
account show for 1962 a net inflow of funds much smaller than in 1961 (see 
again Table 53)• The negative errors of the balance of payments data, more-
over, record an increase from $47 to million between these two years.' 
Insofar as these errors and omissions represent a flight of capital, it can 
be assumed that total import capacity actually did. not increase but was 
practically the same in 1961. In any case, Chile's imports decreased con-
siderably in 1962. Accordingly, the negative balance of external trans-
actions was reduced by approximately one half in relation to the previous 
The official data, used in this Survey, may indeed underestimate the 
1962 improvement considerably. Estimates based on the physical volume of 
Argentina's principal exports, and on international market quotations, indi-
cate that exports may actually have grown by more than another $100 million. 
Likewise, it is presumed that the IMF unit value figures for 1962 incorporate 
this bias, which may be related to the valuation of exports after the March 
1962 devaluation. 
7. The rate of exchange was as follows: 
1959 i960 1961 1962 1962 1962 1962 
1st. qtr. 2nd. qtr. 3rd. qtr. 4th.qtr. 
In pesoB per dollar 83 83 83 83 135 129 134 
In the first quarter of 1962 the Central Bank intervened massively on 
the foreign exchange market. 
8. To some extent the flight of domestic capital might have been 




year; this result was obtained in spite of a slight rise in the rate of 
economic growth. Still, this was the third deficit in three consecutive 
years and it amounted to almost 13 percent of total import capacity. 
Throughout 1962 the external value of the Chilean escudo fell sharply in 
the free market, which had been created at the end of 1961 for certain 
invisible transactions. From October onwards, this devaluation extended 
to the official exchange rates applying to exports and imports. More 
recently, however, the latter rate has tended to stabilize at approximately 
1.9 escudos per dollar against I.05 a year earlier. 
Colombia and Venezuela also suffered from three consecutive balance of 
payments deficits in the last three years and had to devalue their national 
currencies during this period. In Colombia, however, the external disequili-
brium affecting the economy was less acute and the devaluation of much 
smaller proportions than in Chile, as was also the rate of growth of GNP. 
Although the increase in Colombia's exports in 1962, and. the decline in net 
payments for services (see Table 53)> were each of limited size, together 
they contributed to reduce noticeably the negative balance on current account. 
Moreover, the net inflow of private capital rose in the last year, and the 
balance of official capital movements turned from negative to positive, 
mainly because of an extension in the period of repayment of some heavy 
external debts and an increase in disbursements on authorized loans. While 
all these circumstances determined a decline in 1962 in the over-all balance 
of payments deficit, a downward adjustment of the external value of the 
Colombian peso was carried out in November as a more basic step toward ex-
ternal equilibrium. Within the framework of a multiple exchange system, this 
devaluation mainly affected the selling and buying rates other than those 
applying to coffee exports. 
In Venezuela, the partial devaluation of the bolivar goes back to mid-
1960. Together with some direct trade restrictions, it has contributed con-
siderably to the cutting down of the foreign deficit from the very high 
figures of 1959 and early i960. As exports rose in 1962 and imports were 
somewhat lower than in 1961, the usual surplus on merchandise account amounted 
to $1 387 million against $1 282 million the preceding year. The increase in 
gross export receipts, however, was almost completely offset by a correspond-
ing rise in remittances of profits accruing from foreign direct investment in 
petroleum and mining. The flight of domestic capital apparently decreased 
considerably,tyj but, on the other hand, a rather large amount of disinvest-
ment by foreign enterprises continued to take place in the petroleum sector.^ 
9. See Memoria del Banco Central de Venezuela, for 1962, page l6. 
10. It may be, however, that misreporting of repatriated profits partly 
produced this result so that the capital outflow is overstated at the same 
time as the negative balance on service account. 
/Moreover, 
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Moreover, heavy repayments were made on loan accounts, rsininly for the 
amortization of compensatory and short-term loans received in previous years. 
As a result, the net outflow of funds on capital account continued to be 
very large, and the balance of payments deficit—however small in relative 
terms—was practically the same as in 1961 (see Table 5'+). 
In several other Latin American countries the balance of payments 
positions, though not basically weak, have tended to be rather unstable from 
one year to another. Among these countries only one, Ecuador, devalued its 
currency during the 1960-62 period.11/ Honduras, Panama and Paraguay practi-
cally succeeded in balancing their foreign transactions in 1962. Bolivia, 
Guatemala and Haiti, on the other hand, registered a worsening in their ex-
ternal positions in relation to 1961. For several years, these three Latin 
American countries have relied heavily upon foreign grants for paying their 
imports. In both, Guatemala and Haiti, the amount of such grants declined 
considerably in 1962. In Bolivia, official donations as well as the net inflow 
of capital actually increased in the last year. But these additional resources 
were not large enough to finance the extraordinary rise in imports, and the 
balance of payments of the country turned from positive to slightly negative. 
On the other hand, between 1961 and 1962, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador and Nicaragua recorded a shift from a deficit to a surplus 
in their foreign payments. While in 1961 purchases abroad by the first three 
countries had failed to adjust downward to the fall in non-compensatory foreign 
exchange receipts, in 1962 the reverse occurred: the increase in imports lagged 
behind the rise in import capacity. In El Salvador and Nicaragua, the sustained 
growth of merchandise exports since i960 has been the main factor responsible 
for reducing the foreign deficit in 1961 and determining a surplus in 1962. 
Although Mexico's balance of payments has also been unstable during the 
last decade, the cycle of its fluctuations has tended to be longer than in 
the abovementioned countries. In the long run, moreover, Mexico's external 
position has been much more favorable than that of other Latin American 
countries of comparable economic size, such as Argentina and Brazil. The 
last foreign exchange crisis in Mexico occurred in 195̂  and resulted in a 
devaluation of the peso. A period of strengthening of the balance of pay-
ments followed, but this trend was reversed from 1957 onwards. During the 
last three years, however, a marked improvement has again taken place in the 
country's external position; the foreign deficit declined substantially 
between I960 and I96I and turned to a surplus in 1962. Among the positive 
factors contributing to this have been the increasing diversification of 
merchandise exports, the steady growth of tourism receipts, the large amount 
of foreign loans obtained from private and official sources, and the successes 
achieved in substituting imports by domestic production without causing 
strong inflationary pressures. On the other hand, erratic movements of 
foreign direct investment and domestic capital, increases in remittances of 
11. This devaluation was carried out in 1961. 
/profits, fluctuations 
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profits, fluctuations in agricultural output for export, and falls or stag-
nation in primary products prices, have all had an adverse impact on Mexico's 
import capacity. In 1962, however, there was an upturn in cotton sales, and 
the receipts from tourism continued to rise, while the value of imports was 
was practically the same as in 1961. As a result, the current account of the 
balance of payments recorded a surplus for the first time since 1951. The 
positive balance of the external transactions on capital account, however, 
although relatively large, was smaller than in the previous years, because 
loan disbursements from foreign sources were offset to some extent by an in-
crease in the outflow of short-term capital over the last two years, during 
which period over-all economic growth also slackened. 
This decline in the rate of development of total output may, in turn, be 
regarded as one of the factors in the improvement of the balance of payments 
position insofar as it has been responsible for the relative stagnation of 
imports. 
Like most other of the Latin American countries, Peru was unable during 
the fifties to escape foreign payments difficulties and avoid a loss in the 
external value of its currency. In the more recent past, however, its external 
situation has been exceptionally good. Three consecutive and large increases 
in Peruvian imports took place beginning in i960, without affecting the external 
equilibrium of the national economy. In fact, the rise in import capacity was 
large and steady enough to make it possible to obtain a balance of payements 
surplus in these three years. It must be pointed out that the financing of 
additional imports did not stem from an excessive rise in foreign indebtedness 
but, rather, from the upward trend of Peru's foreign exchange receipts, caused, 
in turn, by the growth of increasingly diversified exports. Repayments on 
external loans were made regularly and remittances of profits and interests did 
not show any substantial changes between i960 and 1962. There was, however, 
some flight of Peruvian capital, particularly in mid-1962. This outflow of 
funds, which can be attributed mainly to non-economic considerations, did not 
permanently affect Peru's external position adversely because of the rapid 
increase in foreign exchange receipts. As far as the prospects for the near 
future are concerned, however, it is unlikely that exports will continue to 
grow at quite the same rate as in past years. In particular, the recent and 
very large increases in the sales of Peruvian fishmeal, which started from a 
very low level in absolute terms, are not likely to continue indefinitely. 




B. NON-COMPENSATORY CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
The net flow of non-comperisatory capital into Latin America recorded a down-
turn in 1962 after two years of successive increases. This decline in autonomous 
financial receiptsl2/ amounted to several hundred million dollars in absolute 
terms and reduced by more than two-thirds the 1961 figure (see Table 56). It ex-
plains, moreover, why the region's foreign deficit rose in 1962 in spite of a 
marked improvement in the current account of the balance of payments. The total 
flow of capital, including the changes in liabilities on compensatory accounts,!̂  
was substantially higher than the autonomous financial receipts during the last 
three years (see Table 57)» Furthermore, in 1962 the net inflow of external re-
sources on compensatory accounts were greater than those of a non-compensatory 
nature, and not much smaller than in the previous year. Nevertheless, the total 
flow of capital decreased by almost one-half in relation to 1961. 
Several important qualifications must be made, however, concerning the true 
meaning of these recent changes. As pointed out above, the over-all figures for 
Latin America in fact cover divergent trends as far as the various countries and 
items of the capital account are concerned. First, the fall in autonomous finan-
cial receipts of Latin America reflects primarily the unfavorable experiences of 
12. Including donations. The data available at this time, as well as the 
method used in estimating the balance of payments of some countries (see foot-
note 1 of this chapter, and the sources for Table 52) do not allow for separating 
donations from capital movement for Latin America as a whole. The decline indi-
cated above and in Table 56 refers to the region's total, also shown in column 5 
of Table 55 (net balance of capital movements and grants). Since private dona-
tions are relatively small and stable, it can be assumed that they did not con-
tribute significantly to the over-all change in the net balance of capital move-
ments and grants between 1961 and 1962. An estimate of private donations is 
given in Table 58 together with data on the composition of capital movements. 
Table 58 also includes official data on grants made by the United States 
Government. These grants represent almost the totality of the official dona-
tions made to Latin America. 
13. This total excludes assets on compensatory accounts since they repre-
sent the reserves of international means of payments at the permanent disposal 
of the national monetary authorities. On the other hand, liabilities on com-
pensatory accounts include deferred import payments. Indeed, the non-payment of 
due commercial debts implies external financing although it does not necessarily 
constitute a loan made voluntarily by the creditor country, and certainly does 
not improve the external credit of the debtor country. As it will be shown in 
section C, this unorthodox method of financing balance of payments deficit re-




LATIN AMERICA: NET BALANCES ON THE MAIN ACCOUNTS OF POREI® PAYMENTS, 
1960-1962 
(in millions of dollars) 
I960 1961 1962* 
Balance on Current Account -888 -1 o4o -659 
Net Over-all Balance of Non-
compensatory Capital and Grants 534 862 266 
Errors and Omissions -456 -417 -463 
Compensatory Accounts 810 595 856 ' 
Source: See Tables 53> 54 and 55. 
/Table 57 
Table 57 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL FLOW OF CAPITAL,*/ I96O-I962 
(in millions of dollars) 
I960 1961 1962*. 
A - Net Flow of Non-compensatory 
Capital and Grants 534 862 266 
B - Changes in total liabilities on 
Compensatory Accounts 845 521 396 
Total Capital A + B 1 379 1 383 662 
a. For the definition of the total flow of capital see footnote 13, this Chapter. 
Source: See Tables 52 and 53-
/a few 
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a few countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, which heavily influence the re-
gion's total. Secondly, the decline in the gross inflow of non-compensatory 
capital was of a lesser magnitude than the increase recorded by the gross out-
flow, which was considerable as a result of heavy amortization payments and a 
rise in the recorded flight of Latin American capital. Thirdly, insofar as the 
errors and omissions have corresponded to unrecorded flight of financial re-
sources, it must be added that in 1962 there was only a slight rise in the nega-
tive balance on this account. Lastly, the net inflow in 1962 of non-compensatory 
official capital and donations from the United States were practically the same 
as in 1961 and the financial contribution of international organizations actually 
increased. 
Loans and grants made by the United States Government now constitute the 
most important factor on the credit side of the capital account. This role had 
been played before by United States private capital, the importance of which has 
also recently tended to decline in absolute terms. Because of the lack of de-
tailed data, movements of private and official capital from other sources, as 
well as the transactions related to Latin American capital, must be grouped under 
the residual item "other capital" (see Table 58)• While the wide fluctuations 
in this item used to be partly the consequence of the erratic movements regis-
tered by Latin American private assets, its considerably negative balance in 
1962 reflected also the heavy amortization payments made by Argentina and Brazil 
to creditor countries, especially in Western Europe, as well as a decline in the 
gross inflow of private capital from countries other than the United States. 
1. Official loans and grants 
a. The United States contribution 
While the United States' non-compensatory contribution in 1961 was character-
ized mostly by a very large increase in its amount in relation to the previous 
year, in 1962 it underwent changes mainly in its structure; in 1962 it totalled 
almost $500 million, practically the same as in 1961. There were, however, con-
siderable increases in official grants and loan disbursements by the Agency for 
International Development (AID), and to a lesser extent by the Social Progress 
Trust Fund, and sharp declines in those made by the Export and Import Bank of 
Washington (EXIMBANK) and under Public Law 480 (see Table 59). Since AID is 
specifically designed to meet the needs of underdeveloped countries, its growing 
importance as a lending institution constitutes a positive step toward a sound 
financing of economic growth in Latin America.Ik/  Official grants too, are a 
valuable contribution, especially when they provide basic resources to countries 
whose foreign exchange receipts are not even sufficient to finance current im-
ports of raw materials and essential consumers' goods. 
Í5T Low interest rates, amortization at long term (and in some cases in the 
currency of the debtor country), as well ae a wide range of economic and social 





LATIN AMERICA: COMPOSITION OF NON-COMPENSATORY  CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, 
1960-1962 
(in millions of dollars) 
I 9 6 0 1961 1962* 
A. Grants and Non-compensatory Capital from the 
United States Government (net total) 2 4 5 5 0 4 492 
B . Direct Investments and Transactions in Foreign 
Securities from United States Private Sources 
(net total) 1 8 9 1 9 5 3 
C. Financial Transactions with International 
Institutions (net total) 5 - 1 0 7 0 
D. Other Capital (net total) a/ 208 2 8 4 - 1 7 9 
E. Total Non-compensatory Capital and Official 
Grants (A+B+C+D) 6 4 7 9 7 3 586 
F. Private Donations (net total) - 1 1 3 -111 - 1 2 0 
G. Net Over-all Balance of Non-compensatory 
Capital and Grants (E+F) 5 3 4 862 266 
a. The item "Other Capital" includes non-compensatory private loans from the 
United States, non-compensatory transactions with other countries on private 
and official account and short-term capital movements including privately 
owned assets by Latin Americans. 
Sources and Method; Line A. United States balance of payments published by the 
U.S. Department of Commerce in Survey of Current Business, June 1961, June 1962 
and June 1963. In adding up grants and loans, the compensatory loans by the 
Export and Import Bank of Washington, the United States Treasury Department and 
the United States subscriptions to the Inter-American Development Bank have 
been subtracted. The net disbursements under the compensatory loans totalled 
- 4 5 , 256 and 1 4 2 millions of dollars for I 9 6 0 , 1961 and 1 9 6 2 respectively. 
Line B. U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, June 1961, 
June 1962 and June 1963. The 1962 figure excludes a 75 million dollar bond 
issue floated by the Inter-American Development Bank in the United States. 
See pages 33 and 39* Line C. Figures taken from: Inter-American Development 
Bank, Annual Report, 1961 and 1962; International Development Association, 
Statements of Forms and Credits, December i960, 1961 and 1962; International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, issues of February 1961, 
1962 and 1963, for the loans by the International Finance Corporation and by 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Line D. Residual 
figures equal to: - (A+B+C27, see footnote a/ of this table. Line E. Fig-
ures on this line are equal to: "Net Over-all Balance of Non-compensatory 
Capital and Official Grants" (line G), minus "Private Donations" (line F). 
Line F. These consolidated figures for Latin America as a whole have been 
calculated from IMF's Balance of Payments Yearbook for each individual country 
for i960 and I961. The regional figure for 1962 is a preliminary estimate. 




LATIN AMERICA: COMPOSITION OF OFFICIAL CAPITAL RECEIPTS 
AND GRANTS FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1960-1962 
(in millions of dollars) 
i960 1961 1^62* 
A. Official grants by the United States Government®/ 119 167 194 
B. Loans by the Agency for International Development 
(net disbursements) 25 107 186 
C. Loans from the Social Progress Trust Fund (net 
disbursements) ... 1 21 
D. Loans under Public Law 480 (net disbursements) 28 78 33 
E. Development loans by the Export-Import Bank 
(net disbursements) 113 32 
F. Other official capital from the United States 
Government (net) 25 38 26 
G. Total grants and non-compensatory capital from 
the United States Government (A+B+C+D+E+F) 2i£ ¿04 4g2 
H. Compensatory loans by the Eximbank and the United 
States Treasury (net total) - 45 256 142 
I. United States subscriptions to the Inter-American 
Development Bank 80 110 60 
J. Net grand total taken from official U.S. balance 
of payments 28O 870 694 
a. Excluding military grants. 
Sources and notes on method: Line A. Figures taken from the United States 
balance of payments published by the U.S. Department of Commerce in Survey of 
Current Business, June 1961, June 1962 and June 1963. Besides grants under 
the American Aid program, this Item includes grants under Public Law 480, 
Title I, as well as small 'amounts (approximately $13 million annually) of 
pension payments to Americans residing In Latin America. See Table 9, Note a/. 
/(cont. Table 59) 
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(cont. Table 59) 
Lines B and D. From the U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Grants and Credits 
by the U.S. Government, calendar years i960 and 1961. The figure of line B for 
1962,was taken from the U.S. Department of State, Report on Country Loans by the 
Agency for International Development, December 19&2IThe figure of line D, for 
1962 vas taken from Foreign Grants and Credits, December 31st., 1962, advance 
release. Figures of line D differs from those carried on AID's reports, mainly 
because the latter include some transactions which may be considered as grants, 
and also are related to the dates of actual delivery of food products. 
Line C. Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Reports, 1961 and 1962. 
Line E. Export and Import Bank of Washington, Statement of Loans and Credits, 
December 31st., i960, 1961 and 1962. Line F. Residual figures equal to: 
_/G - (A+B+C+Dj/. Line G. See sources and method of Table 58, line A. 
Line H. Eximbank's Statement of Loans and Credits; December i960, 1961 and 
1962 and U.S. Treasury Department, Treasury Bulletin, May i960 and 1961 and 
April 1962 and 1963- Line I. Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report, 
1961 and 1962. Line J. These figures were obtained by adding up lines 2o, 29 
and, 38 of the United States balance of payments published by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce in Survey of Current Business, June 19^1, June 1962 and June 1963. 
Of course, these figures appear with minus signs in the balance of payments of 
the United States. These figures include additional items not carried in the 
AID report, principally: pensions and other transfers, U.S. subscription to the 
Inter-American Development Bank, U.S. Treasury compensatory loans and residual. 
/The recent 
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The recent changes, first in the amount, and then in the composition of the 
actual flow of United States official capital into Latin America, are part of the 
international program tending to give substance to the Charter of Punta del Este. 
Even if the compensatory credits are added, however, disbursements by the United 
States Government in 1962 still were substantially below the Si billion level 
which is to be its average annual financial contribution to the Alliance.15/ 
Moreover, the net total disbursed under grants and non-compensatory and compen-
satory capital declined by approximately itljO million between 1961 and I962 (see 
again Table 59). On the other hand, the total amount of official loans and 
grants authorized by the United States rose from Sj80 million in 1959/1960 to 
S982 million in 1960/1961, U 100 million in 1961/1962, and approximately 
1(984 million in 1962/1963.16/ An essential condition for a further rise in the 
U. S. official disbursements has therefore been laid down for the years to come. 
In turn, the fulfillment of other conditions—such as the improvement of adminis-
trative machinery, the implementation of structural reforms and development plans 
in the recipient countries—could contribute to narrowing the present gap "between 
authorizations and dis~bursements.1T/ 
The upward trend in total grants continued in 1962 essentially because the 
size of grants—as distinguished from loans—of agricultural surpluses under 
Public Law 480 was more than twice as large as in 1961 18/ (see Table 60). As in 
i960 and 1961, however, grants under the Foreign Assistance Act (which created 
the Agency for International Development and incorporated into the U.S. Legisla-
tion, the Alliance for Progress programs) accounted for most of the total uni-
lateral transfers from the U.S. Government. Although Bolivia, by far the main 
recipient country, obtained more assistance from this source than in 1961, the 
amount of such grants for Latin America as a whole decreased in 1962. 
15. See speech by Secretary of the Treasury, the Hon. C. Douglas Dillon on 
September 11, 1961 in Los Angeles cited in Inter-American Development Bank pre-
sentation to IA-EC0S0C Special Commission IV in San José, Costa Rica, July 1963» 
16. Report of the First Annual Review of the Alliance for Progress 
87th U.S. Congress, Second Session and unpublished information from the Agency 
for International Development. 
17. Naturally, the disbursement rate depends to a considerable degree on 
the nature of the project to be financed. Large dams or irrigation projects, 
for instance, which may take five or even more years to finish, may imply a 
disbursement rate of only 20 (or less) percent per annum. This should be kept 
in mind also with regard to the comparable figures given below for the inter-
national financial institutions (see subsection C). 
18. While Argentina, a food-exporting country, did not receive any as-
sistance under this heading, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico were the main benefi-
ciaries, in absolute terms, of such donations. In the two first countries 
agricultural production is still basically insufficient to cover domestic needs, 
and in the latter the volume of some crops has been experiencing rather wide 




LATIN AMERICA: GRANTS W THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT UNDER THE 
AMERICAN AID PROGRAM AND PUBLIC LAW 480, TITLE III a/, 1960-1962 
(in millions of dollars) 
I960 1961 1962 
American Public American Public American Public 
Aid Law } CO J- Aid Law U80a/ Aid Law U80a/ 
Argentina 0 6 0 8 1 3 • •• 
Bolivia 10 6 0 2 18 2 0 1+ 23 k 1 1+ Brazil 9 0 2 3 6 9 5 2 10 3 8 1+ 
Chile h 9 9 0 19 5 8 6 10 5 3 1+ Colombia 2 6 3 2 3 1 6 7 1+ 1 10 9 
Costa Rica 1 2 — l 5 — 1 8 — 
Dominican Republic 0 1 — — 0 1 0 1+ 2 7 Ecuador 2 8 0 1+ 3 0 1 0 2 8 1 7 El Salvador 1 1 — 1 3 0 1 1 8 1 6 
Guatemala 10 9 0 3 10 8 0 1+ 1+ 0 1 0 Haiti 5 2 0 1 12 2 0 6 3 1 0 8 
Honduras 2 2 0 2 2 8 0 2 3 1 0 2 
Mexico 0 8 1 3 0 7 3 5 0 8 8 9 
Nicaragua 1 1 — 1 1+ 0 3 1 5 1 1 Panama 1 6 0 2 2 9 0 2 3 9 0 5 
Paraguay 2 6 0 8 2 2 1 2 2 1 0 1+ Peru 2 8 2 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 2 0 Uruguay 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 1+ Venezuela 0 1 — 0 2 — 1 ]. 1 1 
Total latin America 60 3 20 b . 89 9 31 9 78 k 1+6 5 
a. Totals differ from Table 59> line A, because official donations by U.S. 
• Government also include some other items such as: grants under Titles I and 
II of Public law 480, grants under the Peace Corps Program, Inter-American 
Highway, regional donations (especially for Inter-American and Central 
American organizations) and pensions paid to residents in latin America. A 
detailed breakdown by countries is not available as far as these other grants 
are concerned. 
Sources: For Public law 1+80 Title III grants: Agency for International 
Development, Operation Reports, and for American Aid grants: Agency for 
International Development Country Finance Reports, various years. 
/Along with 
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Along with the Increase In its disbursements, the amount of loans author-
ized by AID rose considerably in 1962 (see Table 6l). Both developments repeat-
ed the experience of 1961 and also of i960. Likewise, the amount of diburse-
ments continued to increase more rapidly than that of new authorizations the 
former having passed from one quarter of the latter in i960 to almost one half 
in 1961 and noticeably more than one half in 1962. The actual flow of funds 
mainly benefited Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and the Dominican Republic, 
all of which have suffered from a serious lack of foreign exchange during the 
past years. Among these countries, Chile, which in 1962 began to put into ef-
fect its development plan and some structural reforms, 19/ received the larg-
est share of AID's total disbursements. 
In 1962 also, the Social Progress Trust Fund raised its disbursements to 
Latin America well above the insignificant level of 1961 (see Table 62). 
This $394 million fund 20/ is administered by the Inter-American Development 
Bank (iDB) and in less than two years of existence it has authorized total 
loans of $ 320 million to all the Latin American countries, 21/ Cuba and 
Haiti excepted. Most of the money has been earmarked for construction of low-
rent housing (W percent), sanitation and water supply (32 percent) and land 
colonization (15 percent). At the end of June 1963 actual disbursements 
represented only a small fraction of authorized loans. The gap between author-
ization and disbursement in this specific case can be explained to some extent 
by the administrative and technical problems that are inevitably encountered 
when international financing extends itself to a new field. 
The decline in 1962 in net disbursements by the Eximbank offset the in- 1 
crease in those made by AID (see again Table 59)' It resulted from a reduc-
tion in gross disbursements and a simultaneous increase in amortization pay-
ments. For Latin America as a whole gross disbursements amounted to $203 
million and amortization payments totalled $133 million, against $213 and 
$100 million, respectively, in I961. These changes at*the regional level 
reflected mainly the declines in the net flow to Brazil and Chile and, to a 
lesser extent, those to Colombia and Mexico. In Perú, amortization payments 
exceeded gross disbursements for the third consecutive year, but the net dis-
bursements made by the Eximbank to Argentina increased by approximately $8 1 
million. Moreover, the amount of authorized loans for the region as a whole 
rose from $137 to $203 million. In i960, also an increase in total author-
izations took place, and it was followed by a substantial rise in net dis-
bursements in 1961. Conversely, the decline in disbursements which occurred in 
1962, was preceded by a reduction in authorizations in the year before. Thus,' 
the actual amount of financial assistance given by the Eximbank in the 1960-62 
period has been characterized by wide fluctuations from one year to another. 
19* See below, Chapter V. 
20. It is expected that in the course of 1963 its resources will be 
augmented. 
21. By mid-1963 this total had risen to $3WS million. 
/Table 
Table ox 
LATHI AMERICA: LOAMS AUTHORIZED AMD MET DISBURSEMENTS BY THE. 
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, I96O-I962 
(in millions of dollars) 
I960 1961 1962* 
Fiscal Years 
ST /62 196: :/6; -
Loans Met Dis- Loans Met Dis- Loans Met Dis- Loans Net Dis- :•• - r.ii -
Authorized bursements Authorizedbursements Authorized bursements Authorized bursements Au-;.- "lieu \ • . 




















Total Latin America 
10 5 
25 0 























































































































> ? ^ 
•» Á X 
í t 
16 c" 











â<3 Ô » * 
3 0 
12 6 












a. Less than $50 000. 
b. In process of being deobligated. 
c. Includes $0.6 million IAPSP funds approved in FYÍ962, but included as part of FYI963 program. 
Sources: For i960 and 196l, U. S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Grants and Credits by the U. S. Government, calendar 
years i960 and 196l. For 1962, U. S. Department of State, Report on Country Loans by the Agency for International 
Development, December 1962. For fiscal year 1961 and 1962, U. S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance from Inter-
national Organizations, July 1, I9U5 - June 30, 1962, Agency for International Development and unpublished information 
from AID. 
Table 
LATIU AMERICA: LOANS AUTHORIZED AND MET DISBURSEMENTS 
ONDEB THE SOCIAL PBDGBESS TRUST FUND, 1960-1962 
(in millions of dollars) 











Argentina 35 0 5 0 
Bolivia 6 5 
Brazil 4 1 — 46 7 2 4 47 0 
Chile 13 7 — 9 3 1 9 18 7 
Colombia 22 8 — 8.5 3 8 22 8 l 8 
Costa Rica 3-5 0 4 1 5 3 5 0 5 
Dominican Republic — — 6~5 0 5 
Ecuador — • — 13 6 13 6 __ 
El Salvador 5 5 — 6 1 1 7 11 6 0 1 
Guatemala — — 6.8 3 5 
Haiti . _  __ 
Honduras 3 5 
Mexico — — 13 6 _ _ 10 6 
Nicaragua — 7 7 0 3 7 7 
Panama 7 6 0 5 2 8 2 0 10 4 1 2 
Paraguay — — 2 9 _ _ _ __ 
Peru 23 8 - - 2-5 4-5 24 8 2 8 
Uruguay- 2 5 8,0 2 5 
Venezuela 32 0 20 0 2 8 42-0 
Central America 2 9 
(Regional) 


































a. Less than $50 000. 
Sources; Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report, 1961 and 1962. For fiscal years L961/62 and 1962/63 U. S. Foreign 
Assistance and Assistance from International Organizations,. July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1962 (Revised), Agency for 
International Development, and unpublished information from AID. 
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The same can be said with respect to disbursements made under Title I of 
Public Law 480 (see again Table 59). This law makes it possible for the ü. S. 
Government to grant and also to lend to underdeveloped countries part of the 
local currency proceeds obtained through the export of agricultural surplus. 
Both the sales 22/ and loans are made in the national currency of the recipient 
country. Within Latin America, Brazil and Chile have in the past received the 
largest share of such loans. In 1962, however, Brazil did not get any financial 
resources under Public Law 480, while in the previous years it had obtained 
almost $60 million. Accordingly, disbursements to Latin America as a whole 
declined by approximately $45 million. 
b. International agencies 
Total net disbursements on loans from international agencies rose consider-
ably in 1962 (see Table 63). This was the second increase in two years; but in 
1961 the subscriptions to the recently established financial institutions had 
more than offset the foreign exchange receipts on loans account. In 1962 the 
net balance of loans and subscriptions was positive and much larger than in 
I960. It did not account, however, for more than 15 percent of the total 
amount of grants and non-compensatory capital received from U. S. official 
sources. 
During its two first years of existence the Inter-Anjerican Development 
Bank has directed its activities mainly toward collecting capital resources 
and authorizing loans. At the end of December 1962, subscriptions actually 
paid to the IDB totalled $528 million out of an authorized capital of $1 000 
million. Payment in dollars amounted to $389 million, $250 million of which 
was received from the U. S. Government. Moreover, the IDB placed two bond 
issues on private financial markets, the first in the United States for $75 
million and the second in Italy for $25 million.25/ At the same date, cumu-
lative figures for authorized loans totalled $290 million, while disbursements 
only amounted to $38 million (see.Tables 63 and 64). In the first four months 
22. For Latin America as a whole total sales agreements were as follows 
(in millions of dollars): 
I960 1961 1962 Fiscal Years 
1961/62 1952/63 
Total sales agreements a/ 95.5 99.5 212.3 156.5 185.4 
a. These figures exclude such estimated amount for the local currenoy 
proceeds to be spent by the U» S. Government in the recipient country. 
Source: Agency for International Development. 
23. Interest rates for these bond issues in United States and Italy were 




LATIN AMERICA: COMPOSITION OF OFFICIAL CAPITAL RECEIPTS 
FROM INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES, i960 - 1962 
(in millions of dollars) 
I960 1961 1962* 
Inter-American Development Bank 
(net disbursments) - 5 1 32 8 
International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 
(net disbursments) 28 7 55 1 94 3 
International Development Association 
(net disbursments) - 0 6 6.0 
International Finance Corporation 
(net disbursments) 12 4 5 2 12 4 
Total net disbursments 4l.l \ 66 0 145 5 
Subscriptions a/ -36 0 -76 0 ' -75 0 
Net Balance of Loans and 
Subscription^ 5 1 -10 0 70 5 
a. Subscriptions in foreign exchange only, the most part of vhich vas to 
the the Inter-American Development Bank. 
Sources: IHB, Annual Report. I961 and 1962. International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics. February 1963, for IBRD and IFC loans. 
International Development Association, Statement of Loans and Credits, 




LATIN AMERICA: LOANS AUTHORIZED AND NET DISBURSEMENTS 
BY THE INTER-AMERICAN  DEVELOPMENT BANKa/ 1961-1962 




• Net Disburse- Loans Author- Net Disburse-
ments ized ments 
Argentina 29 9 0 2 8 1 4 5 
Bolivia 14-5 2 3 2 6 4 9 
Brazil 27.4 1 7 35 5 7 1 
Chile 18 7 0 3 20 1 3 0 
Colombia 13 3 0 1 8-5 2.8 
Costa Rica 3 0 - 8 2 0 8 
Dominican Republic - - - -
Ecuador 4 7 - .6 1 0 2 
El Salvador 5 8 - 0 4 
Guatemala 4 7 0 1 - 0 1 
Haiti 3 5 - - 0 3 ' 
Honduras 3 7 0 1 6 0 0 9 
Mexico 15 2 6 8 4 3 
Nicaragua 2 2 '. 0 1 - 0 2 
Panama 2 9 - - -
Paraguay 4 0 - 1 2 1 6 
Peru 5 1 - 2 1 1 4 
Uruguay 6.3 - 8 1 0 3 
Venezuela 9.2 0 2 8-3 - • 
Total Latin America 174 1 5 1 121 5 32 8 
a. Loans from the Ordinary Capital and Special Fund are included; loans from the 
Social Progress Trust Fund are not included. 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report, 1961 and 1962 
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of 1963» however, liquid funds were made available at a quicker pace, and at 
the end of April the disbursement rate with loans eligible for immediate utiliza- ' 
tion exceeded 20 percent.2k/  As far as the sectoral distribution of IBD's 
operations is concerned, manufacturing industries received approximately 30 
percent of the loans that are to be financed with ordinary funds; the correspond-
ing share of agriculture (including irrigation), eleqtricity and water supply 
were 18, 17 and 13 percent, respectively. In the case of loans to be paid out 
with special funds, almost kO percent of total authorizations went to projects 
of a global nature and scope, such as the development plans of Bolivia and 
Northeast Brazil. 
Both authorized loans and effeotive disbursements by the World Bank 23/ 
expanded regularly during the last three years, the inorease being particularly 
marked in 1962 (see Table 65). As in 1961, however, disbursements represented 
no more than 28 percent of authorized loans. In relation to total foreign 
exchange reoeipts, the largest amount of liquid fluids made available by the 
World Bank were transferred to Colombia, Ecuador, Mexioo and Peru. In the 
period 196O-1962 almost 97 peroent of total loans authorized by the World Bank 
were related to the development of transportation and eleotrioity supply. Thus, 
the experience of reoent years indicates that the World Bank continued to deal 
mainly with projects tending to remedy certain basio deficiencies in Latin 
America's economic infrastructure. 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the International 
Development Association (IDA), both of which are affiliated with the World Bank, 
also expanded their activities in their own specific fields. For the time 
being, however, the scale of such activities is much more limited than in the 
case of the IBRD (see again Table 63). Assistance to private industrial enter-
prises by the IFC has benefited almost exclusively, until now, Latin American 
countries which are already at a relatively advanced stage of industrialization, 
such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. On the other hand, six 
out of a total of eight loans granted to Latin American countries by the IDA in 
1961 and 1962, went to the following countries which are of relatively small 
economic size and at a stage of incipient industrialization: Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay. At the end of December 
1962, loans authorized by IFC and IDA, reached the cumulative figures of $65 
and $70 million, respectively. 
2k.See Address by the Hon. Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-
American Development Bank in the Second Plenary Session of the Bank. The 
President pointed out that "we can consider this ratio (of 20 percent) as sat-
isfactory, given the nature of the investment projects, whose average period 
is no less than two years." 
25. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) is 
more commonly known as the World Bank. 
/Table 6 
Table óg 
LATIN AMERICA: LOANS AUTHORIZED AND NET DISBURSMENTS BT TEE INTERNATIONAL BANK 
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT i960 - 1962 
(in millions of dollars) 
i960 1961 1962 












Argentina — - bQ 5 - 95 0 17 6 
Bolivia - - - . - - -
Brazil _ 6 8 _ 17 _ 7 9 
Chile — 5 6.0 3 1 - 5 k 
Colombia k8 0 T 1 1 fcl-5 
16 5 50 0 21 9 
Costa Rica 2 0 0 6 17 3 1 8 1 
Dominican Republic _ - -
Ecuador - 8 8 - 5 6 - k k 
El Salvador 3 9 0 5 1 2 _ 1 1 
Guatemala _ -0 8 - -1 3 - 3 
Haiti - 0 6 - 0 2 - -0 2 
Honduras 8 8 2 5 - 1 2 - 3 3 
Mexico 25 0 1 0 15 0 9 160 5 17 
Nicaragua 12 5 -0 8 - - -0 7 - 0 1 
Panama 7-2 - 0 7 k 0 2 b 
Paraguay _ -0 _ -0 5 - -0 5 
Peru 34 5 -1 9 1C 0 5 2 9 2 
Uruguay 0 2 _ 18 5 -1 0 
Venezuela - - li5 0 -0 2 - 2 5 
Total Latin America 141 9 28 7 183 3 55 1 328.0 9k * 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. February 1959, February i960, February 1961, 
February 1962 and February 1963. For Fiscal years 1962 and 1963 see sources for  Table 6 l . 
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c. Official "bilateral contributions from countries 
other than the United States 
The net flow in 1961 of official capital and grants from Japan and OECD 
countries other than the United States increased considerably over i960; from 
$6 to $93 million 26/ (see Table 66). Japan's contribution was mainly responsi-
ble for the increase in 1961, accounting, in fact, for the bulk of the total. 
The net inflow of official capital from Western Germany ranked second in impor-
tance, while net payments on this account were made to the United Kingdom and 
other OECD countries for the amortization of Latin American debts. The geo-
graphic distribution of total net receipts by destination was uneven since in 
1961 Brazil received over three fourths of the total (see Table 67). 
For 1962, the only figure available shows a small increase in Western 
Germany's financial contribution (see again Table 66). Indirect evidence,, 
however, makes it appear likely that the flow of capital from Japan declined. 
This country has been currently engaged In the financing of part of the foreign 
exchange costs related to the construction of a steelworks in Brazil (Usiminas). 
In 1961, this venture had been carried out at a quicker pace than before, and 
by the end of the year Japan had disbursed $75 million out of its original 
commitment  of $100 million. Since the flow of Japanese official capital into 
Brazil amounted to $56 million in the same year, it would seem realistic to 
assume that a major part of this had served to finance the Usiminas project. 
It is uncertain, however, whether the venture is regarded statistically in a 
strict sense, as a private direct investment or as an official transaction on 
loans account, since it involves the intervention of both the Japanese Govern-
ment and a Japanese private firm. In any case, the disbursements related to 
the Usiminas project declined in 1962, and, because of their relatively heavy 
weight in the previous year, it may be presumed that the total flow of official 
and private capital from Japan has also decreased. 
Some Western European governments give indirect aid to developing countries 
in the form of official guarantees applying to private export credits.27/ It 
can be anticipated that the credits from Western Germany to Latin America 
were reduced by $90 million between 1961 and 1962. 
2d, The figure of $93 million, however, represented only 20 percent of the 
financial receipts and donations obtained from the United States Government. 
27. For a more detailed discussion of these transactions, see the next 
sub-section of this chapter. 
/Table 6 
Table 66 
LATIN AMERICA: NET FLOW OF OFFICIAL CAPITAL^/ FROM JAPAN 
AND OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES EXCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, I96O-I962 
(in millions of dollars) 
I960 1961 1962 
Japan 9 80 
Federal Republic of Germany 23 30 38 
United Kingdom -26 -l 
Other OECD Countries, excluding the United States -16 
Total _6 • • • 
a. Net grants plus net loans, excluding export credits guaranteed by 
the government of the lending countries. 
Source: Statistics from the Development Department of the Organization for 




LATIN AMERICA: NET FLOW OF OFFICIAL CAPITAL FROM 
JAPAN AND OECD COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES, 
BY RECIPIENT COUNTRIES 
(in millions of dollars) 
i960 I96I 
Argentina 3,89 21 13 
Bolivia -0 39 0 08 
Brazil 1 86 72 77 
Central American Republics^/ 0 83 0 30 
Chile 7 69 11 62 
Colombia -3 37 — 
Ecuador 0 02 0 o4 
Mexico 3 02 2 64 
Paraguay- 3 03 0 66 
Peru -0 48 2 4l . 
Uruguay -0,15 0 23 
Venezuela -2 ..31 -18 99 
Total Latin America .92 92 89 
a. Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama. 
Source: Statistics from the Development Department of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. 
/in general, 
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In general, the total flow of financial resources from OECD members to all 
developing countries declined in 1962.28/ According to data compiled by the 
OECD, this decline has mainly reflected the changes which occurred in the capi-
tal movements from Japan and Western Germany. In view of the relatively impor-
tant role played by the two latter countries in Latin America during recent 
years, such global developments further suggest a weakening in the effective 
financial aid given to the region by the industrial countries other than the 
United States. As far as new authorizations in 1962 are concerned, the $150 
million loan agreed upon by the Governments of Mexico and France should be 
singled out; it constitutes the first French official credit granted, for long-
term development purposes to a Latin American country. 
In the period 1960-61, new loans to Latin America authorized by countries 
with centrally planned economies only benefited Cuba. They reached $357 million 
out of a world total of $2 157 million. In the same period, disbursements went 
to Argentina, Brazil and Cuba for $27, $2 and $30 million, respectively.2g/ No 
information is available for 1962. 
2. Private capital 
a. The United States contribution 
The total flow in 1962 of United States private capital into Latin America 
amounted to $153 million,30/ whereas the minimum  projected amount needed for 
Alliance purposes has been estimated at $300 million annually.31/ Moveover,'even 
if the IDB's bond issue is added, net foreign exchange receipts from that source 
decreased considerably in relation to i960 and 1961; they had been approximately 
$500 million in each of those years. The recent decline in the flow of U.S. 
2$". Total figures are as follows (in millions of dollars): 
Total DAC Countries United States Other Countries 
1961 7 84l k 2k6 3 595 
1962 7 732 4 2^2 3 490 
Source: OECD 
29. Source: • OECD 
30. United States balance of payments with Latin America in Department of 
Commerce, Survey of Current Business, June 1963- The global figure referred to 
in the text Includes an unknown amount of compensatory capital but excludes the 
bond issue placed by the Inter-American Development Bank on the United States 
market. This bond issue certainly raised the total amount of U.S. resources 
contributing to the financing of Latin America's development in the near future. 
But it was not directly and readily available to Latin America in 1962. 
31. See footnote 15* this chapter. 
/private capital 
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private capital affected not only short- and long-term loans but also~and 
relatively more so—total investment(direct investment plus portfolio securi-
ties). Since the latter is by definition an autonomous financial transaction, 
most probably the amount of non-compensatory funds also declined in 1962. 
The fall in total investment at the regional level was due exclusively to 
certain unfavorable changes In the amount of direct Investment (see Table 68). 
And if the balance on the latter account turned from positive to slightly 
negative, it was mainly because of the developments which occurred in one 
economic branch In one country: investment in the petroleum Sector of Venezuela 
alone amounted to $167 million, that is, almost equal to the regional figure 
recorded by total investment in 1961 (see Table 69).52/ Only two other 
countries—Guatemala and Panama™registered, a negative balance on this account. 
In the case of Panama it is possible that for fiscal reasons the outflow of 
funds has covered, some transfer of profits. ' 
Inflow of new liquid funds into the petroleum sector in Argentina ceased 
almost completely in 1962, after having contributed to a rapid expansion of 
domestic output in the preceding years. But, on the other hand, U.S. firms 
raised their financial contribution to manufacturing industries In such a way 
that the total amount of new direct investment In Argentina declined only 
moderately in relation to 1961 and still constituted the highest country figure 
within Latin America. Since current economic prospects in this country were 
unsatisfactory, a factor partly responsible for the expanded flow of foreign 
capital into manufacturing might have been the lack of internal liquidity which 
resulted from official restrictions on bank credit. There was also an Increase 
in direct Industrial investment in Peru, as well as in Brazil and Mexico, In 
spite of the stricter domestic regulations applied to foreign capital in the 
two latter countries. Thus the long-term prospects offered by relatively large 
and expanding internal markets apparently continued to play an Important role 
in investment decisions. It is noteworthy, however, that in the two last years 
the new direct investments made In Brazil by the United States have represented 
only a small fraction of what they had been during the 1957-60 period ($50 mil-
lion as an annual average). Moreover, the problem of indemnifying certain 
recently-expropriated foreign-owned public utilities remains unsolved. 
In several of the Latin American countries, economic sectors other than 
manufacturing attracted new direct Investments from the United States in 
1962. A certain amount of liquid funds on this account went into the petroleum 
sector in Colombia and into mining and smelting in Chile. The same can be 
said about direct Investments in "other industries"53/ in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Honduras, Peru and Uruguay. 
32. See, however, footnote 10, this chapter, for a possible qualification. 




LATIN AMERICA: DIRECT INVESTMENTS AND TRANSACTIONS IN 
SECURITIES BY UNITED STATES PRIVATE CAPITAL, I96O-I962 
(in millions of dollars) 
I960 1961 1962 
Direct Investments 95 173 - 32 
New Issues of Foreign Securities 107 18 27a/ 
Redemptions - 20 - 9 - 5 
Transactions in Foreign Securities 7 13 13 
Total 182 m -I 
a. See note for line B on Table 58. 
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business. June 1963. 
/Table 69 
Table 69 
LATIN AMERICA: NET INFLOW OF UNITED STATES PRIVATE 
CAPITAL FOR DIRECT INVESTMENT, 1960-1962 
















Argentina 70 104 94 X X 52 X 43 73 9 21 
Brazil 83 7 Ik 1 ' 8 16 - 15 - 2 10 - 8 11 
Chile 2 XX 13 - Ik k X X k - 1 10 10 
Colombia 13 - 7 21 X X - 7 26 X 1 X - 6 
Dominican Republic XX XX XX - 2 X 1 X X X 1 XX 
Guatemala - 3 - 5 - 2 X X 2 XX 1 X - 8 - 2 
Honduras - 11 - 5 3 - 1 X 1 X — X - 5 3 
Mexico 56 45 30 X - 5 16 16 18 23 11 - k 
Panama 30 12 - 31 — — k 2 2 -2 6 - 31 
Peru 7 14 14 19 6 - 12 7 X 8 7 7 
Uruguay XX XX 2 — X - 1 X XX XX 1 2 
Venezuela -150 XX -194 24 X - kk -167 9 XX 11 - 27 
Other Countries - k 8 4 k - 16 k 30 1 1 - 1 - 11 
Total 95 173 - 32 31 - 3 32 -115 76 113 34 - 27 
x. Included in "Other Industries." 
xx. Less then 500 OOO dollars. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business. August 1963 
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For Latin America as a whole, data from the U.S. balance of payments^/ 
show a substantial increase in 1962 in the purchases of securities—almost all 
of them new issues—which would partly offset the decline in direct investment 
(see again Table 68). In i960, also, the inflow of U.S. portfolio capital 
reached $100 million, essentially as a result of a sale of some $75 million 
worth of Mexican bonds.35/ For 1962, however, United States Treasury 
statistics on net securities transactions do not show regional figures ap-
preciably higher than those of I96I.J6/ While net sales of bonds in the case 
of Mexico amounted to $13 million against $19 million in 1961, they increased 
from $6 to $8 million in Venezuela and from $1 to $3 million in Panama. Other 
Latin American countries recorded negative balances on this account; but in 
general, net payments for the amortization of bond issues were of small impor-
tance, the highest figure for an individual country—Brazil—not having ex-
ceeded $4 million. Likewise, net transactions in stocks were of limited im-
portance in 1962, as the main recipient country, Mexico, received no more than 
$1 4 million from the sale of domestic shares to United States residents. In 
fact, the principal factor responsible for the increase in the purchase of se-
curities as shown by the U.S. balance of payments data, was the bond issue 
placed by the Inter-American Development Bank on the United States market.37/ 
This means that $75 million out of the total of $102 million were not directly 
transferred to Latin American countries, but rather served to increase the 
IDB's loanable funds. As far as the IDB's loans authorized and actual disburse-
ments in 1962 are concerned, they are part of the movements of official capi-
tal which have already been taken into account in sub-section 1 of this 
chapter. 
Financial receipts from other United States private sources totaled $149 
million in 1962 against $259 million in 1961. Net disbursements on long-term 
loans declined more than the net inflow of short-term capital. Indeed, long-
term banking claims on Latin America declined by $45 million between December 
1961 and December 1962—that is to say, a net outflow of funds from the region 
actually took place on this account.38/ Even though long-term claims on 
yT.See U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, June 
1963. 
35. See International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, 
Volume 14. Mexico—footnote to item 12.2 of Table 1. 
36. See United States Treasury, Treasury Bulletin," July 1963. Capital 
Movements, Section II, Tables 7 and 8. 
37» See section l.b, this chapter. In the balance of payments of the 
United States published by the Survey of Current Business, subscriptions by 
the U.S. Government to IDB are not entered into the transactions with inter-
national institutions, either, but are included in the flow of U.S. official 
capital into Latin America. 
38. See Treasury Bulletin, various issues. 
/Mexico increased 
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Mexico increased by $23 million, in the case of Brazil and Venezuela they de-
clined by $11 and $79 million, respectively, in part as a result of amortiza-
tion payments on private compensatory loans granted in previous years.39/ 
Since, however, the U.S. balance of payments shows a net flow of "other long-
term capital" to Latin America amounting to $38 million, it appears that in 
1962 the region received $87 million from United States private sources other 
than the banking system. 
On the other hand, net movements of short-term domestic capital such as 
shown in the United States balance of payments are almost equal to the net 
variations in short-term banking claims on Latin America, which are recorded 
by the Treasury Bulletin's statisticts. The corresponding data from these two 
sources indicate a net inflow of funds into the region amounting to $111 and 
$97 million, respectively. Approximately $65 million went to Uruguay and $50 
million more to Chile, both of which financed their external deficit mainly 
through an increase in their liabilities abroad.bo/ A substantial part of the 
credits they have received from U.S. private banks were certainly aimed at 
compensatory financing and should therefore, strictly speaking, be excluded 
from the total flow of autonomous capital from United States private sources. 
39» While disbursement of compensatory loans provides, a posteriori, a 
temporary remedy for insufficient import capacity, the amortization of such 
loans produces, a priori, a reduction of that capacity in subsequent years, 
as it constitutes a current financial obligation of the borrowing country. 
40. See section C. on compensatory financing. 
/b. Flow 
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b. Flow of private capital from Western European countries and Japan 
Private export loans constitute the major component of this flow in the 
case of Latin America. They may or may not be guaranteed by the governments of 
the exporting countries and include the so-called medium-term  suppliers credits. 
In recent years the guaranteed loans have tended to be distributed more evenly 
between lenders and borrowers, than the direct official contributions from 
Western Europe and Japan (see Tables 70 and 71)» To some extent this might be 
explained by the fact that such financial transactions are closely linked with 
current developments and trade promotion. On the other hand, between i960 and 
1961 the flow of credits had recorded noticeable changes both in several donor 
and in some recipient countries, changes that can in part be explained by fluc-
tuations in the rate of delivery—and in the rate of utilization—of the goods 
imported for investment purposes. Net disbursement to Latin America as a 
whole, however, declined but very slightly. 
It was noted above that in 1962 there occurred a fall in the credits 
granted by Western Germany. This country had previously been the main lending 
partner of Latin America and had contributed to maintain the regional total at 
a steady level in I 9 6 I . It is likely, therefore, that the financial resources 
received by Latin America on this account will show a decrease for 1962. 
Incomplete information points to an equally unfavorable change in the 
amount of private direct investment during the last year. In Brazil, where 
Western European and Japanese firms had concentrated most of their Latin 
American ventures in the fifties, total direct foreign investment fell from 
8l47 million in 1961 to 869 million in 1962, notwithstanding a small increase 
in the inflow of funds from the United States. Besides, direct investment made 
by Western Germany in all Latin American countries went down to $17 million, 
and it may be that Japanese firms have also reduced their transfer of capital 
to Latin America.41/ Mexico and Panama, however, might have enjoyed an increase 
in the flow of funds recorded on this account. While the United States con-
tribution in Mexico was appreciably smaller in 1962 than in 1961, and turned 
from positive to negative in Panama, 42/ the total amount of direct investment 
made by all foreign countries remained at the same level in the first country 
and increased by almost 82 million in the latter.43/ 
~TT7~ See section 1(c), above, for the considerations leading to this 
conclusion. 
42. According to the U.S. Balance of Payments published in Survey of Cur-
rent Business, August 1963» See section 2(a), above, for a possible qualifi-
cation. 
43. Available figures on direct investment in Mexico and Panama are as 
Sources: For Mexico, Informe Anual del Banco de Mexico; for Panama, National 
official data on the balance of payments. 









LATIN AMERICA: PRIVATE EXPORT CREDITS GUARANTEED BY THE GOVERNMENTS 
OF THE OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES, EXCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, I96O-I962 
(in millions of dollars) 
I960 1961 19 62 
Belgium 5 54 0 • • 
France 56 12 • • • 
Germany 71 120 30 
Italy 45 -2 • • • 
Japan 6 35 • • • 
United Kingdom 9 -1 * • t 
Others 56 18 • • • 
Total 246 226 » » » 
Source: OECD, The Flow of Financial Resources to Developing Countries 
in 196lt. Paris, 14th March 1965? and Memorandum  of Germany to the De-




LATIN AMERICA: NET FLOW OF GUARANTEED PRIVATE EXPORT CREDITS 
(in millions of dollars) 
I960 1961 
Argentina 36 61 46 43 
Bolivia - 1 56 1 23 
Brazil 105 12 70 51 
a/ 
Central America and Caribbean-' 21 71 18 31 
Chile 21 01 7 33 
Colombia - 1 76 1 82 
Ecuador - 1 27 2 80 
Mexico 43 90 43 08 
Paraguay - 0 01 - 0 22 
Peru - 2 48 44 70 
Uruguay 15 57 4 38 
Venezuela 10 55 - 3 65 
Total Latin America 237 39 236 72 
a. Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama. 
Source: Development Department of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, May, 1963« 
/c. Movement s 
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c. Movements of Latin American capital and the repayment of the external debt 
The net outflow of Latin American capital was of considerable importance 
in 1962 and probably larger than in 1961. Although there is only indirect and 
incomplete statistical evidence of such developments, they can be reconciled 
with the well known existence of non-economic explanatory factors such as in-
ternal political instability and the uncertainties of the world situation 
during the last year. On the other hand, basic economic conditions—especial-
ly the increase in exports in many Latin American countries and'the continued 
strength of the industrial sector—apparently would have justified less unfa-
vorable developments in this field. 
For Latin America as a whole, the decline in the net inflow of foreign 
capital does not suffice to explain the fall in the total net balance of auton-
omous financial receipts which results from comparing the respective movements 
of net current transactions and total compensatory financing (see again Tables 
56, 571 and 58).44/ Secondly, private short-term assets of Latin America in 
United States banks increased by 8112 million against $97 million in 1961 (see 
Table 72? if Brazil is excluded from the regional total, the corresponding 
figures are $165 and $94 million, respectively). Thirdly, the negative balance 
of errors and omissions rose from $4l4 million to $462 million. Conversely, 
errors and omissions in the U.S. balance of payments with Latin America in-
creased from $97 million to $150 million. Of course, these figures must not 
be related exclusively to the unregistered flight of capital. Nevertheless, 
according to a-long-term study made by the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America (ECLA)45/ the negative errors and omissions are more probably 
to be found at the level of outflows of private Latin American funds than at 
that of other external transactions. In particular, short-term assets in 
United States banks presumably do not account for the most part of such funds 
because they enjoy neither the advantage of secrecy not that of yielding a 
convenient return. Other financial ventures in the United States and Western 
Europe may not be so readily accessible, but do offer one or both of these ad-
vantages . 
As pointed out above, direct data on current transactions and com-
pensatory financing in 1962 are somewhat more complete and reliable than those 
on non-compensatory capital movements. 
45. See United Nations, External Financing in the Economic Development 




LATIN AMERICA: SHORT-TERM ASSETS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR REPORTED BY 
BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960-1962 
(in millions of dollars) 
I960 1961 1962 
Argentina 69 69 108 
Bolivia 15 17 18 
Brazil 129 132 89 
Chile 47 51 83 
Colombia 72 71 87 
Dominican Republic 2b 16 18 
El Salvador 19 16 15 
Guatemala 17 18 15 
México 132 174 197 
Panama 103 7b 77 
Peru bl 50 61 
Uruguay 30 29 54 
Venezuela 185 23b 233 
Other Latin American Countries 80 109 117 
Total Latin America 963 1 060 1 172 
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Bulletin. Washington, April 
1961, 1962 and 1963. 
/During the 
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During the two last years, negative errors and omissions in the balance 
of payments of Mexico were exceptionally large and represented more than half 
the regional total (see again Table 54). While the increase in this negative 
balance points to an intensification of capital flight, the quite unusual im-
portance of the errors and omissions in absolute terms suggests the possibil-
ity of an overvaluation of other transactions (especially of those which are 
estimated, such as, for example, the tourism receipts). In any event, the 
recorded outflow of short-term Mexican capital—both from individuals and pri-
vate banks—reached $49 million against $26 million in 1961.46/ 
Short-term assets deposited in United States banks by individuals resid-
ing in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay increased noticeably in 1962, 
while they had changed very little in 1961 (see again Table 72). In the case 
of Argentina, moreover, the total outflow may have reached $253 million in the 
past year.47/ 
For Brazil, the national balance of payments data as well as the U.S. 
Treasury statistics on Brazilian short-term assets record a net flow of pri-
vate capital into the country. The balance of errors and omissions, however, 
turned from +$2 million in 1961 to -$137 million in 1962, and the rate of ex-
change of the cruzeiro on the free market fell by approximately 50 percent 
between the two last years. Thus, it is presumed that an increasing amount of 
Brazilian capital was sent abroad and probably was invested mostly in Western 
European countries. 
On the other hand, in the cases of the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Panama, the amount of short-term private assets deposited in 
United States banks recorded but very small variations, while errors and 
omissions either did not change at all or declined somewhat. Likewise, the 
experience of Venezuela in 1962 was relatively favorable, as the net outflow 
of private capital other than long-term was $69 million smaller than in the 
T&T See Banco de México, Informe Anual, 1962. 
47. According to the review, Economic Survey, Buenos Aires, March 5, 
1963, amortization payments plus the outflow of short-term capital would have 
totalled 532 millions in Argentina. Since amortization payments alone are 
estimated at 279 million dollara by the Development Department of OECD, the 
residual figure for the outflow of short-term private capital is: 
$532 - $279 = $253 million. This figure may include some margin of errors 
and duplications and constitutes a preliminary estimate. 
/Previous year. 
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previous year. For this country also, the annual changes in short-term assets 
in United States banks reflect imperfectly the total net outflow of private 
domestic capital during the corresponding years.48/ 
Apart from the flight of domestic capital, amortization payments on the 
external debt are another expenditure which currently absorbs a substantial 
portion of gross foreign exchange receipts in Latin America as a whole. These 
payments are taken into account in the net individual figures concerning the 
different categories of loans analyzed above. There exist, however, some 
global estimates on amortization and interest payments, which show how heavy 
was the total servicing of the external public debt in several Latin American 
countries during the last year (see Table 73) • In this respect, Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile found themselves in the most unfavorable situations within the 
region. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the financial charge result-
ing from the servicing of the debt was small not only in Mexico and Peru, but 
also in a country—Uruguay—which for some time has been facing a large deficit 
on current account.49/ 
To avoid an excessive weakening of their capacity to import during the 
next years, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia were able to agree with creditor 
countries upon prolonging the amortization schedules of certain loans. Several 
refinancing operations have concerned medium-term  debts toward Western Europe, 
the repayment of which contributed to reduce noticeably the net balance on cap-
ital account in 1962. At the end of the same year, the so-called Paris Club 
refinanced half the total debt of $270 million which should have been paid by 
Argentina in 1963 and 1964. More recently, the Hague Club agreed, in turn, to 
stagger the maturity dates of Brazil's debt over a ten-year period and up t° 
an amount of $210 million.50/ 
The figures can be compared as follows: 
1261 1262 
(in millions of dollars) 
Variations in short-term assets in U.S. banks a/ +49 - 1 
Total outflow of capital other than long-term b/ 235 l66 
Sources: a. Treasury Bulletin; b. Banco Central de Venezuela. 
See an estimate of external public long-term debts by year and 
country in ECLA, cit., page 214. 
50. For more "details on consolidation loans see National Foreign Trade 
Council, Noticias, March 27, 1962 for Colombia; November l6, 1962 for 




LATIN AMERICA: FOREIGN DEBT SERVICING^ IN SELECTED 
COUNTRIES IN 1962 
Total amount in 
millions of dollars 
Percentage value in relation 
to total capacity to import 
Argentina 322 3C# 
Brazil 399 
Chile 107 20# 
Colombia 68 \k% 
Ecuador 16 11$ 
Mexico 254 17% 
Paraguay h 8% 
Peru 48 9% 
Uruguay 12 8% 
Venezuela 126 1056 
a. Includes interest and amortization payments. 
Sources: For all countries, Brazil excepted, Development Department of 
OECD mainly on the basis of estimates made by the International Monetary 
Fund. For Brazil, Boletins da Superintendencia da Moeda e Crédito. 1963. 
/C. COMPENSATORY 
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C. COMPENSATORY FINANCING OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Compensatory financing in Latin America underwent noticeable changes in 
1962, both in its total amount and its structure. As the deficit of recorded 
external transactions at the regional level increased considerably and the 
negative balance of unrecorded receipts and payments was somewhat larger than 
in I96I, compensatory accounts had to provide $26l million more in internation-
al means of payment than they had done in the previous year (see Table 7^). 
Approximately 55 percent of Latin America's external deficit was financed 
through a decline in gross assets of gold and foreign exchange. Another third 
was accounted for by an increase in liabilities to foreign lenders other than 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Export-Import Bank of the United 
States (Eximbank). In contrast, credit granted by the two latter agencies 
represented in 1961 more than nine-tenths of total compensatory financing for 
the region as a whole. 
The decline in the IMF's contribution to external liquidity in 1962 was 
not limited to Latin America. Total gross drawings by all member countries 
only amounted to $584 million, against $2 479 million in the preceding year. 
Even if the exceptionally large credit of $1 500 million granted to the United 
Kingdom in 1961 is excluded, the fall in gross drawings between the two last 
years was no less than $500 million» In the case of Latin America repayments 
exceeded drawings for the first time in many years. Thus, for this region 
alone the net foreign exchange receipts obtained through transactions with 
the Fund decreased by $329 million in relation to 1961. Net payments to the 
IMF were made not only by countries that recorded a surplus in their external 
payments (i.e., Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador and Mexico) but also by those 
suffering from serious exchange difficulties, like Argentina, Brasil and Chile 
(see Table 75)» Within the latter group of countries, however, Colombia, 
Guatemala and Uruguay received net credits for a substantial amount during 
1962. An in the first quarter of 1963 Latin America's transactions with the 
Fluid turned back to positive, as a result of important drawings made by Chile 
and, once again, by Colombia. 
Apart -from cutting its disbursements by almost half, the Eximbank did not 
authorize any new compensatory loans in favor of Latin America in 1962 (see 
Table 76). Compensatory disbursements by the Eximbank (which like the develop-
ment loans are mostly tied with the financing of U.S. exports had been exception-
ally important in 1961, and they had benefitted a larger number of countries 
than before. In 1962, along with the decline in the actual transfer of liquid 
funds, the number of recipient countries in Latin America went down to no more 
than three. As often in the past, Brazil was the main beneficiary of these 
loans. Both Mexico and Venezuela, the other recipient countries in 1962, 
resorted to compensatory credits from the Eximbank for the first time in 196l. 
The great decline in Latin America's gold and exchange reserves in 1962 
came after two years in which there had been small changes in this compensa-
tory account. Even though the region's external transaction had recorded a 
large deficit in both i960 and 1961, its gross assets of international means 
of payment actually had increased a little in the first year and had decreased 
by less than 80 million dollars in the latter (see again Table 7^). It would 
/Table 7 
Table 74 
LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES AND COMPENSATORY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ACCOUNTS, I960 - 1962 
(in millions of dollars) 
1959^ 19602/ 196lV ' 1962^ 
Official gold and foreign exchange assets 2 759 2 851 2 737 2 254 
Gold (1 590) (1 359) (1 390) . (1 185) 
Foreign Exchange (1 169) (1 492) ' (1 347) (1 069) 
Total tranche position with IMF 831 1 151 945 1 017 
Commercial Banks foreign exchange 356 299 339 362 
Total gross monetary reserves 3 946 4 301 4 017 3 616 
Annual variation of gross reserves of official and 
bank gold and foreign exchange e 35 -74 -460 
Net annual increase (-) of indebtedness to IMF -82 -260 69 
Compensatory.loans by the Kximbank -32 -282 -146 
Other compensatory accounts h/ c/ -731 21 -319 
Total compensatory accounts ç/ -810 -595 -856 
Errors and ̂ missions ç/ 456 417 463 
Total, balance of payments ç/ -354 -178 -393 
a* To December 31st. 
b. Includes changes in the callable foreign exchange liabilities of official institutions and banks, balance 
of payments credits—except those of the International Monetary Fund and the compensatory loans by the 
Exports and Import Bank of Washington—and variations in the debt by importers. 
c. For greater clarity, the minus sign (-) has been given to compensatory credits that cover a balance of 
payments deficit* However, in accordance with accounting praatãées for this balance, these changes should 
have a plus sign. Likewise "errors and omissions" carry a sign opposite to that which appears in the 
balance of payments* 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook and International Financial Statistics, 
July and August 1963o 
Table 75 
LATIN AMERICA: «El1 AM  NU AL VARIATIONS IN THE DEBT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MUNjSTAH* FOND, I960 - March 1963 
(In mi l l i ons o f  d o l l a r s ) 
I960 1961 1962 January - t o r c h . 1963 
Net Net Net Net 
Drawings Repayments Drawings Drawings Repayments Drawings Drawings Repayments Drawings Drawings Repayments Drawings 
Argentina 70.0 21.5 48.5 60.0 29.0 31.0 50 .0 59 .0 - 9 . 0 9 .0 - 9 . 0 
B o l i v i a 1 .0 2 .5 - 1 .5 2 .0 4 .0 - 2 .0 3 .5 2 . 3 1 .2 1 . 5 1 . 0 0 .5 
B r a z i l 47.7 47.7 60 .0 20.0 40.0 17.5 - 1 7 . 5 
Chi le 12.4 - 1 2 . 4 76.0 16.7 59.3 12.7 - 1 2 . 7 17.5 17 .5 
Colombia 15.0 - 1 5 . 0 65 .0 65 .0 7 .5 — 7.5 27.5 27.5 
Costa Rica 7 .5 7 .5 2 .5 6 .6 - 4 .1 6 .0 6 .0 
Dominican Republic 9 . 0 9 . 0 — — 
Ecuador 14.0 14.0 4 .0 6 .2 - 2 .2 
EL Salvador 13 .2 7 .5 5 .7 8 .0 11.2 - 3 . 2 8 .0 - 8 .0 — 
Guatemala — — 5 .0 — 5 .0 
Hai t i 1 .3 - 1 . 3 1 .5 2 .8 - 1 . 3 3 .2 1 .3 1.9 0 . 5 1 .0 - 0 . 5 
Honduras 5 .0 3.8 1 .2 2 . 4 1 .2 1 .2 5 . 0 3.7 1 .3 
Mexico — 45.0 45.0 45.0 - 4 5 . 0 
Nicaragua — 6 . 0 1 .5 4 .5 — 4 .5 4 .5 4 .5 
Panana — — — — - — 
Paraguay 1 .0 0 .9 0 . 1 — 1.6 - 1 .6 1.8 - 1.8 0 .2 - 0 . 2 
Peru — — — — — — 
Uruguay — — — — — 15.0 
Venezuela — — — — — — — ——— 
Tota l Latin America 146.? 64.9 82.0 347.4 88.0 259.4 95.7 164.1 - 68.4 57 .5 15.7 41.8 
CT\ 
Source: Internat ional Monetary Fund, Internat ional Financia l S t a t i s t i c s , Kay 1963. 
Table 76 
LATIR AMERICA! COMPENSATORY LOANS BY THE EXPORT AND IMPORT BANK OP WASHINGTON, I960 - March 1963 
(in Billions of dollars) 
1960 1961 1962 Jan-Maroh 1963 
















Argentina II M 9 6 9 7 __ 4 8 _ 
Brazil J 0 16 0 239 3 110 0 — — 81 4 - — 15 8 — 
Chile — 25 0 7 5 17 5 16 7 12.6 — — 4 3 15 0 7 5 3 0 
Coloabia — — 23 0 19 9 44 9 18 0 — — 15 6 — — — 
El Salvador — — — 6 0 6 0 — — — — — — — 
Mexico — — — 90 0 75 0 — — 15 0 — — — — 
Nicaragua — * 0 — — 4 0 — — — — — — 
Peru — — 15 5 — — — — — — — — 
Venezuela 50 0 — — 25 0 25 0 — — 50 0 — — — 
Total 50 0 32 0 71 6 397 7 281 6 146 4 24 7 15 0_ 23 3 3 0 
Source! Exiabank, Statements of Loans and Credits, Deoeaber 31st, 1960, 1961, 1962 and March 31st, 1963* 
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seem, therefore, that gold and foreign exchange reserves were resorted to in 
large amounts, in 1962 when compensatory credits from foreign sources had 
already been utilized very extensively in previous periods. This regional 
pattern, however, distorts substantially developments in individual Latin 
American countries. In the first place, changes in the gross reserves of 
Argentina, Brazil and Colombia only, accounted for the loss of almost $500 
million suffered by Latin America's gross assets in 1962 (see Table 77)• 
Secondly, in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, the monetary authorities financed the 
balance of payments deficits mainly through an increase in liabilities to 
external creditors other than the Eximbank and IMF. Thirdly, in i960 and 1961 
several individual countries had experienced large changes in their monetary 
reserves; but these movements had offset each other to a large extent. 
In 1962, Brazil had recourse to the reserves of gold and foreign exchange 
that the balance of payments surplus of the preceding year had made it possi-
ble to accumulate. Most of the remaining part of the Brazilian monetary 
assets, however, are not freely disposable, as they guarantee the repayment 
of current external debts. Consequently, the Brazilian authorities made 
additional drawings on loans previously granted by the Eximbank, and they 
engaged also in costly swap operations^/ (see Table 78). But certainly, the 
distinctive feature of the Brazilian experience in 1962 was the postponement 
of due payments on imports for almost $130 million. Although this step is 
not without precedent (especially in the mid-fifties), it deserves to be 
pointed out as a symptom of the liquidity crisis affecting the international 
transactions of the country. 
The fact that the balance of payments deficit in Uruguay and Chile was 
financed almost exclusively through an increase in liabilities did not mean 
.that external illiquidity in these countries was even more acute than in 
Brazil. Actually, at the end of 19̂ 2 gold reserves in Uruguay still were 
twice as large as the external deficit of the same year; but formal regu-
lations concerning the issue of money prevented them to fall below certain 
minimun levels. In Chile the amount of gold and foreign exchange assets 
during the past year did not differ substantially from the annual average 
of the last decade. Since these assets did not account for more than 15 
percent of the current annual value of imports, however, external credits 
have apparently been preferred as a method of compensation. Chile obtained 
sufficient quantity of such credits from other sources than the IMF and the 
Eximbank, and partly through the channel of Chilean private banks. 
In 1961, notwithstanding the large deficit of its balance of payments, 
Colombia had been able to keep its monetary reserves relatively steady and 
at a level accounting for approximately 30 percent of the current annual 
value of its purchases abroad. This situation changed substantially in 
December 1962 when Colombia's gold and foreign exchange assets fell below 
51/ Through such operation central banks obtain foreign currency by 
buying it from private sources—at a high rate of interest and with an 
option of repurchase -within a relatively short period. 
/Table 
Table 77 
LATIR AMERICA I MOVEMENT OP COMPENSATOR! ACCOUNTS OP THE BALANCE OP PAYMENTS, 1960-1962 









































Argentina +144 +506 -162 -232 -201 - 31 -291 -306 15 
Bolivia - 2 - 5 3 2 2 - 4 - 4 
Brazil -411 - 10 -401 105 120 - 15 -388 -142 -246 
Chile - 62 - 12 -"50 -131 - 11 -120 - 69 - 2 - 67 
Colombia - 42 - 40 - 2 -165 - 10 -155 - 70 - 50 - 20 
Costa Rioa - 11 1 - 12 - 11 4 - 15 4 6 - 2 
Dominican Republic 7 - 10 17 - 14 - 20 6 12 15 - 3 
Eouador - 2 - 1 - 1 - 1 5 1 - 16 12 5 7 
El Salvador - 22 - 10 - 12 - 7 - 9 2 8 - 1 9 
Guateaala 6 10 - 4 - 6 2 - 8 - 17 - 1 2 
Haiti 2 1 1 a 1 1 . - 6 - 3 - 3 
Honduras - 1 - 1 - 3 -' 1 - 2 — 
Mexioo - 81 - 69 - 12 - 48 37 - 85 72 - 2 74 
nicaragua - 4 - 4 - 5 4 - 9 5 4 1 
Panaaa - 6 - 5 - 1 - 7 - 4 - 3 - 1 5 - 6 
Paraguay - 3 - 2 - 1 3 1 2 - 1 - 2 1 
Peru 14 20 - 6 35 41 - 6 13 17 - 4 
Uruguay - 27 21 - 48 - 5% - 13 - 41 - 90 — - 90 
Venezuela -309 -159 -150 - 44 - 16 - 28 - 45 5 - 50 
Total, Latin America -810 35 -845 -595 - 74 -521 -856 -460 -396 
vji ru 
Sourcei International Monetary Pond, Balanoe of Payments Yearbook and International Financial Statistics. 
Table 7 
LATIN AMERICA: MOVEMENT OF COMPENSATOBY ACCOUNTS OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IN 1962 
(in million of  dollars) 
Total Gross gold Net IMF Gross Exp. US Treasury Swap Oper- Deferred Other Lia-
compensatory reserves and Imp. Department rations Import bilities 
accounts and foreign Bank of - Payments 
exchange Washington 
Argentina -291 -306 9 - 17 23 
Bolivia - 4 - 4 - 1 1. I 
Brazil -388 -142 18 - 81 - 3 - 46 -128 - 6 
Chile - 69 - 2 13 — - 80 
Colombia - 70 - 5 0 - 8 — __ - 12 
Costa Bica 4 6 4 - 6 
Dominican Bepublic 12 15 — — __ - 3 
Ecuador 12 5 2 __ 5 
El Salvador 8 - 1 8 — 1 . 1 
Guatemala - 17 - 5 - 5 __ - 7 
Haiti - 6 - 3 - 2 — - 1 
Honduras — — - 1 ! . 1 
Mexico 72 - 2 45 - 15 — 44 
Nicaragua 5 4 — — — 1 
Panama - 1 5 — . — - 6 
Paraguay - 1 - 2 2 — — - 1 
Peru 13 17 — — — - 4 
Uruguay - 90 — - 15 — — - 75 
Venezuela - 45 5 — - 50 — — 
Total, Latin America -856 -460 69 -146 - 20 - 46 -128 -125 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, August 1963 and Balance of  Payments of 
Brazil, 1962. Export and Import Bank of  Washington, Statements of  Loans and Credits, December 1961 and December 1962. 
Economic Survey. Buenos Aires, 3-13-63. Banco Continental, Newsletter, 1-21-63 and 2-21-63, Lima. Banco Central de 
Venezuela, Memoria Anual, 1962. 
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$100 million for the first time in many years. Although reserves regained 
somewhat during the first months of 19&3, at the end of May they represented 
only 20 percent of annual imports. In Argentina the corresponding proportion 
between assets and purchases abroad fell even more rapidly, reaching down to 
12 percent at the end of 1962. The country's reserves had increased consider-
ably in i960. But in 1961 and above all in 1962, the loss in gross assets 
more than offset the gains of previous years, since Argentina relied very 
little on other compensatory resources to finance its huge balance of pay-
ments deficit. 
In contrast, some other Latin American countries strengthened their 
position on compensatory account. In absolute terms the largest increase 
in gross assets took place in the Dominican Republic in 1962 and in Perú for 
the whole period 1960-1962. But in relation to the value of imports, 
improvement in the reserves position was much less conspicuous. While Perú, 
for example, enjoyed three consecutive balance of payments surpluses in i960, 
I96I and 1962, between the beginning and the end of thiè period the ratio of 
its reserves to its purchases abroad increased from l8 to 20 percent only, 
since the latter also expanded very rapidly. 
/CHAPTER III 
CHAPTER III 
TOTAL PRODUCTION, CAPITAL FORMATION AND MONETARY DEVELOPMENT 
A. VARIATIONS IN TOTAL PRODUCT AND CAPITAL FORMATION 
Latin America's gross domestic product increased in 1962 by something 
less than 3 percent. 1/ This figure is comparatively unfavorable, particu-
larly with reference to the estimated figure for the preceding year (5.4 per-
cent), and as against the rate of growth of the area's popxilation. The latter 
rate has shown an increase during recent years, and it is estimated that during 
the period to which we are referring, that is the early part of this decade, 
it was approximately 2.9 percent. The per capita product did not increase in 
1963 and it is even possible that it may have decreased slightly. If so, this 
will be the second year in which this happened since the beginning of the 
1950's. 
Another year to which reference is made is 1952, a year in which agricul-
tural production, which then comprised a larger share of the total product than 
it does now, fell sharply as a result of the intense drought that struck the 
countries of northern and southern Latin America. The changes which have been 
described for 1962 have been caused, in part, by factors that are equally 
transitory in nature and they have occurred in more defined areas than during 
1952. 
In fact, the minus in the per capita product for 1962 is due primarily to 
the 3.9 percent drop in the product of Argentina, a country of considerable 
weight in the average for the region. ;ln the majority of the other countries 
the rate of increase of the product teijded rather to improve with respect to 
the preceding year, although the product-population relationship also proved 
negative in some other countries. (See Table 79») The 1962 figures reveal an 
improvement over those for 1961 in twelve countries of that area, although in 
some instances the increase was rather slight. In terms of its contribution 
to the area's product, Venezuela was the country that stood foremost. There 
both agricultural and industrial production increased as much as oil production, 
and although the services component lagged somewhat behind, product increased 
by 6 percent, while during the preceding year it had barely increased by 1.5 
percent. In El Salvador and Guatemala a more favorable year for agriculture 
was joined by the industrial expansion stimulated by the economic integration 
of Central America in preventing a repetition of the negative rate obtained by 
their product in 1961. In 1962 there was a 5»5 percent increase of product in 
El Salvador and a 2.0 percent increase in Guatemala. In Mexico there was also 
a recovery in agriculture as well as industry, and according to partial infor-
mation a similar situation appears to have occurred in Haiti. 
1. Data on Cuba are not available. Calculations are based upon the re-
lative weights of the 19 other countries in 1961. 
/Table 7 
CHANGES OVEB THE PRECEDING IEAR IN THE TOTAL, AGRICULTURAL AND 
MANUFACTUHIKG GROSS PRODUCT AND IN FIXED INVESTMENTS IN 
1961 AND 1962 
(Percentages) 











Argentina 1.8 5.7 - 3.9 3 1 14 - 5 6 0 
Bolivia 2.2 4.8 5.0 8 ... 5 • • • Brazil 3.2 7.7 8 1 11 *7* 11 5 
Chile 2.4 4.4 5.2 - 5 0 5 4 28 14 
Colombia 2.3 ^.7 5.Ô 0 5 7 6 7 3 
Costa Rica 3.9 2.7 3.0 ... • • • ... 2 Dominican Republic 3.5 9.7 ... ... • • • • • • ... - 2 Ecuador 3.2 3.4 5.0 b 7 2 2 2 ... El Salvador 3.4 - 3.9 5.5 - 4 9 4 12 - 1 4 
Guatemala 3.2 - 0.5 2.0 - 2 5 0 2 - 8 
Haiti 2.9 - 1.6 6.8 ... » • « • • • • • » • » • Honduras 3.0 6.5 3.3 4 1 ' 3 4 - 1 6 
Mexico 3.1 3.5 4.2 3 5 4 b / 5 y 3 5 
Nicaragua 3.^ 6.0 6.7 8 12 20 
Panama 2.8 7.5 8 .1 9 4 4 20 23 ... Paraguay 2.5 2.4 ... - 2 • • • 3 ... • • • ... Peru 2.9 8.3 5 .3 10 7 9 5 29 13 Uruguay 1.2 2.7 ... 12 • • • - 2 ... 3 Venezuela 3.2 1.5 5.7 3 14 4 7 -19 *3* 
Latin America 2.9 5A 2.6-3 .0 3 .3 8.7 3.7 7.7 
a . Fisheries Included. 
b. Oil refining  not Included. 
Sources and Notes: Off ic ial  sources have been used In the case of  Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala*, Honduras, Mexico*, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela*. Bie asterisk indicates that the data obtained for 
1962 was almost complete. In the case of  the other countries greater s t a t i s t i c a l extrapolation has been necessary. 
Bolivia. AID Mission; Brazil . Conjuntura Económica y Desenvolvimento e Conjuntura, both Jebruary 1963 as to product, the 
estimated changes in investments are based upon changes in imports and production of  equipment and construction; Colombia 
and El Salvador, changes In product correspond to an extrapolation of  the series worked out by ECLA up to I960, the changes 
in investments to the changes in construction and imports of  capital goods; Hait i . ECLA-IDB-QAü Mission; Nicaragua, extra-
polation of  the product series by the Banco Central de Nicaragua, with the data as to production having been supplied by 
the same Central Bank; Paraguay and the Dowrfni  can Republic, unoff ic ial  estimates. 
In the case of  the averages for  Latin America the following  procedures have been used: Total Product - The national indices 
have been weighted according to product values for  1961 at pr ices of  that same year. Those values were obtained from Table 
121 of  United Nations document VCN-13/659/Add.l. The calculation of  the regional average was made cm the basis of  yard-
st icks approximating the variations of  the product In those countries for  which national data are not given; that average 
i s for  19 countries (Cuba excluded) in both years. 
Agricultural and Industrial Product: The available national series (some countries only publish information  on National 
Expenditure and others do not give any breakdown by sectors) were weighted by using values obtained by applying the re la -
tion between current values of  product and of  those sectors to the values described in the preceding paragraph. 
Sector averages for  Latin America are for  countries for  which data covering both years are given. I t i s assumed that 
including the countries on which information  i s unavailable would not a l ter the trend of  those averages. 
Investments: The method used i s the same as that applied for  sector averages. 
Increase of  Population: Calculated on the basis of  information  given in the United Nations, Monthly Baile tin of Statistics, 
July 1963. 
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Offsetting the changes which took place in the four countries just mention-
ed, the economic growth rate of Brazil, Honduras and Peru fell sharply. The 
drop in Brazil was of a general nature, as it occurred not only in the field of 
agriculture, in which the increase was merely 1.3 percent, but also in manu-
facturing. The high rates attained by Brazil in earlier years (13 percent 
between 1957 and i960) fell to 11 percent in 1961 and 7 percent in 1962. The 
total product, which had achieved an increase of 7.7 percent in 1961 showed 
an increase of only 4 percent approximately in 1962. Following the same chro-
nological order, the rate for Honduras fell from 6.5 percent, to 3*3 percent, 
and that for Peru from 8.3 percent to 5.3 percent. In the former of these two 
countries there was an upward trend in the rate for manufacturing with the 
decline in total production stemming from those sectors directly affected by 
decreased investments in and production of bananas. In Peru's case the lesser 
rate of increase was general and stemmed from agricultural and fisheries pro-
duction as well as manufacturing and mining. 
In the remaining countries for which information is available, the 1962 
rate was greater than that of the preceding year by a slight margin. The growth 
rate of the manufacturing sector increased in only one of them, Panama. In all 
the other countries it again diminished. It should be noted in this connection 
that in several of these countries climatic conditions or the favorable opportu-
nity of the coffee cycle brought about a certain increase in the rate for agri-
cultural production and in part offset the opposite trend which predominated in 
teh remaining economic sectors. 
In conclusion, the rate of growth of Latin America's economy, although more 
positive, is far from being satisfactory even if Argentina is excluded. Not 
counting the latter, the product for the l8 remaining countries may be calcula-
ted as having increased 5.0 percent in 1961 and between 3*9 and 4.5 percent in 
1962. On the other hand, Argentina's population increases at an annual rate 
that is regarded as among the lowest in the area, which means, therefore, that 
in per capita terms the product of the other countries increased by 1.8 percent 
in 1961 instead of 2.4 percent, and between 0.8 and 1.4 percent (instead of 
-O.3 to 0.1 percent) in 1962. This means a regional deterioration even without 
Argentina, despite the fact that conditions improved in most other countries. 
This phenomenon is accounted for by the great weight exerted by the figures 
for Brazil in the regional total. At any rate, the general outlook fails to 
show any changes indicating that in 1962 the tendencies of the past five years 
were substantially altered. Although the institutional changes initiated dur-
ing that year may have an important bearing upon the future evolution of the 
great aggregates of Latin America's economy, it would be premature to expect 
such results by 1962 or 1963» 2/ 
The changes in the gross formation of fixed capital were equally variable. 
On the average, those countries for which information is available show in 1962 
an increase of approximately 4percent, a percentage which is influenced by the 
Argentine series even more than that of domestic product. In this instance 
not only are the figures affected by the greater weight of that country owing 




to its high coefficient of investment, according to the national accounts, but 
also by the smaller number of countries for which information was available 
for that year. It is therefore quite likely that the more complete regional 
average may be greater and vary by about 5 percent, approximately. 
The data needed for a detailed analysis of what happened to fixed invest-
ments are not available. However, it Bhould be pointed out that the small 
increase attained in 1962 was influenced to a considerable degree by the com-
paratively slight variation in fixed investments of the private sector and the 
difficulty encountered in most countries by the government sector in continuing 
the large increases undertaken in the immediately preceding years (See Table 
80). 
Private fixed investments show an inoréase in almost all those countries 
for which it has been possible either to obtain official data or1 to estimate 
the same, although in rather rough fashion. These increases, however, are 
generally considerably below the ones shown in relative terms by fixed invest-
ment of the public seotor. In those countries where the relative contribution 
to fixed investment by the public sector was high—Chile and Mexico—the aver-
age rate of increase of total fixed investment almost quadrupled that of pri-
vate fixed investment. In those countries in which the public share is small 
—Honduras and Peru—although public fixed investment increased at even higher 
ratea than in the two countries just mentioned, it succeeded in offsetting only 
moderately the lower rate of private fixed investment. 
The experience of these four oountries does not necessarily reflect the 
situation experienced by the remainder. In faot, most other countries failed 
to have an equally favorably flow of official capital, nor did the prices or 
the volume of their exports increase. 
Although the incomplete data available shows that the government sector 
was able to increase its investment and thus add to the total formation of 
capital, this was not so in those oases in which public investments were rela-
tively small or export prices militated against government resources. In some 
countries there intervened also the fact, which has already been mentioned, 
that in 1961 there was an upsurge in government investments which could not 
readily be repeated in 1962. 
The changes in private fixed investment in 1962 occurred in response, in 
addition to the known influence of the capacity to import, to internal factors 
which vary in importance according to each country. One of the most decisive 
was the net inflow of direct investments from abroad, which have contributed 
in recent years to the expansion and diversification of the productive capacity 
of the manufacturing sector of Latin America. This sector, together with con-
struction, absorbs most of total investment in the Latin American countries. 
To a certain extent, the tendency revealed in the Latin American oountries 
in the net inflow of direct investments is reflected in private fixed invest-
ment (Again, see Table 80). While it is not claimed that the data are fully 




LATIN AMERICA: FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION BY SECTORS 
AND THE INFLOW OF DIRECT PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
1961 AND 1962 
1 9 6 1 1 9 6 2 
Fixed capital Net inflow  of direct investment 
from  the United 
States 
(in millions 'of 
US$) 
Fixed capital Net inflow  of direct investment 
from  the United 
States 
(in millions of 
USS) 
Total Private Public 
(Percentage change 
over I960) 
Total Private Public 
(Percentage change 
over 1961) 
Argentina 6 6 6 34 _ - 1 1 -10 
Bolivia • • • • • • • • • • • • ... • • • • • P • • • Brazil 11 • • • • # • -76 5 • * • • • • 7 
Chile 28 • • • • • • - 2 14 23 13 
Colombia 7 • • • -14 -22 3 • • • • • • 28 
Costa Rica 2 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Dominican Republic - 2 • • • • • • - • • • • • • • • • -
Ecuador - 2 
• • • 8 • • • ... • • # • • • 
El Salvador - 1 -20 8 • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Guatemala - 8 • • • • • • - 2 • • • • • • • • • 3 
Haiti • • • • • • • • • • • • ... • • • • • • • • • 
Honduras - l - 1 3 6 6 3 29 8 
Mexico 3 - 5 16 -ai 5 2 7 -15 
Nicaragua 20 • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • ... ... 
Panama 23 12 102 -18 ... • • • • • • -43 
Paraguay • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ... 
Peru 29 22 73 7 13 11 20 -
Uruguay 3 1 12 - • • • • • 1 • • • 2 
Venezuela -19 • • • • • • 150 3 • • » • « • -194 
Latin America 7.7 78 4-5 -205 
Sources: Tables 69. and 79, Chapter II and III of  this Survey. 
/between both 
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between both series suggests that there does exist a tendency whereby contrac-
tion of the net inflow of United States investment is accompanied by similar 
contraction of the rate of increase in the total of private fixed investment. 
Mexico is the main exception in this case. It had an increase in the inflow 
of direct investments from different sources which compensated in part for the 
situation with regard to United States investment. 
Chile and Venezuela are among the countries for which complete data are 
unavailable and in which there apparently has been a tendency similar to that 
described in the preceding paragraph. The difficulty of determining accurately 
the changes in private fixed investments as well as the size of the direct in-
vestments from other sources precludes their being included with greater detail 
in the present analysis, despite their importance. 
A factor that has gained in importance with regard to private fixed in-
vestments is the slower rate of industrial development prevalent throughout 
Latin America. This slack is due to long-range factors that became more acute 
in 1962.3/ Latin America's industrialization calls for continued diversifi-
cation, for otherwise there can be no coupling of the rapid growth in derived 
demand with the slow rate of increase of final demand for manufactured consumer 
goods. 
The inflow of direct foreign investment during the 195°*s played a dynam- -
ic role in that diversification, contributing not only to the financing of 
imports of capital goods, but also, to the importation of the corresponding 
techniques and systems. It is encouraging, therefore, that despite the de-
creased totals of direct investments from abroad those devoted to manufacturing 
do not seem to have diminished.V This fact notwithstanding, the plant.capac-
ity installed in certain countries exceeded the demand for the manufactured 
products. At least in two countries the countraction of fixed investment in 
machinery and equipment was attributed to this reason. £/ In two others this 
investment was at a considerably lower rate owing to the necessity of revising 
in part the implementation of projects for the expansion of manufacturing capac-
ity, in order to adapt them to changing demand. 6/ 
3. See OAS/ECLA, Economic & Social Study of Latin America 1961, 
Washington, 1962, and Part I, Chapter IV, of the present study. 
k, See Part I, Chapter II, of the present study. There is a possibility, 
however, that the decline in industrial investments in Brazil by other coun-
tries than the United States, Japan and Western Europe may have brought down 
the total for the area. 
5. See the Reports submitted by the Governments of Honduras and Venezuela 
to the Special Committee of IA-ECOSOC (Planning and Drafting of Projects) at 
its July 16 to July 2k, 1963 meeting. 
6. See Part I, Chapter IV, of the present study. 
/B. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS 
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B. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS 
The monetary setting in Latin America has remained essentially the same 
for several years now. In 1962 and during the first half of 1963, many coun-
tries, in their strivings for more rapid economic and social progress, contin-
ued to be faced with chronic fiscal disequilibria and recurrent balance of 
payments difficulties. In keeping with the established pattern, these pres-
sures generally evoked what has now become a fairly uniform policy response in 
the areas a periodic tightening of the restrictions placed on the use of 
credit by the private sector of the economy. This policy, applied in an envi-
ronment of rising costs and prices, has led in more than one instance to the 
paradox of industry and trade suffering from a serious shortage of funds while 
money supply was rising at a rapid pace and government deficit spending con-
tinued on a large scale. 
Inflationary pressures, on the whole, went unabated, and in fact intensi-
fied in a number of countries in relation to the situation that had prevailed 
in 1961. Efforts were made throughout the area to improve existing financial 
mechanisms, establish new institutions, and perfect techniques that would 
permit a more efficient channelling of domestic resources into economically 
productive and socially useful investment. In general, however, the unstable 
monetary climate and the stop-gap nature of the monetary and fiscal measures 
adopted from day to day to relieve economic and social tensions still left rel-
atively little scope for a positive use of financial instruments in furthering 
long-term development objectives. 
1» Money supply trends 
The supply of money increased substantially in a large number of countries 
during the period under review (see Table 8l). As in 1961, the fastest rate of 
monetary expansion was recorded in Brazil, where inflationary pressures re-
mained essentially unchecked, at least until recently. But considerable ad-
ditions to the stock of money were also made in Chile and Colombia, despite the 
continuing stabilization efforts carried out by the authorities in these two 
countries. In the other South American countries—Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, 
Peru and Uruguay—where more or less formal stabilization programs have been in 
progress, the growth of the money supply slowed down markedly in 1962 in rela-
tion to what it had been in 1961 and earlier. The Central American states, on 
the other hand, finally emerged from a prolonged period of deflation and gener-
ally resumed a course of moderate to rapid monetary expansion in 1962 or the 




LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY, 1957-63 
Twelve months ended 
1957-61 1961 1962 1963 
annual 
average a/ Dec. March June Sept. Dec. March June 
Argentina 28 11 ... 7 3 7 11 w Bolivia 20 18 18 17 12 12 11 13 Brazil 37 50 45 53 59 63 58 57 È/ 
Chile 29 13 È9 20 25 29 23 46 
Colombia 16 24 1 22 19 Ik 21 12 • • • 
Costa Rica 4 -3 k 15 2k Ik 17 2i y 
Dominican Republic 5 1 1 6 -5 11 3 • • • 
Ecuador 5 3 -1 3 11 12 14 15 
El Salvador -3 5 6 — • 7 6 
Guatemala -1 1 2 -1 -2 if 13 • • • 
Haiti -3 13 7 8 -3 if 4 2J/ 
Honduras -1 1 8 10 Ik 12 10 
Mexico 9 7 6 8 10 13 • • • • « • 
Nicaragua 3 15 2k 2k 29 27 19 
Panama c/ 5 5 8 k 6 11 15 • • • 
Paraguay 12 27 22 16 5 -2 — 
Peru 13 19 11 5 8 • • • 
Uruguay 27 22 8 7 k 1 • • • • • • 
Venezuela 6 3 -1 1 -2 -2 -1 4 
a. December-to-December changes. 
b. May 
c. Demand deposits at private cuid government banks. No money supply figure is available 
for Panama xhere the bulk of the circulation is in the form of VS dollar notes and 
coin. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistios. 
/2. Factors 
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2. Factors of monetary expansion 
The contribution of the different sectors of the economy to the monetary 
expansion varied from country to country (see Table 82). Foreign operations 
generated important amounts of liquidity in Ecuador and in some of the Central 
American countries, where the balance of international payments had become 
favorable in 1962 after several consecutive years of deficit. The contribu-
tion of the foreign sector was also positive in Mexico, Peru and the Dominican 
Republic, but in these three countries its impact was overshadowed to a very 
large extent by the volume of liquidity created through domestic credit oper-
ations. On the other hand, in most South American countries, as well as in 
Haiti and Guatemala, the deficits incurred on external account generally led 
to a considerable absorption of domestic liquidity in 1962. More often than 
not, however, there were also large fiscal deficits to be financed at the 
banks in these countries, and bank lending to the private sector was simulta-
neously making some contribution of its own to the monetary expansion. The 
net impact on domestic liquidity was therefore always expansionary in some 
degree, even in the countries faced with the most severe drain of funds on 
balance of payments account. 
It is noteworthy that in the countries with favorable balance of payments 
positions, the growth rate in the stock of money and quasi-money did not fall 
below 8 percent or exceed 16 to 1? percent in 1962, except in Nicaragua, where 
the expansionary impact of the external surplus was reinforced by substantial 
increases in bank lending both to the government and the private sectors. In 
contrast, in the deficit countries, where domestic credit expansion had to 
overcome the deflationary impact of a net outflow of funds on foreign account, 
the increase in money and quasi-money tended to far greater extremes. It 
ranged, in fact, all the way from 2 to 60 percent during the year, depending 
on the relative intensity of the pressures brought to bear by each of the dif-
ferent sectors of the economy. 
The most striking examples of almost complete divorce between the exter-
nal payments position and the evolution of domestic liquidity were offered by 
some of the larger South American countries—Brazil, Chile and Colombia: all 
three have experienced serious balance of payments difficulties in most recent 
years, but have simultaneously resorted regularly and extensively to govern-
ment deficit financing. As bank credit to the private sector also expanded 
considerably—chiefly to permit the maintenance of current economic activity 
at rising levels of costs and prices—the domestic monetary expansion, feed-
ing upon itself, proceeded at very rapid rates in 1962 and in the first half 
of 1963. This was particularly the case in Brazil, where the cumulative in-
flationary process, virtually unhampered, had already reached considerable 
intensity in 1961. 
A different situation prevailed in the other two major countries affected 
by large balance of payments deficits in 1962, namely Argentina and Uruguay. 
In these two countries, domestic monetary expansion was not only slowed in the 





















(Changes during the year expressed in peroent of total 
stock of money and quasi-money on Deo, 31, 1961) 
Countries with balanoe of payments 
in equilibrium or surplus* 
Costa Rioa 9.9 2.2 —̂  1.7 Sf 15.0 
Dominioan Republio 1.9 - 5.3 15.2 12.» 
Eouador 9.2 0.* 2.1 13.0 
El Salvador 5.5 4.0 - 5.6 7.7 
Honduras x 6.9 7.1 17.3 
Mexioo 0.8 - 1.7 15.6 11.9 
Nioaragua 11.5 10.9 10.5 26.2 
Panama 2.9 • • • 14.7 15.2 
Peru 2.5 - 5.6 15,1 15.8 
Venezuela — _ _ -7.6 4.1 1.6 
Countries with balance of 
payments deficits 
Argentina - 9.4 6.6 6.6 5.7 
Bolivia - 6.5 17.2 5.1 15.1 
Brazil 26.9 57.2 59.9 
Chile - — - 11.1 22.1 55.8 
Colombia - 1.6 12.5 12.3 25.6 
Guatemala - 7.2 6.7 7.9 8.1 
Haiti -15.7 15.2 1.0 5.0 
Paraguay -15.6 22.7 5.5 








Less than .05 peroent. 
Net of liabilities in the oase of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, the Dominioan 
Republic, Eouador, El Salvador, Haiti, Nioaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Net of ohanges in government deposits at the banks, exoept for Brazil and Uruguay where 
gross figures were used. The monetary impact of expenditures out of official oonterpart 
fund balances was also inoluded here for Bolivia and Haiti. 
Net of ohanges in prior deposits for exohange in Brasil and Paraguay. 
For Costa Rioa, "olaims on government" inolude only those held by the Central Bank, 
"claims on the private seotor" represent all oommeroial bank oredit. 
Demand deposits and quasi-money only. 
Changes between September 1961 and September 1962, expressed in peroent of stook of 
money and quasi-money at the end of September 1961. 
Notei This table does not present an exhaustive breakdown of the factors responsible for 
monetary expansion. For this reason the three oomponents above do not usually add up to 
the total ohange in the stock of money and quasi-money shown in the right-hand column. The 
differenoe represents the net impaot of miscellaneous items whioh vary from oountry to 
oountry, as well as the impaot of ohanges in the banks' oapital aooounts. 
It should be noted also that in a number of the Latin Amerioan countries, the nature 
of the exchange system and of oertain transactions between the Central Bank and the Treasury 
is such that the monetary'effects of foreign transactions are only partly reflected in the 
data on foreign asset holdings of the banking system, the remainder being felt only through 
changes in the government accounts. In this table, the foreign and government accounts have 
been combined in cases where this raises the most serious difficulties. 
Source i International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
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preliminary signs of renewed expansion began to appear in early 1965• The 
pressure of the fiscal deficit on the banking system was greatly intensified 
in each case, but in Argentina an offsetting factor was provided by the dras-
tic curbs imposed on bank credit to the private sector. In Uruguay, on the 
other hand, the balance of payment deficit, on both current and capital ac-
count, took on such proportions during the year that it absorbed nearly all the 
liquidity created within the domestic economy by private and government borrow-
ing at the banks. 
Monetary trends in most of the remaining countries represented minor vari-
ations on the basic theme of domestic credit expansion offsetting to a smaller 
or greater extent the absorption of funds on foreign sector account. In 
Bolivia, bank credit to the private sector rose substantially while important 
amounts of liquidity were also generated by expenditures made out of the of-
ficial balances built up in recent years as domestic currency counterpart to 
U.S. grant aid. In Guatemala the monetary impact of the capital outflow and a 
decline in foreign grants were offset by a compensatory increase in government 
bank borrowing, and accompanied by a moderate increase in credit to the private 
sector. Haiti, on the other hand, experienced virtually no net monetary ex-
pansion, as the impact of the fiscal deficit, financed at the banks and by 
drawing down counterpart fund balances, did little more than cancel out the de-
flationary pressures generated in the foreign sector. 
It is clear from this brief review that inflationary deficit financing by 
the government sector was frequently the major factor of monetary expansion in 
Latin America in 1962. Although the relative importance of public versus pri-
vate sector borrowing at the banks varies greatly from country to country, 
outstanding claims on government have shown a tendency to rise significantly 
faster than credit to the private sector in a large number of countries. This 
was particularly the case in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and the Central 
American countries, where the ratio of government to private sector bank lend-
ing jumped sharply in 1962 (see Table 83). 
There were, however, several notable exceptions to this pattern. In 
Mexico, Peru and the Dominican Republic, as mentioned earlier, a fair rate of 
monetary expansion was achieved on the basis of a brisk increase in credit to 
the private sector. The operations of the government sector, on the other 
hand, appear to have led to a net absorption of liquidity in all three coun-
tries (see again Table 82). Similarly, in Paraguay and Venezuela, after 
several difficult years, the Treasuries accounts were brought into balance in 
1962. This apparently permitted a badly needed acceleration of bank lending 
to the private sector to proceed in Paraguay without refueling the inflation. 
The growth of credit to the private sector was much slower in Venezuela, where 
bank reserve positions were still in the process of recovering from the huge 
deficit drains experienced during the 1958-59 flight of capital from the coun-
try, but its expansion, at any rate, was not hampered by competitive demands 
for funds from the government sector. An easing of the fiscal pressure also 
seems to have conferred relatively greater importance to private sector lend-




„ LATIN AMERICA: RATIO OF PUBLIC TO PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT EXTEND 
BY THE BANKING SYSTEM */ 
I96I-63 
December December June 
1961 1962 1963 
Argentina .50 .56 .62 3/ Bolivia 4.25 4.09 3.34 
Brazil .71 .66 .68 2/ Chile .48 .73 .67 
Colombia .23 .32 .32 y Costa Rica y r Dominican Republic .92 .68 / 
Ecuador .12 .12 .14 
El Salvador .11 .15 .17 
Guatemala .10 .18 .09 
Haiti 1.60 1.96 1.89 d/ 
Honduras .31 .38 .43 
Mexico .22 .17 • • • 
Nicaragua • .18 .25 .22 d/ 
Panama .02 .02 f/ • • • 
Paraguay .48 .26 ~ .23 d/ 
Peru .29 .23 f/ • • • 
Uruguay .07 .11 • • • 
Venezuela .14 .04 .06 
a. Credit to the government is net of,government deposits at the banks, 
except for Brazil and Uruguay for which gross figures were used. Counter-
part fund balances were also netted out in the case of Bolivia and Haiti. 
b. Complete breakdown between credit to government and private sector not 
available. 




Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
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In Brazil, on the other hand, the banks continued to be under intensive 
pressure to lend to both the government and the private sector, but the very 
momentum  of the accelerating inflation was bringing private borrowers back in 
the foreground as the major cause of domestic credit expansion, after several 
years during which the rapidly growing deficit of the government had taken the 
lead in this respect. 
3. Balance of payments and price pressures 
Balance of payments trends continue to loom as a major factor in the 
determination of Latin American monetary conditions. In fact, the external 
deficits, because they are so large and recur so frequently, have in many 
countries assumed an importance that goes far beyond the direct impact they 
may be allowed to have on the supply of domestic liquidity in any particular 
year. Over a period of time, the need to correct them, or at least cut them 
down to a more manageable size, has often been the most important single influ-
ence involved in the formulation of over-all monetary policies. The fact 
that, notwithstanding occasional surpluses, virtually all Latin American coun-
tries have had a very weak balance of payments position in recent years ex-
plains the large number of formal monetary stabilization programs that were 
either in progress or about to be adopted in South and Central America during 
the period under review. Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay, for instance, are 
still pursuing stabilization policies initiated in 19591 1956 and 1957» respec-
tively. Chile and Colombia for their part, have applied stabilization programs 
—with varying degrees of rigor—since the late 1950's, and planned to inten-
sify their efforts in 1963» Similarly Uruguay, which did not implement very 
effectively the program adopted at the end of the last decade, was again taking 
up its monetary stabilization attempt in 1963» In 1961, stabilization programs 
had also been undertaken by Ecuador, Costa Rica and El Salvador, in an effort 
to redress unfavorable balance of payments positions and check exchange 
speculation. 
The extent to which the Latin American stabilization policies were able 
to correct external imbalances in recent years was determined in large part 
by the coherence of the fiscal and monetary measures employed to cut down total 
effective demand and dampen inflationary pressures in the domestic economy. 
The record in this respect was analyzed at some length in the preceding issue 
of this Survey.?/ It was pointed out then that generally, with a strong em-
phasis on credit restriction to the private sector, and at a heavy cost in 
terms of investment, output and employment levels, substantial results were 
often quickly obtained in the form of an improved balance of payments position 
and a new found confidence in the national currency. 
Devaluation of the exchange rate to a more realistic level and direct 
restrictions on imports had also contributed greatly to the initial successes 
7« See Economic and Social Survey of Latin America, 1961, Pan American 
Union, Washington, D".C., Volume I, pp. 216-17 and 225-28. 
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of most stabilization programs in curbing external deficits. Subsequently, 
however, as domestic price levels had continued to rise, the new exchange rates 
for the most part were not allowed to depreciate and had again become substan-
tially overvalued in a number of countries by I960 or 1961 (see Table 84). 
This undoubtedly contributed to the renewal of import pressures and speculative 
capital outflows observed in that period in countries whose stabilization poli-
cies had initially been rewarded with success. Although the increased import 
volumes served for a time to ease the renewed inflationary pressures experi-
enced in the domestic economy, large amounts of medium-and  short-term foreign 
debt were accumulated to finance the high import levels, and the exchange rate 
was supported only at huge costs to official reserves. 
In 1962, restrictive measures were multiplied to hold down imports and 
economize foreign exchange in a number of countries, especially Argentina, 
Chile and Colombia. Similar pressures were felt in Brazil, where, although no 
comprehensive monetary stabilization had been undertaken, exchange policy had 
preserved a certain amount of flexibility through the exchange reforms of 
early 1961, but had supported increasingly unrealistic rates in the subse-
quent period of accelerated domestic inflation. 
Eventually, in each one of these countries in the course of 1962, and in 
Uruguay in 1963, speculation reached crisis proportions, and a new wave of 
exchange rate adjustments, comparable in importance to that of the 1958-59 
period, swept away existing parities and, in some cases, led to major changes 
in the structure of the exchange markets. The Argentine peso, which had been 
maintained at the same level for three years after the December 1958 devalua-
tion, was allowed to fluctuate and depreciated by more than 60 percent between 
April and June 1962 (in terms of number of pesos per dollar). In Brazil,.the 
controlled free market rate was allowed to depreciate several times in the 
course of 1962 and once again in April 1963, so that by May 1963 the dollar 
was quoted in that market at nearly twice the cruzeiro value it had had in 
December I96Í. Chile re-established a dual exchange market in January 1962, 
and stopped supporting the official rate in October. Both the free and offi-
cial rates for the dollar rose sharply in late 1962 and early 1963« In 
Colombia the official import rate, which had been supported at 6.70 pesos per 
dollar since i960 for fear of the impact its depreciation might have on the 
cost of living, was finally raised to 9«00 in November 1962. In Uruguay, the 
official exchange rate was not devalued until May 1963• A return to a dual 
rate system was then anticipated for the near future. 
Domestic price and wage pressures, for their part, were largely unabated. 
In many countries, the rise in the cost of living continued at about the same 
pace as in 1961 (see Table 85), and the resulting claims for commensurate wage 
increases sent the inflationary spiral on yet another upward round. The ex-
change rate adjustments moreover, were not without impact on the price level 
of the countries concerned. They were probably a major factor in the acceler-
ation of the cost of living increases observed in Argentina and Brazil through-
out 1962. In Chile and Colombia, the sharp increases in the index around the 
turn of the year can be attributed to the devaluations of October and November 
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a. Controlled free rate. 
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c. Rate used in base year was free rate., 
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e. May. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics» 
Official rates, unless otherwise indicated. 
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''iCíKiv̂ ít! '.ãClSlTAlE R ;D 
37-61 1961 
- . ;1 :e Xf ~.3 • ' • 
6 3 T 0 1 9 
annual 
average a/ Dec. 
i ; j Jurv . 3e 
i 
Dec. March June 
Argentina '42 19 22 3-+ 32 36 23 
Bolivia 6 7 5 ? -4 • • • 
Brazil 31 44 ! r fc;2 6? 69 b/ 
Chile 19 10 10 i i, J. X i ~ ¿C 46 " 
Colombia 9 5 •Z -I - 35 
Costa Rica 2 - - — - 4 b/ 
Dominican Republic -1 -5 II •o 7 
Ecuador i 3 % — j 7 
El Salvador -1 -4 -2 0 1 
Guatemala — 3 -2 -z •• « » • • • 
Haiti - 2 3 -1 * . « * - . • * • • • • • « 
Honduras 1 — 2 i 5 1 
Mexico 6 - 2 — 1 1 1 
Nicaragua — - 2 — 1 - 2 — 
Panama — — - 1 2 
Paraguay 15 32 t • < ... • • « • • • • • • • • • Peru 8 7 '7 c; 
y 
6 5 b/ 
Uruguay 27 10 9 1 - ii 8 • • • 
Venezuela 2 1 T — -2 • • - 1 b/ 
H| 
o o & 
a. December-to-December changes. 
b. May. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial ;gt 
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essential food items. Particularly drastic measures were called for in Brazil, 
where poor harvests combined with soaring prices to create acute shortages of 
staples in some northeastern cities. Concern about the implications of an ex-
tremely rapid rise in the cost of living also led the Brazilian government to 
re-establish in 1962 an exchange subsidy on imports of wheat, petroleum and 
newsprint, which had been eliminated in the course of the 1961 exchange reforms. 
The abolition of this subsidy, which was one of the objectives of the three-
year development plan, 8/ was again decreed in January 1963, but in April, 
when the cruzeiro was devalued to 620 per dollar, the previous rate of 475 w a s 
maintained for wheat, petroleum and newsprint, marking in effect a return to 
preferential treatment. 
4. Fiscal pressures 
As already noted, the domestic inflationary pressures arose in many coun-
tries from the size of the government budget deficit. Although tax reform 
programs were initiated and tax yields raised in many parts of Latin America 
in 1962, 9/ the impact of these measures was often still too moderate, or came 
too late in the year to provide the public sector with resources commensurate 
with its growing expenditures. The figures on net government borrowing at the 
banks give an indication, albeit incomplete, of the gravity of the fiscal situ-
ation, and, in many countries, of its further deterioration in relation to 
1961 (see Table 86). 
A thorough evaluation of the fiscal situation would of course require a 
more detailed analysis of the structure of government expenditures in the 
different countries, as the future impact of these expenditures on the economic 
stability of a country depends to an important extent on the type of expendi-
ture incurred. Considering the limitations as to information, however, the 
following discussion will limit itself to a partial review of the problem. 
Only in isolated cases were government budgets balanced in 1962. One 
outstanding example was that of Venezuela, where a rise in oil revenues took 
place in 1962 and the first months of 1963» Revenue from exchange profits 
also rose sharply, as a result of a further tightening of exchange control 
regulations which transferred a large number of non-essential imports to the 
free market, where dollars could be bought at about 4.5 bolivares, while the 
government continued to purchase the bulk of the country's export proceeds at 
the petroleum rate of 3«09 bolivares per dollar. 
Examples of non-inflationary financing through the domestic capital mar-
ket were also rare. Except for Mexico, where government and official entities 
have continued to finance a large part of their investments needs by borrowing 
ÊFI See below, Chapter V, section A. 




LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN BANKING SYSTEM'S NET CLAIMS ON' GOVERNMENT^/ 
1961-1963 
1961 1962 1963 
First half 
Argentina 9 24 lld> 
Bolivia 7 18 
1 e ) Brazil 82 51 




73 25 18 
Dominican Republic 96 - 9 c) 
Ecuador 124 3 15 
EL Salvador 162 31 5 
Guatemala -4 93 V -8d) Haiti 11 26 
Honduras 2 34 14 
Mexico 5 -11 • • • 
Nicaragua -3 48 
- v Paraguay 20 -33 
Peru -7 -l6f) • • • • 
! Uruguay 2 76 • • • 
Venezuela 93 -71 66 
a. Net of changes in government deposits at the banks, except in Brazil and 
Uruguay, where gross figures were used. Changes in counterpart fund bal-
ances were also netted out in the case of Bolivia and Haiti. 
b. Central bank credit only. 
c. Not comparable to 1962 data. 
d. January - May. 
e. January - March. 
f. Twelve months ending September. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
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from the non-bank public, what long-term loans were obtained usually came from 
foreign sources. 10/ Bolivia, Paraguay and some of the Central American coun-
tries continued to rely to a considerable extent on United States grant aid. 
In Peru, where parliamentary delays to tax reform legislation contributed to a 
deterioration of the budgetary position in 1962, the government was initially 
able to draw on accumulated surpluses to finance its deficit, and used funds 
provided by the revaluation of the official gold reserves to cancel part of 
its debt to the Central Bank. Towards the end of the year, however, a bond 
issue had to be placed with the banks and the major foreign mining and indus-
trial companies to permit financing of the fiscal deficit. 
In the major South American countries, the picture was mostly one of 
growing budgetary imbalance in 1962, and the year was often spent searching 
for expedients to postpone goverment payments and raise additional short-term 
funds while minimizing, in so far as possible, the impact of the deficit on 
the over-all monetary expansion. 
In Argentina, the fiscal situation took a sharp turn for the worse in 
1962, as the difficulties involved in getting at the root causes of the deficit 
(in particular, the subsidies to the state enterprises) were compounded by the 
impact of the business depression on the flow of government revenues. Arrears 
in government payments became common and suppliers credits increased greatly. 
A large part of the deficit was financed, both in 1962 and in the first half 
of 1963, with debt cancellation certificates issued to suppliers and contrac-
tors in lieu of payment. In 1962, the government also floated a special bond 
issue ("9th of July bonds") with tax exemption and exchange depreciation guar-
antee clauses, which was also subscribed by state suppliers. In 1963, limita-
tions on Treasury borrowing from the Central Bank were eased by a one-year 
charter amendment. Moreover, the government planned to obtain additional 
funds from the commercial banks, whose cash position had improved in the early 
months of this year, and which are now required to invest a certain proportion 
of their available resources in government securities. 
A stepped-up use of commercial bank resources to finance public expendi-
tures was also made in Chile, where the banks were allowed to include Treasury 
bills in their required reserves. Colombia for its part, was considering a 
measure involving compulsory bank purchases of government bonds up to five 
percent of demand deposits in the package of emergency powers requested from 
the legislature to reinforce monetary stabilization in 1963» Large issues of 
promissory notes had already brought total government borrowing from the 
Central Bank to record levels at the end of 1962. 
A good deal of the potential Brazilian deficit for 1962 was temporarily 
avoided by delaying a large number of payments to government suppliers and 
creditors until 1963» A serious financing problem remained nevertheless, and 
the government continued to borrow from the Central Bank on a large scale. At 
mid-year, the Treasury floated a 15G billion cruzeiro issue of 20-year bonds 
that the commercial banks were allowed to include in their required reserves. 
There were also a number of compulsory loans subscribed by income-tax payers 
through surcharges'on their regular income tax assessments. 
10. See above, Chapter II, section B. 
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5. Bank credit to the private sector 
In countries faced with over-all inflationary pressures and incompres-
sible fiscal deficits, bank credit to the private sector continued to be 
the major target of restrictive policies. In a number of countries, the rate 
of growth of total bank credit to the private sector slowed down markedly in 
1962. Moreover, even in the countries where the nominal increase was still 
high, in real terms the change was often insignificant, or even negative 
because of the momentum  of the price inflation (see Table 8?)• 
This was especially the case in Argentina, where particularly severe 
restrictions on commercial bank credit and a decline in bank deposits created 
conditions of acute liquidity shortage which had a considerable impact on the 
level of economic activity. In Brazil, the rapid growth of bank credit to 
the private sector was barely enough to keep up with the price increases in 
the past two or three years, and a slowdown of production became clearly 
noticeable in the early months of 1963 in many industries—such as the auto-
mobile industry—that were especially affected by restrictions to faster 
credit expansion. Money was also scarce in Bolivia, Chile, and elsewhere. 
In Uruguay, the lack of liquidity to carry out normal business activities 
became a major problem. 
Changes in commercial bank reserve requirements remained one of the major 
instruments of monetary policy. In the course of 1962, increases were made in 
these requirements in a number of countries. In Argentina, increases of, fk 
percent were made monthly from October 19*62 to May 1963» though loans for pro-
ductive investments could be included in the banks' minimum  required reserves. 
The Brazilian authorities raised the required reserves on demand deposits from 
14 to 22 percent in May 1962, and those on time deposits from 7 to Ik percent. 
New increases were decreed in early 1963, with a number of exemptions provided 
for banks in the north and the northeast, as well as banks in some of the cen-
tral western states and banks engaged in certain priority types of lending. 
Colombia, for its part, proceeded to a gradual increase in commercial banks' 
required reserves in the early part of 1962, and has now restored a 100 percent 
marginal requirement on deposit increases over the December 1962 levels. 
Marginal reserve requirements were reduced, on the other hand, in Peru, 
to permit a greater expansion of credit to the private sector in 1962. In 
January 1963, to meet anticipated credit needs during the year, the basic 
requirement, which had remained at 28 percent since 1961, was raised to 29 
percent, and the marginal requirement entirely eliminated—the net effect being 
a 10 percent decline in total required reserves. In Uruguay, reserve require-
ments were temporarily suspended in April 1962 to ease the credit shortage, but 
they were re-established a few months later. Reserve requirements were also 
lowered in Ecuador in the early part of 1962, to offset the effect of the.fund 
shortage which had resulted from the outflow of funds and loss of confidence 
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a. Nominal change in bank credit deflated by change in cost-of-living index. 
b. In Costa Rica, the figures are those for total commercial bank credit, 
which may include some credit to the government. 
c. Twelve months ending September. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics» 
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Central bank rediscounting assumed renewed importance in a number of 
countries where the credit squeeze brought particularly severe hardships on 
industry and trade. To deal with this problem, emergency rediscount systems 
were set up in several instances along different lines from those of the usual 
rediscount mechanisms. In Argentina, the commercial banks' liquidity position 
was extremely tight during most of 1962, and the reserve deficiencies with the 
central bank substantial. To remedy this, the Banco Industrial was authorized 
in May 1962 to rediscount commercial paper of industrial enterprises for the 
commercial banks, up to 20 percent of each bank's capital and reserves, with 
25 percent of each loan to be used to meet tax payment arrears of the enter-
prise. Later in the year, further arrangements were devised to enable the 
banks to provide credit for certain hard-pressed sectors of industry despite 
their required reserve deficiencies. A special committee was set up to study 
the loan position of each bank with reserve shortfalls, and to exempt specified 
credits from the very high penalty rates usually charged for failure to meet 
the reserve requirements. 
In Uruguay, the rediscount ceilings of the commercial banks at the Bank 
of the Republic had been raised by about 35 percent at the end of 1961 to pro-
vide liquidity for the year-end needs of business and the beginning of a new 
wool season. Further increases were made in these ceilings in the final months 
of 1962 to ease the increasingly severe liquidity shortage prevailing in the 
economy. Finally, in July 1963, special credits for periods ranging up to five 
years were made available to industry and agriculture by the Bank of the 
Republic, to facilitate the repayment of debts incurred in the course of 
business. 
A somewhat similar measure was also recently taken in Brazil. In the 
early part of 1963, the government established a temporary fund to help in-
dustrial firms recover their liquidity and to provide the working capital 
that would permit them not to curtail operations. 
As would be expected, interest rates were extremely high in many Latin 
American countries in 1962. They were reportedly running at more than 40 
percent a year in Argentina, in the nonbank market, while in Bolivia, for 
instance, the average effective rate on commercial bank loans ranged between 
20 and 25 percent. Attempts to bring lending rates down, and make deposit 
rates more attractive, became an important feature of central banking policy. 
In Argentina, there was an easing of restrictions and a general increase in 
rates paid on bank deposits. The Bolivian central bank had increased its 
deposit rates in 1961 and the commercial banks followed suit. In Chile, 
interest rate ceilings on commercial bank lending rates were lowered to 12 
to 15 percent from their previous level of 16.5 percent. In Peru, a new 
central banking law also permitted the setting of maximum  bank lending rates 
at 13 percent in February 1962. A 16 percent maximum  was established in 
Uruguay as part of the fiscal and monetary measures accompanying the devalua-
tion of the peso in May 1963. 
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6. Institutional reforms 
The need to perfect instruments of monetary control and develop finan-
cial markets on a more adequate scale led to a large number of institutional 
changes in the past two years: new banking laws were passed in about half a 
dozen countries, and were under study in several others, while various changes 
were made in the long-term capital markets to stimulate a greater flow of funde 
into industry and housing construction» 
Central bank legislation was modified in El Salvador and Peru. The 
Salvadorean central bank had been nationalized in 1961 and its credit control 
powers spelled out. Under the new law, which came into force in January 1962, 
the bank modified reserve requirements and set commercial bank rediscount 
ceilings for the first time. In Peru, a new central banking law adopted at 
the beginning of 1962 redefined the functions of the central bank, giving it 
a more active role to play in the formulation of monetary policy, and wider 
powers to regulate the activity of both bank and nonbank financial institutions. 
The Peruvian commercial banking law was subsequently modified in July 1963 to 
permit an expansion of commercial banking commensurate with the growth of eco-
nomic activity in the country. 
In Nicaragua, the central bank was established as an independent entity, 
separate from the National Bank of Nicaragua, in 1961. Venezuela, for its part, 
had been given a new central banking law at the end of i960 to broaden the 
discount powers of the central banking institution and increase its control 
over the volume and direction of commercial bank credit. - Finance companies 
became subject to regulation by thé monetary authorities in 1961 in Venezuela 
and in January 1962 in Argentina. 
Major bank reforms were under consideration in several other countries. 
Bolivia, for instance, was contemplating changes designed to obtain a more 
satisfactory allocation of credit to the various sectors of the economy, and 
Costa Rica was considering changes in the banking law to permit greater bank 
participation in the financing of industrial development. In Brazil, a bank 
reform bill submitted to the legislature would set up a National Monetary 
Council and reinforce the powers of the present credit control agency, the 
Superintendency for Money and Credit (SUMOC). Similarly, the Colombian govern-
ment requested in 1963 the power to appoint a special committee which would 
take the formulation of monetary policy over from the Bank of the Republic 
with which it has rested until now. 
In Uruguay, steps were taken in May 1963 to effect a major reorganization 
of the Bank of the Republic. The Bank would be turned into the sole agency 
for granting selective credit to industry. Its Issue Department would be 
empowered to fix quantitative and qualitative controls on credit extended 
both by banks and nonbank financial institutions. 
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Mexico and Nicaragua both passed new General Laws of Credit Institutions 
in 19é2. The Mexican law, among other things, eased regulations on commer-• 
cial bank export credit activities, created new mechanisms through which 
medium and small industry could obtain long-term financing from investment 
banking institutions, and widened the scope for mortgage lending activities 
by various types of savings institutions. The Nicaraguan law authorized the 
acceptance of savings accounts from the public by banking institutions and 
the creation of cooperative savings and loan associations for housing finance. 
Other important measures taken in the long-term financing field included 
the reorganization of official development banks in several countries and 
the establishment of savings and loan associations in various parts of Latin 
America. In Colombia, a special fund for medium-term  lending to private enter-
prise began to operate at the Bank of the Republic in June I963. In El Salvador, 
a Capital Market Commission was set up at the end of 1962 to organize, develop 
and control the operations in the securities market. The Ecuadorean National 
Security Commission, for its part, intensified its operations in 1962 and was 
considering major reforms to permit a better channelling of funds into invest-
ment. In 1963, Venezuela announced the establishment of a Fund for the 
Stabilization of Mortgage Bonds, which would seek to create an aotlve market 
for bonds issued by the Venezuelan mortgage banks* 
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. CHAPTER IV • 
THE MANUFACTT3RING  SECTOR^/ 
1. General Development of I'ianufac turing 
The general course of the Latin American manufacturing 
industry in 1962 was less favorable than in several pre-
ceding yearst at least as far as the growth of over-all production is concerned* In the other aspects of industri-
al development—primarily  intended set the stage for its 
future growth—considerable•progress continued to be made 
in a large part-of the area. Outstanding among these 
aspects of organic development are significant progress in 
projects under way, the gradual completion and integration 
of industrial processes, tlie progressivo orientation of 
production toward the potentialities of the regional market, 
and growing rationalization in the operations of manufactur-
ing enterprises» 
The unsatisfactory growth of manufacturing output has 
been mainly the result of reverses sustained by Argentine 
industry. In fact, because of the decrease.in secondary 
activities in that country, the manufacturing industry in 
the region has shown an over-all production increase of 
only about 3.7 percent over the. preceding year. Excluding 
the Argentine component from the corresponding regional 
totals, we obtain a rate of increase of approximately 6.1 
percent, a figure which does hot fall so far below the 
analogous rates of the previous year. These'were more 
than 8.5-with Argentina, and 7.5 without her.2/ For 
purposes of comparisons it nay be noted that m the last 
five years, the cumulative rate of growth of industrial 
production in the area' was 7 percent per annum. 
XI Although .all .the. data for 19.62 in this survey are 
preliminary, it is well to pOiht out that those of this 
chapter may be subject to subsequent and quite extensive 
revisions and must be considered onlĵ  as, .Indicative of 
general tr.ends. . 7" 
2, In computing these rate?, as well as several 
others which will be given in this chapter, the -results 
of Cuban industrial production being unknown, have not 
been taken into account. 
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Argentine industry experienced a drop of almost 5.5 
percent in manufacturing production, "but as the structure 
of this sector of the natio.nal...eçojxomy is fundamentally 
sound and capable oí' latôr development, this phenomenon 
may "be considered as transitory; and it cannot "be predict--'? 
ed, of» course,- at-what - stage or to. what-extent it will "be 
overcome.3/ Indications for the next period are not yet 
sufficiently clear. During the first quarter of 1963, 
further drops in manufacturing production were noted, al-
though these were at a.somewhat lower rate.-
Industrial development in the other countries has 
."shown lesser changés with respect to the previous year 
"(see Table 88). These changes, of course, have; also . 
modified the. impact which the respective'national indus-
tries have I194 on.the growth of the manufacturing product 
òf Latin.America as a whole. 
Although, ih 1962, its rate of growth dropped to 7 
percent, after an average growth of about 13 percent 
during the four years preceding, Brazilian industry con-
. tinued to "be one.of the., most dynamic elements in the, 
development of manufacturing in the region. The decline 
may "be explained, to. a. great extent by the general eco-
nomic difficulties of the year though this does not 
eliminate•the .possibility that it may have had deeper 
roots. If such.we£e the case, the stimulus of indus-
trial growth in the last seven years would be giving 
rise to a less intense, but still appreciable, expansion. 
This change could be connected with the fact that the 
manufacturing development of the country will be based 
less and less on the substitution, of import's and, instead, 
satisfying the current needs of an expanding internal 
market, as well as increasing utilization of the possi- -
bilitiep of the. regional market, will take oh importance.4/ 
3« The industrial.recession in'Argentina mainly affect-
ed the consumer goods industries—current consumer goods 
and, still more,, durable consumeritems—and  repercussions 
were felt in: several mechanical industries producing parts 
and equipamént; the crisis—coupled with a noticeable 'lack 
of liquidity—spread to other sectors, also, 
... * 
~~ Recently", the're have also been, various indications 
of the interest in Brazilian industrial circles in export-
ing manufactured  a r t i c l e s to' a i ; o a s outside Latin. America 
growth. 
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In turn, Mexican industry has overcome the recessionary 
forces that had "been 'operating in 1961 and has registered 
a higher rate of growth than in the year preceding^ Taut it 
has not yet recovered its former rate of expansion» At the 
same time, it has "been possible to observe signs that 
efforts to substitute for imports were gradually being in-
tensified, with respect to certain industries in which there 
still seem to be quite extensive possibilities despite thé 
possible effects of the free trade zone. It is well to 
mention that in Mexico, just as in Argentina and Brazil, 
orientation of the industrial sector toward'the regional 
market is becoming more and more perceptive. 
The last growth coefficients for Colombia, Chile and 
Peru range between 4.3 and 5.7 percent.5/; oily in the case 
of Peru is there a rather substantial -difference between 
the rates of growth in 1962 and in 1961. 
- 5. The high growth rate of manufacturing shown in 
1962 by the Chilean index of industrial production has --•• 
been adjusted downwards in the course of official 
computing of the national product. 
- 4 - CIES/299 (English) 
» 
TABLE 88 
LATIN AMERICA: ./MAimp AC TURING. GRCWGJÍ BY COUNTRY AND BY SELECTED 
• INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS- 1957-1962 . 
(Rates of increase and weighting) 
Rates of growth ̂  - Weighting 
I960 1961 1962 1957-1962 1957 1962 
A, Growth by country 
Argentina 11>1 13,9 •-5,3 • 2,4 23,7 19,2 
38,2 y Brazil 10.6 11.1 6.9 11,6 30,8 
Chile -2,3 4,7 4,3 6,0 3,1 2,8 
Colombia 5*2 6,8 5,7 5,1 6,6 6,0 
Ecuador 5,0 2,1 2,3 2,5 0,7 0,6 
Mexico 10,9 3,5 5,2 6,7 15,6 15,6 





-4,0 3,8 7,3 7,2 5,2 5,3 
4,2 3,9 4,1 3,0 12f7 10 f 6 
8.4 8.6 3.7 6.8 100.0 100.0 















5.0 9.8 5.1 8.1 
é 
Petroleum refin-
ing g/ 7.1 
6.8 12.3 9.3 
é 
Cement 7,7 5,1 6,6 4,9 
Pig iron 24,3 15,7 7,1 13,1 
Raw steel 14,5 11,3 9,7 11,7 
Finished steel 15,1 11,0 7,4 10.1 
Motor vehicles ... 25.4 12.7 V " . 
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(Table 88 cont'd) 
a.. Rates given in the first three columns represent increases 
with respect to the preceding year; coefficients shown in 
the fourth column are rates, of annual growth for the 
1957-62 period. 
"b. The marked drop in the industrial production of Argentina 
in 1962 not only caused her manufacturing product to fall 
in position with relation to the Latin American total, "but 
also temporarily raised the weighting for: Brazil and the other countries. 
c. Changes in Cuban manufacturing activity "being unknown are 
not included». 
d. These data are given "by way of illustration and cannot "be 
taken as representative with respect to the total for the 
sector "because the respective weighting are unknown. 
e. For paper and cardboard. 
ff In aggregate. 
g. Including Venezuela. 
h. The corresponding annual rate of 88 percent does not lend 
itself to the analysis because a very small, initial base 
is used for the comparison. 
Sources: The data for 1957 and a great part of those for I960 
are taken from the ECLA series and are expressed at constant 
prices. The other basic data come from the following: for 
Argentina, Informe presentado por el Gobierno de la Argentina 
to the special committees of the IA-ECOSOC in 1963 (OAS/Ser. 
H/X. 5, Doc. 11, Pan American Union, Washington); for Chile 
and Peru, analogous reports of the respective governments 
(Docs. 15 and 19); for Brazil, IBGE, Conselho Nacional de Es-
tatística, Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1962, and —for 1962— 
Conjuntura Econamica,Feb. 1963; for Colombia,, report presented -
to the IA-ECOSOC by. the Government of Colombia, in 1962 (OAS/Ser* 
doc. 23) and, for 1962, preliminary data published by 
Fortnightly Review, Feb. 6. 1363; for Me.xico, analogous report 
of the Government (Doc. 32) and, for 1962, Memoria del Banco 
de Mexico S.A.» 1962,; for Ecuador, Memoria del Gerente General 
del Banco Central del Ecuador 196Í and preliminary estimate 
based on fragmentary national reports for 1962; and, for Vene-
zuela, Banco Central de Venezuela, Sistema de Indicadores a Cor-
to Plazo, January 1963» 
CIES/299 (English) 
The recent manufacturing development of Peru and 3 
Colombia has been achieved with a degree of stability 
greater than that which prévàiled in the Chilean eco-
nomy that year, and during this period, Chile felt 
various delayed effects of the serious lack of- exter-
nal equilibrium which had become evident toward the end 
of 1961 and which occasioned severe measures in the 
beginning of the following year. Still less favorable-
according to provisional estimates— was the recent .ma-
nufacturing development of Ecuador, where industrial 
growth was quite s£0w during the' fivo-year period/'* 
At the same time, after a two-year standstill, 
Venezuelan industry showed a growth of almost 7.-5' 
percent. Even if this preliminary figure is somewhat 
inexact, there can be no doubt that in Venezuela, se-
veral intermediate and current consumer goods indus-
tries have recently gathered momentum.  Pro Dable con-
tributing factors have been the continuing stimulus of 
the Government's development policy and the considerable 
resources of the country for manufacturing development. 
Although the trend of Latin American current consumer 
goods industries has been unfavorable in'1962—at least 
as far as the evolution of the respective regional to-
tals is coneèrned—a large number of those intermediate 
and mechanical industries on which reports in physical 
terms are available continue to show considerable dyna-
mism. In certain of the latter branches, production 
figures, including those for Argentina, show more or . 
less normal development. 
• Outstanding among the major dynamic branches of 
manufacturing in the region are petroleum refining-and 
raw steel, with growth rates of between 12.5 and 9*5 
percent. 
The automobile industry and the other mechanical ; industries—despite the Argentine recession—also made 
an appreciable contribution to the'Latin American ma.-
nufacturing product (12.7 percent). .In the production 
of cement.,,, whose expansion had been less vigorous than 
that., of the other intermediate industries during the 
last five-year period,a higher'degree of growth was 
attained in 1962 than in the previous year and even . 
:exceeded the average annual increase for the five v 
years. Although no up-to-date data are available on , 
the development of chemical industries for the whole 
region, recent production figures of various nations, 
especially Mexico and Brazil, indicate a noticeable 
- 7 - CIES/299 (English) 
expansion. Among the normally dynamic industries, the pa-
per industry received a rather weak impetus this year. 
2, Current Consumer Goods Industries 
Current consumer goods industries—somewhat heterogeneous, 
hut actually traditional manufacturing activities—continued to 
expand gradually in:1962, although they barely achieved an 
increase of 2,3 percent for the region as a whole. Such a 
low coefficient of growth compares unfavorably even with the : 
cumulative annual rate of 3.8 percent, which shows the slow 
growth of these activities throughout the 1957-62 period, 6/ 
In this connection, it. is well to recall that the slow 
expansion :of the traditional industries is due especially to 
the fact that — at least in the semi-industrialized countries 
of the. region—they no longer have great possibilities of re-
placing imports. Besides, the great majority of these indus-
tries have lacked special stimuli for improving their output 
or quality with a view to winning new markets, domestic or 
foreign. 7/ 
6/ The figures in section 2 are for all those manufac-
turing activities which it is customary-to group together 
under the term "traditional" industries,.. However, for the 
practical purposes of the present analysis, the two.concepts 
may be almost identical since the latter embraces the prepon-
derant part of industries belonging to the former, and only 
a small fraction of the other industries (e.g„ the wood and 
the furniture industries). Por more details on the composi-
tion of the manufacturing group under consideration, see the, 
definition and explanations,given, in the Economic and Social 
Survey of Latin America, 1961 (Pan American Union, Washington, 
1962), particularly the note at the bottom of page 388 
(Spanish version). 
Moreover, the list of branches of industry which make 
up the traditional group— as considered in this study—also 
is given in Table 89. 
2/ The case of certain food branches was, in a way, 
different. Some, such as sugar processing have achieved some 
noticeable increases in production¿ upon finding new export 
possibilities, thanks to special circumstances 
- - C I E S / 2 9 9 (English) 
Furthermore, the regional market has not furnished 
notable incentives in this field, and,in the near futu-
re, it will also probably offer less than to other ma-
nufacturing activities. 
The recent evolution of this manufacturing group, by 
industrial branches, can be studied only for Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela, utilizing, for this 
purpose, mainly the respective indices of manufacturing 
production. 8/ 
The product of the traditional industries of these 
five countries represents almost two thirds of the Latin 
American product of these manufacturing "branches and, 
in 1962, showed an expansion of 2.6 percent, in circum-
stances which the cumulative'annual increment for the-last, 
five-year period raises to 4.4 percent (see Table 89). 10/ 
The most remarkable phenomenon of the different 
activities within the group is the marked decline in the 
textile industry, attributable not only to the drop in .• 
Argentine production but also, in a lesser degree, to a 
slackening in this activity in Brazil. Moreover, a cer-
tain faltering in expansion is to be noted in the subgroups 
of shoes and clothing and wood and furniture. As for the 
former, the changé is not very pronounced, since these 
activities only ..went through a period of stagnation in 
Argentina and a moderate decline in growth rate in Brazil, 
which were compènsated. for to a great extent by the simul-
taneous increase in development in Peru, Chile and 
Venezuela. Similar trends also evidenced themselves in the 
wood'and furniture industries, but in this area the achieve-
ments o£ the latter three countries were not sufficient to. 
compensate fully for the falling off in Brazil and Argentina. 
....... • . • 
8/ The aggregate of the traditional industries represents 
at present about 42 percent of the manufacturing product of 
all Latin America. Percentages are slightly lower for cer-
tain semi-industrialized countries of the region. 
In the case of thè: relatively smaller nations, however, 
these industries are of great importance both for the totals 
and percentage-wise, their proportion -being at times substan-
tially higher» 
9/ See note a/ Table 89, in order to place these countries 
in their regional perspective. 
10/ It should be remembered that the corresponding rates 
of growth for all Latin America were 2.3 and 3.8 percent, 
respectively. 
- 9 - CT .S/299 (English) 
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3» Paper Industry 
Latin American production of paper.and cardboard 
showed an incrcmçnt of 5 percent in 1962, compared with 
almost 10 percent in the year preceding and 5 percent in 
I960 (sec Table 90), As for cumulativo annual expansion 
during the last five-year period, ;the industry showed a 
rate of growth of more than 8 percent» 
.In the case of cellulose pulp production—the most re-
tarded item, the production of which, therefore, usually 
shows a greater dynamism—the  recent increment" was somewhat 
over 5.5 percent; in the two preceding years it fluctuated 
between 9 and 10,5 percent, under circumstances, which cause 
the cumulative rate of the last five-year period to rise to 
11 percent. 
In 1962, only the production of newsprint maintained 
the growth rate of the last five-year period (almost 20 
percent), the most notable increases being registered in 
Brazil and Mexico» . 
footnotes to Table 89 (continued) 
d. The high rata under this heading is due to the extraordi-
nary character óf the Brazilian component. The basic (la-
tum—a preliminary estimate;taken from the review "Con-
juntura Económica"—ris, possibly, an overappraisal of the 
growth in this branch. It should be pointed out here that 
various other figure's in the indices used also seem to 
leave a certain amount to be desired* in the way of precise-
noss, but there are reasons for assuming that they 
counterbalance one another to some degree, at least in 
, the totals of the traditional group. 
Sources of basic data; Dirección Nacional de Estadistica y 
Censos, Boletin Mensual^de Estadística, Buenos Aires (vari-
ous numbers); Conselho Nacional de Estatística, Anuário Es-
tatístico do Brasil 1962, Rio de Janeiro.; Banco Central de 
Chile, Bole,tin Mensual,""April 1963, Santiago de Chile; Ban-
co Central 'de Venezuela,- Memoria Anual, 1957-61, Caracas; 
Sociedad Nacional de Industrias» Industria Peruana, April 
1963, Lima. Also, for 1962: Conjuntura Económica, Rio do Ja-
neiro, February "1963,- and fragmentary data relative to the 
production of Chilean, Peruvian and Venezuelan industry. 
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The figures citod show plainly that, in the course of 
1962, the expansion of Latin American paper production did 
not attain the growth rate of the previous year and that the 
rate of increment was also lower than that f̂ the last five-
year period. The reasons for this decline in expansion 
during 1962 vary according to the country. While in some ca-
ses, mainly that of Argentina, the unfavorable evolution of 
demand contributed to slow growth or stagnation in production, 
in the majority of Latin American countries limitations in 
productive capacity constituted the principal obstacle. 
With regard to domestic demand for paper, there do not 
seem to be any grounds for long-range concern, since consump-
tion normally tends to. expand gioatly, Thus, while in 1955 
regional demand had risen to only 1.8 million tons, in 1965— 
according to a recent study 11/ it is predicted that con-
sumption will reach 3.5 million, and in 19 75, 6.5 million. 
Furthermore, the progress of projects under way and the new 
ones that are being drafted afford promising prospects as 
regards future supply,; although complete fulfillment of 
existing plans and desirable additions thereto will depend 
to a great extent on the availability of funds for investment, 
especially foreign exchange. These are not yet assured, in 
various instances. , 
The scant use of the cellulose resources of Argentina 
in the past, and the-consequently large, volume of imports of 
this intermediate matarial and of finished paper led the gov-
ernment of that country to establish, during the latter half 
of 1961, a system of i;ax concessions and facilities in favor 
of those private industrialists who would be willing to 
Footnotes to Table 90 
a. Includes the production of El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Panama. 
Sources: For 1957: ÈCLA, Doc, E/CN 12/570. For other years: 
Direct information; from the producers of their trade associa-
tions and from public organizations, : For .countries whose 
production is still low and for which data was not obtained 
in time, estimateŝ  were made on the basis of fragmentary in-
formation. . ' 
IT.  United Nations, ECLA/FAO/BTAO, pulp and Paper in 
Latin America, New York,' 1963. 
- 13 - CIES/299 (English) 
d e v e l o p t h e i r activities along certain lines. 12/ Although the 
g e n e r a l economic evolution o f  1 9 6 2 was not favorable to increase 
in production-during this period, preparation of new plans and 
the progress thereof seem to demonstrate that this system has 
c p n s i ^ t u t e d a n . e f f i c a c i o u s  stimulus, at l e a s t fro© t£e point of 
view'òf futwre productl^ / In fact, if the platuT for 
of the first f i v e cellulose plants accepted under the scheme, 
which s u p p o s e a total investment of 48 million dollars, were 
realized^ the replacement of imports would "be substantially 
advanced, 13/ Subsequently, wlit.-l the Ledesma project was 
approved, tEe number of privileged lumber enterprises rose to 
six. This industry will use the sugar cane bagasse available 
in the zone for its integrated paper plant. Meanwhilè, a new 
project has . "been presented which would also use bagasse and 
would manufacture various types of paper and cardboard. Final-
ly, it should be mentioned that the Misiones project 14/ has 
passed into one stage of materialization, inasmuch as construc-
tion' of this plant, of 30,000 tons capacity (in terms of paper), 
for the production of pulp and Kraft paper, has been entrusted 
to an international-'firm, at a cost of 15 million dollars. 
Since the mid-^O's, the Brazilian paper industry has met 
the notably expánáive. • trend in consumption with a fair degree 
of flexibili-̂ r, $he degree of self-sufficiency in this.field 
has even been steadily increasing,- Present indications are 
that this trend will continue, and it. is • thought that by 1965 
national .produetií¡fin could handle 86 percent of total paper 
consumption. However, in .oertain sectors of thia industry it 
will be necèssâryto continué importing in relative!^ large' 
quantities, Outstanding among them is that of newsprint, 
importation of which—though less than in the past—foresee-
ably will remain for some time at relatively high levels.Thus, 
4 
12. The benefits granted under this policy are more liberal 
for those concerns whose programs are integrated with f'orest-
ation plans, but they are not limited to induètri^s whose 
activities extend to the extraction of primary wood products. 
The text of Decree No. B14I, issued in September of that year, 
may be consulted for further details, 
13. It -Ijas been estimated that the consequent gross saving 
in foreign ¿exchange, could run as high as some 30 million 
dollars-'per year; 
14. See OAS/ECLA Economic and Social Survey of Latin America 
1961, Chapter V (Pan American Union, Washington, 1962;. 
- - CIES/299 (English) 
i 
according" to recent calculations, in 1965» 43 percent of the 
total newsprint consumed will still have to "be imported. 
An important event in the recent expansion was the in- -
stallation of new equipment at the Monte Alegre (Paraná) news-
print plant. This has-increased capacity from 42,000 to 
106,000 tons annually . The capacity of the pulp plant recent-
ly equipped "by this same enterprise runs to 140,000 tons. 15/ 
There are, in addition,* several new projects with a good pos-
sibility of realization. 16/ 
* 
With the granting of a loan of 1.4 million dollars by the 
Inter-American Development Bank for the purchase of machinery 
and equipment, the projected Puerto Isaacs plant (near Calí) 
in Colombia is now in the preliminary stages of becoming a 
reality. This new installation would start off with a produc-
tion of 17,000 tons of wood pulp-and, subsequently—as of 19^6' 
or a little later—reach 34,000. 
In southern Chile, preparatory activities for proceeding 
with expansion of the Laja plant, at an estimated cost;of 
22.6 million dollars, have continued; it is expected that 
external financing will be obtained through various interna-
tional. credit organizations. If this project is carried out, 
the country's cellulose-producing capacity would increase to 
140,000 tons. At the same time, a Canadian plant is planning 
construction:in Chile of a plant which would produce from 
60,000 to: 70,000 tons of newsprint, the greater part of which 
would be ear-marked for export to Latin American countries. 
15. This firm also plans to.set up a cellulose plant in 
tho State of Pernambuco. It would' use the bagásse found in such ample supply in this sugar-producing zone. / 
16. One of the proposed plants would be set up with finan-
cial backing from well-known European firms in the field and 
would produce Kraft paper; another would use bamboo, which 
grows abundantly in the State of Bahia„ A third p r o j e c t — a n d 
the greatest in scope—has to do with setting up an integrated 
plant in Montenegro (Rio Grande do Sul) which would use the . 
acacia resources for which the zone is known. 
- 15 - CIES/299 (English) 
The ¡recent evolution of the Mexican paper and cellulose 
industries shows a slackening in growth rate, as compared with 
preceding years, but there is a prospect that construction 
potential will open the way for revitalized expansion. Replace-
ment of paper imports has progressed farther in this country 
than in most of the other producing countries of the region, 
17/ which also explains why demand has at time been less 
intense. Moreover, Mexico is one of those countries in which 
cellulose manufacturing shows the greatest structural changes 
regarding composition of raw materials used. Among the espe-
cially non-traditional materials increasingly used in this 
country §xe sugar cane bagasse, cotton lintèrs, and, recent-
ly, wheat straw» 
The'Venezuelan paper industry has recently gone through 
a marked expansion, with the inauguration of the Maracay plant 
which, with a capacity of 35,000 tons, will produce writing 
and wrapping paper, and with the opening of a cardboard 
factory in the environs of Valencia, with a capacity of 26,000 
tons annually, which is sufficient to satisfy present demand 
for this product. At the same time-, tha largest enterprise 
in the fieid has been expanding its paper production capacity 
from 45,000 ¡to 70,000 tons. 
Although, so far, paper and cardboard production in the 
Central American Isthmus has been small in quantity, and no 
celidióse is manufactured, it is hoped that the plan for a 
comparatively important integrated plant will crystallize 
under the common market program. It would be carried out iñ 
conjunction with'a more systematic exploitation of the Honduras 
timber resources. At the same time, various lesser projects 
ih other countries of the Isthmus are making progress. 
17. According to a recent estimate, 85 percent of needs are 
now being met locally, , This figure, of course, holds true 
only for the overall- picture, since •the margin for replacement 
in some products i"s still very great. In particular, lòcal 
industry contributes only 15 percent of newsprint consumed. 
Table 91 
LATIN AMERICA: CAUSTIC SODA AND SULPHURIC ACID PRODUCTION, 1957, I960, 1961, and 1962 
(Thousands oí tons) 
Caustic Soda 
1957 
Argentina 32; 6 
Brazil 47 0+ 
Chile 3 5 
Colombia 19 3+ 
Mexico 34 2 
Peru. 1 5 
Venezuela 0 0 
Latin America¡ &/ 
Total for seven 
countries a/ 138-1 
Annual incre-
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Footnotes to Table-^Ix 
a. In addition to the seven countries shown in the table, less-
er quantities are produced in other Latin American coun-
tries, but volumes are not known, ECLA has estimated that, 
for 1959, sulphuric acid production-of the remaining coun-
tries-—including Cuba—-ajrounted-to about 40,000 tons ; at the 
same time—according to an estimate of this Secretariat— 
caustic soda production in countries other than those listed 
was very low, probably very slightly over 1000 tons. 
Sources; ' For Mexico: Nacional Financiera, -Mercado de Valores 
(various numbers) and ECLA, La Industria Química en America La-
tina; for ~ " ' ' " " " ' ' : ~ : " "e-
Estadística, and ECLA-, op.cit.; for remaining countries: vari-
ous national sources and estimates based on fragmentary infor-
mation. 
. nezuela 
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4* Chemical Industries 
Although over all data on the recent development of the 
chemical industries—a very heterogeneous group,, in which no 
one product in particular predominates—are not yet available, 
the fragmentary information on hand gives reason to presume 
that expansion here has maintained almost the growth rate 
of preceding years j the rate this time "being in the neighbor-
hood of 10 percent. Despite such a small variation in the 
average growth of these industries, greater changes have 
taken place in their make-up than in the periods immediately 
preceding. 
Regarding changes in growth rate by country, the intensive 
production increases in Mexico and Brazil—16.5 percent, accord-
ing to tentative indications—should be pointed outj compara-
tively significant progress is also to be noted in the case 
of Venezuela and, to a certain degree, of Peru. 
As for the general pattern of expansion and composition 
by product, the changes v/hich have taken place are quite 
complex. Mention should be made of the sizable increments 
shown for various countries in the manufacturing of pharma-
ceuticals and of fertilizers and their basic ingredients, and 
in processes relating to the obtaining and processing of 
plastic materials. In the field of relatively new basic 
materials, the steady development of the petrochemical in-
dustries is outstanding, and—to a lesser degree—the increas-
ing use of coke by-products. Certain synthesis processes 
recently introduced have exhibited vigor as has manufacturing 
of some materials—such as certain acids and alkalis—the 
production of which is not so new in the region, but the grow-
ing use of which in numerous industries is a corollary of 
manufacturing development. Thus, for example, Mexican produc-
tion of sulphuric acid increased 32 percent in 1962 and 
caustic soda, 17 percent (see Table 91). 
The products mentioned also have a prominent place among 
the items to'be manufactured by the plants presently under 
construction. In addition, comparatively smaller installations 
are being constructed at various points for the production of 
insecticides, detergentes, explosives, etc., and there is 
notable interest in the local manufacturing of synthetic 
rubber. 
During 1962, the first Latin American synthetic rubber 
plant was inaugurated in Brazil. It has a capacity of 
40,000 tons annually, which can be doubled within a few 
years. This plant, originally supplied with imported raw 
materials, has been designated to utilize similar by-products-
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of-the Duque de Caxias refinery, located near Rio de Janei-
ro. For processing of the materials required —"butadiene and 
styrene— an adjacent installation is "being set up. All of 
this is part of the country's second petrochemical complex, 
still in the stages of construction or completion. 18/ In 
addition, there is a synthetic rubber project in thilTorth-
east; this plant, using by-products of the sugar-refining 
industry, will have a production capacity of 25,000 tons. To-
ward the end of the year, the construction of new chemical 
works was begun at Camacari (Bahia); this complex will com-
prise, first of all, ammonia and urea plants with daily 
capacities of 200 and 100 tons, respectively. It is also 
planned to set up installations in this locality for the 
production of oxygen, carbon dioxide, hydrogen, nitric acid, 
etc. Among the projects about to be carried out at various 
points are, also, three phosphate fertilizer plants (superb-
phosphate) with a combined capacity of almost 300,000 tons. 
With reference to the Mexican chemical industry, it may 
be pointed out that, in production value, it ranks second in 
Latin America, but its long-range growth is more intense than 
that of any other country of the region. Moreover, it is 
outstanding because of its many-sided orientation—it is 
progressing simultaneously in almost all branches of this 
field 19/— and also, because of a policy consistently aimed 
toward export, along with positive measures for setting up 
diverse projects on a large scale, capable of competing with 
those of other countries. 20/ 
In 1962, various plants begun in the country in preceding 
yearsf were completad. The inauguration of an ammonium anhydride plant in Minatitlán and the virtual completion of 
another in Salamanca should be pointed out. Toward the end 
of the year, the first urea plant in the region was set up. 
18. It should be remembered that the first group of 
plants of this type was the manufacturing belt around the 
Cubatão refinery (environs of Santos). 
19. Nevertheless, fertilizers are outstanding both as 
regard production and as regards high growth rate; this 
fact is connected with the development of an expanded 
petrochemical program. Mexican chemical products include, 
among other items dodecilbenzene, nylon, ammonium,  ammonium 
nitrate, carbon dioxide, etc. 
20. Por further details, see: ECLÂ, The Chemical Industry 
in Latin America, Volume I, Doc. E/CN,12/628, August 1962. 
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Also worthy of mention are three new installations for the pro-
duòtion of refrigerating gases, hydrofluoric acid, and carbon 
tetrachloride, respectively, and two others.which will produce 
organic pigments and synthcthic resins. Also, during this same 
year̂  the'range of locally-produced .pharmaceuticals was increased 
Among the projects under construction or in an advanced stage of 
preparation and deserving of special notice are those coming 
uñder a petrochemical:program of major:propçrtions whiçh will, 
introduce the pro duct i or of lamp"b lack, 'phenol, acetofie, methanol, 
"benzene, toluene, ethylene, lead >:.traothylene and various polyesters, as well as synthetic rubber'. Investments planned 
for this development of the petrochemical industry over the next 
threes-years amount to almost 2,500 million pesos (200 million 
dollars). Among the other projects underway, a plant with an 
initial production of 100,000 tons of sodium carbonate is pro-
minent; completion of this projcct, in.addition to making'the 
country self-sufficient for a certain ti: o in this product—since 
there are also natural sources of supj.1". —will make export' possi-
ble to the other countries of the region. Finally, mention 
should be made of the progress in plans for .constructing a large 
sulphuric acid plant and an installation, for the production"of 
citric acid. An installation is also planned,for the extraction 
of sodium sulphate from the Laguna del Rey salt reserves. 
In Argentina, also., progress continued in various important 
projects.' Near the end of the year, a major chemical center in 
San Lorenzo (Santa Ee Province) went into its first stage of 
operation. The recently equipped installations have an annual 
production capacity of 75,000 tons of sulphuric acid, 14,000 
tons of carbon disulphide, 1,000 tons, of hydrogen peroxide and 
1,200 tons of phthalic anhydride; in the second stage, they will 
go on into the manufacturing of ethylene and polyethylene. At 
the same time, efforts have been made toward solving the 'pending 
problems of an important petrochemical complex, construction of 
which is to begin about the middle of 1963.' Its program in* 
eludes, among other items, synthetic rubber. In connection with 
the rubber industry, mention should also be made of the ground-
work laid by another enterprise for the manufacturing of lamp-
black. Outstanding among the remaining projects are.those having 
to do with the production of phenol, citric acid and methyl 
alcohol. Likewise, it is planned to set iip an industrial com-
plex in the southern part of the country for the production of 
sodium alkalis, as well as chlorine and several of its compounds, 
including polyvinyl chloride. 
It is intersting to observe that for several years these 
three great countries have been sharing about three quarters of 
the chemical production of the region,̂  a proportion which, 
according to recent ECLA projections, will probably be maintained 
for. several more years. 
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In Colombia, the Mamonal anrmoniuni. and nitric acid plant 
(near Cartagena) was virtually completed toward the end of the 
year, likewise â fertilizer" plant in the same zone, where a great 
part of its production will be used. In addition, the fertilizer 
plant of the future Barrancabcrmeja petrochemical complex has 
been almost completed; an installation is also planned in,this 
locality for the production of ethylene. Finally, mention should 
be made of the construction of an insecticide plant, intended, 
to reduce imports of this item by one half, Among projects re-
cently launched, a second Solvay plant is outstanding; it will 
be sé"t up near Cartagena, with a sodium carbonate capacity of 
320 tons daily; more than half of this quantity will be sold -as 
such¿ the remainder being"reserved for conversion into caustic 
soda. Moreover, various projects are being promoted for the 
production of plastics and pharmaceuticals. 
Plans are still under consideration in Chile for setting up 
a chemical industry center in the south of'the country to produce 
sulphuric acid, fertilizers and pesticides. 
Likewise in the planning sta,ge is the project for a fcrti=-
lizer-mixing plant in Guayaquil, Ecuador, which" would -operàte on 
a basis of imported materials. And in Paraguay, construction 
of an installation for producing plastics is nearing completion. 
During the year, a contract was let for construction of a 
fertilizer plant in Cuzco, Peru. Preparations are also pro-
gressing for the petrochemical project in Los Organos, which 
is to produce 200 tons of ammonia daily. At the same tire, the 
Callao ammonium  plant, which begs,n operations a few years ago, 
continued to increase its production. In addition, installation 
of a calcium carbonate plant at Chimbóte has virtually been 
completed. Among projects in preparation arc ones for the futu-
re production of urea,- and for increased production of chlorine, 
hydrochloric acid, etc, 
Venezuela, first-stage construction work has been practi-
cally completed for the Moren petrochemical complex, which now 1 comprises fifteen installations and which, within a few months, 
will begin production of ammonium  sulphate, urea, nitric acid and 
ammonium  nitrate, with capacity sufficient to meet domestic needs 
and to export in certain quantities. Expansion of the refining 
division of this industrial center is expected soon, likewise 
the beginning of construction work on a plant for the production 
of explosives. Various other second-stage works will include 
the manufacture of synthetic rubber and raw materials for deter-
gents; It is planned to complete whis stage Within about four 
years. Meanwhile, a lampblack plant has been set up in the 
environs of Valencia. 
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- 5̂  Petroleum Refining 
The volume of Crude, oil. processed "by Latin American-refi-
neries in 1962 surpassed that of the preceding year "by more 
than 12 percent, again registering a High growth rate for the 
industryi after tv/o yeàrs of less vigorous expansion 
.(see Table 92)* The transitory slackening in development for 
"both years was mainly dur to a ¿declino in. the rate of expansion 
in Venezuels, a country whose refineries, in tèrms of capacity, 
account for almost one half of the regional installations in .;. 
this field* 21/ Despite two years of moderate growth, the ¡cumu-
lative ' annual increment • for the five-year period, on the regio-
nal level, amounts to 9»3 percent i 
The circumstances contributing to this new surge in Latin 
American petr oleum.,rexining have varied. As for the stimuli 
of demand, it should be pointed out that in those countries 
which produce mainly or exclusively for domestic consumption, 
not only have the expansionist tendencies peculiar to the de-
mand for petroleum products and by-products continued by.t,in 
various instances, they have bacone pronounced. Such tendencies 
result from rapidly ..growing needs among conventional consumers 
of these products and from the continuous entrance of new con-
sumers into the market. Of course, the replacement of imports 
continued to play a certain role, in this expansion; however, 
the process in general is quite well developed, and,in several 
instances, progress in replacement—achieved by putting new 
installations in operation—merely counterbalanced those pe-
riodic increases in imports v-hich had occurred during construc-
tion of the new facilities. 22/ . 
In 1962, - the growth rate shown for Venezuelan refining 
industries waw 10.5 percent, the-rates, for the remainder of 
the region, moré than 14 percent. The corresponding coef.- • 
ficients for 1961 were almost 5 and 9 percent,, .respectively. 
22. It shcruld also be borne.in mind in regard to certain 
by-products—such" as fuel oil—that it may be advisable to< co-
ver a certain margin by importing. In fact, domestic demand 
for the different petroleum by-products does not ordinarily 
correspond exactly to the proportions in which these by-products 
are produced in the national processing of crude oil. Local 
production, of a residual product, the need for which is com-
paratively high, would require additional capacity, calling for 
largo '..investments, and would, suppose- export of ourpluo by-pro-
ducts uncí or' not "always "very" favorable -terms7 since there-- mây 
also" K'"a surplus in neighboring countries. • 
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Table 92 
LATIN AMERICA; PETROLEUM REPUTING--' 
1957, 1960, 1961, and 1962 -
(In thousands of tons) 
1957 I960" 1961 1962 Argentina , 10,724 12,303 13,285 15,600 
Bolivia 329 305 300 - : : 350 
Brazil 5,862 8,.966 10,126 15,543 
Chile 1,006 1,397 1,640 1,970 
Colombia 2,444 3,533 3,929 4,193 
Ecuador 273 560 560 ... 520 
Mexico 11,684 . 16,023 17,022 16,950V 
Panama - - - 900 ç/ 
Peru 2,110 2,237 2,242 2,430 
Uruguay 1,160 1,389 1,4-02 1,535 
Subtotals-7 
Rates of increment 
35,597 46,713 50,806 57,991 
over.the preceding year 8. 8 14.1 
Rates of cumulative 
annual increment.1957/1962 10.3 
Venezuela 
: Rate s of increment 
36,745 47,232 49,545 54,746 
í over the preceding year 4. 9 10.5 




Totals • 72,342 93,945 100,351 112,737 
Rates of increment over _ 
the preceding year 7, 7 6 .8 12.3 
Rat e s...'•of cumulative annual 
increment 1957/1962 9.3 
Footnotes arid sources are , given on; page '¿4 
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Of course, the case of Venezuela is very different, since 
three fourths of the refining industry is geared to export; 
therefore, a significant increase in production supposes im-
proved prospects in the usual foreign markets or the winning 
of new consumers. Recent expansion was directed to the latter. 
As for the other exporting countries of the region, it should 
"be pointed out that they sell only marginal quantities o"f "by-
products on the foreign market. 
Recently, the abundant supply of domestic crude oil in 
Argentina certainly accounted, in part, for the growth in re-
fining operations of that country. An important complementary 
factor in this increase was the expansion of the Lujan de Cuyo 
(Mendoza1Province) installations, with an added capacity of . 
more than one million tons. In addition there were delayed 
effects of certain expansionist activities begun during pre-
ceding periods. 
In Brazil, the demand for petroleum by-products kept on 
rising in 1962 as a result of continuing industrial development 
and the steady growth of the automotive fleet. At the same time, 
supply T/as considerably augmented because of the almost full-
scale operation of the new Duque de Caxias plant (near Rio de 
Janeiro;, wMch was set "up during the preceding year and has a 
Footnotes to Table 92. 
a. The figures for some countries include natural gasoline. 
It's production., however, is of minor proportions. 
b. The figures given by Petroleos Mexicanos—which indicate 
that part of petroleum production which is destined.for 
refining, although this quantity may not be totally re-
fined during the calendar year in which it was taken 
from the ground—are at some variance with the official 
figures quoted. They.show an .increase on the order of 
4 percent for the last year. The data given by this 
last source, converted into units of weight, show 16.7;;-
and 17.4 million tons for 1961 and 1962 respectively. 
c. Estimate 
d. Does not include Cuban production for lack of pertinent 
data. 
Sources; United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, 
World Petroleum Statistics (various numbers); for Mexico: 
• Petroleo Publishing Co., Petróleo Interamericano, 
April 1963; Dirección General de xlstadisticá, (various 
numbers); for Venezuela: Dirección G-eneral de Estadística, 
Boletín Mensual de Estadística (various numbers), Caracas. 
The original figures, indicating units of volume, have 
been converted to tons in accordance with the specific 
weights set forth in the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 
of the United Nations. 
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capacity of more than 4 million tons per year. This additional 
productive capacity coupled with hotter use of certain others, 
made possible an appreciable replacement of imports in 1962, 
in spite of increasing .consumption, since, at the same time, 
the total of imported petroleum products dropped by more than 
2 million tons as compared with the preceding year. 
The half government-owned Chilean plant of Concón (near 
Valparaiso), expanded in I960, considerably increased the util-
ization of its installed capacity, meeting requirements of the 
growing demand. Its production exceeded tha.t of the preceding 
year by more than 20 percent, a rate exceeded that year only 
by the expansion in Brazilian refining operations. 
In 1962, Mexican refineries did not increase the amount of 
crude processed oil over that of the two preceding years, but 
the progressive introduction of certain processes made it pos-
sible to increase the output of various products of relatively 
greater value, such as gasoline, kerosene, diesel oil and gas 
oil; national output of these products now comes close to meetr-
ing domestic demand. Work on new projects has also been advanced. 
The fact that Venezuelan refineries increased production 
in 1962 at a more rapid rate than in the preceding year reflect-
ed heavily in Latin American totals. In 1961, the Venezuelan 
petroleum industry, including the refining sector, had been con-
fronted with the partial loss of certain of its traditional 
markets. Recently, such difficulties have been largely overcome 
as a result of the growing European demand for light oils and 
the gradual entrance of Venezuelan petroleum products in new 
markets. 
Prospects.for the refining industries appear even better 
in 1963 because then the Salamanca and Minatitlán plants will 
begin operating and thus increase Mexican refining capacity by 
almost 4.5 million tons a year. In addition, ono plant in 
Bolivia and three in" C.entral America (Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and Nicaragua) are expected to begin operating. These plants, 
together with one in Panama—whose first stage was completed 
in 1962—will add more than One'million tons a year to the 
total capacity of the region. 
Finally, projects now under way will bring about a. significant 
increase in tho refining capacity of Latin America in subsequent 
years. By 1965—or not much later—two important Brazilian 
plants, together with the multiple expansion program planned 
by Pemex in Mexico and the new Chilean plant in Concepción, are 
expected to raise the region's capacity by about 10 million 
tons annually. In addition, consideration is being given to 
a few, relatively small projects in Colombia, Paraguay, the 
Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica. 
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6. The Cement Industry 
In 1962, Latin American cement production increased by a 
little more than 6,5 percent over the preceding year. This 
figure is slightly higher than that of. the year, before and of 
the last five-year period (see Table 93)* 
It may be noted that regional rates of growth encompass 
a great many different national coefficients, which not only 
vary considerably among themselves, but also usually fluctu-
ate—sometimes  markedly—in consecutive years. Thus, in 1962, 
the Chilean cement industry registered a growth, rate of over 
15 percent, and" the Mexican and Colombian industries show-
ed rates of approximately 10 percent, while the figures for 
Argentina and Venezuela reached levels of- only between 1 and 
1,5 percent. But if the percentages for Argentina and Mexico 
are compared with corresponding data for the preceding year, 
exactly the opposite trends are noted,'for in that year 
Argentina registered a coefficient of 10 percent, while Mexico 
showed production at a standstill. As .for Chile and Colombia, 
it should be pointed out that their cement production, now 
moving ahead strongly, had shown no signs of growth vitality 
for several years preceding; on the other hand, the Venezuelan 
industry had been outstanding'in the past for its steady 
growth. 
These facts also seem'to point up another characteristic 
of the course of this industry: the tendency of national 
growth rates to level off among themselves in the -long run, 
despite the variation in their annual fluctuations. Thus, for 
the last five--year period, the cumulative rates of Argentina,-
Chile, Co_cribia, and Mexico range between 4,5 and 7,0'-percent. 
Hence, an annual growth of 5 or 6 percent may be considered 
quite typical .for a group of: semi-industrialized countries of 
the region which, in other aspects, have an appreciable weight-
ing in the Latin American totals.23/ 
23. Growth of ..the cement industry over the five years 
was slightly ¿.reater in Brazil and Ecuador and weaker in Peru, 
Uruguay, etc. The present poor course of this material's-
production in Venozuela seems to be of a temporary nature. 
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Table 93 
LATIN AMERICA: CEMENT PRODUCTION 
1957, I960, 1961 and 1962 
















Latin America : 
Totals 
Rates of increase 
£>võr preceding year 
Cumulative annual 
Waters of- growth . 
1957/1962, 
1957 1960 1961 1962+ 
2,363 2,641 2,906 2,941 
24 39 42 49 3,393 4,474 4,709 5,076 
222 269 28> 275 
727 835 883 1,021 
1,356 1,385 1,567 1,716 
280 170 207 212 
155 201 219 230 
28 48 44 46 
2,560 3,089 3,035 3,348 
109 114 120 
12 14 16 17 
545 600 654 680 
417 415 381 402 
1,747 1,487 1,513 1,535 
.3,908 15,776 16,573 17,668 
7.7 5.1 6. 
4. 
Sources; Official statistics and international publications, 
especially; United Nations, Statistical Yearbook,• 
1962.and Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, June 1963. 
a. Includes El Salvador, Guatemala,•Honduras and Nicaragua cement is not yet produced in Costa Rica. 
-I8®! 
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Besides the marked fluctuations in short-term development 
of this industry—reflecting the relative instability of the 
"building industry and the fact that in this area the ""buffer 
of import substitution is practically nonexistent 24-/—some 
attention should also be given to the peculiarity cir its long-
term rate of growth. In fact, the cumulative five-year rate 
represents an "intermediate" growth, which differs as much from 
the growth coefficient of the so-called dynamic industries in 
the region̂  as from the pattern of traditional manufacturing 
activities. 
In order to account for this behavior of the cement 
industry, it is necessary to turn to the fact that, despite the 
sizable substitution achieved in the import area-which consti-
tutes the main difference with respect to the still dynamic 
industries—it still has, potentially, sufficient new domestic 
markets. This potential is being progressively exploited 
through the gradual acquisition of new consumer centers, as 
well as through expanded use of this product in applications 
more or less novel on the domestic scene. In particular, the 
completion of vairious major engineering projects and numerous 
lesser ones—presently under way throughout the region or 
planned for the near future—is likely to increase demand for 
this material. Moreover, intensification of demand for public 
and private engineering projecte- osn have a more and more 
stabilizing influence on the development of this industry, 
compensating somewhat for the erratic incidence of residential 
construction, 25/ 
Major expansion of capacity is now in progress in Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico, but the expansion of productive capacity in 
Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay is also significant. As for 
the construction of new installations in Argentina,: it is expec-
ted that these will cover requirements for the next few yaars; 
on the other hand, certain doubts have arisen, regarding the 
ability of the current expansion of Brazil's cement industry 
to meet the steadily increasing domestic demand. 
24. In general terms. It should be mentioned, however, 
that toward the middle of 1963 the Peruvian Government withdrew 
the tariff protection granted this industry, after the latter 
raised its domestic prices, 
25. Although the severe economic crisis in Argentina had 
already had an effect on the course of various important indus-
tries at the beginning of the second half of 1962, the cement 
industry sustained major reverses only in the latter part of 
the year, and, even then, it closed the year with a certain 
advance. This seems ascribable, principally, to the cushioning 
effect of the consumption of engineering projects in the pe-
troleum industry. 
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7. THE IRON'AM) STEEL INDUSTRY 
During,1962, the Latin American iroii and steel industry 
continued to growj at a pa.ce almost as fast as in preceding 
years. Moreover, in the most important producing countries of 
the region, ita development showed various favorable signs 
regarding product quality and elasticity of long-term supply, 
although its short-term availability was not always sufficient, 
in fact, conditions of relatively ample supply in certain 
countries alternated with growing shortages in others. So too, 
in the rationalization of operations certain progress has been 
evident, even though-in many localities competitive levels have 
not yet been reached. 
The new increase in production resulted almost entirely 
from the expansion of existing facilities and the construction 
of new installations. Originally, and even greater expansion 
had been planned for 1962, but the lack of funds-^especially 
domestic—has delayed completion of certain major projects 
under construction. • 
Despite these drawbacks, the manufacture of raw steel in 
1962 increased at a rate of almost 10 percent, slightly lower 
than that of preceding years (See Table 94). $/ 
As for the production of finished steels—rolled, wire-
drawn and pressed—the provisional figures available 26/ 
indicate an increase of only about 7.5 percent for 19̂ 2» which 
is much lower than the increase for the 1957-62 period. However, 
no symptomatic significance can be attached to this slackening 
of pace since it results entirely from the temporary drop in 
production in Argentine rolling mills—where there is a surplus 
capacity—without affecting the growth pattern of raw steel 
manufacturing. 
The simultaneous development of pig iron production should 
'be subject to a somewhat different appraisal. The recent 
slackening in the growth fate of this item, which fel from 16 
percent in 1961 and 13 percent for the five-year period to 7 
percent for last year¿ draws attention. The expansion of 
26. With respect to the production of raw steel and pig 
iron, 1962 data are now final for the most part or only subject 
to relatively minor adjustments; on the other hand, regarding 
finished steels, a great part of the latest figures are still 
provisional. , . 
x/ Table 94 will be issued- separately. 
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cast-iron capacity.is characterized by larger production units 
and, therefore, variations in growth are normàlly moro abrupt. 
In this instance, the circumstances, of the yèàr;contributed 
toward a more pronounced fluctuation. In fact, the main' reason 
that more intense growth'was registered in pig. iron production 
than in the.'other iron, and steel operations during the five-
year period was the eagerness Of various Latin American coun-., 
tries to set up integrated iron and steel mills 27/? this 
brought on a more or less parallel expansion in "iliç manufac-
ture of steel and cast iron. But as production of the latter 
item was initially lower, corresponding rates of growth were 
higher than for steel. Nevertheless, recent problems in 
financing, more than anything else, delayed completion of 
certain important integrated projects, for which reason the 
slackening of pace in this item was more marked than in 
steel ingots. Actually, the last annual increment in Latin 
American production of pig iron would bè even lower, were it 
not the successive installation of electrometallurgical.fur-
naces at the new Venezuelan plant and certain improvements 
made in the Chilean integrated center. 
In the manufacture of raw steel, the highest increments 
were achieved in Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Venezuela. At 
the same time, production remained—for the first time in a 
long while--àlmóst stationary in.Mexico, and below that of 
the preceding year in Colombia, á slight drop also being 
registered for Peru 28/. 
57" To a certain extent, thè setting up of certain new 
iron-smelting works with charcoal blast furnaces also contri-
buted to this result. 
28. In addition to slight variations in percentages for 
each country in total Latin American steel production, recent 
changes, especially outfitting of the Venezuelan electrome-
tallurgical plant, as well as various technological transforma-
tions effected in the Brazilian industry, also.caused steel 
production to vary according to processes in use. In 1962, 
about 68 percent of production was accounted for by Siemen-
Martin plants, 25 percent by electric furnaces, 4 percent by 
the Linz-Donauwitz process, 2 percent-by Thomas converters, 
and 1 percent by the Bessemer process» .. 
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In 1961, regional production of 5 million tons of finished 
steel was supplemented "by importing 3 million tons. For 1962, 
data are not, yet complete as to the relation "between production 
and imports, "but it may "be anticipated,that the volume of im-
ports has incieased for various countries. 
Meanwhile, completion of projects under way and planning 
for new ones followed a course- that was relatively independent 
of fluctuations in production. . The total importance of these 
projects offers promising1 prospects for the future production 
of this industry on the regional leyel. 
Despite the serious,difficulties encountered by the 
Argentine, economy in 1962 and the depressive effect of large 
steel imports during the preceding period, progress has been 
made in standardizing operations at the integrated San Nicolas 
center where, moreover, development of the so-called "immediate" 
expansion program has taken place between the first and second 
stages of construction of this plant. Nevertheless, it has 
been deemed necessary to postpone the beginning of second-
stage operations. 29/. 
Toward the end of the year, the new .semi-integrated plant 
at Siderca en Campana(Buenos Aires, Province), of 100 thousand 
tons capacity, was inaugurated. At the same 'time, first-stage > 
construction work was greatly advanced at Altos Hornos Güemes 
(Salta, Province), whose two furnaces will produce 25 thousand 
tons, per year; 30/ During the year in question, progress was 
29. With reference to completion of the first stage, in 
1962 the mill for hot-rolling sheet steel went into operation 
and, in the beginning of 1963» that for cold-tolling; only the 
tin-plate process remains to be begun. As ,a part of this 
additional ("immediate") program, the fifth Siemens-Martin 
furnace was inaugurated at the steelworks. 'The plan will reach 
completion with installation of an oxygen plant and certain' 
auxiliary equipment which will soon raise mill capacity to 
1.16 million tons per year; this will tend to balance somewhat 
the capacity of this department with that of the large-scale 
rolling mill. On the other hand,, postponement-,-of.the second 
stage proper precludes the possibility that the plánt-wiil 
reach for 1965 or 1966 the production figure of 2 million tons 
in steel ingots which.had been previously contemplated* 
3.0. The first blast furnace was inaugurated at this plant 
in March 1963, 
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also made in the planning of other projects, among which is 
a'plant for special steels. 
Although these projects will supply some temporary re-
lief as regards supply situation in the near future, it must 
also be taken for granted that iron and steel shortages in 
the country will soon again become acute.. In fact, recent 
projections of steel demands in Argentina show an increase 
in consumption whichunay rise from 3 million tons of raw? 
steel in 1962 to 3*8 million tons, in 1965, 4.4 million in 
1967, and 5 million in 1970. 
An important event in the Brazilian iron and steel indus-
try in 1962 was the lighting of the first blast furnace at the 
new Usiminas plant ¿1/ in Tpatinga (Minas G-erais). The ini-
tial steel-producing capacity of this plant will be 500 
thousand tons. Capacity will rise to 2 million in the second 
stage, which will be initiated around 1966. As the completion 
of various of its divisions has had to be postponed somewhat, 
in the interval pending introduction of integrated operations, 
the plant will export pig iron to Japan,,in exohange for coking 
coal coming from the United States. MoreovêT, it will provide 
Volta Redonda'with certain amounts of pig iron and steel, and 
Acesita with coke. 32/ 
Construction and equipping of Cosipa, another important 
new plant being erected near Sao Paulo, has been delayed 
somewhat longer, although" considerable progress has been made 
in severa], of its sections. Certain delays álso have charac-
terized the transformation of the Vitória ironworks into 
integrated center and the construction of the steelworks in 
th,e. .Sortheast. 33/ At the same time, progress"has been made, 
through various technological improvements, in-¡development of 
the great Volta Redonda plánt, and the integrated: Belgo-Minei-
ra and..Mannesmann-centers have been expanded through,. new • 
construction work. In conclusion, it is expeçteâ :thát-,Bra-
zilian. steel próduction, which in 1962 come to-2*5 million 
tons, may double by 1966 or a little later, 7-million-ton 
31. For information pertaining to the financing of this 
plant,.see Part I, Chapter II of the present survey.' 
32.. It : as been estimated that manufacture of ohemicals 
from by-procirots of coke will, double production of this item 
for the country. "' 
33. Beginning of par4:L8,l operations at Copipa and 
inauguration of the first-stage steel installations at Vitória 
are scheduled for the second half of 1963. 
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level being foreseen for 1970. Realization of these goals would 
mean almost meeting projected consumption for the second half 
of this decade, as long as development requirements in this 
field do not substantially ekceed present estimates. 34/ 
Two interesting features of the recent evolution of the 
iron and steel industry in this country are the gradual re-
placement of Siemens-Martins processes by L-D converters (with 
oxygen injectors), and the- increasing regional distribution of 
the industry. 
At the Colombian plant in Paz del Rio, a sheet mill with 
a capacity.of 50 thousand tons per year went into operation, 
toward the end of 1962. The new development plan for this 
plant entails raising its steêl-producing capacity from 123 
thousand tons per year to 220 or more in the first stage, 
completion of which is expected by 1965» while in a second 
state, which will be begun simultaneously but completed at a 
later time, it is proposed to- diversify production to include 
the manufacture of tin plate, etc. 
Iron and steel production in Colombia shows certain trends 
toward decentralization, inasmuch as this country's two semi-
integrated plants now have a combined capacity of slightly 
more than 50 thousand tons and—despite certain considerations 
to the contrary—new plans are under way for construction of 
other plants on the Atlantic coast and in the Cauca valley. 
At the integrated Chilean center of Huachipato, the 500-
thousand-ton mark in ingot production was reached for the 
first time in 1962. The concern^ immediate goal is to 
increase capacity gradually until a production of 600 thousand 
tons is attained in 1965* This expansion would be effec'tjefl 
~ 34. According to statements made by one official of the 
industry 500 thousand tons of steel per year, are needed for 
the manufacture of automobiles, and 100 thousand tons for 
shipbuilding; with reference to canning-industry, demands, it 
should be observed that domestic production presently takes 
care of one half. 
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"by an investment of 50 million dollars, partly for replacement 
of certain equipment and partly for new installations intended 
to increase productivity. 35/ 
The temporary standstill in Mexican, iron and steel produc-
tion for 1962 relates to certain phenomena of the economic 
contraction of the preceding year which resulted in a falling, 
off of apparent steel consumption, which dropped from a level 
of almost 1,930,000 tons in I960 to 1,850,000 for 1961. ¿6/ 
On the other hand, the steady growth of the Mexican iron and 
steel industry in the past has made it possible to keep re-
ducing the share of imports in this country's apparent consump-
tion, so that the volume of imported items dropped from 40 
percent in 1956 to 30 percent in 1958, and to 15 percent in 
1961. This reduction in the,margin of substitution—which 
continued downwards in 1962 to the 10-percent level 37/~tended 
to make producers more cautious in the face of accumulation of 
stocks. Nevertheless, the domestic steel market seems to be 
quite expansive on a long-term basis, and construction of new 
facilities was continued in 1962. Plans of the most important 
concerns in this field for succeeding years were also maintained. 
Projects for expansion of the Monclova and Monterrey plants are 
particularly noteworthy, as are those at Tarnsa and two new 
projects of'considerable importance with good prospects of 
realization. 
35. With reference to operation of the blast furnace, 
changes planned involve injection of petroleum and/or coke gas, 
strict control of ore size and setting up a self-fluxing sinter 
plant, etc. In the steelworks, injection of oxygen into the 
Siemens-Martin furnaces will be introduced, and the capacity 
of two of these furnaces will be increased'from 100 tons to 
200. The rolling mill already has a processing capacity of 600 
thousand tons per year in ingots, but for optimum output it 
requires auxiliary installations which will also be set up 
during this phase of expansion. Shortly after completion of 
these complementary installations, the remainder of the original 
plans for expansion is to be carried out, including construc-
tion of a second blast furnace and various other works to 
complement the other stages of production. 
36. In 1962, apparent consumption again rose slightly, 
reaching a level of 1.9 million tons. 
37. In 1962, domestic production met total domestic 
consumer needs for wire rods, cast-iron pipe, sheet iron, 
tinplate, and galvanized sheets. Moreover, domestic industry 
supplied 90 percent of direct consumption of structural beams; 
corrugated reinforcements for concrete; spikes; drawn wire; 
steel for tools, tubing, nails, and staples; hot-and cold-
rolled sheets; and hot-and cold-rolled strips. 
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Toward the middle of 1962, the owners of the plant at' 
Chimbóte, Peru, concluded a contract with .a. European partner. 
According to the terms of this agreement tlrer capacity of this 
integrated center--whieh had been designed for 60 thousand 
tons and which, owing to certain recent improvements,  can now 
producé about 75 thousand tons of raw steel-would be raised 
within a few years to 350 thousand tons, at a cost of 130 
million dollars* At present, the country consumes some 
200,000 tons, the estimate for 1970 coming to 500,000, 
Geologise! surveys recently carried out in Uruguay have 
made it'possible to estimate that the Valentines iron-oire 
reserved run to 30 million tons; this amount is sufficient 
to supply a domestic iron and steel industry over a long period 
and still leave a surplus:for export. Various foreign offers 
are presently being considered for exploitation of those 
deposits, and at the same time, plans for providing'the country 
with an integrated center have received new impetus. 
The new Venezuelan plant--at Matanzas? which had gone' into operation toward the' end of 1961 with the manufacture of seaot-
less:tubes,using imported materials, next began producing pig-" 
iron, and, toward the middle of 1962,it alsò"began to pour ateél, 
Thus, operation of the plant which will soon be completed with 
the rolling of beamô,began on an integrated tjasis, The suc-
cessive putting into operation of the different installations 
of "Oils plant means á steel-making capacity of 760 thousand 
tons for 1963 and a pig-iron capacity of 700 thousand tons. 
Finished-steel capacity will be 600?000 tons, approximately half of this yearly volume being seamless tubes. Steel-pouring 
capacity may increase in the coming years,through introduction 
of certain technological processes, to 1 million tons, while in 
the second-stage development of the plant it may reach more than 
2 million tons, 
Por Venezuela, thêse plans not only imply an early reduc-
tion in its sizable steel imports, but also, with the passing 
of time, the possibility of exporting iron and steel in in-
creasingly significant amounts, it being estimated that within 
about 12 years production in this commercial field could be of 
a magnitude comparable to that of today's petroleum industry. 
It should be observed that the government plan for development 
of the iron and steel industry is closely tièd in with the 
design of a great-complex of industrial projects proposed for 
Venezuelan Guiana, 38/ 
38, : Expansion of a semi-integrated plant now able to' 
produce §0,000 tons of steel bars was also completed by 1962, 
1 
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8. The Motor Vehicle Industry 
During 1962, the automotive industry continued to "be one 
of the most vigorous factors in manufacturing development. 
However, with the gradual maturing of such operations in the 
two principal producing countries, the growth rate tended to' 
slacken on the regional plane, falling from the 25 percent 
registered for the pideeding year-«in terms of units produced— 
to a little over 12.5 percent. 
Of the Latin American production of more than 405*000 
automotive vehicles in 1962, 320,000 units were the product 
of integrated manufacturing systems ót of systems on the way 
to "being integrated, the "bulk of parts "being mánufactured 
locally. The rest weie the product of assembly. Of these 
vehicles, somewhat more than 190,000 were produced in Brazil, 
and slightiy less than 130,000 in Argentina 39/ (see Table 
95). 
39. In Brazil, probably more than 93 percent of compo-
nent parts;are being manufactured locally, and in Argentina, . 
about 65 percent. Figures in both instances are in terms of. 
value, calculated on àn average basis, among the various "types 
of automotive vehicles and for the two halves of the year¿ 
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Table 95—cont. 
• • 1957 I960 1961 1962+ 
Subtotal I 
Automobiles and jeeps 21 5 102 4 158 6 221 5 
Trucks 23_.4_. 120. 0 . 123 3,.. --98 7 
' Total.' 72 4 63 8 77 1 84 5 
Subtotal II 
Automobiles and jeeps 37 2 39 4 51 2 59 4 
Trucks 35 2 24 4 . 25 9 25 1 
"Total 72 4 63 8 77 1 84 5 
Latin America 
Automobiles and jeeps 58 7 141 8 209 8 280 9 
Trucks • -58 6 144x 4 149 2 123 8 
. Total 117 3 286 2,- 359 0 404 7 
Rates of growth in comparison 12 M> with previous year 25 4 Xu. vj pj 
Cumulative annual rates of! 
growth for the five-year 28 3$ period 1957--62- • • ' - ' 
a. Motorcycles, motor.scooters and similar motor vehicles 
(with fewer than four wheels) are not included. 
. b. The distinction between national manufacture and as-
sembly is based on the criterion adopted in earlier Economic 
Surveys of Latin America, according to which automotive vehi-
cles assembled m a country are considered to be of national 
manufacture if at least one third of their weight is made up 
of locally manufactured components and if,—where the domestic 
contribution does- not--far exceed such proportions— a plan for 
gradual increase of that share is being carried out.. 
Sources: United Nations¿Monthly Bulletin, of Statistics, New York 
Conselho Nacional de iS'stáiística, Anuario Estatístico do Brasil 
1962 and Boletim "Estatístico, Oc t ob e r-De celnber 19&2T, Rio de Ja-
neiro; Dirección General dé Estadística, Boletin Mensual de Es-
tadística October-November and December 1962, Caracas; Dirección 
(íéheral de Estadística, Revista de Estadística (various numbers 
for 1962 and 1963)» Mexico; the figures for Chile, Colombia and 
Uruguay are based on estimates from fragmentary information. 
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1 Moreover, out of the grand total of 405,000 units, 281,000 
we.rc automobiles and. Jeeps, and only 124,000, or slightly over 
30 percent, trucks. It should:be observed that ĥe percehtage 
of vehicles in this latter category has been gradually falling 
year after year in the regional totals and,;with the, exception of Venezuela, in national totals, also, Paral-lé-l-iíig-this trend, 
ever-increasing emphasis has been placed on satisfying the 
perceptibly more pressing demand for vehicles for personal use. 
40/ Hence, production^of the latter item increased, even in 
1962, by 34 percent Qver; that of the previous year. . 
The indirect effects cf the continuous build-up of the 
automotive industry continued to constitute, in various ways, 
stimuli favorable to growth in general. This came about" 
particularly owing to connections with supply industries, but 
also, in some measure, thanks to trie support afforded the 
transportation'industries. At'the'samft:tine, the growth of this, .activity exerted. increasing pressure' or. insufficient 
resources and, through.the financing cf purchase.of'vehicles, 
on the limited supply Of savings and' nciiinflatioiiary crodit 
sources in general.. 
Aside from these features general to the evolution of the 
automotive industry, the;state of development and leading pro-
blems of the moment naturally show considerable variations' 
among the producing countries.".' ' : . 
In" Brazil, the first-stage development of this branch has 
now. been practically.completed'with the virtual integration of 
pertinent producing,activities: Nevertheless, the backlog of 
demand in the automotive field has also been met, for which 
reason the industry is,now faced with .the urgent task;of adapt-
ing its operations to the requirements of current domestic 
demand, .and to, the needs for more steady export. This 
or o suppose 3, . ia both píreas, settled costs and prices. Accord-
ing to"the results of an official investigation, among the 
factors of greatest importance. in the unsatisfactory evolution 
of automotive prices are the;high degree of remuneration 
asigned to elements of limited productive value (entrepreneurs, 
investment capital, higly qualified technicians) and the 
multiplicity of taxes. Ways of reducing these factors espe-
cially in regard to the problem of taxes on units earmarked 
40. This trend, moreover, corresponds to the distribu-
tion of production between the two categories of vehicles in 
higly developed free-enterprise countries. 
i 
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for export, are under study. Despite these circumstances,' 
Brazilian exports of vehicles and Of parts, in particular, 
within and without the region, through diverse types of trans-
actions, approached the 10 million dollar level in 1962. 
Argentina is also engaged in achieving a high degree of 
integration in its-automotive industry, similar to that achieved 
in Brazil. The plan for gradual replacement of imported -parts 
is, however̂  only now in its third year of operation and is not 
expected to "be completed until 1965» From the point of view of 
this objective, the most important events in this field have 
been the successive installation of new plants' for the manufac 
ture of component parts, a process which, despite certain set-
backs, has shown undeniable vigor. 
The serious crisis through which''manufacturing production 
in the country passed during the second half of 1962—espe-
cially in the mechanical industries sector—also affected this 
activity. Although automotive production did not sustain a 
reduction of more than 7 percent in the balance for the whole 
year, this outcome is due especially to the appreciable incre-
ments achieved in the first months of this period. 41/ 
This crisis also highlighted various problems relating to 
the operations of this industry, especially in connection with 
the multiplicity of models manufactured and the capitalization 
of the respective enterprises, the importing of-parts not used 
in current production, quality control of nationally-produced 
parts, and financing of sales. In accord with present guide-
lines, it seems probable that* of the '23 assembly enterprises 
in existence, no more than 10 -will be definitively approved. 
Moreover, urgent measures are planned" to assure a more effi-
cient control of imported parts neédéd during the remaining 
years -of transition, including priority utilization of component 
parts imported in the recent pást for the purpose of building 
up inventories. At the same time, more complete equipping of 
the automotive research center maintained by interested' indus-
trialists is. being expedited with a view to .; .expanding its 
services both of an advisory nature and for"quality control of 
materials and parts locally produced. ' • • ' 
41» Results for the first quarter of 1963 show a more 
pronounced drop in the manufacture of automotive vehicles. 
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Finally, in matters of sales credits, among other solu-
tions the endeavor is- being made to obtain more active cooper-
atioh from the foreign parent companies through partial con-
tribution of the necessary funds. 
Only in recent years has Mexico begun to develop its au-
tomotive' industry on an integrated basis. Recent laws require 
that the national content of vehicles be at least 60 percént, 
including motors, beginning September 1964» However, in order 
to achieve fuller integration concession of.a longer period 
than in the South American countries is being contemplated. On 
the eve of liquidating -heir operations of mere assembly, 
several foreign firms..̂ .eL;..tryingl io.:;.maintain themselves in the 
rmarket by making important investments. Nevertheless it is felt that in:the long run only-about eight of them will remain 
in the field', some; of them,: of course, representing, mergers of 
tvvo different well-known makeá. It' is-'éxpocted-that the effect 
of .tax indúcem'eñts 'sòón to be ânnouncM̂ vv'ill.-'¡be considerable; 
hòwevèr, the same time sharp limita';i oka 'will be introduced 
on the length óf time foreign technicians caá be employed.. Por 
this and other reasons, it is likely that greater emphasis will 
be placed on.the acceleration of technical training;. 
In Mexico there is no backlog-—accumulated;over a period 
of years—such as that-vifaich hotlong ago:characterized the 
market of several-South ÂmèS-lôMiy'countries; rather, it is 
expected that the increase in' demahd over ; the next: few years 
will The relatively even-paced. 
As for the three remaining motor vehicle-producing.coun-
tries, it èHouid be noted that assembly plants have been-in 
regular operation for more than a decade in Venezuela and for 
almost half à decade in the Chilean-free port, of Arica, while 
in Colombia this activity has been going on for hardly, two . 
years, 42/ A common feature of policies of the last three 
countries in 'this 'matter is the manifested desire; to_ achieve 
gradual integration òf their automotive prpdu.ctibnr"r;-r 
It would seem easier for Colombia and Chile, which are 
members of LAFTA, to try to organize the manufacture of parts 
by pooling their resources with those of other_nations of_ that 
zone. As a mattetf-óf 'fact, certain provisions i-n'Misdirec-
tion have recently been iriclu'ded in their- regulations. 
42. Small quantities of vehicles are also being assembled 
in Uruguay and plans have been made to begin assembly oper-
ations soon in Peru. 
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' 'a" somewhat slower pace in future local 
manufacturing of component parts hut it shows a keen interest 
in acquiring soon sufficient assembly capacity to be able.to 
forego all imports of vehicl'es assembled àbroad. Furthermore, 
specific plans have already been,made in the country to begin 
manufacturing patts in several plants to be constructed during 
a five-year period in the Valencia area, with local, production 
of certain parts expected to get under way within a year or 
two. Eventually eVen motors will be manufactured. 
9. Tractors production 
With respect to the production of tractors in Latin Ameri-
ca, it can be said that this industry exists in only two coun-
tries at present: Argentina, which has been active for more 
than a decade, and Brazil, which recently entered into its 
third year. In 1.962, the volume of production in both coun-
tries lagged behind expectations 43/ (see Table 96). ' 
Since the farming techniques employed in vast areas of 
Latin Ame'rica are far from efficient, there is, in principle, 
a great need for mechanization of agriculture. However, ge-
neral economic conditions and the structure of this productive 
sector would hardly permit large-scale purchase of such an 
important pioce of farm machinery as long as the prices of 
locally produced units are not in line with world levels and, 
especiallyj if it is not possible to keep ample credit systems 
in operation. The inflationary climate of various nations 
naturally precludes the extension,'¡of credit by privaté sources; 
therefore the burden of providing financial assistance in 
those nations tends for the most part to fall upon the\;public 
sector. 
Argentina now has an annual capacity of assembling 30,000 
tractors* in I960, production had reached-21,000 units, which 
is substantially greater than the 12,000 or so assembled in 
43» The relative increase of 20 percent in this activity 
for the past year over the previous year is due only to 'the 
fact th'at in Brazil the tractor industry is in the early stage 
of development and that the basis for comparison is small. 
Furthermore, two years prior to that the regional total was 
greater than in 1962.,., due.rt£-jthe highest levels of this activity reached''in, Argeiititia. at that',.time. 
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1962. Such a low level of operations in this sector is due in 
part to the extraordinary conditions of the year under study, 
hut it should "be noted that production had begun to drop per-
ceptibly in 1961, Thus, it can be expected that the volume 
produced will rise again in future years and that progress 
toward integration of the industry will continue. It should 
be mentioned that the necessary steps have been taken to se-
cure an important loan from an international financial insti-
tution, - considerable part of which will b-e used to promote 
farm mechanization. Furthermore, the privileges granted in 
the past to the importation of internal combustion engines 
have been suspended, leaving the local industry to produce 
them for the manufacture, of tractors in accordance with, the 
program for the development of this industry. 
On the other hand, the increase in Brazilian production 
was 1-1 percent lower than that called for in plans for the 
industry, due in part to certain delays in getting some new 
plants under way1 and also to a more limited demand, which 
apparently influenced to some extent the lag in the instal-
látloh~õf additional units""." Furthermore the already unfa-
vorable demand conditions worsened during the first few months 
of 1963, at which time production showed a. drop from the same 
period of the preceding jear. At any rate, far-reaching solu-
tion to. the credit problem is being sought ürrough government inter-
vent i on, "by which means 60 percent of the cost òf each unit is 
"being financed, as well as through the utilization of an inter-
American loan in this case. 
In. Mexico, where small quantities of tractors had been 
assembled -in the past, and the industry then, suspended,, it 
was recently decided to give full governmental support to 
firms that produce locally. The purpose of this policy is to 
substitute imports that fluctuate between 5,000 and 6,000 
units per year and, eventuallyi to increase farm mechanization 
which is inadequate at present. It is estimated that the 
country will need 220,000 units instead of the 50,000 that 
are available now. The integration of this industry will also 
be carried out gradually. There is now a specific project, 
with assured financing, for the local manufacture of certain 
spare parts. In addition, preparations .are being made to build 
one tractor plant soon and possibly a second. 
Other plans are under way in three Latin American coun-
tries—Colombia, Chile and Venezuela to intensify their 
industrialization by promoting their machine industries and 
the manufacture of motor vehicles. 
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Table 96 
LATIN AMERICA: TRACTOR PRODUCTION, 1957, I960, 1961 AND 1962 
(Units) 
1957 1960 . 19.61 1962 
Argentina 10,878 20,958 14,730 11,742 
Brazil — 37 ' 1,678 8,077 
Latin América 10,878 20,995 16,408 19,819 
Sources: Por Argentina: Desarrollo Económico y Social de la 
Argentina, Report presented "by the Government of Argentina to 
the Second Annual Meeting of IA-ECOSOC at the Expert Level, 
1963, Doc. OEA/Serv.H/X.5 CIES/309; the data for recent years 
have "been taken from various national and international pu-
blications. Por Brazil: Conselho Nacional de Estatística, 
Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1962 and Boletín Estatístico, 
October and December 1962, Rio de Janeiro» 
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With respect to the manufacture of tractor parts, ascer-
tain degree of cooperation exists "between several countries 
in the center of the free-trade area, hut most of the effortB 
made to date have not produced effective results. 
10. Ship building 
The ship "building industry is gradually "being established 
in Latin America although, on a relatively large scale it is 
still restricted to two countries: Argentina and Brazil. To 
date, only these republics have achieved a marked degree of 
development. 
The Brazilian ship-building industry—which was established 
only four years ago has now reached a yearly capacity of 180 
thousand deadweight tons (dwt)' and chips of up to 12 thousand 
dwt are being built; 10 thousand workers are employed and, 
according to official figures, 60 per cent of the parts are 
manufactured locally. 44/ Whereas in 1961, shipyards in the 
country were building 17 ships with a total tonnage of ap-
proximately 70 thousand " t, in early 1962, 21 units were 
under construction with a total tonnage of 110 thousand dwt 
designed primarily for ccastal shipping. 
The initial sucaess achieved in the industry leads to the 
conclusion that current capacity, in addition to improvement 
by the establishment of two Shifts, will expand in the near 
future. The largest shipyard in the country has initiated an 
expansion program to utilize its installations for the assembly 
of ships up to 60 thousand dwt. It is estimated that a capacity 
of 300 thousand tons would be needed for immediate replacement 
alone^ and a backlog dcmond still" exists.' Prospects for exports 
in the near future are also favorable. Mention should be made 
44. This percentage indicates the national proportion with 
respect to: shi,p tonnage. . It' iè estimated the.t r;ith respect"to 
value,'lõcal industry is now. contributing'over 70 per qont. It 
is also anticipated that not ftru^h. latcr„±lian<~-1-ic end of"ip64, 
nationalization will surpass 95 por cent, as by t".at timo, 
diesel marine engines—which will bo produced by then—will be 
provided entirely by national nlants and, moreover, TJsiminas 
would be .in a position;to^dcliver thick síeèl/pl&tes f or; the 
ship-building. 
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of the potential future export capacity of the Brazilian ship 
building industry resulting from the successful completion of 
negotiations with Mexico to build five freighters of from 
4, 500 to 10,500 dwt. 
A rehabilitation plan for the merchant fleet is being 
carried out in Argentina, whereby approximately one-half of 
the total needs, estimated at one-half million dwt, will be 
met through a ten-year local construction program. Another 
phase of the program calls for. purchases abroad and, meanwhile, 
some second-hand vessels will be purchased.• The local phase 
of the purchase plan involves over 30 units. In May 1962, the 
first of three sister ships, was launched. These vessels are 
8 thousand dwt each and are being built by the government-
owned shipyard* The aforesaid ocean freighter is the largest 
vessel ever built at an Argentine shipyard. In addition, in 
late 1962, a 1,780-ton river-tank vessel was launched, and in 
early 1963, two tugboats built for the river navigation fleet, 
which is likewise engaged in a rehabilitation program were also 
launched, 
Mexico is also promoting the expansion of ship installa-
tions in Vera Cruz, which wen given in concession to a private 
fina, and it appears that it will also carry out the Mazatlán 
project, which has the support of a European firm. According 
to plans, units :of increasing tonnage will be built succes-
sively, first 3 ,000-ton vessels and evéntually, after five 
or six years, other vessels of from 15>000 to 20,000 tons. 
Smaller fishing and coast guard vessels, as well as a few 
units for export, are now being assembled. 
In Chile and Peru, this branch of industry is becoming 
increasingly important primarily because locally built units 
are needed for the expanding fishing industry. Similar plans 
are now under study in Colombia, 
11. Manufacture of Industrial Machinery and Equipment 
Even though a quantification of the recent development 
of the manufacture of different producers' goods encounters 
serious methodological and statistical diff i c u l t i B S , parti-
cularly in considering its scope for the region as a whole, it 
may be said that this activity now constitutes an increasingly 
important segment of the mechanical industries, particularly in 
the three largest and most industrialized countries in the re-
gion, The production of machinery and instruments of univer-
sal use has been outstanding for many years. Examples are 
machines, tools, pumps, cranes and even traveling cranes as 
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well as diverse components of electrical equipment, including 
heavy parts. Recently however, the manufacture of equipment 
for specific industries has taken on growing importance, such 
as petroleum, iron and steel, paper, textile, sugar, certain 
chemical branches, mining in general and building. 
In the field of machinery manufacturing, developments in 
Brazil continue to be outstanding. In 1961, the industry in 
that country had already met 40 percent of the domestic demand, 
and in 1962—according to incomplete data available—there 
seems to have been continued progress though at a slightly 
lower rate. Despite this trend, that branch of manufacturing • 
appears likely to undergo more rapid development in the future. 
A recent study 45/indicates that it could grow to the point of 
satisfying approximately 85 percent of the needs for such 
machinery. 
Recent achievements of Mexican industry are also outstand-
ing. Several plants for the production of new types of capital 
goods have been opened in that country. At the same time it 
has begun to implement or prepare other projects designed to 
continue expanding the range of equipment produced. In this 
field, moreover, there appears to be prevalent determina-
tion to assure new industries of a competitive position in the 
future. 
Notwithstanding the crisis in Argentina, progress con-
tinued to be made in various project. There have been certain 
delays, which were connected with the simultaneous weakening of 
. the demand for products of several industries in this branch, 
but which were also partly ascribable to the pronounced lack 
of liquidity. 
United Nations, The Manufacture of Industrial 
Machinery and Equipment in Latin America, I. Basic Equipment 
in Brazil. New York, 1963 
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THE EXECUTION OF ECONOMIC PROGRAMS UNDER THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS 
A. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 
Economic planning is not a new idea in Latin America; a number of countries 
have for some time had experience with the formulation and execution of long-
term programs for particular sectors or regions.l/ Over-all planning has aleo 
received attention by a number of Latin American governments* By the time the 
Charter of Punta del Este was signed, public agencies in Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela for instance were engaged in either the actual prepa-
ration of national development plans or in laying down the bases for such 
actions.2/ 
Nevertheless, the Charter of Punta del Este signified a new departure in 
this field. For the first time all member states of the Inter-American System 
officially endorsed the concept of planning as a vital policy tool for devel-
opment and, implicitly, as one of the criteria by which national efforts could 
be evaluated and put into perspective.̂ / For the first time too, the notion 
that some connection might exist between the quality and seriousness of a coun-
try's development effort as expressed in its economic plan,V" and the foreign 
assistance it might be ready to absorb received official endorsement by all 
member governments. 
1. Mexico, for example, has for several years had plans covering public 
investment, private investment and specific activities in different regions, 
but coordination of these at the national level is a recent phenomenon. 
Brazil has had a special Development Bank since 1952, and since 1959 a more 
comprehensive development agency for Northeast (SUDENE). 
2. The Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (C0RF0) of Chile, created 
in 1939» had been approaching the aggregate planning stage gradually over a 
number of years; in Colombia work on a national development plan was initiated -
in the latter half of the nineteen fifties; and in Ecuador the Junta Nacional 
de Planificación published in 1958 the Bases y Directivas para Programar el 
Desarrollo Económico del Ecuador. In Venezuela, the Oficina de Coordinacion 
y Planificación Económica (CORDIPLAN) had been working on a national plan 
since 1958. 
3. See Charter of Punta del Este, Title 2, Chapter II. 
b, Including specific economic and social goals, as well as such socio-
political changes as land reform and tax reform, which would require strong 
and well designed government action and which therefore would have a place in 
an integral plan if such a document is indeed considered a government's action 
program and not merely a statement of desired targets or of past trends pro-
jected into the future. 
/Viewed in 
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Viewed in this context, the tasks facing the Latin American governments 
in 1961, when they subscribed to the principles of the Alliance for Progress, 
were immense. In most countries the apparatus of government was not geared 
to an easy absorption of a centrally designed, coherent economic policy for 
development; even in those few countries in which enough technically compe-
tent personnel could be found to formulate and implement an over-all program, 
making it operational meant profound changes in the decision making procees, 
for which time, patience, enthusiasm and perseverance will continue to be 
needed. 
1. Progress achieved in plan formulation 
It is thus all the more remarkable that by mid-1963 not only had all OAS 
member states formally created central planning bodies, but an appreciable 
number had actually either formulated long-term development plans or had 
advanced enough in this direction to expect that by the end of 1964 all but 
two or three will have finalized such plans. To date Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela have submitted plans to the Panel of 
Experts.]?/ Tha analysis of the first three of these has been completed and 
the Panel is well advanced in its evaluation of the Honduran, Mexican and 
Venezuelan plans; evaluation of Panama's plan has recently been initiated. 
The five Central American countries aré rapidly advancing in their plan formu-
lations through national programs broadly synchronized on a regional basis 
with the help of a joint OAS/IDB/ECLA/SIECA (Permanent Secretariat of the 
General Treaty for Central American Economic Integration)/BCIE (Bank for 
Central American Economic Integration) mission, which is trying especially 
to assist in the aspects of national planning that have implioations for ttye 
regional integration program. Work is also well advanced in a number of 
other countries (see Table 97).6/ 
The widely differing historial contexts in which planning has arisen in 
individual countries, and the differing priorities which governments have 
placed on the various aspects of planning, have resulted in plans in which not 
only specific targets vary widely but also the length of the planning period, 
the scope of the seotors covered, the degree of detail regarding specifio 
targets and projects, as well as the institutional and policy instruments to 
be used for their achievement; in short, the general methods and approaches 
adopted are by no means uniform (see again Table 97). This heterogeneity 
can be explained partly by the enormous differences among countries in their 
economic and social conditions, and by the general lack of experience in 
successful over-all planning. 
5. A group of nine high level experts who, under the mechanisms 
established by the Charter of Punta del Este, are charged with evaluating 
national development plans (see Charter of Punta del Este, Title 2, Chapter V). 
6. Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay are receiving the assistance of joint 
OAS/IDB/ECLA advisory missions in the preparation of their national plans. 
/Table 97 
Table 97 
DEVELOP BENT PLANS PREPARED OR IN PREPARATION 
Planning Institution 
and Data of Creation 
Period of 
Piam Scope- Name of Plan 
Plans prepared 
Bolivia Junta Nacional da Planeamiento 
(Ootober i960) 1962-71 global-^ 
Plan da Desarrollo Económico y 
Social, 1962-71 
Brasil «inistírio de Planejamento (1962) 
Coordenaçto Planejamento 
Nacional (July 1963) 1963-65 global 
1 
Plano Trienal de Desenvolvimiento 
Econômico e Sooial, 1963-65 
Colombia Consejo Nacional de Política Econó-
mioa y Planeación (No*saber 1958) 1961-70 global 
Plan General de Desarrollo Económi-
eo y Social, 1962-70 
Cbil* Comité de Programación Eooníaica y 
Reoonstruooión (1961) y Corp ora— 
ción de Fomento (1941) 1961-70 global 
Programa Nacional de Desarrollo 
Eeonómioo, 1961-70 
Guatemala Consejo Nacional de Planifioaoión 
Eoonómioa (November 195*) 1960-64 
public 
investment 
Plan de Inversiones Públicas, 
1960-64 
Honduras Consajo Nacional de Economia 
(February 1955) 1963-64 
total 
investment 
Plan Nacional de Inversiones Pfibli-
oas, 1963-64 
Mexico Dirección de Planeaoión Nacional 
(August 1961) y Comisión Inter-
secretarial de la Secretarla da 
la Presidencia y da la Secreta-
rla de Haoienda y CrSdito Pfiblioo 
(March I960) 1962-64 global 
Plan de Aooión Inmediata, 
1962-64 
Panama Oireoeión General de Planifioaeióa 
y Administración (June 1959) 1963-70 global 
Programa de Desarrollo Económico y 
Sooial, 1963-70 
Venezuela Oficina de Coordinación y Planifi-
cación Económioa (December 1958) 1963-66 global Plan de la Naeióm, 1963-66 
Table 97 (Cont'd) 
Planning Institution 
and Date of Creation 
Period of 




Argentina Grupo del Planeamiento del Consejo 
Racional de Desarrollo y Consejo 
Federal de Inversiones 
November 
1965-67 global Ootober 1963 
Costs Rioa Ofioina de Planifioaoión ten years global August 1964 
Dominioan Republio Junta Haoional de Planificación y 
CoordinaoiSn (January 1962) 
Ecuador Junta Haoional de Planificación y 
Coordinación Económioa (Hay 1954) 
1964-68 
1969-73 global September 1963 
El Salvador Consejo de PlanifioaoiSn y Coordi-








Nicaragua Ofioina Haoional de CoordinaoiSn y 
Planeamiento Eoonómioo y Sooial 
(Deoember 1961) three years global June 1964 
Paraguay Seoretaria TSonica de PlanifioaoiSn 
del Desarrollo Eoonómioo y Sooial 
(April 196a) ^ ^ ^ 
0/ 








Uruguay Comisión de Inversiones y del 'Desa-
rrollo Eoonómioo (January I960) 
a. Global refers to comprehensive ooverage, including seotoral plans as well as aggregate plans and with both the publio and private 
seotcrs included in total investment. 
b. A two-year investment program is being prepared by Bolivia to implement the over-all.plan. See p. 8. note d/. 
c. On the reeommendation of an OAS/IDB/ECLA mission, a diagnosis of the Paraguayan eoonomy and a short-term plan are being prepared. 
d. A diagnosis of the Uruguayan economy, whioh will serve as a basis for its development plan, has recently been oompleted by a 
tripartite mission of OAS/IDB/ECLA. 
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In spite of these differences» however, there are also many similarities 
concerning the specific goals and targets adopted and the methods employed. 
Regarding the former, a broad framework is given by the Charter of Punta del 
Este, in which a per capita growth rate of 2.5 percent is stipulated as the 
minimum  needed to achieved the over-all aims of the Alliance for Progress, 
and in which a more equitable distribution of income and wealth—particularly 
of landed property—is part of the central content JjJ Among the tools—other 
than land and tax reform—to which a commitment  also exists are, domestically, 
an increase in the rate of investment and savings, and a reasonable degree of 
price stability; and in the international sector, the strengthening of the 
process of regional economic integration and stabilisation of basic products 
prices. 
But while the Charter provides a basic framework, it is left to each coun-
try to establish its own priorities and to choose the policy tools that seem 
most appropiate to its own particular circumstances. Even so, there are a 
number of methodological features common to most of the plans that have been 
prepared to date* In most cases the general method of planning the organi-
zation of resources has been to first project the amount of investment neces-
sary to obtain the desired rate of per capita growth in product by applying 
an estimated capital-output ratio for the economy as a whole; and then to 
estimate, on the basis of past experience and the expected results of fiscal 
reform, the amount of private and public savings available and consequently 
the net amount of foreign financing necessary.8/ Projections of exports and 
imports together with the expected inflow of foreign direct investment suggest 
the quantity of new loans needed, to which must be added the amortization and 
interest costs of such foreign borrowing. 
Once the magnitude of the investment program is determined, investment 
priorities are established according to the needs of each country. Although 
these often include private investment, the core of the action program usually 
is public sector investment, leaving the flow of private investment tò the 
voluntary operation of the market mechanism and to the results of general 
incentive policies. Several countries have included programs of agrarian 
reform in their national plans, others include special regional programs, and 
most give some consideration to the problem of unemployment and the need to 
develop human and natural resources as well as capital formation. These 
points, however, are often covered by general qualitative statements rather 
than by specifio estimates or proposals. Furthermore, based on the experi-
ence of the first two years of the Alliance, more emphasis is now being 
placed on incorporating an inventory of investment projects underway or 
planned, and on including specific projects worked out in sufficient detail 
7. See Charter of Punta del Este, Title I. 
8. An interesting variation is presented in the Panamanian Plan, in 
which investment requirements are estimated on the basis of an aggregate 
production function which permits one to take into account explicitly the 
expected growth of other inputs, particularly of land and of labor. 
/to allow 
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to allow prompt action once financing has been arranged. The dearth of such 
projects has, to datet been a major impediment to prompt and massive develop-mènt actions by governments and international financing agencies.£/ 
> 
Further adjustments of the planning process may be expected in the course 
of adaptihg the experience of other countries to Latin America's development 
needs. For one, the administrative responsibility of planning requires modi-
fications to the traditional operational procedures of arriving at investment 
decisions; the planning agency should be supplied with sufficient capability 
and authority to coordinate the diverse investment budgets of the ministries, 
decentralized government agencies and autonomous regional corporations with 
the investment plans of private industry, coordinating as well the separate 
request for foreign assistance* To date the most common arrangement has been 
to establish the planning agency as an executive organ of the government 
authorized to review the ministerial budgets and suggest changes to the 
cabinet. Mexico is probably the country in which the process of central 
coordination of public investments has advanced farthest; in many other coun-
tries as yet only formal arrangements have been made* Costa Rica has solved 
the problem of defining responsibility by making the planning agency directly 
responsible for formulating the nation budget; in El Salvador it may revise 
the budget as presented and in Guatemala and Panama special administrative 
links between the budget bureau and the planning agency are designed to 
achieve close cooperation. In working out this relationship, some of the 
countries may also find it useful to expand or alter the representation of 
different economic sectors in the planning agency's membership. To a large 
extent both these immediate tasks and the long-run effectiveness of planning 
depend on the availability of trained personnel. In the preparation of devel-
opment plans, as in the success of the development effort as a whole, the prob-
lem is as much one of skills and organization as of capital. 
2. Growth targets: output, capital formation 
and: the balance of payments 
The over-all quantitative implications of the various plans differ con-
siderably» ranging, for instance, from a 5.5 percent annual growth rate in 
per,capita product in Bolivia, to rates oí 2.5 percent in Colombia, Honduras, 
Mexico and Panama. For this, three main reasons may be adduced, of which the 
third one is of particular interest because it alone relates to the magnitude 
of the effort represented by achieving the planned .targèts. Different target 
growth rates of total product reflect (a) considerable differences in demo-
graphic growth rates, (b) differences in the appraisal of what it is actually 
possible to achieve from particular increases; in inputs—mainly of capital—10/ 
and (c) differences in tike estimates of the amounts of capital'that governments 
9. Bolivia, for example, completed in March 196 3 a final draft of a 
detailed two-year investment plan in response to recommendations by the Com-
mittee of Nine that specific investment projects be made ready. 




expect to be able to mobilize over the planning period.11/ Thus, withing a 
10-year period Bolivia expects to raise its investment coefficient from a 
pre-plan level of l*f.7 to 19.6 percent; Chile, from less than l*t to 21 percent 
in eight years, and Colombia from 18.̂  to 26.8 percent in four years (see 
Table 98).12/ Some idea of the size of these programs can be gained by noting 
that if the planned investments were distributed equally each year, the eight 
countries represented on Table 98 would alone require foreign investment and 
credits totaling more than $1.7 billion in 1963 in order to finance an invest-
ment program of close to 810 billion. 
In general, a larger proportion of this amount is expected to have to 
come from grants and credits than from direct investments, although only four 
of these plans attempt to estimate probable direct investment (see Table 99)» 
Of these four, Panama anticipates the largest role for direct investment, 
which is expected to contribute nearly bO percent of total foreign capital 
requirements during the plan period; in Brazil and Chile the proportion is 
slightly more than one-fourth and in Colombia less than one-tenth. Venezuela 
anticipates a continued net outflow of investment capital, as will probably 
be the case also in Honduras in 1963 due to the contraction in operations 
there of foreign banana companies. 
Of the total requirements of foreign funds, a very high proportion is 
intended for use in servicing the foreign debt, including part of the debt 
contracted during the plan period. In Bolivia, Brazil and Venezuela the 
amount of foreign capital needed for this purpose exceeds the need for 
foreign financing of imports of goods and services. Although estimates of 
the latter are subject, of course, to a much wider margin of error and may 
in some cases be considerably underestimated, the absolute amounts of amor-
tization costs, which are more easily calculated, would alone require about 
$675 million in 1963 in the seven countries for which these data are availa-
ble.1¿/ To that extent, the figures cited earlier overstate the share of 
investment resources expected to be supplied from abroad. Excluding Mexico, 
total investment amounts to about $8 billion and the foreign participation to 
$1.1 billion, of which amortization costs would absorb $675 million. It may 
be seen, therefore, that the ambitious investment programs contemplated are 
intended to be achieved largely through domestic efforts, with domestic 
Ü. Expressed as a proportion of total product. Thus these differences 
will be referred to as differences in the investment coefficients. 
12. In the latter two cases mentioned, the Keport of the Panel of 
Experts' Ad Hoc Committees suggests that even greater investment efforts may 
be possible and desirable. See Nomina de Expertos, Evaluación del Programa 
Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social de Chile (October 1962), p. 109 
et infra, and Evaluación del Programa General de Desarrollo Económico y Social 
de Colombia (July 1962), p. 67. 
13» The Mexican plan is not available presently for detailed review; 
references are included where possible. 
/Table 98 
Table 9 
PLANNED GROWTH OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND THE NECESSARY INVESTMENT, COMPARED WITH THE MAGNITUDES 
REALIZED I» 1961 AND 1962 
Bolivia 1962-71 1961 2.5 
1962 2.7 
Planned 1962-71 5.5 
Brazil 1963-65 1961 4.4 
1962 1.3 
Planned 1963-65 3.9 
Chile 1963-70 1961 2.0 
1962 2.7 
Planned 1963-70 3.0 
Colombia 1962-65 1941 2.3 
1962 3.4 
Planned 1962-65 2.5 
Honduras 1963-64 1961 3.3 
1962 0.3 
Planned 1963-64 2.5 
Mexico 1961 0.4 
1962 1.1 
Planned 1962-64 2.5 
Panama 1963-70 1961 4.6 
1962 5.2 
Planned 1963-70 2.5 
Venezuela 1963-66 1961 -1.0 
1962 . 2.4 
Planned 1963-66 4.7 
(1) 
Gross Domestic 
Product - Per 
Capita Constant 
Prices 
(X per annua) 
(2) 
Ratio of Gross 
Domestic 
Investment 
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a. Total foraign oapital inflow less amortisation and in the oase of Venezuela, 
less private oapital outflow. See oolumn (5) of table 3. 
b. Plan Table 21. 1958 prices. 
0, At the assumed rate of 11.00 » 450 oruzeiros, as implied in Tables 13 and 14 of 
the plan. See also Sooial Progress Trust Fund, Seoond Annual Report, 1962, pp. 431-2. 
1962 prioes. 
d. At the assumed rate of 11.00 - 1.47 esoudos, as applied in the evaluation of the 
Plan. 1961 prioes. 
e. At the assumed rate of $1.00 » 7.00 pesos, as applied in the evaluation of the 
Plan. 1961 prioes. 
f. At the ourrent offioial rate of 11.00 » 2.00 lempires. Current prioes. 
g. At the ourrent offioial rate of tl.00 = 12.50 pesos. 
h. 1961 prioes. 
1. At the offioial rate of 11.00 - 3.35 bolívares. I960 prioes. 
Motes 1 The Mexioan figure refers to GNP. 
Guatemala has not been inoluded as its plan is oonoerned only with investment by the 
oentral government. For the four-year period 1960-1964, planned oentral government 
investment totals 170.5 million quetzales, 83 million of whioh oorrespond to the latter 
two years, 1962/63 and 1963/64. Of that figure, 16 million, or 19 peroent, are expeoted 
to be needed in the form of foreign loans. 
Seuroesi See Table 1. All data for Chile and Colombia are based on the evaluation of 
their respeotive plans by the Panel of Experts, and for Venezuela all data are based on 

































- (in millions of dollars) 
Bolivia 1958 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • - 32 
Planned 1963 • • • • • • 80 14 67 - 67 
1971 • • • • • • 3 36 33 33 
Total Plan Period 375 210 L55 3155 
Brazil 1961 109 488 597 384 +213 -242 
1962 69 367 436 297 +139 -408 
Planned 1963 100 305 403 463 - 60 -203 
1965 110 335 445 355 + 90 -159 
Total Plan Period 310 950 1 270 1 285 - 15 3515 
Chile 1961 70 394 464 187 267 -265 
1962 55 343 318 202 196 -165 
Planned 1963 30 232 262 93 167 -105 
1965 50 178 228 81 147 - 81 
Total Plan Period 5TÕ 1 287 1 757 "Si? 1 063 -570 
Colombia 1961 ' • • • • • • • • • • • • - 16 -140 
1962 • • • • • • • • • • • • 54 -121 
Planned 1963 20 252 272 60 212 -212 
1965 20 293 313 51 262 -262 
Total Plan Period 75 1 004 1 079 228 851 -851 
Honduras 1961 - 7 9 2 2 _ — 
1962 - 4 14 10 2 - 8 - 8 
Planned 1963 • • • * • • • 32 2 - 29 - 29 
1965 » » » 40 4 - 36 — 36 
Total Plan Period 71 s TT5 ="55 
Panama I960 47 12 35 - 35 
1961 • • • • • • 5 5 b/ 8 27 - 27 Planned 1963 30 20 50t/ 2 48 - 48 1970 56 29 8 51/ 8 77 - 77 Total Plan Period 321 197 518— IS Ü82 3¡82 
I960 .182 415 233 255 - 22 + 22 
Planned 1963 -193 337 144 83 + 59 - 59 
1966 -173 160 - 13 - 53 + 53 
Total Plan Period -727 1 125 398 220 +178 -178 
- 11 -
Table 99 (Cont'd) 
a. Where possible, excluding compensatory capital movements, 
b. At the time of publloatlon of the Plan, Panama estimated an additional 57 Million 
Balboas a year, on the average, to be neoessary, It is here assumed that this amount is 
fully supplied by autonomous eapital inflows, 
o, Only on those loans oontraeted by the end of 1962, 
Souroest See Table 97. 
Boliviai Plan, Table 29. 
Braxili SUHOC, Boletín, Haroh 19691 Plan, Table 9. 
Chile i Report to the IA-EC0S0C (CIES/3lO, July 1963 and plan evaluation, Table 16. 
Colombia) Balanoe of Payments ohapter, this Survey, Tables 53 and 55) Plan evaluation, 
tables 22, 23. 
Hondurasi Plan, Table 18 at fl.00 - 2.00 lempiras. 
Panamai Report to the IA-ECOSOC (CIES/323)| Plan, Table VII.10. 
Venezuelat Plan, Table XIX.7. 
• / 
/savings expeoted 
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savings expected to supply approximately percent of the ovefrk̂IíOÍrflfeatitemt 
needs. In only four of the seven countries under review are foreign resources 
expected to contrib\i\èiŴ 9tér '>j>mp(Sftím's6fQ:icmà.lí'feWintò1  mê^beén the 
perÍ8ffmwiíl rê qüírê ar̂  
cannot be anticipated with mere hope but require that the plan contain detailed 
policies to bring them aboyar IjQn̂ \̂*Bjn̂ a«r«»jt«oldW«?«afiô.ttaxpoî lBOar«) com-
bined with immediate measures to limit the current expenditures of the public 
sector and to mobilize the savings of the private sectoriv%tê glf'9fe:he,jia9®BBion 
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a. Public savings 
Even were the need for greater revenues less insistent and the claim for 
greater equity less compelling, fiscal policy and administration would be 
aided by clarifying the tangle of accumulated rate changes and exemptions 
which comprise much of present tax legislation* The search for additional 
sources of income provides an impelling incentive, and all seven countries 
have included in their development plans proposed guidelines for fiscal reform. 
Yet, despite the" unanimous agreement on the need for tax reform, the increase 
in government expenditure necessary to meet the goals of increased per capita 
income is not projected to be fully covered by current income during the plan 
period. Current expenditures of the public sector inorease úaturally with 
the extension of services to a growing population, and are now to be further 
increased by the per capita expansion of such services as education, public 
health and low-cost housing. At the same time, sharp increases in capital 
expenditures are planned with public investment growing even faster than total 
investment. The plans generally express awareness of the need to restrict 
current expenditures to a minimum  by eliminating excess personnel and reduc-
ing the subsidies entailed by artificially low rates on public utilities and 
transportation? and include estimates of substantial savings to be realized 
in this respect. Nevertheless, continued deficit financing is implied in 
plans of this magnitude. For most countries this is an extremely  p r e c a r i o u s 
position as reasonable price stability is a premise of effective development 
planning.Ik/  Consequently, it is of great concern that the necessary 
1*+. At present inflation is a particularly serious problem in Brazil. 
A return to price stability there is one of the prime goals of the three-
year plan, which includes measures designed to reduce the rate of price 
increase by half (to 25 percent) in 19̂ 3 and to 10 percent in the following 
year. 
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Table 100 
THE FINANCING OF PLANNED INVESTMENT, COMPARED WITH BECENT REALIZED INVESTMENT 
Savings 
Gross Domestic Investment Gross Domestic Savings Foreign Savings 
Average Annual Undertaken By: Total Public Private (Balance of  payments 
Total on current account) 
(millions of  local Public Private 
currency units. Sector Sector 
constant prices) (in percent) (percent of gross domestic investment) 
Bolivia a/ 1958 489 • • . ... 37 • • • • • • 63 Planned 1962-66 1 040 62 • • • • • « 38 
Brazil a/ 
1967-71 1 418 ,,, ... 106 • « • * • • - 6 1958 711 ... ... 76 • • • * • • 24 Planned 1963-65 1 167 ... ... 93 • • • • • • 7 Chile 1961 634 53 47 58 42 
1962 726 57 43 77 • * • • • • 23 
Planned 1963-65 1 034 56 44 86 44 42 14 
Planned 1966-70 1 633 51 49 94 51 43 6 
Colombia 1959 4 952 23 67 100 b/ 24 76 __ 
Planned 1962-65 10 206 30 
; 
70 85 ' 20 66 15 
Honduras 1961 110 19 81 101 17 86 - 3 
196 2 127 2k 76 95 10 85 5 
Planned 1963 168 40 60 65 9 56 35 
Planned .1964 ' 195 39 61 63 9 54 37 
Panamá I960 72 13 87 51 • • • 49 
1961 92 22 78 71 • • • • • • 29 
Planned 1963-70 113 48 52 47 • • • • • • 53 
Venezuela I960 4 917 45 55 102 68 - 2 
Planned 1963-66 7 048 ,36 64 98 UO 58 + 2 
a. Investment in billions» 
b. 1957-1960 average. 
Sources: See Table 97. 
Bolivia: 1958 prices. Plan Tables 21, 22, 29 "and'pp. 110, 111. 
Brazil: 1962 prices, Plan Tables X, XI, XIX; 1958 investment converted to 1962 prices by index of  wholesale prices excluding 
coffee.  Foreign savings share computed using exchange rate of  450 cruzeiros = 81.00. 
Chile: 1961 prices, report to the IA-ECOSOC (CIES/314), July 1963,.and Tables 5, 12, 13, 16 of  plan evaluation. 
Colombia: 1961 prices. Plan Tables 1, 4, 33, 55. 1959 data converted to I96I prices by index of  home and import goods prices. 
Honduras: current prices, Plan Tables l8, 38. 
Panama: 1961 prices, report to the IA-ECOSOC (CIES/323), July 1963 and Plan Tables V-4, VI-I 
Venezuela:I960 prices. Plan Tables III.2, III.5. 
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increase in internal debt be financed in the least inflationary way, that is, 
that the maximum  amount be placed directly in the hands of the private sector. 
b. Private savings 
In some cases such policies may channel into productive investments 
private savings not reached by the present banking system or capital market. 
In the Venezuelan Plan, for example, it is pointed out that the high com-
ponent of transfers in government capital expenditures is in large part due 
to the failure of financing institutions to absorb a potentially sufficient 
supply of savings. Other countries would also benefit by more flexible and 
more attractive savings institutions, as is witnessed by the recent rapid 
expansion of savings and loan associations in Latin America. In recognition 
of this need, Bolivia and Colombia are weighing reorganization of their bank-
ing systems to better serve development purposes, and Chile has undertaken, 
with international assistance, a thorough study of its capital market. Use 
of these facilities presupposes confidence and interest on the part of the 
private sector in the development effort, a major prerequisite for the success 
of the Alliance program. 
c. Foreign savings 
In some countries, Chile and Brazil for example, private savings are 
probably adequate so that in the absence of capital flight they could meet 
the demand for investment finance.15/ In many other countries private savings 
are less elastic and the persistence of a public deficit makes foreign fi-
nancing more imperative as the only alternative to monetary expansion. In 
Colombia, for example, the heavy investment responsibility of the private 
sector impinges on its ability to save, making it unwise for the government 
to resort to internal deficit financing, or to tax measures which restrict 
savings incentives. And in other countries—such as Honduras and Panama— 
the average propensity to save is so low that further resources from the 
private sector can only be acquired by increasing the progressivity of the. 
tax structure to absorb some of the great differential in income levels, and 
by promoting foreign trade, the major source of tax revenues. Thus, Colombia, 
Honduras and Panama will rely increasingly on an inflow of foreign savings to 
finance their planned investment; in Venezuela, the foreign component of 
savings will remain very low; Bolivia, Brazil and Chile expect to reduce 
their dependence on foreign savings through a greater mobilization of domes-
tic resources and by expanding exports. 
Export expansion is of course a goal shared by all, (see Table 101) 
since for the time being the necessary capital goods must be to a large extent 
imported, even in those countries where import substitution has been under-
way for some time. Bolivia plans an extensive program of import substitution, 
15. See, for instance, the Panel of Expert's evaluation on Chile 
(op.cit. p. 162). 
/Table 101 
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Balance of Payments on Current Account 
(millions of dollars, constant, prices) 




























Bolivia 1958 58 90 -32 7 82 d/ 11 37 26 37 
(1958 prices) Planned 1966 111 122 ... • • . -11 13 81 5 - 42 31 37 _ 1971 195 162 ... ... +33 19 68 6 7 47 29 25 -Planned annual rate of increase 
1958-71 9.8* 4.6* All (Food aad Live 
Average annual increase 0.856 0.4* Mufacturea Anialals) 
Brazil 1962y 1 312 1 721 -409 + 1 -408 70 7 ... 23 62 22 12 -Planned 1963 1 502 1 705 -203 - -20J 70 9 ... 21 55 21 13 11 1965 1 666 1 785 -159 - -159 66 11 . . . 22 50 23 13 14 Planned annual rate of increase 
1963-65 5.3* 2.3* 
Average animal increase 1953-61 -0.9* 2.1* 
Chile b/  1962 575 660 -85 -80 -165 8 88 W 38 28 44 _ Planned 1963 630 639 - 9 -96 -105 5 79 17 a/ - 44 32 21 3 1965 740 695 +45 -126 - 81 5 74 213/ - 45 31 20 3 Planned annual rate of increase 
1963-70 5.8* J.O* 
Average annual increase 1953-61 4.8* 8.4* 
Colombia 1962* 595 • 716 -121 + 1 -120 81 15 .... 4 56 37 ? -Planned 1962 591 699 -108 - 44 -152 71 23 . . . 6 52 37 11 1 
1965 699 864 -165 - 97 -262 70 24 6 56 34 10 I 
Planned annual rate of increase 
1962-65 
Average annual increase 1953-&L -1.5* 2.1* Honduras 1962 85 82 - 3 - 5 - 8 86 3 1 9 24- 33* 44* Planned 1963 85 108 - 23 - 6 - 29 86 4 1 10 34 29 37 -1964 88 118 - 30 - 6 - 36 84 4 1 U 36 29 35 -
Planned annual rate of increase 
1962-64 1.8* 7.0* 
Average annual increase 1953-61 2.0* 1.3* 
Panama 1961 155 182 ... ... - 27 90 . . . . . . 10 35 11 54 A Planned 1963 170 218 ... ... - 48 89 ... . . . 11 36 ii 53 1970 230 307 ... - 77 84  ... 16 39 11 50 Planned annual rate of increase 
1963-70 4.4* 5.0* 
Average annual increase 1953-61 9.2* 9.2* Balance oí Bal. on Other Agri-
4erchandise Balance services Current Ace. Investment Manufáèt. cultural Others 
Goods items Products 
Venezuela I960 2 356 1 157 +1 199 -1 177 + 22 1962: 1 97 y 2 23 62 5 10 Planned 1963 2 713 1 258 +1 455 -1 514 - 59 2 97 1 - 29 56 3 10 (I960 prices) 1966 3 100 1 288 +1 812 -1 759 + 53 2 96 2 - 42 45 3 10 
Planned annual rate of increase 
1963-66 4.5* 0.8* 
Average annual increase 1953-61 7.1* 6.2* 
a. The average of annual variations over the period 1953-1961. 
b. The composition of exporta is based on 1961 data. 
c. The composition of imports is baaed on I960 data. 
d. Less than 0.6 percent. 
Sources: For Country sources, see Table 97. 
Bolivia: Plan Tables 21, 22; 14-17, 28. 
Brazil: 1962 data from SDMOC, Boletim. March 1963. 1963-65 data from Plan Tables XIX, XXII, XXIV; Table XXIV was grouped as follows: (a) importa of 
machinery, chemicals, manufactures and semi-manufactures, Cb) petroleum and metals (c) wheat - which may not correspond exactly to the SUMOC 
classification used for 1962. ~ 
Chile: 1962 data from report to IA-ECOSOC (CIES/314), October 1963; 1963-65 Plan, Table 16 and pp. 163, 169, 172, 175; rates of growth in exports and 
imports 1963-70 pp. 169, 175. 
Colombia: 1962, Balance of Payments Yearbook. Vol. 15; 1963-65 Plan Tables 14, 18, 22. 
Honduras: Tables 18, 14, 17. 
Panama: Heport to IA-ECOSOC (CIEV323), October 1963, Tables VII-10, VII-6, VII-7, VI1-4. 
Venezuela:Plan Tables II-7, III-II. 
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especially of processed foods, which is projected to save an estimated 
$9 million in 1966 and $19 million in 1971. For Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
and Venezuela, however, where import substitution has been pursued for a 
much longer period, it may proceed at a slower rate in the future; for 
Honduras and—possibly—Panama  it must await an expansion of the market 
accompanying the progress of Central American economic integration. In 
general, the plans are moderately optimistic regarding the possibilities of 
increasing earnings by exporting larger volumes of mineral products, live-
stock and a few agricultural commodities such as cotton and shellfish, but do 
not predict price increases. Expectations about the future of exports to the 
United States and Japan are more favorable than the projection of future 
exports to the European Economic Community. 
Within the limited opportunities for export expansion, the plans seek 
maximum  diversification. In mineral exporting countries, agricultural, and 
in the case of Chile, industrial exports are to increase faster than the 
traditional exports, while in agricultural countries the mineral export sector 
is expected to be more dynamic. But this large category breakdown conceals 
the extent to which new products enter the export trade, for in the relativèly 
short period of time covered by these plans the major effects of diversifi-
cation will occur within the presently dominant export sector, be it of agri-
cultural or of mineral products. While the same qualification applies to the 
classification of imports in Table 101, the intent to limit imports of goods 
of final consumption in favor of capital goods is in most cases very clear. 
3. Measures to reduce structural imbalance 
Complementary to the goal of export diversification is that of reducing 
structural imbalance in the domestic economy and correcting the disequilibrium 
among the economic sectors, among the different regions of the country and 
among the employment opportunities of the population. ' 
a. Gross domestic product by sectors 
Within the given increases of total product at a specified annual rate, 
there is to take place a shift in the composition of output, particularly a 
marked increase in industrial production as a 6hare of the total, and a sharp 
rise in some basic services. Industrial production is scheduled to expand at 
an annual rate of about 11 percent in Brazil and Venezuela, and nearly 10 per-
cent in Bolivia, compared with annual rates*of 6, 8 and 6 percent, respectively, 
for agricultural output in these countries (see Table 102). In Brazil and 
Venezuela the high rates of growth for industry represent a continuation of 
the direction in which the composition of output has been moving for several 
years;16/ but for Bolivia the high rate of growth in industrial production 
projected in the plan will require an effective policy of industrialization. 
16. See OAS/ECLA Economic Survey of Latin America, 1961 (Pan American 
Union, 1962), Chapter V. 
/Table 10 
Table 102 
PLANNED ANNUAL INCREASES IN PRODUCTION, BY SECTORS, IN FIVE COUNTRIES 
(in percent) 
• 
Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Venezuela 
1958-71 1961-65 1961-70 1959-65 1962-66 
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Government • • • 4.8 2.5 5.4 7.0 
Other — 3.5 . — 
Sourcest See Table 97 for list of country sources* 
Bolivia: Plan Table 25-




CORTO, version of Plan submitted to Panel of Experts, 
Table 3 
Plan Table 2. 
Plan Table 1.1 
/Chile and 
- 18-
Chile and Colombia also plan rates of growth of industrial production higher 
than those of primary production or services, but in these two countries the 
differential is less pronounced. 
Within the general grouping of services, rapid increases are planned in 
those basic services often referred to as constituting the infrastructure of 
an economy. The increase in provision of electricity, gas and water is greater 
even than the rate of growth of industry in Venezuela and Colombia, and trans-
port and communications are of special importance in Brazil. 
Whereas Bolivia, Chile and Colombia plan an expansion in mineral pro-
duction in excess of that in agriculture, in Venezuela this pattern is re-
versed. Agricultural production is to increase as a share of total product 
while the petroleum sector increases at only four percent annually, with 
total mineral production expanding only slightly faster. 
To achieve these output targets, considerable reliance is being placed 
on substantial increases in private investment which continues to be con-
siderably larger than public investment in most of Latin America. The large 
increases planned in public investment are divided among public works, indus-
trial activities and social services in the proportions believed most con-
ducive to maximum  productivity of all investment, public and private. This 
criterion does not necessarily conflict with the desire to improve the health 
and living conditions of the population, since over longer time periods the 
distinction between economic and social investments has less meaning; never-
theless, the shortage of investment resources does impose a limitation on 
those projects whose contribution to production is recovered only in the long 
run. For investment to increase at the planned rate, the jnajor share of pro-
jects has to be of the variety which generates an immediate response in,ris-
ing income from which the further increases in investment may be drawn. 
Among the five countries which present a sufficiently detailed breakdown of 
their investment plans, the share of public investment destined for the more 
specifically social sectors of health, education and housing ranges from 
26 to 52 percent of total planned public investment with the balance of two-
thirds to three-fourths allotted to economic investments 17/ (see Table 10J). 
Investment in transport, communications, fuel and power is to absorb JO to 52 
percent of total public investment: it ranges from JO percent in Panama to 
more than half of the total in the case of Guatemala and Honduras. In most 
of these countries, investment in agriculture, manufacturing and mining is 
to remain largely the responsibility of private.investors, supplemented by 
public investment to the extent of 12 to 17 percent of the latter's total 
commitments.  In Venezuela, however, where 17 percent of total public invest-
ment is to be devoted to carrying on the government's agrarian reform program, 
this share rises to 2k percent; and in Chile where more than half of total 
17* The Mexican plan similarly allots 2J percent of total public 
investments to social sectors and 76 percent to economic activities. 
/Table 103 
Table 10 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PLANNED INVESTMENT BY SECTORS 
(in percent) 
Brazil Chile Colombia Guatemala Honduras Panama Venezuela 
Total Public Public Public Public " Public Public 
Investment Private Private 
(1963-65) (1963-70) (1963-65) (1963-64) (1963-64) (1963-70) (1963-66) 
Agriculture 8.4 22.0 9.6 16.2 19.1 8.0 8.9 16.9 6.4 
Mining 7,6 0.4 1.0 9.9 — — 2.2 16.5 
Manufacturing 18.6 7.9 1.0 29.8 d/ 8.9 f / 5.6 5.4 27.3 
Construction • — 25.3 — — — 13.9 14.0 i / 26.5 i / 
Housing 12.it l8 . l 13.1 21.2 3.6 4.8 ¡ / 10.1 — — 
Other a/ — 7.2 — — 3.8 — — 
Commerce —_ . — 1.6 0.5 — _ f / 0.8 12.5 
Transport and 
Communications 29.0 19.8 b/ 27.5 15.5 42.4 39.8 22.2 25.2 2.5 
Fuel and Power 13.7 15.5 16.4 0.7 12.6 12.1 8.1 9.9 2.6 
Water Supply — . c/ 8.2 2.4 5.9 — y y Health * c/ 2.8 2.3 8.1 5.5 9.0 
(10.0)e/ 
Education — c/ 8.0 • 2.4 10.1 6.7 — ~ — 
Urbanization — y — . — s/ — i / i / 10.8 4.0 
Administration — — / — 5.0 — 25.5 k/ — 
Other 10.3 — — — 9-5 — 25.7 W — 5.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a. Where not specified,  expenditure on construction is included in the investment of  the various sectors. 
b. Transport and communications includes urbanization. 
c. Not yet available; in preparation. In the IBRD review of  the original plan for  1961-70, these items amounted 
to 8.5$ of  total gross investment. 
d. Industrialization of  agricultural products is included under agriculture. 
e. Estimated. See Sources. 
f.  Commerce is included in manufacturing. 
g. Urbanization is included in housing. 
h. Not yet programmed 
i . Urbanization is included in construction, 
j . Water supply is included in fuel  and power. 
k. Health, education are included in. government. • • 
Plan Table 13 
Plan Table 6 
Plan Table 7; report to CIES, October 1963 
Plan Table 1; refers  only to planned investment of  1962-63 and 1963-64 
Plan Table 21 
Plan p. 196 
Plan Table III. 2 public investment in education and health is estimated on the basis of  the 
sectoral programs, deflated  from  1962 to I960 prices by the price index of  home and import 











gross domestic investment is undertaken by the public sector, the proportion 
is 30 percent. Again the largest share—in this case more than one-fifth of 
total public investment—will go to agricultural development, as Chile has 
recently become a net importer of agricultural products. 
b. Regional disparities 
It is a commonplace that regional characteristics—including income 
levels and resource endowment—vary widely in a country of Brazil's size, 
but even in a comparatively small country like Panama there are decided dif-
ferences in resources and productivity in different geographic areas; and 
regional disparities are perhaps nowhere more pronounced than in Bolivia. 
In the latter the problem of floods and erosion in the valleys, and of 
extreme fragmentation of landholdings on the altiplano, together with the 
pressure of population growth in both areas, has induced the government to 
adopt a development strategy which places considerable reliance on a massive 
relocation of population to the tropical lowland areas of the Oriente. 
Bolivia's current program of agrarian reform and heavy investments in transport 
and communications have been devised in large part to encourage colonization 
of the lowlands. Honduras, too, considers resettlement a necessity; the 
emergency plan presented by the President of the Republic to complement the 
public investment program contemplates relocation in agricultural cooperatives 
of persons living in rural areas where unemployment is most serious. Since 
1959» Brazil has succeeded in increasing slightly the share of the Northeast 
region in total national income, thanks to the creation of a special agency 
(SUDENE) concerned exclusively with the development of that region, and with 
large investments in Bahia by the state petroleum corporation, Petrobras.* 
The area remains one of great poverty, however, and requires tremendous 
assistance to attain the rate of growth characteristic of the rest of the 
nation. The general guidelines of regional planning in Brazil direct the 
Federal Government to intensify pre-investment activities related to the 
evaluation and use of natural and human resources, including the offer of 
financial assistance to state and local governments, which are constitution-
ally responsible for primary education, and to continue the policy of pro-
viding incentives to private investment in the less developed areas. In . 
Venezuela too, regional planning is in various stages of advancement; the 
focus of development planning will be on organization of urban services in 
the metropolitan areas of Caracas and Maracaibo and the Lago de Valencia 
region, on agricultural production and small and medium-scale industry ill 
Los Andes and the Centro-Occidental regions, on intensive agriculture in 
Majaguas and on hydroelectric power and basic metallurgical industries in 
Guayana. In Chile and Colombia, regional variations in productivity are 
closely related to the disparity between urban and rural income levels which 





One of the most serious obstacles to economic development in Latin 
America, and perhaps the single most vital factor to its success, is the 
ability of each country to fully absorb, economically and socially, its 
human resources* The rate of population growth is high, the rate of growth 
of the labor force often even higher. In Bolivia, for example, it is esti-
mated that merely in order not to increase unemployment, it would be neces-
sary to create more than a quarter of a million new jobs between 1961 and 
1965, and the problem is of similar magnitude elsewhere. In part the shifting 
of resources into industrial produotion noted in these plans was devised in 
order to provide employment for the migrants from rural to urban areas. The 
extensive construction programs are labor intensive and should also aid in 
creating employment opportunities. The agrarian reform programs 18/ are 
aimed at the same problem of low productivity, for unemployment and under-
employment are equally discouraging to attempts to raise the living standards 
of the population as rapidly as possible. But all of these measures require 
skills and mobility to a greater degree than is presently characteristic of 
rural workers. Thus, the bulk of the responsibility for longer term devel-
opment still rests with the education programs; only by vigorously developing 
its underutilized human resources can Latin America hope to enter into a 
phase of sustained internal growth; and only thus will the region's capacity 
to absorb foreign financial and technical aid grow with the supply. In this 
way alone will the present planning efforts increasingly become expressions 
of concrete governmental actions responsive to the needs of the people and 
based on detailed knowledge of the plans and needs of the private sector of 
the economy. 
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B. NATIONAL PROGRAMS OF AGRARIAN  REFORM 
Since August 1961 ten countries have passed agrarian reform legislation! 
Costa Rica and Colombia in I96I5 Chile, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Panama and Peru in 1962} and, Paraguay and Nicaragua in 1963. 
Mexico, Bolivia and Venezuela previously passed such legislation introducing 
programs to alter the agrarian structure of their countries; Brazil, Ecuador, 
EL Salvador and Uruguay have submitted such legislation to their respective 
Legislatures.19/ 
The economic and social pressures of antiquated land tenure systems have 
long been a recognized problem in Latin America. The exhortation to attend to 
this very serious situation was summarized at Punta del Este when an important 
aim of the Alliance was stated to be "replacing the structure of latifundias 
and minifundias by a just system of property."20/ The coexistence of extremely 
large land holdings by a small proportion of the rural population and precar-
iously small holdings by the majority of the rural, population is characteristic 
of most of these nations, together with the related problem of lcu?ge numbers 
of persons living and working on the land without any legal title of ownership. 
In agreeing to act to reduce the great inequalities in land ownership, the 
countries acknowledged a common motive of social justice, peeking a "just system 
of property." In the lengthly parliamentary discussions that have usually pre-
ceded the adoption of such legislation, it was often claimed that it ie equally 
injust to substitute a system that would threaten the rights of private property. 
The resulting legislation represents in each case an attempt to reconcile widely 
divergent views and aims: a broader distribution of land ownership on the one 
hand and the inviolability of private property on the other; a breaking up of 
the present very large units and the need to provide supplementary services 
to insure an economically viable system.21/ 
19. Two State programs are already in effect in Brazil, in São Paulo and 
Rio Grande do Sul. In Ecuador, two projects have recently been initiated which 
deserve mentions a loan of $1 880 000 from AID is to cover 36.5 percent of the 
cost of developing 219 mountain villages as part of a five-year rural develop-
ment program; another AID loan of $2 535 000 is to cover 64 percent of the cost 
of relocating 1 600 low-income rural families in northern Ecuador. 
20. The Government of Peru submitted a new agrarian reform bill in August 
1963. Charter of Punta del Este, Title I, point 6. 
21. In most cases the new laws represent the latest step in a series of 
agrarian reform legislation, but the earlier efforts were generally limited to 
colonization and did not attempt to deal directly with the system of land 
tenure. Thus some of the countries not mentioned here also have in effect 
legislation dealing with land settlement, but only those programs designed 
as national programs of agrarian reform in accordance with the Charter of 
Punta del Este are considered in this section. The programs which existed 
prior to the initiation of the Alliance are considered more briefly than their 
more recent counterparts and with emphasis on their practical effect rather 
than on the legislation from which they derive. 
/l. The General 
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1. The General Pattern of Recent Agrarian Reform Programa 
a. The legislation 
The agrarian reform laws passed since the 1961 Punta del Este Conference 
are complex pieces of legislation, many of them lengthy and all of them open 
to differing interpretations on numerous points* The language is often im-
precise, different clauses of the same law may be contradictory and many 
questions of operating procedure and jurisdiction remain to be worked out in 
practice. 
Any agrarian reform law however, in seeking to both protect and extend 
the institution of private property must incorporate certain basic decisions 
on method. The lowest common denominator of such laws includes answers, how-
ever imprecise, to the questions of which land is to be affected and which 
exempted by the program, how this land is to be acquired and prepared for 
distribution, and what are to be the qualifications and obligations of those 
receiving title to the land. Within these categories the dispositions of these 
particular laws range from terminology so broad that further defining 
regulations will be necessary, to detailed compilations of exceptions} and im-
plementation will be further complicated by the differing institutional struc-
tures as they have evolved in the various countries. In order to present a 
composite picture of the actions taken recently pertaining to agrarian reform, 
the summary which follows describes in over simplified form those characteris-
tics common to most, but not all, of the agrarian reform legislation adopted 
since the initiation of the Alliance. In the following subsection (2) the 
experiences of individual countries are summarized to the extent that the 
salient discrepancies from the composite picture may be noted. 
« 
According to the basic pattern abstracted from the various laws, respon-
sibility for the program is entrusted to a newly created autonomous agrarian 
reform institute. The duties of the institute include acquiring and distrib-
buting land, conducting prior geographical studies, constructing accesss roads 
and irrigation canals where necessary and extending technical and financial aid 
to the settlers. 
The institute or agency entrusted with this program is generally allotted 
a specific appropriation in the annual budget of the central government and 
authorized to issue bonds up to a maximum  value in local and foreign currency 
to finance its operations. It is a legal entity directly subordinate to. the 
President, which is generally governed by a board of directors and often 
maintains local advisory bodies in different areas of the country. 
The Institute is charged first with preparing and distributing land 
currently belonging to the State or acquired by the State through voluntary 
sale of private holdings. When such land is no longer available, it may 
generally expropriate privately owned land which is idle, poorly exploited or 
exploted by third persons. A reserve, generally of 50-100 hectares 22/ of 
irrigated lands or the equivalent, is allowed the owner. The purchase price is 
22. One hectare equals 2.̂ 17 acres. 
/to be settled 
- 25 -
to be settled by appraisal in each case taking into account such factors as 
location, productivity and recent sale values of similar property, with 
compensation in currency on terms ranging from five to ten years at an 
interest rate of about percent per annum. 
There is no limit to the quantity of well-cultivated land which may be 
held, although most countries reserve the right to expropriate even well-
cultivated land should it be essential to the regrouping of minifundias or 
subject to the right of eminent domain as land of "public utility". 
Once made ready for occupation the land must be divided into family 
farm units of workable area. These units are then distributed to those 
persons over 18 who can demonstrate a need for additional land, with 
preference given those who live in the immediate vicinity and have the 
largest number of dependents. Selection among the many qualified candidates 
is left to the Institute. Those seleoted must agree to work the land 
personally with their families and to fulfill any obligations imposed by 
the Institute with respect to the extent and type of cultivation. The cost 
of the land plus improvements is to be repaid.over a period of 15-25 years 
at low interest rates. Compliance with these regulations entitles the settler 
to full title; neglect may lead to repossession of the land. Directed 
colonization projects may also be undertaken, whereby the Institute establish-
ed an entire new community including schools, churches and other common facil-
ities. A third part of the Institute's activities will continue to be the 
granting of title to land already settled. 
In addition to land, the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform laws are 
promised credit facilities to help in buying equipment and housing, along with 
technical assistance. Unfortunately, however, while the laws.acknowledge the 
need for expanding such services, in general the language of the law is neither 
specific nor mandatory in this regard. 
b. Implementation of the legislation 
Approximately half of Latin America's 20 million rural families live a 
precarious existence on the land. That agriculture alone cannot absorb this 
number plus the annual increment in rural population does not lighten the 
responsibility of the agrarian reform programs to serve as many as possible 
as quiokly as possible. But difficult problems of organization, time and 
finance are being encountered in implementing both phases of the agrarian 
reform programs—settlement  and the provision of services complementary to 
the land grant. 
Settlement" on public lands is hindered by the fact that these lands often 
require clearing, soil studies and access roads before they are usable, and 
such preparatory projects are extremely costly as well as time-consuming. Once 
it becomes necessary to expropíate privately owned lands the detailed appraisals 
and negotiations, together with the possibility of a recourse to the courts, 
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postpones settlement 23/ and may require large numbers of personnel as well as 
large amounts of financial resources in order to compensate the owners in 
currency at an appraised price. Consequently, an agrarian reform program 
large anough in scope to be effective requires an enormous budgetary alloca-
tion and could endanger as well the monetary stability of the nation. 
Nor is the actual distribution of land a simple matter. The specific 
size of family farm units will depend not only on the size of the family but 
must take into account as well the geography of different areas, the crops 
to be cultivated and the degree of mechanization considered reasonable. Before 
the technical decisions can be made, however, the general guideliness of 
agricultural policy must have been well thought out at the national levels, 
and this requires a degree of comprehensive planning just beginning to be 
realized in most countries. 
Another serious obstacle to the execution of agrarian reform is the 
current inadequacy of technical and credit assistance available to small 
agricultural producers. Such services are vital to the new land owners in 
the same way that they are esôential to the development of established farms 
of the agricultural sector of the economy and to assure rural families a 
continually rising standard of living. In fact this particular need was 
admitted long before the more ambitious project of land reform won acceptance 
and has not yèt been met effectively. For the renewed intentions to be more 
practicable, the effort will have to be more imaginative, and the budget 
larger, than before. Agricultural extension services and credit availability 
should be closely associated, encouraging the use of improved techniques by 
those receiving loan funds. It has been recommended  2M/ that, in view of the 
importance of credit assistance in integrating the rural population with the 
national economy, part of the costs incurred might well be charged to the 
social investment program, reducing the burden to be paid by the individual 
beneficiary. International assistance is helping in this direction by 
providing loans for credit tied to technical assistance. 25/ 
23. The Colombian land reform institute, INCORA, reports that in the case 
of voluntary sale of private lands, negotiations may be completed within four 
months, if there are no complications, whereas an additional five months is 
necessary before taking possession of an expropriated property. INCORA, Infor-
me de Actividades en 1962, p.83. 
W. See the Final Report of IA-ECOSOC Special Commission II, on 
Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform, Costa- Rica, July 1963. 
OEA/Ser.H/XIII, CIES/Com.II. 
25» For example, Colombia recently received three loans totalling 21.5 
million dollars from the Agency for International Development for agrarian 
reform; one of these, of $10 million for 40 years at 3/4 percent interest will 
be used to encourage diversification of crops and the use of modern methods of 
farming and to provide credit tied to technical assistance. In addition, a 
credit was received by Colombia from the Development Loan Fund of 8 million 
dollars for agricultural loans not exceeding 17 500 pesos each. 
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The eventual outcome of these programs will depend on the balance of 
resources between settlement and services} but above all it will depend on 
the seriousness of those who interpret the laws in administering their ap-
plication. Competent administrators are essential to the success of any 
project, but agrarian reform programs in particular will stand or fall with 
the Bkill and conviction of those in charge of converting legislation into 
practice. As mentioned before, the desirability of a wider distribution 
of land ownership has a long history of verbal acceptance in Latin America 
expressed in a series of laws dealing with colonization and land reform. 
But outside of Mexioo, Venezuela and Boliviaj there is only little practical 
experience in this field.26/ and there still remains a substantial segment of 
popular opinion opposed to institutional reforms of so basic á nature. 
Among those who stand to benefit from additional land, the need to change 
farming methods and possibly to move to a different area has sometines 
engendered suspicion of agrarian reform, while those who do not expect 
to gain more land are indifferent at best and more usually opposed, especial-
ly if they foresee part of their own land being sacrificed to carry out the 
program. The large number of agrarian reform laws passed since initiation 
of the Alliance is testimony to the compromise achieved between the wide-
spread support of social justice in the abstranct and the small but power-* 
ful opposition to agrarian reform. Nevertheless, to effectively carry out 
a mandate which is a compromise rèquires more skill than1 to ̂  enact:a measure 
which has the decisive support of a large majority. 
Aware of the unfavorable connotations to the landowner of the term 
expropriation, the laws, in using the term, tend to surround it with as-
surances of restraint, approaching agrarian reform through the distribution 
of land rather than through the regulation"of tenancy conditions which have 
in large part created the need for reform. Land cultivated indirectly, 
that is by persons other than the owner, is generally subject to eventual * 
expropriation; but this is a last resort and in the meanwhil'e exploitation 
of the land by non-owners, including occasionally even those systems of 
tenancy which compensate farm labor with limited rights to land use, are free 
to continue. Some steps have been taken to regulate the length of lease or 
amount of rent paid but these are only a beginning and evasion would not be 
difficult. Under such conditions, the programs outlined in the agrarian 
reform laws will only accomplish agrarian reform if, by the efforts of their 
administrators,costs and delays are kept to a minimum  and the technical 
services sufficiently decentralized so that the new farms afford a genuine 
alternative to the present system. 
Thus, considering both the high initial costs and the short time which 
these laws have been in effect, it is understandable that the major activity 
in 1962 consisted in the granting of titles to settlers already occupying land 
to which they had no legal claim. Organizing the agrarian reform institutes 
created by the new laws (see Table 2) required most of that year and several 
of these agencies only began operations in 1963. Consequently the land 
distributed in 1962 largely pertained to projects formulated prior to the 
new laws, and this will probably be the case to a similar extent in 1963. More 
rapid handling of the projects in process is intended, however, as well as the 
preparation of additional projects. Furthermore, while the land affected in 
26/ And some of these experiences are so conditioned by particular 
national factors that their applicability elsewhere may be limited. 
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1962 was for the most part of public ownership, this same procedure of legal-
izing "invasions" of land is being continually extended to private property. 
In Peru for examplê  the new government has recently announced that it will un-
dertake expropriation of several large estates in the Sierra region to distrib-
ute to the Indian peasants who have settled there. Elsewhere, prodding by those 
who need land is a constant reminder to those entrusted with enforcing the pro-
visions of agrarian reform'legislation. To encourage the opening of negotiations 
on the sale or expropriation of large idle tracts of land, labor organizations 
will often support selective spontaneous settlements. In the futurê  cooperation 
between local representatives of the rural population—such as the labor organi-
zations and the Church—and the central agrarian reform agency should be in-
creasingly valuable in carrying out these programs. It is also clear,however,by 
comparing in Table 2 the goals for 1963 with the number of families owning less 
than 5 hectares of land, most of whom may be assumed to benefit by inclusion in 
the agrarian reform program, that if a solution to the problem is to be approach-
ed within a decade or so,the dimensions of the annual programs will have to be 
greatly expanded in each case. This will require a reduction of legal complexi-
ties and administrative costs as well as greater cooperation with those elements 
of the private sector interested in agrarian reform. Admittedly it will take some 
time to work out the most efficient procedures for settlement programs and tech-
nical and credit assistance programs; and as there is evidence that additional 
projects are being prepared for implementation in the near future,evaluation of 
the practical effect of the new laws may be better reserved until the responsi-
ble Institutes have been operating a full year. 
2.- The experiences of individual countries 
The individual agrarian reform laws do not, of oourse, all conform to the 
same extent to this composite outline. Nor are the present conditions the same 
in each case. Some of the major features of the different national programs 
are outlined below, beginning with whose agrarian reform programs began under 
the Alliance. 
Following the common pattern, Chile's law of November 1962 aims at higher 
productivity and a more equitable system of land ownership primarily by means 
of land distribution, beginning with state-owned land and, when necessary, . 
resorting to the expropriation of private land in excess of 50 hectares which 
is idle or very poorly cultivated. Indirectly cultivated land is subject to 
expropriation when belonging to juridical persons or when rented for a period 
of less than six years. However, given the order of expropriation, rented land 
of more than 50 hectares whioh remains ilde is nevertheless liable to expropria-
tion even when the rental contract is of the legal duration. This should reduce 
somewhat the t.emptation to evade the effects of the law through simulated rent 
contracts. The obligation to invest part òf the rent receipts in land improve-
ment is raised from 10 to 15 percent, although enforcement of this provision 
will continue to be only as effective as in the past. Private land may also 
be expropriated if it is necessary to the regrouping of minifundias or, under 
special conditions, if it constitutes a latifundia. With respect to the first, 
rural land is not to be divided in lots of less than 15 hectares.of irrigated 
land or the equivalent. At the other extreme, latifundia is defined as land 
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of single ownership valued at more than bOO times the annual minimum  salary of 
an employee of private business in Santiago. If the prerequisite of a regional 
development plan is satisfied, latifundia may be expropriated. A reserve 
allowance of land valued at 200 minimum  annual salaries plus 20 for each 
dependent is authorized by the law. The basis of valuation Is apparently 
to be determined in each case. In addition, the Chilean law grants the 
President of the Republic extensive supplementary powers to regúlate import 
duties on agricultural materials and tò establish norms on agricultural 
housing, salaries and cooperatives. 
Practical application of the law began in January 196?. One of the major 
projects being prepared is the leasing of 53 000 hectares of government land 
in Magallanes in 937 lots. At present the cost per family is extraordinarily 
high, slowing the extension of services to the nearly 300,000 rural families 
in need of land. The goal for 1963 is to settle 7 000 families, for which 
approximately $60 million has been budgeted. An extensive áeriàl photo-
gramme trie and field survey of agricultural lands, undertaken with the aid 
of a $2.1 million loan from the Inter-American Develópment Sank as part three 
of a four-part agricultural survey, is nearing completion and is expected to 
greatly facilitate all agricultural development programs. > ! 
In Colombia (agrarian reform law passed in December 19Ô1), about 90 
percent of agricultural land is devoted to livestock grazing and only a small 
fraction of government-owned land is readily accessible, 'so it has been neces-
sary to resort to expropriation of private lande. As ¿first Btep, all persons 
owning rural property in excess of 2,000 hectares must préèeht the title and 
a description of the land to the Agustín Codazzi Geographical Institute which /; 
will study the economic use of the land;if it has remained uncultivated for ten 
years, the owners stand to lose title. 27/ When sufficient "private holdings 
are not offered for sale voluntarily the Colombian National Agrarian Reform 
Institute, INC0RA, is authorized to expropriate at a negotiated price lands 
which are uncultivated, inadequately cultivated or indirectly exploited. In 
each case the owner may retain 100 hectares of farm land for his own use and 
except where the object of expropriation is the regrouping of minifundias, he 
may reserve a further 100 hectares of non-farra land. Regulations subsequent 
to the Agrarian Reform Law define more precisely the terms "inadequately 
cultivated" and "indirectly exploited" and limit the price paid for expropria-
ted land to not more than 30 percent higher than the Value as appraised in 
the last agricultural survey. 28/ In some cases the settlement programs may 
represent "directed colonization" whereby INC0RA provides schools, churches, 
27. By the end of 1962,1 238 such reports had been received covering 7.̂  
million hectares of land, or 25percent of the total privately owned rural 
land. According to the information submitted by the owners, 2.6 million hec-
tares were well exploited, while million Were not exploited at alio INCORA, 
Informe, 1962, p. kl. 
23. Several steps were advocated by the Social Agrarian Council (Consejo 
Social Agrario) in resolutions adopted at its first meeting in April, 1963. 
These include measures which would abbreviate negotiations between INCORA 
and proprietors of affected property, define work arrangements in which labor 
is exchanged for land as labor contracts, and modify local councils to give 
greater representation to rural labor. 
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and similar community facilities in addition to the land grant} under this 
system, 70 percent of the land not necessary for such construction is to be 
granted free to settlers of scarce resources; the remainder and all other 
land grants are to be repaid, plus cost of improvements, within 15 years of 
the date of possession. INCORA may, in some cases, however, choose to rent 
rather than sell the land. In assessing the possibilities for land distri-
bution, INCORA is assisted by advisory committees at the departmental and 
municipal levels; and in the administration of technical assistance to the 
settlers it ÍB supported by an Agricultural-Livestock Institute, created by 
an Agency of INCORA with the financial collaboration of the Ford, Rockefeller 
and Kellogg Foundations in July of 1962. 
Nine projects were approved in 1962, covering 200 thousand hectares 
which will benefit 15 000 families. Plans for 196? include the settling of 
5 000 families along with giving assistance to 10 000 families in areas of 
spontaneous colonization in the form of roads, credit and land titles. In 
addition, a project to recover 150 000 hectares of land through irrigation 
will be initiated in 1963. Despite this ambitious program, the needs remain 
very great. The uneconomically small size of farms combined with severe 
erosion defines the nature of the problem affecting most of Colombia's rural 
population. The Ministry of Agriculture stated in 1959 that there were more 
than 800 00Ó farms of less than 5 hectares, and it has been generally claimed 
that a majority of the 1.5 million rural families do not own land. Under 
such conditions, it is urgent that the program incorporate the maximum  number 
of families at the lowest possible cost. Some financial flexibility is af-
forded by the stipulation that expropriated land which was unexploited may 
be paid in Agrarian Bonds, but a few head of cattle would.presumably entitle 
the owner to a cash indemnity. More valuable provisions are those limiting 
the price to be paid in cases of expropriation, and assurinĝ  INCORA a budget 
of 100 million pesos a year plus borrowing power of up to one billion pesos 
over five years. 
Costa Rica's agrarian law of October 1961 entrusts responsibility for the 
agrarian reform program to the Banco Nacional; legislation of October 1962 
created the Institute of Lands and Colonization to share this task. Further 
legislation is promised regulating the forms of indirect cultivation. Mean-
while a new tax is imposed on all holding in excess of 100 hectares, ranging 
from l/k percent of the value declared for the territorial tax for land 250 
hectares or less to 2 l/2 percent on excess land of 5»000 hectares and above. 
Recipients of land are exempt from land taxes for five years. 
The law does not make any disposition on poorly cultivated land; it does 
provide for the expropriation of private land" which is not cultivated or which 
has been indirectly exploited for five years, land distributed to settlers who 
have failed to comply with the regulations of the Institute on land use and 
land devoted to grazing which is suitable for crops. Minifundias may be ex-
propriated for regrouping providing that cm adeauate land parcel is guaranteed 
each displaced owner; all lands larger than latifundia are to be automatically 
expropriated. The term latifundia is not defined. Expropriation is to take 
place only when State land is no longer available and when it is not possible 
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to acquire sufficient land on voluntary sale» Compensation must not exceed 
the value of the land as declared for tax purposes and will be made in either 
cash or bonds at the discretion of the Institute. These latter features will 
permit more extensive purchases than where current value in cash is required. 
Another distinctive feature of the Costa Rican law is the intended survey of 
all lands in excess of 1 000 hectares to determine whether .their extension has 
been correctly reported for the tax rolls} land in excess! of the reported area 
will be inscribed in the name of the Institute if it is uncultivated, with the 
owner allowed to retain 40 percent of the excess if it is cultivated. There 
is strong emphasis in the law in favor of the formation of agricultural 
cooperatives, which are given priority in requests for credit for housing and 
equipment. Land may be either sold or rented by the Institute. 
While the problem of land distribution is not as grave in Costa Rica as 
in some other countries, there are large numbers of squatters without land 
and many of the 51 000 farmers who at the time of the. 195Ò census owned less 
than 3*5 hectares could use additional land to advantage. Plans, for 1963 
center on a settlement program in Bataan covering U 6?0 Hectares and serving 
600 families. The estimated budget of ITCO for 1963 is 6.6 faillion colones, 
of which 3*8 million will represent capital expenditures... 
In the Dominican Republic a major immediatetask la the distribution of 
large areas of land confiscated from the Trujilla family and nòW held by the 
government. To this end the Agrarian Reform Law (April,19&2)..outlines 
succinctly and specifically the responsibility of t H < i ; p f Agrarian 
Reform. The plots are to be distributed among those needing land by a raffle 
system and each recipient is assured both housing and credit. The Institute 
has a budget of two million pesos. In order to serve as many as possible of 
the estimated 225 thousand families who as of I960 worked farms of less than 
one hectare, it has cut costs to a minimum  (approximately 550 pesos per 
family). 
The program, which began in April of 1963, appears to be moving swiftly, 
with distribution underway of 100 000 hectares to 10 000 families. At present 
another project is being given serious consideration whereby with large scale 
international assistance the Dominican Republic would develop 500 thousand 
hectares of land in an irrigation project similar tò the United States Tennessee 
Valley Authority, with the expectation of thereby doubling the incomes of 
250 000 persons. 
The Guatemalan law (October 1962) authorizes the- expropriation of private 
land only insofar as it is left idle, and exceeds 50 hectares. Such land is 
taxed from 0.75 to 2.50 quetzales per hectare according to five classes of 
land, with cumulative surcharges of 20 percent imposed eaeh year for the follow-
ing four years. Rental contracts must extend five years and imply nò personal 
servitude, but on meeting these two conditions rented land is removed from the 
effects of the law.In fact, rented land is by definition not idle land, without 
regard to its state of cultivation. 
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Given this alternative and the stipulation that expropriated idle land 
will be paid itB current value at 4 percent interest in five years, the 
program will be an expensive one if it is to be at all effective. The latest 
figures available are from the 1950 census at which time about l40 000 families 
were landless. 
Honduras, according to the law of September 1962 and subsequent amend-
ments, land which is idle or inadequately cultivated or indirectly exploited 
fails—by definition of the agrarian reform law--to fulfill its social function, 
and is therefore subject to expropriation. The National Agrarian Institute 
may, however, rent public land for commercial use and renew such concessions 
granted formerly} this amendment has helped to quiet protests that the law was 
intolerant of business needs. Land devoted to livestock is adequately exploited 
if it contains one head of cattle (or five calves) for each two hectares or if 
it is cultivated for forage; farm land is judged according to its yield. All 
land declared idle or uncultivated is subject to a tax, beginning two years 
from the date of the law, equal to 3 percent of the declared value in the first 
year and rising to 40 percent in the fifth year. Indirect exploitation of 
land is permissible only if it represents a sharing of capital and is approved 
by the National Agrarian Institute; all such contract stipulations which require 
payment for the land in labor or in kind or which oblige the rentee to sell or 
purchase at a fixed market specified by the renter are declared null. The 
expropriation of private property requires prior payment in cash of the full 
price decided upon by appraisers. The land is to be distributed in parcels of 
10 to 20 hectares of irrigated land, or the equivalent, for which payment is 
made in 10 to 20 years at a rate of interest from zero percent in the case of 
national land to 3-4 percent on private land. The recipient must agree to 
certain obligations regarding construction of housing, extent of cultivation * 
and general orderly behavior. The National Agrarian Institute "is assured a 
budget of at least 2 million lempiras per year and is authorized to issue 
agrarian bonds of 20 years at four percent to finance the compensation of 
acquired properties. 
By mid-1963 provisional title had been granted to approximately 300 
families settled on 4 150 hectares. Planning for the settlement of 6 000 
families in the Aguan valley is expected to be completed during 1963. The 
investment budget for the year is about one million lempiras. Fifty-Beven 
percént of the 156 000 farms included in the Agricultural Survey of 1962 were 
of less than five hectares and were found to provide an inadequate income. 
The Nlcaraguan agrarian reform law of April 1963 offers free title to 50 
hectares to those persons who have been settled -on public lands for at least 
one year prior to the promulgation of the law with the option to purchase at 
a price fixed by appraisers any additional area they had under cultivation. 
The government also intends to open negotiations with the owners of private 
land currently worked by squatters in order to transfer title to the latter 
without charge; the owners will be compensated in bonds or cash on install-
ments. Others in need of land who meet certain standards with respect to age 
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and agricultural experience qualify for family units for tfhich they are to 
reimburse the Agrarian Institute in 15-20 years at interest not exceeding five 
percent. Payment may be made in produce at market prices and a deduction of 
five percent of the total amount is allowed for each child born after occupation 
of the land parcel. Full title is granted when all obligations have been met, 
including full cultivation of the land and at least 25 percent payment. The 
land parcels are to be formed first on national and communal lands, or private 
land voluntarily sold, then on expropriated private property. Grounds for ex-
propriation are failure to cultivate for two consecutive years or to assume 
directly the economic risk of cultivation for the same period, inefficient 
cultivation, or failure to comply with the regulations on natural resources. 
In each case a reserve of 500 hectares of irrigated land is permitted. Land 
above this limit may also be expropriated if it prejudices an established 
nucleus of farmers due to scarcity of land in the area. Free personal services 
and the payment of rent in labor are prohibited. 
The major activity of 1962 was an extension of rúrálvci#ditthrough the formation of six new rural credit agencies and the completion of work on basic 
studies for a project to irrigate 10 000 hectares in the Pejjàrtweftt of Rivas. 
According to the Census of 1952 close to one-third of the farnis in the country 
were of less than 3*5 hectares. ;'•.•.-.•• 
In Panama, as in the Dominican Republic, the land to be distributed is for 
the most part government-owned; although the Agrarian Code of September 1962 
does provide for the expropriation of private holdings in excess of 100 hectares 
which are idle, poorly cultivated or indirectly exploited. Compensation is to 
be made in cash or agrarian bonds on the choice of the proprietor and at the 
value determined by the agricultural census of 1956 or, in the case of property 
acquired after the entry into force of the Code, at the purchase price. Families 
with an annual income of less than 600 Balboas are granted land parcels free; 
others are given 20 years in which to páy the cost of the land. The Institute 
may also rent land to settlers. 
In 1961 the government presented a five-year plan (1962-66) to settle 
k 500 families on 150 000 hectares of idle land. Two projects were ready at 
that time: Tonosi 29/ and Penonome. The goal for I963 is to distribute 
20 000 hectares among 1 200 families, with the help of a $2,9 million loan 
from the Inter-American Development Bank. According to the i960 census there 
were then about 60 000 landless rural families who lived as nomads settling on 
idle property and moving frequently in search bf better land. 
29» Tonosi is explicitly excluded from the agrarian program as regulated 
by the Code; however, according to the development plan this is not an insur-
mountable problem. A greater problem is to reduce the costs to a feasible level. 
/Laws 852 
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Laws 852 and 854 of March 1963 supplement the i960 legislation on land 
settlement in Paraguay replacing earlier measures in this field. The latest 
laws create the Institute of Rural Welfare to replace the Institute of Agrarian 
Reform and outline the procedure for land distribution. The Institute is in 
charge of establishing colonies, including all community facilities. Recipients 
of land will repay the Institute in 15 years, although a 15 percent deduction 
is granted those who can pay in cash; a four percent interest charge is to 
form a contingency fund in case of crop failure or public emergency. Title is 
granted free to fathers with seven or more minor dependents and to those with 
a 30 percent disability from the Chaco war. 
Colonization may take place on public lands or lands acquired by the 
Institute or may be undertaken by private proprietors with the aid and supervi-
sion of the Institute. Private establishments of any extension of which the 
improvements represent 50 percent of the fiscal value of the land are exempt 
from expropriation. Land not meeting this condition is considered not ration-
ally exploited and the Institute may encourage the owners to adopt private 
colonization schemes or to sell to the Institute. If necessary the Institute 
may initiate expropriation proceedings. Land which is not rationally exploited 
and which exceeds 10 000 hectares in the eastern region of the country or 
20 000 hectares in the west exclusive of forest reserves (the definition of a 
latifundia) is subject to a progressive tax. The scale of the tax and the 
maximum  limit to land holdings of any one person will be specified in future 
legislation. Land which has been the site of stable de facto settlements for 
20 years or for a shorter period in the event of a social problem, minifundios, 
and suburban land which is not rationally exploited are also affected by the 
law and when the owners are unwilling to sell, the Institute may resort to ex-
propriation, paying in cash over 10 years. 
The law stipulates that all contracts of rent or share-cropping must be 
formalized in writing and that rent may not exceed 12 percent of the fiscal 
value of the land, nor the proprietor's share of the crops 20 percent of the 
total product. Under the system whereby the owner provides land, seed and 
tools to third persons who provide labor, the contract must specify the contri-
butions of each and the division of the produce or profit, of which the owner 
is not entitled to more than half. 
From 1956 through 1961 the Institute of Agrarian Reform distributed title 
to former public lands to 17 000 families, and a further 8 600 families became 
land owners in 1962. The National Development Bank has initiated a supervised 
credit program to benefit k J>00 families and two settlement programs are being 
prepared along the Paraná River which together will serve approximately 4 000 
families. 
In view of the marked disparity in agricultural conditions between the 
mountainous and coastal areas of Peru, the agrarian reform program there is to 
be carried out in zones of development. A law of November 1962 outlined the 
bases for agrarian reform; but this law may be superceded by a bill submitted 
to Congress in August 1963 by the new government. The law of November 1962 
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provided for the establishment of family farm units on public land, the land of 
legal persons not directly essential to their stated purpose and private lands 
which were idle, deficiently or indirectly exploited or excessively concentrated 
in one zone. It also provided for a progressive tax on land by area the proceeds 
of which would be used for local public works, and promised legislation to 
regulate indirect exploitation of the land and to extend the benefits of minimum 
wages and social security. Land expropriated was to be valued with reference to 
its productivity; the precise method of valuation as the reserve allowance and 
the obligations and rights of land recipients remained to be specified by im-
plementing legislation. The new bill specifically outlaws all forms of payment 
in kind or in services for the use of land and declares expropriable in full any 
rural property worked entirely by persons other than the owner. Land worked in 
part by non-owners is expropriable to the extent of indirect exploitation. Those 
proprietors who work their own land are allowed a reserve of I50 hectares of 
irrigated land or a larger allowance of non-irrigated land depending on its 
condition and the area in which it is located. Land belonging to juridical 
persons is subject to expropriation to the extent that it is,not directly essen-
tial to the purposes of the possessing organization whether political, clerical 
or business. In the case of both legal and natural persons, the sum of all 
holdings are considered to constitute one single property, including properties 
owned by several corporations in which one person or institution holds 40 percent 
of the capital stock. Compensation, not to exceed by more than 30 percent the 
fiscal value of the land is to be paid in full in agrarian bonds of 20 years at 
five percent, These bonds are guaranteed by the State and acceptable in pay-
ment of land taxes or as collateral in requests for credit. The recipients of 
land parcels will repay the price of the land determined according to its eco-
nomic capacity over a period of not less than 20 years at two percent interest, 
with a period of grace to be specified for each zone. They must personally, 
live on and work the land, with the assistance of credit and'technical advice. 
During 1962 settlement continued on the San Lorenzo project with the 
distribution of 7 000 hectares in k2k lots; but the most intensive effort is 
scheduled for the near future. Preparations are being made to settle b 000 
families in the Apurimac region, some 17 thousand families are to benefit by 
the irrigation of 26 thousand hectares in Arequipa, and more than a million 
hectares of mountain land are to be reclaimed by the construction of 14 access 
roads. 
Among the countries where agrarian reform legislation was in effect prior 
to the signing of the charter of Punta del Este, Mexico has by far the longest 
experience. The Mexican system of land redistribution, begun during the 
Revolution of 1910, centers on the ejido or communal land. Over the period 
1910-1962 approximately 50 million hectares of land have been distributed to 
more than 3*5 million rural families. Reform of the agrarian code has been 
approved recently by Congress to increase the availability of land for distri-
bution. A Banco Nacional Ejidal offers a system of agricultural insurance and 
/the Federal 
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the Federal government has made available a national network of storage facil-
ities and has continued to expand the irrigation system, which now serves one 
third of the total cultivated area of the country. In 1962 a new medium and 
long-term loan program directed specially to small- and medium-sized  farms was 
begun with the assistance of a $20 million loan from AID. At present an im-
pressive self-help project is underway in Campeche where a pioneer group of 
500 heads of family is clearing land and constructing living centers as the 
nucleus of a large-scale resettlement of families from the north. 
Bolivia's agrarian reform program, also the product of a revolution, has 
been in effect since 1953» A new bill, simplifying the procedures established 
earlier is expected to be approved in 1963» Reorganization of the Agricultural 
Bank is also under consideration as the scarcity of agricultural credit remains 
a serious problem. During the nine years of existence of the agrarian reform 
program, 133 thousand families have been settled on million hectares; 26 
thousand of these families were settled on 0.9 million hectares in 1962. In 
addition, 221 thousand titles have been turned over, 50 thousand of these in 
1962. In order to raise the living standards of its population, Bolivia intends 
a major relocation of rural families from the valleys and altiplano to the 
fertile eastern lowlands .¿0/ The single most important project to date, Alto 
Beni, is part of that plan. 
Uhder Venezuela's exceptionally active program of land distribution, ap-
proximately 56 thousand families were settled on 1.53 million hectares between 
the approval of the agrarian reform law in March i960 and the close of 1962. 
The speed of the 'settlement program has exceeded the flexibility of the finan-
cial and technical assistance services, however, hampering the economic effec-
tiveness of the program. To remedy this situation the government is currently 
emphasizing the expansion of agricultural extension services and credit facil-
ities. The number of agricultural extension offices was increased from 124' to 
l40 in 1962 and is planned to reach 500 by the end of 1966. Agricultural credit 
also increased substantially in 1962 and is to rise by 25 percent in 1963. The 
present goal is to settle a further 100 000 during the period of the national 
plan, I963-I966. If this can be accomplished, the program will have reached 
almost all of the estimated l80 000 families in need of land. Increasingly 
rapid extension of technical services will also be necessary, however, if the 
goal of raising the minimum  income of rural workers to at least 80 percent of 
that of unskilled industrial laborers is to be met during the plan period. 
30. See above, section A of this chapter. 
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C. TAX REFORM 
Tax reform is a basic component of the development planning and agrarian 
reform programs outlined above. In carrying out the greatly increased invest-
ment programs and the institutional reforms called for by the Alliance it 
has proved necessary to review the yield and incidence of the present tax 
structure and to reorganize it to serve more effectively as an instrument of 
economic development. A detailed analysis of advisable tax reforms in Latin 
America would have to take into account the existing basé from which reform 
is to be undertaken and the special conditions of development in each country; 
with a generous allowance for simplification, however, it is possible to 
consider tax policy on the regional level in the general context of develop-
ment needs. 
One obvious need is additional revenue to enable the: public sector to 
carry out its share of the increased investment, and to reduce the government 
deficit. In the past, attempts to prevent government déficits have often 
taken the form of emergency taxes or surcharges on existing taxes to meet an 
acute financial need. As tax revenues in many countries still derive largely 
from customs duties and depend to that extent On highly variable external 
factors, such temporary measures may be revoked and reihstátéá repeatedly to 
meet the current needs of the Treasury. The aim of tax reform under the Alliance 
is to provide for higher tax receipts in such a Way that the other goals of 
tax reform are not prejudiced. The other goals of tax reform can be stated 
in various ways but a particularly useful one is the formulation adopted by 
Special Committee III (Financial and Fiscal Policy and Administration) of 
the Inter-American Economic and Social Council: 
a. to obtain the resources necessary to finance the planned economic 
and social development without hampering total investment, including 
that of the private sector, or causing an unfavorable alteration in 
the level of prices} 
b. to adjust the tax burden so that it is distributed justly and 
equitably; this objective will be fulfilled when the tax burden is 
equal for those in equal circumstances and when the total tax burden 
is progressive in relation to the economic capability of the taxpayer; 
c. to guarantee effective compliance with fiscal obligations by perfect-
ing the legal system and improving the mechanism of tax administra-
tion; 
d. to adopt an effective and rational policy of fiscal incentives which 
will serve to channel investments towards activities Or areas of high 
economic and social priority and discourage investment in non-
essential activities; 
/e. to promote 
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e. to promote the effective functioning of common markets by harmonizing 
fiscal systems so as to avoid distortions in the systems of production 
and commerce in the member countries.30/ 
Conforming to these criteria tax reform measures in 1962 may be reviewed 
under the following headings: 1) increased tax receipts; 2) more equitable 
distribution of the tax burden; 3) tax incentives for investment; and 4) improv-
ed tax administration, with the latter incorporating objectives c) and e). 
1. Increased tax receipts 
If the public sector is to fulfill its responsibilities under the 
Alliance, it is indispensable that it be able to obtain the resources necessary 
to finance the planned economic and social development without incurring any 
detrimental effect on total investment, public or private, or on the level of 
prices. The Latin American countries made renewed efforts to meet this objec-
tive in 1962, and although budget deficits were not reduced as much as had been 
hoped, it is believed that with continued efforts, the steps already taken may 
have some additional delayed effects in future years. 
In Argentina a series of measures were introduced in 1962 affecting taxes 
on income, production, consumption and foreign trade. A 20 percent surcharge 
was imposed on income above a certain level, in place of the former tax on ex-
traordinary earnings, to be effective through fiscal year 1964; the deduction 
of increased assets by industrial and commercial enterprises was limited to 50 
percent of investments made when these constitute at least 10 percent of the 
increase in assets; and the deduction of legal reserves in computing taxable 
income of corporations was eliminated. Earnings from the sale of securities, 
when this is a habitual occupation, were exoluded from the income tax and made 
subject instead to a special one percent tax, while the tax on occasional earn-
ings from the sale of land units was raised from 5 to 10 percent and on earnings 
from games of chance from 5 to 20 percent. Other dispositions of the income 
tax, designed to offer tax relief to lower income groups and to the livestock 
industry, are discussed in the following sections. Further revenue-increasing 
measures included a temporary 5 percent tax on the production of meat, wool, 
grains and oilseeds applicable in 1963. An emergency tax of one-peso per liter 
of gasoline was also imposed along with the creation of a 5-peso per liter tax 
on lubricating oils; the latter has subsequently been raised to 10 pesos a liter. 
Items formerly not subject to a sales tax are now taxed at 3 percent, but the 
sales tax on items earlier taxed at 13 percent has.been reduced to 10 percent 
for essential products; the sale of items considered luxuries or non-essentials 
continues to, be taxed at 13 percent. The special sales tax on automobiles has 
been increased by 50 percent and a new tax levied on passports. An additional 
30. See Final Report of Special Committee III (CIES/302), San José, 
Costa Bica, July 1963» 
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5 percent tax on imports, except those declared of high national priority, was 
also imposed during 1963» 
In Brazil new measures introduced in 1962 reinforcing the effects of 
reforms made the previous year are expected to result in an increase of 150 
billion cruzeiros in 1963 revenues. In I96I the income tax law was amended, 
and a state sales tax was introduced in Minas Gerais. More recent measures 
impose a new tax on earnings from letters of exchange, increase the rates of 
income tax and establish a compulsory loan of 20 percent of the tax on incomes 
withheld at the source, except income from labor; the former 20 percent 
emergency tax was eliminated. At the same time consumptiort taxes were altered, 
with the rates on non essential items increased, important revenue gains are 
expected in the future from the alteration of the tax on electric power from a 
fixed amount to a rate based on the value of the power consumed and increasing 
progressively over the next three years, 1963-1965; collections on this account 
are expected to improve 40 percent by 1965• 
Chile has prepared an extensive program of tax reform. At present a 
series of measures are under parliamentary discussion, whiph would restructure 
the income tax to make it more progressive, introduce à tax on capital gains, 
modify the tax applicable to gifts and inheritance, provide, for periodic 
reevaluation of real property, and reform the administrative organization of the 
Internal Tax Service. 
The Colombian government has requested of Parliament extraordinary powers 
to completely reorganize the decentralized institutes in Order to eliminate 
duplication and rationalize their operations, to reform tax administration 
including the administration of taxes by the departments and municipalities, to 
improve the system of valuing real property and to reform the system of 
valuation of intangibles, of setting exemptions and of determining the rates 
applied to enterprises which do not distribute profit in the country. 
Specific tax changes recommended include the establishment of a tax of 3 to 10 
percent on the sale of finished goods, a 20 percent surcharge on the income tax, 
a consumption tax on gasoline to be used to finance highway construction and 
an import registration fee. A technical assistance mission of the OAS/IDB/ECLA 
has studied the Colombian tax system and made recommendations on tax reform. 
In the Dominican Republic. Ecuador and Mexico one of the most important 
changes introduced in 1962 was the addition of a global tax on income super-
imposed on the schedular system. In May of 1962 the Dominican Republic 
introduced a progressive surcharge ranging from 3 to 4o percent on personal 
income; progressive rates of 10 to 38 percent apply to corporate income. The 
income tax is expected to contribute one fifth of all fiscal revenue in 1963 
compared to one tenth in I96I. Ecuador also added to the schedular tax on 
income from all sources a complementary progressive tax intended to facilitate 
the eventual transition to a global progressive tax on income. Ecuador is 
also studying revision of the sales and stamp taxes. In addition to imposing 
a,complementary tax on all income, Mexico in 1962 increased the rates 
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applicable to middle and upper brackets and to rental income, imposed a 
special one percent tax on income to finance  middle and higher education, 
provided for  accelerated depreciation allowances and established a tax on 
use and ownership of  automobiles. A capital gains tax was initiated in 1962, 
and a tax on distributable profits  which are not reinvested. Tax revenues 
increased 12 percent in 1962 over I.96I and are expected to rise by 20 percent 
in 1963 with approximately half  of  these increases credited to the new provi-
sions. Further revision is being considered, especially in the direction of 
modifying  the scheduler system of  income taxation. 
Numerous tax increases were introduced in Peru in 1962, but most of these 
were later reduced. A special tax on exports of fish flour, together with 
the rise in price of the major export products, has contributed additional 
revenue to reduce the budget deficit, and it is expected that administrative 
reforms will also contribute to higher tax collections in 1963. 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela had all made certain reforms  in the tax 
structure in In 1962 Paraguay, like Argentina, sought to stimulate the 
livestock industry by offering  tax incentives; the income tax on this industry 
was eliminated and to replace the loss in revenue a tax was introduced on the 
sale of  cattle or horses. Uruguay introduced a tax on income for  the first 
time in July of  1961, and at the end of  that year raised the rate on corporate 
income from  30 to 50 percent. Venezuela increased in 1961 the rates of 
taxation on most types of  income and on inheritance taxes, doubling those on 
corporate income. The Venezuelan four-year  development plan for  196̂ -66 
provides for  the introduction of  taxes on dividends and on land. 
Among the Central American countries, taxes on income, property, inherit-
ance, sales and consumption have all been considered potential sources of" 
higher tax receipts with different approaches settled upon by the different 
countries. Costa Rica has had since 1958 a serious problem of budget deficit, 
caused in part by the heavy subsidies granted to state enterprises and 
aggravated by a difficult balance of payments situation. Besides the reduc-
tion of fiscal revenues originating in the deterioration Of export receipts, 
some other factors have also affected revenues unfavorably. Thus, the 
industrialization program has also created some difficulty due to the tax 
exemptions offered as incentives and to the reduced income from imports 
accompanying the progress of import substitution. New measures to reduce the 
deficit by raising revenues include the obligation of state banks to pay 
income and land taxes, a new progressive tax on idle lands graduating with 
their extension, creation of an Administrative Fiscal Tribunal to handle 
discrepancies between tax declarations and the dispositions of the law and 
improvements of the system of withholding taxes at the source and paying 
in quarterly installments. Proposals have also been made that a tax be 
levied on the income of public servants and other taxes on goods manufactured 
within the country, the latter to recover some of the loss from reduced 
imports of these goods. 
/Following the 
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Following the reform of the income tax in El Salvador in 1961, which 
made the rate structure more progressive with ¿ range of 2-76.5 percent and 
which contributed substantialy to raising revenues, new measures were 
introduced in 1962 to improve collections. Reforms are also being contem-
plated of the tax on inheritance and gifts.53/ 
When the Guatemalan income tax law took effect on July 1, 1963» it 
marked the first time that all Latin American nations have employed a tax on 
income. Further amendments are expected to this law which at present excludes 
70 percent or more of Guatemalan workers through the generous deductions and 
the gradual increases in rates over broad levels of income.32/ Guatemala has 
also raised the property tax from 3 to 5 peroent per thousand and provided 
for the revaluation of all property not appraised in the past 15 years to 
300 percent of its last appraised value. A tax has been levied on exports 
of cotton and some essential oils according to variations in the market price 
and the export tax formerly levied on coffee has been lowered. 
Beginning July 1, 1963, Honduras imposed a 20 percent surcharge on 
taxable income of 20 thousand lempiras or above, and introduced a progressive 
tax on forestry and woodworking industries. The tax on production and sale 
of carbonated water was increased and a tax equal to 5 percent of the sales 
price imposed on automobiles formerly exoluded from taxation. 
Nicaragua rained the tax on gifts and inheritance and on the transfer 
of immovable properly. The tax on capital was also increased and divided 
to apply separately to housing and other immovable propertiesj the former was 
raised to 0.5 percent on values not less than 20 thousand córdobas in the 
departments or 30 thousand in the capital and the latter to one percent, with 
a 10 thousand córdoba exemption. Certain stamp taxes were also raised and 
consolidated. 
Panama approved in 1962 a surcharge of 10 percent on incomes above 1.8 
million balboas, an increase from 20 to 40 percent in the surcharge on 
income of companies in which more than half of the capital stock is owned 
by one person or group, and a tax on dividends paid by companies who by virtue 
of contracts with the state are exempted from incomè taxes. A land tax was 
also initiated in 1962, and several consumption taxes earmarked for specific 
purposes. Import tariffs were raised by 0.5 percent with additional levies 
on liquor, beer and automotive vehicles! and the exemption from import taxes 
formerly granted the autonomous institutions was revoked. The draft of a 
general tax reform, prepared with the assistance of an 0AS/IDB/ECLA Mission 
was presented to the National Assembly at the end of 1962. 
31. El Salvador, Informe Económico Social preparado para la Comisión III 
del CIES, June 1963, p. 14. 
32. Informe del Segundo Periodo de Reuniones de la Comisión.III. July 1963» 
(OAS/Ser«H/XIII; CIES/Com.I11/27 Rev.2) p. 13» and Banco de Guatemala, Informe 
Sobre Finanzas Públicas correspondiente a los años i960 a 1962. July 1963, p.5. 
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2. More equitable distribution of the tax burden 
Among the reform measures listed in the preceding section there is evident 
an attempt to alleviate the tax burden on the lower income groups relative to 
those better able to contribute to the public sector and at the same time a 
concern that private investment not be penalized by heavy taxation. 
The tax increases recently imposed in Argentina, for example, exempt the 
lower income groups by imposing the surcharge only on incomes of 50 thousand 
pesos or more and on capital. At the same time the family deduction was raised, 
the basic rate lowered from 9 to 8 percent, and the sales tax was reduced on 
essential items. Brazil also raised the basic family income exemption and 
restricted increases in consumption taxes to nonessential items. The compulso-
ry loan does not apply to income from personal services. 
In Chile the tax on dividends was eliminated in order to diminish double 
taxation. 
Introduction of a tax on income in Guatemala together with the increase 
of the property tax, and the initiation of a global tax in the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador and Mexico are also based on consideration of the ability to 
pay. Mexico also changed the payment of taxes on personal income from a month-
ly to an annual base, making it conform to the other schedules in this regard 
and lowering the annual tax charge on those whose incomes may vary widely in 
different months. 
The tax on idle land introduced in Costa Rica in 19Ô2 and the initiation 
of a land tax in Panama were also intended to redirect the incidence of the 
tax away from those of lower income and wealth. In addition Panama raised the 
tax on immovable property and applied a surcharge on the income tax which 
varies from 10 percent on personal income from personal services to 20-bO per-
cent on the income from capital. 
J. Tax incentives to investment 
Several of the Latin American countries are presently reviewing the sys-
tem of incentives to industries or to regions which it is considered desirable 
to develop in order to assess their effectiveness in relation to the other 
objectives of tax reform such as higher revenues and more equitable distribu-
tion of the burden. 
Argentina has recently reordered the tax privileges granted for develop-
ment purposeè and Chile has proposed to the National Congress a greater reli-
ance on accelerated depreciation as a stimulus to industries which the develop-
ment agency, C0RF0, designates to be of high priority. Mexico offers accel-
erated depreciation allowances to agricultural, industrial, mining and con-
struction enterprises and levies a tax on distributable profits not reinvested. 
Panama is also studying a draft of new legislation on incentives and the mem-
bers of the Central American Common Market are currently in the process of 
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approving the Agreement on Uniform Central American Incentives.. Brazil is 
finding very successful the 50 percent reduction of income tax liability to 
those firms which invest in the northeast region of the country the amount of 
the tax saving plus an equal amount from their own capital, with the approval 
of the northeast development agency SUDENE. New measures in Argentina and 
Paraguay in 19Ô2 offer special tax reductions to the livestock industry. 
4. Improved tax administration 
a. More efficient collection 
Greater efficiency of collection procedures is essential if the selective 
emphasis of tax reform, that is, the alleviation of the tax burden on low in-
come groups and on industries important to the national development, is to be 
compatible with the primary responsibility of the tax system to produce enough 
revenues to finance the public sector's responsibility in the development pro-
gram. But where tax evasion is known to be easy in practice and is widely 
condoned, to reverse this custom requires strong action. Thus numerous meas-
ures are being enacted or studied to improve the collection of taxes by impos-
ing strict penalties on attempts to evade payment of the full tax liability, 
as well as by introducing more efficient methods of collecting and accounting. 
In Argentina, for example, a period of grace was declared during which 
previously undeclared income could be registered with the tax authorities with-
out penalty and at a considerably reduced tax rate. Thereafter certain opera-
tions such as the transfer of real property and of automobiles and qualifica-
tion for bank credit above specified amounts are made contingent on the inter-
ested persons' being registered on the tax rolls. In this way 450 000 persons 
disclosed 200 billion pesos in previously undeclared capital which at the re-
duced rate brought in 12 billion pesos in taxes, about 9 percent of total' tax 
revenue collected in 1962, Peru and Uruguay follòwed a similar procedure in 
1963, reducing rates on tax arrears during a temporary amnesty after which 
sanctions were made more strict than before. In Peru, for example, heavy 
fines of 500 to 500 000 soles and/or two to six months imprisonment are now the 
penalties for tax evasion. A national register of taxpayers has also been 
compiled in Peru. 
Mexico has also recently introduced a national register of taxpayers, on 
which some 3«5 million persons have now been inscribed, compared with 0.7 
million in 1962. In addition Mexico will adopt beginning in 1962 the practice 
of individual determination of tax liability, reducing the responsibility of 
the administration to checking these declarations. Electronic computers are 
used in this'task. 
Costa Rica and El Salvador are now also installing electronic equipment 
as part of their programs to improve the efficiency of tax collections. In 
addition the Costa Rican government has submitted to the legislature a propos-
al to deny certain public services to persons who have not declared their in-
come or real estate. In Honduras the Executive is authorized to charge fines 
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for delayed tax payment and in Guatemala the Minister of the Treasury is per-
mitted to take legal action in casen of delayed payment. In Panama, too the 
process of legal retribution in cases of fraud ha3 been made more effective by 
eliminating the burden of proving intent to deceive. Additional collection 
facilities have also been provided by using the offices of the National Bank 
of Panama throughout the country. 
b. Rationalization of administrative methods 
Simplification of tax codes and rationalization of administrative methods 
are also important areas of tax reform, both in themselves and with a view to-
ward regional standardization of tax systems for the purpose of economic inte-
gration. In these phases of reform, the adaptability of foreign experience 
has been particularly useful. 
In Chile, for example, a complete review of the Tax Service was conducted 
in late 1962 with the help of United States experts in tax administration and 
the results for improved tax collection have been remarkable. Similarly the 
tax systems of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Uruguay and the Central 
American Republics have been evaluated by the joint tax missions of the OAS/ 
IDB/ECLA, with recommendations submitted on both structural and administrative 
reforms. 
Tax administration in the Dominican Republic is also being studied with 
the help of the OAS, and consultants from the United States Internal Revenue 
Service have pronounced the recent reforms in Honduras to be outstandingly 
successful. These reforms are credited with increases of JO percent, 25 per-
cent and 7 percent respectively in the collection of export, income and salês 
taxes in Honduras in 1962. 
Peru and Ecuador have created permanent commissions on administrative re-
form of their respective tax systems. Argentina, Brazil and Guatemala already 
have similar commissions studying comprehensive reform of the tax structure. 
In addition, Ecuador has begun a codification of fiscal law and has in-
troduced government sponsored training courses in public administration. The 
El Salvadorean government also offers seminars in tax administration, and 
Chile in 1962 graduated the first class of students from the school of tax 
administration created in 1961; 575 students, or nearly 50 percent of the tax 
administration personnel at the time, completed the course, Chile also in 
1962 completed for the first time a unified manual of the fiscal code, a proj-
ect which Bolivia and Ecuador have since begun; the former with ECLA 
assistance. 
Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay introduced improved accounting and collec-
tion procedures in 1962, Mexico initiated a monthly withholding system on wage 
and salary income and Venezuela initiated the payment of income taxes in the 
same period in which the income is received. 
/Further simplification 
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Further simplification of administrative practices remains one of the 
objectives of tax reform measures, together with simplification of the tax 
measures themselves. For several countries the distribution of revenues be-
tween the central government and its subdivisions also remains problematic. 
Continued improvements in the area of tax administration, are indispensable to 
meeting the other aims of tax reform, which are together indispensable to ful-
filling the over-all goals of the Alliance. 
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Table 10^ 
SUMMARY OF SOME MAJOR FEATURES OF AGRARIA» REFORM LAWS PASSED SXSCE ADGUST 1961^ 
Month/ 
Year of 




Terms of payment 











Lav 15020 11/62 a) Public lands b) Idle or very poorly 
cultivated private 
land 
c) Land of legal 
persons Indirectly 
cultivated 
d) land rented on a 
lease less than 
six years 
e) Minifundios for re-
grouping 
f) Latifundia in ac-
cordance with a 
development plan 
for the region 
i) Private land valued 
at 200 ml rií Ttnim 
annual salaries•of 
an employee of 
private business 
in Santiago plus 
20 per dependent 
valuation not spec* 
ified 
n) Well cultivated lan¿ 
or rented land of 
a 6 yeaxs or more 
lease 
Price determined in 
each case, cash 20$ 
down,not less than 
10 years at 
To be specified by 
lav; not less than 
20 nor more than 30 
years 




Family Unit—' one 
additional unit al-
lowed for each 3 de-
pendents 
Credit, technical aid, 
Social Security and 
market facilities 
15$ of rent receipts 
oust be Invested 
in improvements; 






Lav 155 12/61 a) Private land of 
more than 2000 ha-
uncultivated 10 yrs 
b) Accessible state-
owned 
c) Private property 







a.) 100 hectares farm 
land of 200 hec-
tares total exclud-
ing steep slopes 
from "faimland" 
s) Well cultivated 
land ' 
i 
Price negotiated by 
appraisers uncul-
tivated land in 
Agrarian Bonds, 
others in cash 20$ 
down, 5-8 years 
-6$ interest-
15 years; principal 
beginning third year 
from receipt 2$ in-
terest first two 
years, U$ thereafter 
in "directed colonies 
70$ plots distributed 
free IUCCRA may rent 
instead of sell 
50$ under cultivation 
in 5 years, 65$ in 
directed colonies; 





ESCORA may buy land 
plots indirectly ex-
ploited 
Family Unit Credit & technical aid Advisory committees 
at departmental and 
local level farms 
of less than 3 hec-
tares legally null 
Costa Rica 
Lavs 2825 and 
3033, 30^2 IO/61 a) Public lands 




uted land on which, 
obligations neg-
lected, farm land 
used for grazing 
To be determined by 
the Institute, land 
fulfilling its social 
function 
Hot more than fiscal 
value bonds or cash 
at discretion of 
Institute 
a) Parcels: 25 yrs.» 
beginning 5 yrs. 
from receipt;repay 
cost of land, im-
provements and 
first year's credi' 
allotted by Insti-
tute, discount of 
5$ per resident 
dependent 
Adjustment in year 
of poor crops 
b) Institute nay chose 
to rent to colonis' 
Direct exploitation; 
not trans ferrable or 
divisible for 15 yrs. 
and until fully paid, 
obligations to Insti-
tute on cultivation, 
tax exempt for 5 yrs. 
s 
Family Unit on lands 
received free by 
State not more than 
10 hectares for crops 
or 50 for pasture 
Credit for one year's 
crop priority in 
credit, technical aid 
Tax on «-11 land 
holdings l/b to 
2 1/2$ taxable 
value, emphasis on 
cooperatives, lands 
of store than 1000 
hectares registered 
Incorrectly trans-
ferred to State to 
extent of uncul-
tivated excess 
Table 104 Cont'd. 
Dominican Republic 
Law 5879 It/62 Lands belonging to and 
purchased by state 
All private property 
not voluntarily sold 
or donated 
Sales contracts to be 
specified by Insti-
tute 
Hist work land per-
sonally; not divis-
ible or transfer-
rabie until full titli 
free of all legal 
burdens 
Family Unit Housing, credit, tech-




Law 1551 10/62 a) Public lands 
b) Idle private land6 
on petition 
a) Cultivated land 
b) Rented for at least 
5 years with no 
personal service 
exacted 
Price determined in 
each case; paid in 
cash, 5 years at 
Price determined by 
Institute; paid 10^ 
down, 20 annual quota: 
for land, 5 for equip 
merit, no interest 10̂  
reduction if paid in 
less than 20 years-
public lands may be 
rented by Institute 
Divisible, transfer-
rable only with 
approval of Institute 
Direct exploitation 
Family Unit not less 
than 20 hectares 
Credit and technical 
aid 
Idle lands taxed 
0.75 to 2.5C 
quetzales per 
hectare vith sur-
charge of 20 
60$, 80# in five 
years, rent may not 
exceed crop a 
year 
Honduras 
Decree 2 9/62 a) Public lands 
"b) Communal lands 
c) Private lands 




tined for rural 
private parcella-
tion and not serv-
ing this person 
50 hectares of irri-




Price determined in 
each case; based on 
fiscal declaration 
wnfl recent produc-
tivity to be fully 
paid in cash prior 
to possession 
10 to 20 years, no 
deposit; no Interest 
on public lands, yfr-
on land acquired 
from private owners 
Ownership of 1000 
lempiras business 
capital or 2000 agri-
cultural from receipt, 
failure to cultivate 
2 years in succession 
nnmAfft of land 
or family two years, 
failure to meet 
housing norms, or 
resort to Indirect 
exploitation Implies 
loss of title 
Sot less than 10 nor 
more than 20 hectares 
of Irrigated land 
Credit, technical aid Farms less than 5 
hectares indivis-
ible, payment of 
rent in kind or 
labor forbidden, 
rental must be 
approved by IIíA. 
tax on idle lands 
5$ tax value year 
one, to kO^o 5 years 
Nicaragua 
Decree 797 U/65 a) national lands 
b) Communal lands 




d) Private lands above 








500 hectares of first 
quality land or 
equivalent 
Valued according to 
location and poten-
tial productivity; 
terns not specified 
Those already settled 
on and cultivating 
public or private 
land free title,other-
wise 15-20 years •-1th 
2 years of grace at 
Interest not to ex-
ceed 5 percent per 
year.1 5$ reduction of 
total for each child 
born after receipt of 
land 
Work land personally; 
no renting or tenants; 
build housing, full 
cultivation and at 
least paid qual-
ifies for full title, 
division or transfer 
requires approval, 
inembargable land 
'equipment exempt from 
all public charges 
Family Unit Credit, technical aid Free perse* i.. :.jr-vices ana payvi-snt 
of rent in labor 
prohibited. 
Institute to reg-
ulate renting and 
share-cropping 
Table 10*» Cont'd. 
Panama 
Law 37 9/62 a) Public lands ¡ 






Well exploited Value established by 
Agricultural Survey 
of 1956 or purchase 
value if purchased 
after 9/62. Cash or 
bonds on choice 
of owner 
If annual income below 
600 felboas, free; 
otherwise 20 years at 
- 3$ with 10 years exte 
sion at 6$ if neces-
sary. Institute may 
choose to rent rather 
than sell 
Full cultivation In 5 
years if less than 50 
hectares, if more 
i-than 50 hectares full 
title when fully ex-
ploited, not divisibl 
or transferrable 
without approval 
Family Unit 10 ha.min-
imum colonization in 
50 ha. lots 
Credit, technical aid. 
Paraguay 
Laws 852, 3/63 Land owned or pur-
chased by Institute 
Private lands on which 
a) improvement¿ do no-
represent of 
fiscal value of 
land 
b) stable population 
settled 1 
c) minifundios 1 
i 
Reserve to be estab-
blisbed by law, 
rationally exploit-
ed land (improve-
ments - 50$ fiscal 
value) 
If not occupied,price 
is the average of 
sale price and fiscal 
valuation in past two 
years; if occupied, 
paid average fiscal 
valuation of last 15 
years cash, 10 yearly 
installments 
Free title to heads of 
family with 7 minor 
dependents and to 
those with 30 percent 
disability from Chaco 
War. Otherwise 15 
years; 15$ reduction 
pay cash 
Not embargable or 
transferrable, may 
not be rented for 
10 years beyond full 
payment. MUst work 
land personally; 
build house within 
6 months 
Varies with type of 
exploitation from 
1/2 to 8000 hectares 
Credit, technical aid- Tenancy contracts 
to be written; 
rent not more than 
12 percent fiscal 
value; crop pay-
ment not more than 
20 percent produce; 
owner not more than 
50$ profit in Joint 




Law 1̂ 238 11/62 a) Public land b) Lands of legal per-
sons not directly 
essential 







centrated in one 
zone 
Reserve to be speci-
fied by law for each 
zone, well cultivated 
land 
Valued according to 
productivity 
Hot yet determined Hot yet determined Family Unit Credit, technical aid. 
Legislation to set 
mi n̂ríTTTO salary, 
extend Social Securit; 
Progressive tax on 
land by area; pro-
ceeds for local 
r public works• 
Legislation to reg-




1. This is only a brief summary of scsnk provisions of these laws to indicate the general directions of action toward agrarian reform; it is by no means complete and therefore not a legally accurate 
presentation. : ' 4 
2. In case of grave need, other private land nay be expropriated on burden of proof of public utility in accordance with the relevant disposition of the respective national Constitutions. 
5. Excluding land occupied by buildings, forest reserves, national parks, the shores of rivers and lakes and land immediately bordering urban concentrations; specific exemptions of this nature are 
included in the respective laws. , 
4. The "Family Unit" as used in this table refers to the measure, common to several of these laws but denoted differently,of that quantity of land which is capable of being worked by a settler and 
his family without additional labor, although help may be obtained during the harvest, and which given a rational use of available equipment and techniques will yield a sufficient income to pay off the 
debt of purchase and provide a progressive Improvement in the standard of living of the resident family. 
Sources: Chile: Ley de Reforma Agraria, No. 15020, November 1962 • 
Colombia: Ley de Reforma Agraria, Bo.135> December 1961 -
Costa Rica: Ley de Tierras y Colonización, Ho. 2825, October 1961 
Dominican Republic: Ley de Reforma'Agraria, Bo. 5Ô79, April 1962 
Guatemala: Ley de Transformación Agraria, Ho. 1551» October 1962 , 
Honduras: Ley de Reforma Agraria, Decree 2, September 1962 
Nicaragua: Ley de Reforma Agraria, Ho. 797, April 1963 
Panama: Código Agrario, Law 37, September 1962 
Paraguay: Estatuto Agrario, Law 85̂ , March 1963 
Peru: Bases de la Reforma Agraria, Ho. 1U238, November 1962 
Table 105 




Estimated number of 
families owning less 
than 5 ha. of rural 
land 
Number  of families receiving land 
or title 
Agency of Agrarian Reform 
Beginning of 





1963 Budget 1965 
Estimated 
cost per 
family Major Programs Underway 
Chile Corporación de Reforma 
Agraria 
January 1965 
1962: 300 oooSi' 5 860 7 000 60 m.US$ US$7 500 
Leasing of 53 000 hectares of public lands 
in Magallanes in 937 lots 
Colombia Instituto Nacional Colombiano 
de Reforma Agraria 
January 1962 
1959: 800 000 U 52UV 5 000 
300 a. pesos 
authorized 
inves tment 
of 50 000 ps. 
9 projects approved in I962 will benefit 13 hoc 
families by dividing Wt 000 ha. of idle or 
poorly exploited land and 117 900 ha. by 
irrigation 
Costa Rica Instituto de Tierras y 
Colonl¿ación 
November 1962^ 
1950: 50 000 
6.6 million 
colones 
plans for distribution, of 270 000 ha. to 
20 000 squatter families 
Dominican Republic Instituto Agrario April 1962^ 
I960: 225 000 738 UUO 3 000 
2 million 
pesos 550 pesos 
distribution of 100 000 ha. to about 10 000 
families; possible hydroelectric development 
to irrigate 250 000 acres of new land 
Guatemala Instituto Nacional de 
Transformación Agraria 
October 1962^ 
1950: ito 000 20 000 
Sebol project in northeast, including a road 
network} total cost 12.6 m. quetzales 
Honduras Instituto Racional Agrario September 1962^ 1962: 90 000 30U 2 million lem-
piras 
Planning to be completed in 1965 on project to 
settle 6 000 families in Aguan Valley; pre-
liminary studies for National Cadastral Survey 
Nicaragua Instituto Nacional Agrario April 1965^ ... 
Panamá Comisión de Reforma Agraria March 196J2/ 60 000 1 200 1 - Alanje project to be ccnrpleted in 1963, Tonosi currently 50^ completed and four others 20$ 
completed - total of 110 thousand persons to 
benefit 
Paraguay Instituto de Bienestar Rural ^ s/ March 1963-' 
25 000 11 253 Parana River project to divide h2 000 hectares into 1 UOO plots has begun; project being 
studied to develop 10 000 ha. for 2 500 families 
Peru Instituto de Reforma Agraria 
y Colonización November 1962^ . hzk 1 620 T 000 66 million soles Settlement of 6 U60 families in San Lorenzo, 1963 settlement of 2 000 families in Apurimac by 1967-68 
« I 
Table 105 Cont'd. 
Notes? ....... 
a. See Inter-American Development Bank, Social Progress Trust Fund,Second Annual Report, 1962. 
b. Equals "titles expedited" "by INCORA. See INCORA Informe, p.44.. 
c. Fran October 1961 to October 1962, the Banco Nacional administered the settlement programs. 
d. Refers only to a colonization project in Bataaa; other projects are intended but have not yet .been quantified. 
e. Date of entry into force of law creating the Institute. 
f. A loan of $5 million vas granted by AID in May 196jv 
g. The AJanje project, scheduled for completion in 19̂ 3 will benefit 50.7 thousand persona; a Tonosi settlement, 50 percent completed, will benefit 3-2 thousand persons. The estimate given here includes 
these two projects and assumes' an average of 5 persons per family. 
Sources: 
Chile: Inter-American Development Bank,Social Progress Trust Fund,Second Annual Report, 19̂ 2; United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture, May 27, 19̂ 5; Evaluation of Plan by Committee 
of Nine; Report to the IA-ECOSOC, July 196} (CIES). 
Colombia: INCORA, Informe de Actividades en 1962 and "Boletin Informativo," various issues) Caja de Crédito Agrario,."Carta Agraria," various issues. The estimated, number of families needing land is the 
number of faros of less than five hectares: in 1959 according to the Ministry of Agriculture; the number benefiting in 1962 is the number of "titles expedited" by.IIÍCORA as given on p . o f the Informe. 
The cost par family settled refers to investment, excluding administrative costs, and is estimated by INCORA (p. 42/ Informe) to be divided almost evenly between'the cost of land and of credit. 
Costa Rica: Report to the CIES, July 19̂ 3* The estimated number of families needing additional land corresponds to the number of farms of less thsm five hectares in 1950: see Pan American Union, La Estructura 
Agropecuaria de las Ilaciones Americanas, 1957-
Dorcinican Republic: Social Progress Trust Fund, Second Annual Report, 1962; "Alliance Weekly Newsletter," August 26, 19̂ 3» «.«cording to the preliminary results of the I960 census approximately half of the 
45O 000 tapas consisted of less than one hectare of land. . 1 . . . . 
Guatemala:'Social Progress Trust Fund, Second Annual Report, 1962. According to the census of 1950* there were. l40 000 rural families who did not own land. 
Honduras: Social Progress Trust Fund, Second Annual Report, 1962; Report to the IA-EC0S0C, July 1963 (CIES/32O-II). The number cited as needing additional Land equals the number of farma of less than 5 ha. 
according to the 1962 census. 
Nicaragua: Inter-American Development Bank,Social Progress Trust Fund, Second Annual Report, 19̂ 2. 
Panama: National development plan) report to the CIES, July 1963, (0AS/Ser.H/X5). According to the census of i960, there were 60 000 rural aquatter families. 
Paraguay: Inter-American Development Bank,Social Progress Trust Fund, Second Annual Report, 1963. 
Peru: ¡Inter-American Development Bank,Social Progress Trust Fund, Second Annual Report, 19̂ 3; Report to the IA-EC0S0C (CIES/325). 
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Three dots (...) indicate that data are not available or are not 
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A stroke (/) indicates a crop year or fiscal year—e.g., 195̂ /55. 
A full stop (.) is used to indicate decimals. 
A space is used to distinguish thousands and millions (3 421 520). 
Use of a hyphen (-) between two dates —e.g., 1950-195'+—-normally 
signifies an annual average for the calendar.years involved, including 
the beginning and end years. 
"to" between the years indicates the full period—e.g., "1950 to 195^"— 
means 1950 to 195̂  inclusive. 
Reference to "tons" indicates metric tons; and to "dollars," United 
States dollars, unless otherwise stated. . 
Totals do not necessarily correspond to the sum of their components, 
because of rounding. 
An asterisk (*) is used to indicate figures partially or wholly 
estimated. 




A. OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPAL RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION 
The effort to achieve the economic integration of Central America, which 
is motivated by an understanding of current needs and is based on the deep 
roots of a tradition of community feeling, has been receiving an increasingly 
more favorable reaction from the nations of this area. This is manifested in 
the attidude of the government circles themselves, who, following their basic 
decisions regarding the establishment of a common market, have accelerated the 
efforts to achieve that objective, at the same time expanding its scope; and 
in the attitude of private enterprise and the public, who, by their active 
interest and participation, have added practical content to the process leading 
to progressive economic union. Despite the serious difficulties that charac-
terize the launching of any undertaking of this kind, many signs in recent 
developments point to the possibility of a great success* 
Such a success, of course, depends on several circumstances. It natural-
ly presupposes a consistent course of action, carried forward not only with 
the patient dedication of the participants themselves, but also with the ef-
fective cooperation of the appropriate international organizations and an 
understanding attitude on the part of those industrialized nations that are 
in a better position to cooperate in achieving the goals that have been fixed* 
But in addition the joint development must follow, in conformity with the 
desires of all those concerned, appropriate objective and technical standards. 
This, in turn, presupposes a better knowledge of the situation and of the 
possibilities that arise from the new conditions. 
This study is a result of the desire of the sponsoring agencies of the 
American States to help clarify the problem and of the positive cooperation ; 
of other organizations that are engaged in making studies in other fields of 
economic development of this area. 
The aim has been to throw some light on three fundamental aspects of the 
recent structural developments and to make certain projections regarding the 
immediate future, with the emphasis always on the physiognomy of the combined 
economy of Central America. 1/ These aspects are: i.' exports; ii. total pro-
duction by large sectors, especially industry; and iii. imports and their 
partial replacement under the integration system. 
1. In relation to production consideration was also, given, in so far 
as possible, to the combined economy of the entire Central American Isthmus 
parallel to that of traditional Central America. In the latter concept, the 
area of the five Central American States was included, and in the former, 
the Republic of Panama was added. 
/The immediate 
2 -
The immediate aim of the study is to serve as a basis for more thorough 
up-to-date studies, which would adequately fill the existing lacunae by the 
use of more recent, more detailed statistics obtained on the spot* However, 
it has been considered desirable to publish now the results obtained, even 
though they are incomplete, in order to make them accessible to a greater 
number of persons interested in the economic development of the Isthmus, and 
to stimulate constructive objectives for later studies. 
A few conclusions concerning the studies made are set forth below. 
i. In considering Central American exports and their composition, 
the study concentrated on recent trends and their probable 
development in the next five years in an attempt to ascertain 
whether or not there are possibilities of a renewed "development 
outward" and also to throw a little light on the possibilities 
of financing, with largely internal resources, and accelerated 
internal development. 
It was found, first of all, that—with the exception of the 
intra-area trade, which has tripled in six years, but which 
still represents a small percentage of the total—exports of 
the region have been almost stationary recently. This was due 
chiefly to the unfavorable development in prices for the 
principal products. Although Certain efforts have been made 
to diversify this trade, about three-fourths of Central American 
income from abroad still comes from the export of three com-
modities: coffee, bananas, and cotton. There are, to be sure, 
a few other items in the region*s trade that have not been so 
affected by the unfavorable development in foreign markets and 
that have better prospects for the future, for example lumber, 
meat, sugar, and cacao. However, the relative importance of 
these products is still too small to change decisively the 
general export trend in the near future. 
The projections made in this report 2/  suggest that under 
reasonable assumptions, it may be expected that the stagnation 
in Central American exports outside the integration area will 
not continue, but even so the sales of the most important primary 
2. The projections have been made by an extrapolation of the trends 
observed into the next five years, but other indications of the probable 
future development of the world market for the basic products in question 
have also been taken into account. Although the large number of unreliable 
elements makes it necessary to interpret these results with due caution, it is 
believed that these projections show roughly what is most likely to occur on 
the basis of the assumptions established. 
/products of 
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products of the region to its traditional markets will probably 
only increase slowly—about 2.7 percent a year—in the coming 
five-year period. In particular, the outlook for coffee and 
bananas does not appear very good owing to the saturation of 
the United States market for those products and the present un-
favorable conditions for increasing sales of those products in 
in the more dynamic European market where the preferential 
treatment accorded to the associated African countries by the 
European Economic Community prevails. As for cotton, which is 
a relatively new product in Central America, trade in this 
product has shown a marked potential for growth, but up to now 
only Japan has been an expansive market for it. It should also 
be considered that possible increases in sales of this article 
will depend almost entirely on the Japanese textile industry, 
whose present development is characterized by rather uncertain 
tendencies. 
Under these conditions, a definite impetus to accelerate the 
growth of the Central American export sector could only be 
expected from significant gains in obtaining new markets for 
traditional exports and a pronounced development of new or 
secondary export products, such as lumber, meat, shellfish, 
soluble coffee, nonferrous metallic minerals, etc. 
In any case, the present export outlook makes necessary an 
intensive development within the area and an increasing careful 
diversification of production.̂ / 
ii. The analysis of the structural aspects of the total production, 
of goods and services in the area, especially those referring 
to industrial production, contains more evidence and comments 
regarding the status of diversification, which, to be sure, is 
not very advanced, of these economies and the progress made in 
the process of structural conversion in the last decade. The * 
emphasis is, above all, on the meaning of certain relatively 
rapid changes that have occurred in the ratios of the large 
economic sectors. Such dislocations in the production structure 
are, in general, a natural phenomenon in the course of develop-
roent. The marked increases in the ratio of certain services, and 
nonimportable elements are quite typical of this stage in the 
development of economies, while's slow decline in the ratio of the 
primary sector to total output is the logical result of the 
3, It should be stated before going further that the diversification 
proposed, as will be expressed later does not mean a fragmentation of activi-
ties or the establishment of industries that are not able to achieve a certain 
degree of competitiveness. 
/advance by 
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advance by the more dynamic sectors. However, in this process 
in Central America certain special characteristics are worthy 
of attention. 
First of all, it should be stated that these changes during the 
ten-year period in question were somewhat greater than those 
experienced at the same time by most of the countries in other 
regions in a somewhat similar stage of development. 
This fact could be considered as a sign of a more dynamic diversi-
fication process. However, this characteristic of Central Ameri-
can development has been« to a large measure« attributable to an 
insufficient growth of agriculture in the period under exami-
nation—and more specifically, during the second five-year period— 
in relation to the unfavorable trend in farm exports, whose rather 
unsatisfactory development has been made up only in part by the 
gains in agriculture for domestic consumption* Actually, the 
rate of agricultural growth was even less than that of popu-
lation growth. This endangered the balanced advance of the 
diversification process, since, during industrialization and 
the development of services, agriculture should continue to 
supply these economies with increasing amounts of exchange 
resources or at least ensure the supplying of their increasing 
demand for food and industrial inputs* 
The unfavorable relationship of the sectoral rates of growth * 
also caused a near-stagnation of the total output per capita. 
In fact the rate of agricultural growth dropped from 3 «5 per ' 
cent a year during the first part of the decade to about 1.5 in 
the second half; it should be remembered that in i960 agricultur-
al activities still represented almost 40 per cent of the total 
output of Central America. The development of the manufacturing 
sector, with a rate of growth of 6.5 percent a year, followed a 
rather even course throughout the ten-year period, but did not 
make up for the decline In agricultural expansion. The rate of 
Increase of the tertiary activities in the first five years was 
slightly higher than that of manufacturing industry, but during 
the second five years, it was somewhat lower. In short, the 
total growth of the Central American economies dropped from 
almost 5«5 per cent a year in the first five years to 3.5 in the 
second, with a resulting drop in the rate of increase of per 
capita output from 2.2 per cent a year to 0.3. 
In examining the possible favorable effects of the shift in the 
relative position of the various sectors, the impact of this 
change on the imbalance in sectoral productivity was considered. 
The progressive industrialization and development of certain 
services have tended to decrease the marked differences that 
formerly existed between the productivities of the various 
/segments of 
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segments of the economy, but without remedying these disparities 
substantially or bringing about a notable reduction in disguised 
unemployment, which is concentrated in the primary sector. On 
this point, there are appreciable differences among the various 
countries of the Isthmus. 
The fact that the ten-year transformation of the productive 
structure has not been motivated by powerful internal forces 
tending toward diversification is also seen in the course of 
the structural development within the manufacturing sector. 
Indeed, the composition of industrial output—at least by large 
groups and branches—showed only slow changes, in contrast to 
the more striking changes noted in the composition of the total 
output by broad sectors. In other words, Central American 
industrial development has not been marked by the usual sharp 
differences in the growth of the various manufacturing groups. 
The traditional industries—which in 1953 represented 85 per 
cent, and in 1958, 84 per cent, of Central American manufactur-
ing output—showed in this period an annual growth of 5.6 per 
cent, indicating a greater upward surge than in the more devel-
oped economies and than the corresponding average rates for 
Latin America. This confirms the fact (which is also seen in 
the low levels of per capita production) that there have been 
more or less ample opportunities to replace imports in such 
industries, and indicates that a continued development of these 
activities would probably have permitted the countries of the 
Isthmus to achieve a greater than mere vegetative industrial 
growth for several more years, even without integration. 
However, if operating conditions are taken into account, it 
also appears likely that an attempt to take advantage of such 
margins for replacement would have led fairly soon to increasing 
problems in production costs, which, in turn, would have af-
fected incentives for investment, unless em excessive protection-
ism had been established-
At the same time, the development of a large part of the inter-
mediate-industries—which together represented 9 per cent of 
the sector's output--has been impeded by the rigid restrictions 
of the economies of scale, and so its over-all growth was only 
slightly greater than that of the traditional industries, and 
its rate less than the corresponding average rate for Latin 
America. Moreover, the intermediate industries of the Isthmus 
had a rather narrow spread, not only because they lack certain 
important branches, but also because they consist in several 
categories of complementary activities of the industries them-
selves (packing, mixing, repairs, etc.). Nevertheless, it 
should be stated that several promising initiatives were made 
in the second half of the period under consideration, and the 
integration atmosphere has led to the appearance of several 
projects of major importance. 
/What has 
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What has been achieved in the mechanical industries up to now 
is even less significant, but here, too, there are several 
initiatives that may be valuable, although they consist for the 
most part, in the assembling of certain appliances* 
The integration movement, recently initiated, is expected to 
have an effect on several characteristics of manufacturing 
development. 
First of all, it is to be hoped that, because of its diverse 
stimulating effects, it will accelerate the sector's growth, 
with the first impetus affecting the traditional industries; 
this will probably be superseded within a few years by the 
development of the intermediate industries. 
Consequently, a certain manufacturing diversification is also 
likely to occur, chiefly as a result of the establishment of 
the so-called "integration industries," most of which will be 
intermediate industriesSuch new activities would not only 
benefit from the unification of national markets, which in 
themselves are very small, but also from the pooling of certain 
scarce resources. 
The establishment of these Industries will probably strengthen 
somewhat, at least temporarily, the monopolistic structure of 
the Central American industrial market, although measures have 
been taken to ensure reasonable prices. However, at the same 
time, the expansion of the market for industries for which the 
scale of operation is not so important will make it possible 
to increase internal competition, which in turn will promote 
the gradual rationalization of costs and prices through market 
forces. 
With respect to the problem of costs and prices, it is noted 
that the potential industrial growth of the developing countries 
--viewed from the standpoint of demand—is composed of several 
elements. Although the replacement of imports is at present 
the most important component, it is also important to consider 
the possibilities that may exist in the area of industrial ex-
ports and those derived from the simultaneous expansion of the 
other sectors, including the passible increase in the local 
market for certain products through the progressive redistri-
bution of incomeProgress along these last three linea of 
The integration industries, which because of their nature, require 
production on a larger scale, are being established in the various participat-
ing countries, where they enjoy certain temporary privileges, for the purpose 
of supplying the common market. See footnote 1 on page 1. 
5. In this connection, it is to be noted that higher income groups show 
a greater tendency to consume imported articles. 
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Industrial expansion is substantially affected by excessively 
high industrial costs and prices. That is why a process of 
selection should be applied to manufacturing development, reserv-
ing priorities for industries having a solid foundation and 
promising future and especially for those that cem be competitive 
on the international market. 
In making a selection, priority should also be given to those 
industries that, besides being economically and technically 
feasible, are capable of exercising a greater stimulating ef-
fect through interindustrial linkage forward and backward, that 
is to say, their effect of promoting additional industrialization 
by providing inputs for other industries, or markets for the 
output of intermediate industries. 
Another criterion for selection, which is appropriate to the 
Central American region, is the possibility of increasing em-
ployment, which would mean—in addition to its obvious social 
implications—utilization of the most abundant resource in the 
Isthmus and would help increase the value of that resource by 
practical training. 
Attention is given, finally, to the increase in industrial em-
ployment, and to the structure of employment and capital in the 
various manufacturing activities. It is shown that in this 
area there is scarcely any relationship between the productivity 
of labor by industrial branches and capital intensity. Among • 
the possible reasons for this phenomenon is the prevalence of 
inadequate utilization of the installed capacity, because it 
has not been possible to obtain equipment adapted to the require-
ments of the small Central American national markets, or, in 
other cases, because the shortage of qualified supervisory 
personnel has prevented operation on three, or at least two, 
shifts, or else because the coordination of the operations and 
the maintenance of the machinery have suffered owing to a lack 
of adequate technical skill. It is hoped, owing to certain 
encouraging signs in the integration process begun, that the 
strengthening of intra-area trade and common efforts to put 
production on a technological basis will help solve these 
problems. 
iii. The final part of the study is devoted to the development of 
Central American imports, the volume of which depends chiefly 
on import capacity, and through it, on exports, but the compo-
sition of which bears above all the stamp of the production 
structure, on whose future development the prospects for intra-
area import replacement also depend. 
Central American imports grew very rapidly in the decade follow-
ing the war, during which period the volume tripled. In contrast, 
/beginning in 
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beginning in the middle fifties, imports were marked by a 
declining rate of growth and virtual stagnation as a result 
of the unfavorable export trend, and in three recent years 
(1958» 1959» and I961), temporary declines were recorded. 
The nature of the changes that occurred simultaneously in the 
composition of imports varied throughout that period, and 
there were differences, noted also among the various countries. 
For example, up to 1953» the ratio of intermediate goods to 
imports in the area increased significantly, while the share 
of ordinary consumer goods tended to decline. This letter 
trend was, however, manifested only in the foreign purchases 
of the three Central American countries having the most advanced 
industrial development, since the other nations not only main-
tained, but increased, the ratio of their consumer goods to 
their imports at the cost of other items. In the second half 
of the period, the decrease in the volume of manufactured Imports 
subject to replacement tended to extend throughout the area, 
but even so, the rate of such changes was smaller in the totals. 
At the same time, there occurred another somewhat significant 
increase in the share of raw materials. 
The inter-area trade continued to be relatively light until 
1958, but at that time a definite expansion, at least relatively 
speaking, began (20.5 million dollars in 1958; 32.7 million in . 
1960} and V?.0 in 1962). 
The growth in the intra-area trade and its undeniably promising 
outlook has stimulated the industrialization of Central America, 
which has led, above all, to better utilization of installed 
equipment, and as stated earlier, has also been an incentive to 
the establishment of industries. By bringing with it a replace-
ment of imports from outside the area, this trade has increased 
manufacturing diversification and the strengthening of certain 
traditional industries, especially textiles and foodstuffs. In 
its initial stage, this reciprocal trade has encountered several 
obstacles* These include the tardy accession of two countries; 
the lack of experience in integration of the agencies called on 
to put it into effect; and the inexperience of the entrepreneurs 
in estimating the requirements of the regional market. Neverthe-
less, such difficulties are being gradually overcome, and coordi-
nated development programming and the solution of financing 
problems are the chief tasks now* 
In considering the area as a whole, an important fact is that 
additional "justified" replacements can be made. Actually, from 
the standpoint of the integration area, it can be considered 
that it is a matter of an "overdue" replacement, since it could 




already existed in the area. The elimination of this margin 
presupposes an accelerated growth, chiefly of the manufacturing 
sector, and the rate at which this process advances depende on 
prevailing conditions, particularly the volume of investments 
in the years to come. It has been estimated that an investment 
of at least 150 million dollars is needed to cover this replace-
ment lag, if it is to be done within the next four years. The 
amount would be considerably higher if the total industrial 
capacity now being inadequately utilized were not used. It 
should be noted that this estimate does not include the require-
ments for a parallel expansion of the infrastructure. 
In analyzing the possibilities of the foreign sector, it was not 
possible to go beyond the export projections already described, 
although the logical objective was to establish tentatively the 
future (net) import capacity. Therefore, it is not possible to 
compare the demands of future development with the exchange 
resources available for that purpose. Nevertheless, the rather 
narrow margins of possible income from exports indicate in 
advance that it would be very difficult to purchase the necessary 
equipment abroad unless rather substantial foreign funds were 
available for that purpose. Moreover, the present situation 
also indicates that if foreign loans or additional private 
foreign investment are tied to high amortization rates or 
repatriated profits, development, which has been stimulated 
by an initially favorable atmosphere, could soon be obstructed 
by the ¿ffect of an external imbalance. 
9 
/B. THE PROBLEMS 
B. THE PROBLEMS OF SKALL COUNTRIES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO 
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN  SITUATION 
The circumstances that have, in the past, retarded the economic develop-
ment of  the Central American countries or have tended to channel it in less 
favorable  directions have been most varied. However, if  we consider them in 
rather broad terms, there have been three things, in particular, that have 
somewhat determined the direction of  the other forces  involved. 
1. The underdevelopment of  the production resources of  the area is so marked 
that in many fields  any gain meant overcoming the initial inertia. To illus-
trate this point, it is sufficient  to refer  to the almost complete lack of 
economic and social infrastructure  in vast areas and to the considerable short-
age of  the other external economies that normally accompany a certain degree of 
development, including those related to the human element. This situation has 
prevented access to known or potential natural resources or has impeded their 
profitable  exploitation.6/ Of  course, there is also a causal interaction in 
this situation, since the extremely small economic activity in these areas was 
also one of  the causes of  the slowness in establishing basic installations 
there. Similar problems have also hampered several aspects of  the manufac-
turing development, and, in the last analysis, the formation  of  industrial 
capital and the strengthening of  the other factors  of  production. It should 
be noted that in recent years, there have been certain perceptible indications 
of  improvement in some of  the countries of  the region in this situation known 
as the "vicious circle" of  the early stages of  development. 
2. The institutional conditions prevailing in a large part of  the Isthmus, 
as is widely known, have been largely responsible for  restricting any possible 
progressive initiatives and decreasing their favorable  results'. In that 
connection, mention should be made of  the serious problems involved in the ' 
existing distribution of  wealth, especially in the agricultural sector, the 
precarious educational and health situation, and the system, which is obsolete 
in many respects, of  socioeconomic incentives that prevail in the community. 
3. Finally, reference  should be made to the smallness of  the countries under 
study. This factor—in  combination with the stage of  development of  these 
countries—also appears to have conspired against their more rapid, balanced 
development. Although the role played by the two above-mentioned factors 
6 . A s examples, we could mention the case of  Honduran lumber and that 
of  the potential resources in the nearly inaccessible province of  Peten, which 
constitutes one-third of  the entire territory of  Guatemala. 
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scarcely requires comment today, the third has received little attention.2/ 
Additional research will have to be devoted to this subject in the future, 
since the empirical evidence concerning it is far from satisfactory but 
certain main points can be established as a hypothesis. 
Despite the fact that the problems in connection with economic develop-
ment involved in the small size of certain countries have not yet been studied 
very carefully, certain recent events have pointed up their importance. It is 
reflected especially in the progressive establishment of regional markets, 
which can be interpreted as an attempt to approach thé problem, although at 
times it has also been the result of political considerations. 
In this analysis, it appears sufficient to sum up the conditions consider-
ed to be the most frequent disadvantages of those nations that may be classi-
fied as "small." It should be noted that ordinarily such a classification is 
based on the number of inhabitants and, of course, always in a very relative 
sense. It should also be emphasized that the effects of these disadvantages 
could be calculated accurately only if all the other circumstances were practi-
cally the same in relation to the aspect being considered. 
Outstanding among the more general disadvantages of the small countries 
is the fact that their small size does not permit them to utilize properly the 
economies of scale, which are essential or very beneficial to several indus-
tries, especially the intermediate and mechanical industries. For this and 
other reasons, related principally to less variety, on the average, in natural 
resources, their production structure tends to reveal less diversification 
than that of the bdg nations, and their dependence on foreign trade is often 
greater.8/ Actually—according to certain statistical evidence—not only is 
their ratio of foreign trade to output usually higher, but also the 
7. Efforts have been started, however, to analyze the problem seriously. 
In addition to works by international organizations, see, for example Economic 
Consequences of Size of Nations (proceedings of a Conference held by the 
International Economic Association, 1957, edited by E.A.Q. Robinson, New York, 
I960). 
8. The greater potential for diversification of the large countries not 
only helps reduce their vulnerability to external factors, but also leads to 
several domestic advantages. Among the latter should be mentioned the broad 
play of external economies that usually results from a highly integrated in-
dustrial system. The importance of the external economies that can be derived 
from their specialization is sometimes stressed as comparable advantages in 
the situation of the small countries. However, the transformation of a system 
having but one -facet into a highly technological one is a very difficult task 
and even if it succeeds, it is doubtful that the results will in themselves be 
comparable to those of the more or less integrated production machinery. As a 
matter of fact, the kind of specialization that is carried out by the enter-
prises of a large, diversified economy, spontaneously and chiefly as an inter-
nal division of labor appears, in principle to be more conducive to optimum 
/concentration of 
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concentration of exports among the countries of destination.Parallel to this 
situation, and combined with the fact that the share of their principal pro-
ducts in world trade is often not very high, their negotiating power also tends 
to be weaker. 
Moreover, the burden of certain administrative expenses is often heavier 
for the small countries. Especially, the uneconomic use of their resources, 
for reasons of security or prestige, can be a heavier burden. At the same 
time, the need to train and maintain an outstanding intellectual group in a 
greater variety of specializations, familiar with world progress—may exceed 
their financial possibilities. 
Although disadvantages of this kind tend to be linked with the situation 
of the small countries that are more or less developed, the problems that 
arise from this fact are much more difficult for those countries that are 
both small and underdeveloped. Their principal export products, which consti-
tute a significant part of their income, are, for the most part, primary pro-
ducts subject to considerable fluctuations on the world markets. There is 
little likelihood that a great variety of natural resources that are easy to 
exploit and market will be found in their territory, which is usually also 
very small. At the same time, they have a narrower field of selection of 
personnel for more complicated tasks, and frequently their capital is insuf-
ficient for an undertaking of broader scope. This being the casé, a serious 
error in a project requiring large amounts of scarce resources—for example, 
a mistake in locating a large hydroelectric plant—can be an irreparable 
error, because it will probably be a long time before the necessary means to 
carry out a better planned project are available. 
$1 (Cont.) 
solutions than the "specialization" of a small country, which concept refers 
rather to the principal course followed by its entire economy, which is 
adopted in a somewhat compulsory manner and primarily at the precarious 
level of an international division of labor, while preserving perhaps a high 
degree of vertical integration at the enterprise level. In any case, the 
prosperity of such an economy depends largely on the skill of the entrepre-
neurial group and the government in selecting the specialized activities and 
continued success presupposes, in addition, a greater degree of flexibility 
in order to adjust the direction of the national specialization to the chang-
ing conditions of foreign markets. 
9. These differences in the importance and direction of foreign trade 
appear, of course, only in a comparison of countries at a similar stage of 
development. For the statistics mentioned, see S. Kuznets in Robinson op. 
cit., pp. 19-2-3, and a Summary of the Discussion, id., pp. 352-352. In the 
final section of this study, some of the aspects of Central American exports 
will be described. 
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The case of Latin America illustrates the disadvantageous situation of 
the small countries in an environment of underdevelopment. Whereas in the 
economically more advanced areas of Europe, certain small nations have over-
come the abovementioned obstacles and have achieved a considerable degree of 
development, a marked relationship between size and stage of development 
prevails in Latin America.10/ 
As a matter of fact, the three most economically advanced countries in 
Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, are also the largest in popu-
lation and area,11/ whereas the nations having the lowest per capita income 
are almost always among the smallest in population. And although this coinci-
dence is partly due to other factors that are difficult to measure, such as 
climate, geographic location and configuration, and various ethnic character-
istics, the circumstances that surround Latin American development leave 
little doubt regarding the existence of a causal relationship between na-
tional size and economic potential. 
In Considering the problem of size with respect to Latin America, approach-
ing it from the standpoint of markets, it should be remembered that income 
levels and the resulting purchasing power of this region are substantially 
lower than in the industrialized areas. In Western Europe, the per capita 
output is on an average three and one-half times higher than in Latin America, 
and in the combined industrialized areas of the world, including the United 
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, it is between four and 
10. In speaking of Europe, the examples of Switzerland and Denmark are 
usually mentioned. However, it should be borne in mind that the economic . 
power of these nations and of others in a similar situation -and their solid 
relations with foreign markets had been formed before World War I, that is, 
in a period when national boundaries were not such an important barrier in 
economic events—particularly with respect to the mobility of factors, the 
monetary system, taxation, and tariff protection—as has been the case in 
more recent years. However, examples that are more or less comparable, 
though less striking, are also found in other regions. In such countries, 
among which New Zealand and Israel are outstanding, it has been a matter of 
colonization by heavy immigration from the industrialized areas of Europe, 
accompanied by considerable amounts of capital, foreign exchange, skills and 
entrepreneurial experience, at times supplemented by preferential access to 
large protected markets. 
11. These countries also belonged to the small group of countries whose 
rate of manufacturing growth between 1957 and 19&1 exceeded that of 1950-1957. 
See OAS-ECLA,, Economic and Social Study of Latin America, Graph VI-1. 
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five times higher.12/ Thus, in this region the market absorption capacity of 
a country with 12 or 15 million inhabitants can be the same as, or less than, 
that of nations having three, four, or five million inhabitants in the indus-
trialized parts of the world. Suffice it to say that, despite the equality 
in size of the total market, the structure would be very different. 
With respect to Central America in particular, we should not lose sight 
of the fact that the population of the countries in this region, whèn consider-
ed separately, ranges between only one and four million inhabitants, an average 
of slightly more than two million, of which 44 per cent are under 15 years of 
age, and that their per capita income is scarcely 40 per cent of that of the 
five relatively more prosperous Nations of Latin America. Therefore, their 
national markets cannot be classified simply as "small," but rather as belong-
ing, even within this category of size, to the extreme cases. In short, no 
matter how minor the influence of national size on development may be after a 
certain minimum  has been reached, it appears reasonable to consider that, in 
such definite cases, especially with respect to the inadequacy of the market 
and of the developed resources that can be combined within it—size has been a 
rather decisive element in the past economic development. 
This is also corroborated by the experience in the past few years since 
the launching of the first plans and government decisions on economic integra-
tion, since in this brief period, there has been a very promising current of 
intra-area trade and, at the same time, the production of several industries 
has registered an accelerated growth. 
However, in noting such a favorable phenomenon, it should also be remember-
ed that, in the Central American countries,- economic union implies only the 
possibility of terminating an extreme situation, but the market of the integra-
ted area, with its 11 million inhabitants today and its 14 million in 1970 13/ 
12. The abovementioned amounts were estimated on the basic of figures 
given by P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan. See his "International Aid for Underveloped 
Countries" in Review of Economics and Statistics, May I96I. In this work, 
figures are given on the per capita output, in dollars, for several countries 
and areas of the world. The computations are made in two ways, with and without 
adjustment to impute the greater domestic purchasing power of currency in cer-
tain parts of the world. These adjustments do not make the orijginal relation-
ship between the output levels of Latin America and those of Europe vary sign-
ificantly, but with respect to certain other industrialized areas of the world, 
there are differences of some importance. Thus, in comparing the Latin American 
per capita output with that of the highly developed regions as a whole, a ratio 
of approximately 1:5 was obtained without adjustment, and about 1:4, with an 
adjustment. 
13. If Panama is included, it would have 12 million inhabitants now, and 
something over 15 million by 1970. 
/will not become 
will not become similar to that of a large country. In other words, the inte-
grated group will continue to have the characteristics of the rather small 
economies, but will be significantly improved over the past, with levels 
comparable to those of the medium-type economy of Latin American countries.1^/ 
1Í.In the symposium already cited (See Robinson, op. cit., page 3^9 
et seq.), it was suggested that the most "appropriate" dividing lines between 
large countries and small countries was about 15 million inhabitants. It 
should be pointed out that this statement developed principally from an 
analysis of the small economically advanced countries, and no attempt was 
made to establish a different dividing line for the less advanced countries. 
The statistics given by Kuznets to demonstrate the existence of a relationship 
between the size of a country and certain aspects of foreign trade were ob-
tained by a division at about 10 million inhabitants. In this study, the 
criterion of a population of 15 million was applied as the basis for the 
classification by size in the computations made for Table 1-5» but distinctions 





STRUCTURE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS 
OF CENTRAL AMERICAN EXPORTS 
Central America's role in the world economy is still largely the tradi-
tional one of an underdeveloped area located outside of the temperate zone, 
that is, as supplier of only two or three tropical agricultural commodities to 
the industrialized countries of Europe, and the United States. For a long time 
this trade pattern had provided a. valuable stimulus to the region's development. 
In recent years, however, the relative saturation of the traditional markets 
for tropical products and the unfavorable trend of prices paid for them have 
been responsible for a virtual stagnation of Central American export earnings; 
and while some effort has been maide to diversify, excessive dependence on a 
small number of primary products is likely to remain a serious obstacle to the 
expansion of exports in the coming years. 
These points are illustrated in the present chapter, which seeks to ana-
lyze the structure and trend of Central American exports since 1955i and to 
examine the prospects for the area's major primary product exports in the next 
five years. 
A. PATTERN AND DEVELOPMENT OF EXPORTS 
Outside of intra-regional trade, which though it has tripled still remains 
a small percentage of the total, Central American exports virtually stagnated 
between 1955 and 1961. This was largely a reflection of the unfavorable evolu-
tion of prices for two of the area's key exports, coffee and bananas. The sharp 
export rise experienced in 1962 was solely the result of a large increase in 
cotton exports, which boosted the export receipts of El Salvador and Nicaragua 
appreciably, but had little or no impact on the rest of the area. Throughout 
the period, despite the recent appearance of some new export lines, such as 
meat, shrimp and soluble coffee, Central America continued to derive the bulk 
of its export income from coffee, bananas and cotton. Hie destination of the 
coffee and cotton exports underwent some significant shifts, which involved a 
substantial increase in West Germany's coffee purchases and the emergence of 
Japan as a major importer of cotton from the area. On balance, however, these 
shifts did not add up to a marked diversification of the market structure for 
either product, and Central American exports taken as.a whole continued to . 
depend almost exclusively on the United States and Western Europe for their 
markets. 
Currently, the total export trade of the five Central American countries 
amounts to approximately &500 million. The two largest exporters are El Salvador 
and Guatemala, which each ship over $100 million of goods annually, while the 
value of exports from the three remaining countries, Costa Rica, Honduras and 
Nicaragua, amounts to some $80 million each (see Table 1). Coffee, which rep-
resented nearly 60 percent of all exports from the area in 1955» now accounts 
for less than half of the total, and the share of bananas has also declined 
slightly; however, these two products, together with cotton, continue to make 
/Table 
Table 1 
CENTRAL AMERICAN EXPORTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1955-62 
(in millions of dollars) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962* 
Costa Rica 80„9 67.5 83.4 91.9 76.7 85.8 84.2 85.7 
El Salvador 106.9 112.7 138.5 116.0 113.4 1Í6.8 119.1 136.4 
Guatemala 107.1 123.3 115.9 107.2 107.5 119.4 115.1 111.6 
Honduras 51.5 73.3 64.9 69.8 68.7 63.1 73.0 78.0 
Nicaragua 71 9 57.8 64.3 63.8 65.0 56.0 60.6 82.5 
Total 4l8 3 434.6 467.0 448.7 431.3 441.1 452.0 494.2 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, May 1963» 
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up about three-fourths  of  Central America's exports (see Table 2). A few 
other basic commodities, namely wood, meat, sugar and cocoa, together now 
account for  about 8 percent of  the total, as against 2 to k percent in 1955-57. 
The remaining 18 to 20 percent consists primarily of  the growing number of 
agricultural and manufactured  products entering Central American intra-regional 
trade. In trade with the outside world, on the other hand, there are sti l l 
few  other exports, and their value, though rising, is sti l l small. At present, 
their list would include among other things, a variety of  metals from  Honduras 
atld Nicaragua, soluble coffee  from  El Salvador and Guatemala and, since I960, 
shtimp from  El Salvador. 
As mentioned above, the continued prodominance of  coffee  and bananas in 
the Central American export structure was the major factor  behind the lacklus-
ter performance  in 1955-62. During this period, the value of  exports of  both 
dropped by 15 percent (see Table 3) • I n both cases, the declines reflected 
primarily the fall  of  prices on the world market. In the case of  coffee,  the 
drop in the unit value was so severe that the loss in earnings could not be 
offset  even with sizeable increases in the volume exported. The slow growth 
of  demand for  Central American bananas restricted the scope for  compensatory 
volume increases. With cotton, on the other hand, a drastic expansion of  the 
volume exported effectively  made up in the 1950*s for  unfavorable  price trends. 
By 1962, moreover, cotton prices were rising and the value of  exports was 
nearly double what it had been in 1955» As for  the less significant  basic pro-
duct exports from  Central America, excepting cocoa, they benefited  both from 
stable or rising prices and expanding volumes. Wood exports rose only moder-
ately, but meat .exports, which had hardly existed until 1959» almost doubled 
in the next two years. Central American sugar exports increased sharply after 
1959, as a result of  the windfall  increase in United States purchases following 
the exclusion of  Cuban sugar from  that market., 
Throughout the period under review, the heavy specialization of  Central 
America in the export of  a few  primary commodities has been paralleled by the 
concentration of  its markets (see Table k). The United States, besides pro-
viding the largest outlet for  Central America's coffee,  takes nearly all of  its 
banana, meat and sugar exports, as well as the greater part of  its cocoa. The 
fall  of  coffee  prices led to a substantial decline in the dollar value of  this 
trade in 1958-59, but in 1961 over one-half  of  all Central American exports 
sti l l went to the United States and Canada (the latter importing small amounts 
of  coffee  and bananas), Western Europe, which bought increasing amounts of 
coffee—and  some cotton—from  Central America, maintained its share of  the 
area's total export trade at about 30 percent throughout—with West Germany 
now accounting for  the bulk of  Central America's European coffee  trade and one-
third of  its total coffee  exports, against only 17 percent in 1955. On the 
other hand, intra-regional exports, though they rose rapidly in this period, 
sti l l represented less than 10 percent of  the total in 1961, and trade with 
the rest of  Latin America and the Caribbean are countries was almost non-
existent. Japan's share, which country came to supplant Western Europe as 
Central America's major cotton importer, rose to 9 percent of  the total in 
1961, solely because of  trade in this one commodity. 
/Table 
Table 2 
COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION OF CENTRAL AMERICAN EXPORTS, 1955-62 
1955 1956 1957 
Coffee 243.4 250.0 273.2 
Bananas 74. 9 84.7 80.5 
Cotton kk.7 46.5 • k2.1 
Wood 9.6 8.9 11.7 
Meat — - .1 .1 
Sugar 1.8 .6 2.0 
Cocoa 6.3 3.2 4.3 
Total major products 380.7 394.0 1̂3.9 
Other 37-6 40.6 53.1 
Total exports 4ÍS.3 434.6 467.0 
Coffee 58 58 59 
Bananas 18 19 17 
Cotton 11 11 9 
Wood 2 2 3 
Meat — - — 
Sugar 
Cocoa 2 1 J. 
Total major products 91 91 89 
Other 11 
Total exports 100 100 100 
225L 1959 I960 
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Less than $50 thousand, or .5 percent. 
a. Does not include small amounts exported from El Salvador and Nicaragua. 
b. Does not include small amounts exported from Costa Rica. 
c« Exports from Guatemala estimated on the basis of U.S. and Central American import data. 
d. Estimated on the basis of U.S. imports. 
e. Estimated on the basis of Costa Rican exports. 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. May 1963, and: Costa Rica, 
Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, Comercio Exterior. 1955-61. El Salvador, Dirección General de 
Estadística y Censos, Anuario Estadístico. 1955-61. Guatemala, Dirección General de Estadística, Anuario 
de Comercio Exterior, 
1955-60 and Banco Central de Guatemala, Boletín Estadístico, January—February I963. 
Honduras, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, Comercio Exterior. 1955-61. Nicaragua, Recaudación 
General de Aduanas, Hemoria, 1955-61. 
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Table 3 
VALUE, VOLUME AND UNIT VALUE OF CENTRAL AMERICA'S MAJOR PRIMARY PRODUCT EXPORTS, 
1955-62 
( I n d i c e s 1955=100) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 ! 1961 1962* 
Value I 
Co f fee 100 10 3 .1.12 ' 102 «8 95 87 
Bananas 100 113 107 103 88 92 94 85 
Cotton 100 104 94 115 134 83 114 189 
Wood . 100 93 122 106 130 133 119 
Meat - 100 165 175 
Sugar 100 33 111 161 211 372 467 667 
Cocoa 100 51 68 102 125 100 83 79 
Volumei 
Co f fee 100 93 109 122 126 133 132 147 
Bananas 100 110 116 113 99 114 113 101 
Cotton 100 115 109 136 190 106 141 238 
Wood—^ 100 91 117 99 124 128 117 
Meat - 100 170 176 
Sugar 100 28 89 136 209 353 395 546 
Cocoa 100 68 75 82 121 123 108 88 
Unit va lue» 
Cof fee 100 110 103 83 69 71 66 58 
Bananas 100 103 93 91 89 81 8.4 85 
Cotton 100 90 87 ek 71 78 80 81 
Hood-. 100 102 117 118 116 118 119 
Meat - 100 97 100 
Sugar 100 120 121 117 100 105 117 119 
Cocoa 100 77 90 123 104 82 77 84 
a. For neat, 1959 was used as base yaar. Exports ware insignifioant in aarly yaars. 
b. For wood, tha voluaa and unit valua indioes axoluda Nioaraguan exports. 
Souroas i For values, Tabla 2| for volumes, FAO Trad a Yearbooks and yon t My Bulletin of 
Agricultural Eoonoaios and Statistics. Also, national souroas listad in Table 2. 
/Table 
Table 4 
CENTRAL AMERICAN EXPORTS BY DESTINATION, 1955-62 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961* 1962* 
(i n millions of dollars) 
Total exports 418.3 434.6 467.0 448.7 431.3 441.1 452.0 494.2 
Central America 13.1 14.7 17.7 21.3 28.7 30.9 37.0 47.3 
Total exports outside 
of Central America 405.2 419.9 449.3 427.4 402.6 410.2 415.0 446.9 
United States and Canada 260.9 252.7 260.1 239-7 207.8 218.8 229.6 
Western Europe 113.8 134.4 158.5 146.8 141.8 148.6 129.0 
Japan 16.1 19.4 10.8 25.0 37-6 "27.9 41.4 
Other 14.4 13.4 19-9 15.9 15.4 14.9 15.0 
(in percent of total exports) 
Central America 3.1 3.4 3.8 4.7 6.7 7.0 8.2 9.6 
United States and Canada 62.4 58.1 55.7 53.̂  48.2 49.6 50.8 
Western Europp 27.2 30.9 33-9 32.7 32.9 33.7 28.5 
Japan 3.8 k.5 2.3 5.6 8.7 6.3 9.2 
Other 3.5 3.1 4.3 3.6 3-5 3.** 3.3 
Sources: For total exports, International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
For exports by destination, United Nations, Direction of International Trade. For Guatemala 
the banana customs valuation adjustment, which is given only for total exports, has been 
prorated to the U.S. and Western Europe components. For Nicaragua, gold exports have been 
subtracted from both regional and total export figures. The 1962 intra-regional trade figure 
is an estimate from the Secretariat for Economic Integration of Cèntral America (Carta 
Informativa, Anexo Estadístico No. 11). 
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A more detailed review of  the evolution of  trade and market distribution 
of  Central America's principal primary product exports in 1955-62 is given in 
the commodity analyses that follow. 
1. Coffee 
Coffee  is sti l l by far  the most important source of  export earnings for 
Central America. Its share of  the total, however, has been declining fairly 
steadily in recent years, and now represents less than half  of  all export 
receipts (see Table 5)« In absolute terms, the annual value of  Central 
American coffee  exports has ranged between $200 and $275 million in the period 
covèred by this study (see Table 6). Its abrupt fluctuations  had been one of 
the rtiajor factors  in the year-to-year changes in total export receipts until 
about I960, but,had relatively less impact in the last two or three years, as 
other export products have risen in importance. 
At present, coffee  brings about $200 million to the region. It is a 
major export product for  each of  the five  Central American countries. The 
btllk of  the area's coffee  exports, hov/ever, comes from  three major suppliers, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala, where coffee  earnings account for 
roughly half  of  total exports and range between $50 and $70 million. In 
Honduras and Nicaragua, on the other hand, coffee  brings in only $10 to $15 
million and, while it st i l l accounts for  15 to 20 percent of  total export 
receipts, it is topped in one country by bananas and in the other by cotton 
as a source of  foreign  exchange. 
During the 1955-62 period, the violent price fluctuations  that character-
ized the world coffee  market naturally had a strong impact on.Central America. 
After  remaining high in 1955-57, the export unit value of  Central American 
coffee  fell  by approximately one-third between 1957 and 1959» Coffee  export 
receipts dropped sharply as a result. The decline, however, was mostly 
confined  to El Salvador and Nicaragua, where export volumes remained relatively 
unchanged. In the other three countries, where coffee  production had been 
much expanded in response to the price increases of  the early 1950's, large 
increases in the volume of  coffee  exported permitted the maintenance of 
receipts at a relatively steady level (see again Table 6). Between 1955 and 
1962, the value of  Central American coffeee  exports dropped by 15 percent but 
the volume rose nearly 50 percent, chiefly  as a result of  increased shipments 
from  Costa Rica and Guatemala. Costa Rica, in fact,  increased its dependence 
on coffee  as a source of  foreign  exchange in recent years, in contrast to the 
rest of  Central America, where as mentioned above, the role of  coffee  has 
steadily diminished. In El Salvador, in particular, whose dependence on 
coffee  was virtually complete in 1955, the share of  coffee  in total export 
receipts was reduced to less than 50 percent by 1962 (see again Table 5). 
Central America exports almost all its coffee  to the United States and 
Western Europe. While the United States remains the bigger of  the two 
markets, Europe now stands a close second. Since 1955, Western Europe's 
share in Central American coffee  exports has, in fact,  risen sharply (see 
/Table 5) 
Table 5 
SHARE OF COFFEE  IN CENTRAL AMERICAN EXPORTS RECEIPTS, 1955-62 
(ill percent) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962* 
Central America 58 58 59 55 50 53 47 42 
Costa Rica 46 50 49 55 52 53 53 55 
El Salvador 86 78 79 72 63 66 59 47 
Guatemala 70 75 72 73 71 66 60 61 
Honduras 21 19 19 16 17 18 13 15 
Nicaragua 39 40 44 38 21 34 29 19 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
Table 
CENTRAL AMERICAN COFFEE EXPORTS - TOTAL AND BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 
1 9 5 5 - 1 9 6 2 
• 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962* 
( i n m i l l i o n s o f  d o l l a r s ) 
Value 
T o t a l C e n t r a l America 2 4 5 . 4 2 5 0 . 0 2 7 3 . 2 2 4 7 . 3 2 1 3 . 5 2 3 1 . 7 2 1 0 . 7 2 0 6 . 2 
C o s t a R i c a 3 7 . 4 3 3 . 8 4 0 . 6 5 0 . 6 4 0 . 1 - 4 5 . 4 4 4 . 9 4 6 . 8 
El S a l v a d o r 9 1 . 5 8 7 . 4 1 0 9 . 8 8 4 . 1 7 1 . 3 7 6 . 7 7 0 . 2 6 4 . 2 
Guatemala 7 5 . 5 9 1 . 9 8 2 . 3 7 7 . 5 7 6 . 3 7 8 . 6 6 9 . 2 6 8 . 3 
Honduras 1 1 . 1 1 3 . 7 1 2 . 0 1 0 . 9 1 1 . 9 1 1 . 8 9 . 0 1 1 . 5 
N i c a r a g u a 2 7 . 9 2 3 . 2 2 8 . 5 2 4 . 2 1 3 . 9 - 1 9 . 2 1 7 . 4 1 5 . 4 
Volume ( i n th ousand metr i c t o n s ) 
T o t a l C e n t r a l America 1 9 0 . 3 1 7 7 . 5 2 0 7 . 0 2 3 2 . 4 2 4 0 . 6 2 5 3 . 4 2 5 1 . 1 2 7 8 . 8 
C o s t a Rica 2 8 . 3 2 2 . 8 2 9 . 5 4 6 . 2 4 3 . 3 4 6 . 7 5 2 . 0 6 5 . 1 
E l S a l v a d q r 7 1 . 8 6 4 . 5 3 3 . 2 8 0 . 5 8 3 . 0 8 9 . 5 8 6 . 6 9 7 . 5 
Guatemala 5 8 . 4 6 1 . 4 6 1 . 8 7 1 . 5 8 2 . 7 7 9 . 9 7 9 . 0 8 0 . 3 
Honduras 8 . 9 1 1 . 9 ' 1 0 . 4 1 1 . 4 1 5 . 3 1 5 . 5 1 2 . 6 1 4 . 5 
N i c a r a g u a 2 2 . 8 . 1 6 . 9 2 2 . 0 2 2 . 9 1 6 . 3 2 1 . 3 2 0 . 9 2 1 . 4 
Uni t v a l u e ( i n d o l l a r s p< r t o n ) 
T o t a l C e n t r a l America 1 279 1 408 1 320 1 064 887 914 839 740 
SourcesFor value figures: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
For voluBe figures» FAO, Trade Yearbooks and Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics. 
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Table 7). In both markets, Central America supplies an equally small share 
of the total demand for green coffee—approximately 10 percent. In 1955-61, 
however, there was a great deal of difference in the behavior of these two 
markets. In absolute terms, the volume of United States coffee imports from 
Central America, though it fluctuated widely from year to year, showed little 
tendency to expand. Central America merely continued to supply a fairly 
steady share of a total demand that was rising very slowly. In the European 
market, on the other hand, not only did total demand grow very rapidly but 
Central America also managed to secure some improvement in its rather marginal 
position (see Table 8). In practice, what happened is that Western Europe was 
able to absorb practically all of'the increment in Central America's coffee 
output since 1955» 
Within the European market, Central American coffee exports are virtually 
limited to the European Economic Community (EEC), and within the EEC they have 
been highly concentrated in one major country, West Germany. The volume of 
Central American coffee exports to West Germany increased by nearly 150 per-
cent between 1955 and 1961, while the small sales made to other EEC countries 
showed almost no change (see Table 9). West Germany is in fact the only 
European country where Central American coffee exports are large in absolute 
terms and have captured a substantial share of the total market—38 percent 
in 1961. Central American coffee holds a fairly important place—about 20 
percent of the market—in a few other countries, such as Austria and 
Switzerland, but the small size of the over-all market in these countries 
makes the actual export figures rather marginal (see Table 10). This under-
lines the great importance of the West German market for Central American 
coffee producers—the only market, in fact, that can be said to have been a 
dynamic factor in the evolution of Central American coffee exports in the 
past seven or eight years. 
2. Bananas 
Bananas, traditionally the second largest source of export earnings for 
Central America, declined gradually in importance during the 1955-62 period 
and in 1962 were surpassed by cotton exports. As a proportion of total export 
receipts in Central America,  bananaB represented 18 percent in 1955 and 19 
perfcent in 1956, declining in subsequent years to 16 percent in 1961 and, 
•cfcording to a partial estimate, to 13 percent in 1962 (see Table 11). In 
Honduras, which is now the largest producer, bananas have accounted for 
roughly one-half of total exports throughout the period. On the other hand, 
the relative share of bananas dropped considerably in Costa Bica, which now 
ranks as the second Central American exporter of the product. In value terms, 
banana exports have fluctuated within a range of $64 to $85 million around 
the average value for the eight year period of $73 million. In I96I bananas 
brought in $71 million in export receipts; preliminary figures indicate $64 
million in 1962 (see Table 12). 
The loss in export receipts in 1962, compared with 1961, is attributable 
to a sharp drop in volume of bananas exported, which itself was the result of 
/Table 7 
Table 7 
CENTRAL AMERICAN COFFEE EXPORTS BY DESTINATION, 1955-61 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 
(in thousand metric tons) 
United States 133.8 111.3 125.9 137.8 I28.4 124.3 130.0 
Western Europe 5̂ .4 65.4 78.0 91.9 109.5 121.9 111.7 
Other 2.0 0.8 2.6 2.7 , 3-1 
Total 190.2 177.5 207.0 232.4 240.6 249.5 244.8 
(in perc »t) -
United States 70.3 62.3 - 60.9 59-3 53.3 49.4 53.1 
Western Europe 28.6 36.6 38.1 39-5 45.4 48.7 45.6 
Other 1.1 1.1 - 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.9 1.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 UOO.O 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: 1955-59: FAO, La Economia Mundial del Café, 1961. For 1960-61s Pan American 
Coffee Bureau, Annual Coffee Statistics» Hie data from the Pan American Coffee Bureau 
differ slightly from that given by the FAO, hence the slight difference between the I960 
and 1961 export volume figures given in this table and those appearing in Table 6. 
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Table 8 
POSITION OF CENTRAL AMERICAN COFFEE IN MAJOR MARKETS, 1955-61 
(import volumes in thousand metric tons) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 
United States market 
Total coffee imports 1 179 1 275 1 252 1 210 1 390 1 324 1 348 
Imports from Central Americâ  111 126 138 128 124 130 
Central American percentage 
share 11.4 8.9 10.1 11.4 9.2 9A 9.6 
Western European market 
Total imports 699 261 121 820 920 1 071 
Imports from Central America 5k 65 79 92 110 122 112 
Central American percentage 
share 7.8 8.6 10.2 11.2 11.9 12.5. 10.4 
Sources: 1955-59: FAO, La Economia Mundial del Café, 1961. For 1960-61: Pan American 
Coffee Bureau, Annual Coffee Statistics. 
/Table 9 
Table 9 
CENTRAL AMERICA!) COFFEE EXPORTS TO WESTERN EUROPE BY COUNTRY OF DESTIItATIOH, 1955-61 
(in thousand metric tona) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 
West Germany 32.4 41.8 53.3 68.8 76.9 85.6 77.7 
Netherlands 9.9 11.4 9.8 8.2 10.0 " 11.6 12.1 
Belgium-Luxembourg 4.7 3.0 5.0 3.8 5.2 7.1 6.0 
Italy 2.5 3.1 4.5 4.6 7-9 6.2 4.3 
France 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.5 1.6 
Total EEC 49.7 . 59.8 73.0 85.5 99.9 110.9 101.8 
Other countries 4/7 5^6 5.8 6.4 9.6 11.0 9.9 
Total Western Europe 54.4 65.4 78.8 91.9 109.5 121.9 111.7 
H sources i For 1955-59» FAO. U Economía Mundial del Caf<. 1961. For 1960-61, Pan American 
° Bureau, Annual Coffee Statistic». • 
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Table 10 
SHARE OF CENTRAL AMERICAN COFFEE IN IMPORTS OF MAJOR EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES IN 1961 





,(in thousand metric tons) (in percent) 
West Germany 212 80 38 
France 207 1 — 
Italy 105 5 if 
Sweden 78 6 8 
Netherlands 69 5 8 
Belgium-Luxembourg 62 ** 7 
United Kingdom 59 1 l 
Denmark kk . — l 
Finland 38 1 3 • 
Switzerland 32 7 20 ' 
Norway 27 . — 1 
Austria 13 3 19 
Notei The figures in thiB table, based on European import data, differ 
slightly from the figures in Table 9, which are based on Central American 
export data* 
— Less than 500 metric tons, or .5 gercent. 
Source: Pan American Coffee Bureau, Annual Coffee Statistics ; 
/Table 
Table 
SHARE OF BAHAMAS  IR CENTRAL AMERICAN EXPORT RECEIPTS, 1955-62 
(in percent) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 , 1959 1960 1961 • 1962 * 
Central America 18 19 17 17 15 16 16 13 
Costa Rica 41 38 39 29 25 24 25 25 
El Salvador — - - — — — — — 
Guatemala 16 12 13 12 14 17 14 8 
Honduras 47 60 52 54 47 45 46 44 
Nicaragua 1 — — — — 3 
— Less than .5 percent. 
Sourcest See Table 2. 
Table 2 
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— Less than USS50 thousand, or 50 aetric tons, 
a. Excluding El Salvador and Nicaragua, 
Souroes: Vain* figuras1 International Monetary Pond, International Pinaaoial Statistics, for Costa Rica, 
Guatemala and Honduras. For 1955-61, the other value and all voluae figures were obtained fro» the national 
souroes listed in fable IX. For 1962, the voluae of banana exports fro* Cesta Rica, Guatemala and Honduras 
was estimated on the basis of the indices-giv^n in International Financial Statistics. 
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adverse weather conditions in Guatemala. As a consequence of recurring blow-
downs and the persistence of Panama disease, the volume of exports has fluc-
tuated widely from year to year, but in the period under review there has 
been a tendency to increase. In most years the volume has been maintained 
well above the 1955 level and has contributed toward slowing the decline in 
export receipts, which may be traced instead to falling export prices. The 
unit value of banana exports declined steadily from 1955 through I960 and 
despite a slight improvement in 1961-62 remained about 15 percent lower than 
in 1955. 
More than half the regional banana exports come from Honduras, where the 
volume of banana exports between 1955 and 1962 increased enough to offset the 
falling price and to counteract the effect on total value of*the declining 
banana exports from Costa Rica. In that country, the volume of banana exports 
has been subject to substantial fluctuations and has not yet recovered from 
the fall in 1959• In Guatemala, the third largest producer, export receipts 
were relatively stable throughout the period '1955-6.lv̂  but fell by almost 50 
percent in 1962 causing a loss of $7 million in total regional exports. 
El Salvador and Nicaragua are not major exporters of bananas. 
Canada and the United States each purchase about kO percent òf their 
bananas from Central America and together absorb about 90 percent of the 
region's banana exports (see Table 13). The remainder is largely shipped to 
Europe, mainly to West Germany, Norway and Sweden. To date, however, Central 
America is only a marginal supplier of these markets, and its exports to them 
are minor in comparison with its dependence on the North American market. As 
for intra-regional trade, it is very small, for all five Central American 
countries produce bananas in some quantity. 
/Table 13 
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Table 13 



























































Sources: National sources listed in Table 2 . 
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3» Cotton 
Cotton has ranked close to bananas as a source of foreign exchange for 
Central America in recent years. By 1962, it was bringing in about $85 mil-
lion, or 17 percent of total export receipts, as compared to $k5 million and 
11 percent of the total in 1955-56 (see Tables Ik and 15). This remarkable 
expansion was largely the result of three and four-fold increases in the value 
of cotton exports from Guatemala and El Salvador, where the development of cot-
ton cultivation, encouraged as a matter of government policy, effectively made 
up for the coffee and banana income losses of the period. The pattern was 
quite different in Nicaragua, however. That country, having developed its cot-
ton exports a few years ahead of the other two major Central American producers, 
was already highly dependent on this product in the mid-1950's. In 1959, how-
ever, fiscal difficulties led the government to withdraw its subsidy to cotton 
producers. This and falling world prices led to a sharp curtailment of output 
in the 1959/60 and I96O/6I crops so that, by 1962, Nicaraguan cotton export 
earnings were just recovering their 1955 level. 
The growth of cotton export volumes roughly paralleled that of values in 
Central America in the 1955-62 period. Cotton prices declined relatively less 
on the average, between those two years, than those of other basic exports on 
the world market. The price of Central American cotton exports dropped gradu- > 
ally in 1955-58 by nearly 30 percent, but has been rising since 1959» As a 
result, and though there were fluctuations during much of the period, by 1962 
the Central American cotton producers were able to turn virtually all of their 
expanded export volumes into rising foreign exchange income. 
The major markets for Central American cotton are to be found in the .in-
dustrialized countries, and, among these, notably Japan, West Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands. At present, Japan is by far the largest 
purchaser of Central American cotton, absorbing from two-thirds to three-
fourths of the area's exports. The rest goes mostly to Western Europe. This 
represents a complete reversal of the situation prevailing in 1955, when 
Western Europe took in the bulk of Central America's cotton exports and Japan 
bought only one-fourth of the total (see Table 16). 
In terms of volume, exports to Japan increased about sevenrfold between 
195^/55 and 1961/62, as Central America benefited both from the rapid growth 
of the over-all Japanese demand for cotton in 1955-62 and from a substantial 
improvement in its share of the Japanese market (see Table 17). In the major 
Western European markets, on the other hand, where demand for cotton showed 
few signs of increase, Central American cotton sales remained more or less 
stagnant. The Japanese market has thus provided the only outlet for Central 
America's increased cotton production in recent years. All three major Central 
American cotton producers are equally dependent on Japan in this respect, and 
all three have seen the growth of their cotton exports paralleled by an increas-
ing concentration of their sales in one single market (see Table l8). 
/Table l*f 
Table 14 
SHARE OF COTTON IN CENTRAL AMERICAN EXPORT RECEIPTS, 1955-62 
Cia percent) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 * 
Central America 11 11 9 11 14 8 11 17 
Costa Rica 1 " 1 • • • 
El Salvador 9 16 11 16 20 14 18 26 
(Guatemala 4 4 4 5 4 5 9 14 
Honduras 
• 
—^^ 1 1 4 4 1 _ • • • 
Nicaragua 43 kl 39 45 26 30 38 
— Nil or less than »5 percent. 
Sources: international Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; and Costa Rica, Dirección 
General de Estadística y Censos, Comercio Exterior. Guatemala, Dirección General de Estadística, Anuario 
;de Comercio Exterior, and Banco de Guatemala, Boletín Estadístico. Honduras, Dirección General de Esta-
!distica y Censos, Comercio Exterior • 
Table 1 
VOLUME AND VALUE OF CENTRAL AMERICAN COTTON EXPORTS TOTAL AND BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1955-62 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 • 
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35.5 2 0 > 
32.5 
1^2.0^ • • • 
• • • • • • • * * • • • 
Unit value (in dollars per ton) Total Central 
America 701 633 608 589 495 546 564 560 
o*« Less $ 50 thousand, or 50 tons. 
a. Excluding Costa Rica. 
b. Estimated on the basis of production figures. 
c. Estimated on the basis of 1961-62 production data. 
Sources: Values: Same sources as in Table 13. Volumes: FAO, Trade Yearbook and Monthly Bulletin of 
Agricultural Economics and Statistics. For Guatemala in 1961, Banco de Guatemala, Boletín Estadístico. 
Table 16 
CENTRAL AMERICAN COTTON EXPORTS BY MAJOR MARKETS, 1955-62̂ / 
Country of 
destination 195V55 1955/56 1956/57 1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 
(in thousand metric tons)—'̂  
Japan 10 33 Ik 23 75 kl 58 7k 
West Germany 19 35 9 16 2k 6 - 5 15 
United Kingdom 5 9 8 6 15 6 5 7 
Netherlands 3 7 3 8 11 2 1 
(in percent of total) 
Japan 26 35 22 32 52 67 7k 59 
West Germany 36 13 . 23 17 10 7 12 
United Kingdom 12 10 13 8 10 9 7 5 
Netherlands 9 8 6 11 8 3 1 3 
a. Crop year ending in August. 
b. Converted from bales at the rate of 0.21682,metric tons per bale. 
Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee, Cotton-World Statistics. 
Table 17 
TOTAL COTTON IMPORTS AND SHARE OF CENTRAL AMERICA IN SELECTED MARKETS 1955-62̂  
195V55 1955/56 1956/5 ̂  1957/58 • 1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 
Eotal Imports (in thousand metric tons) 
Japan 444 517 640 521 550 713 770 619 
West Germany 264 278 348 316 266 368 310 282 
United Kingdom 322 322 384 314 246 ' 304 249 211 
Netherlands 74 73 83 68 69 87 84 74 
Share of  Central America (in percent) 
Japan 2 6 2 4 14 6 8 12 
West Germany 7 13 2 5 9 2 2 5 
United Kingdom 2 3 2 2 6 2 2 3 
Netherlands 5 10 4 11 • 16 2 1 6 
a. Crop year ending in August. 
Source; International Cotton Advisory Committee, Cotton-World Statistics. 
Table 1 
SHARE OF MAJOR MARKETS IN COTTON EXPORTS OF MAJOR CENTRAL AMERICAN PRODUCERS, 1955-1962̂  
(In percent) 
195V55 1955/56 1956/57 1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 
El Salvador 
Japan 42 57 50 59 70 86 91 76 
West Germany 8 12 4 12 2 3 6 17 
United Kingdom 28 11 5 8 6 4 1 
Netherlands 8 5 4 5 1 . — — 1 
Nicaragua 
Japan 24 20 11 12 33 40 57 
West Germany 24 41 24 28 21 18 18 
United Kingdom • 6 8 20 9 9 17 10 — 
Netherlands 23 21 24 25 15 10 6 — 
Guatemalâ  
Japan — 18 9 16 73 79 80 77 
Nil or less than .5 percent. r 
a. Crop year ending in August. 
b. A consistent breakdown of exports by destination is not available on the same basis as for El Salvador 
and Nicaragua. The figure given here for Guatemalan cotton exports to Japan is based on Japanese 
import statistics. 
Source; International Cotton Advisory Committee, Cotton-World Statistics. 
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if. Wood 
Since 1955 the value of wood exports has fluctuated annually around an 
average value of $11.0 million, reflecting fluctuations of similar proportion 
in volume; unit value, on the other hand, has remained almost unchanged since 
1957 following a rise in that year from the level of 1955-56. In 1961, wood 
exports accounted for $11.h million or 2.6 percent of total export receipts. 
Almost two thirds of the region's wood exports originate in Honduras, 
another 20 to 25 percent come from Nicaragua, with Costa Hica and Guatemala 
exporting considerably smaller quantities. Wood exports from Honduras showed 
some increase over the 1955-62 period; exports ,from the other countries have 
been stable or declining since 1955 (see Table 19)» 
Although the largest market for Central American wood is the Caribbean 
area—particularly Venezuela, Jamaica and Cuba—Central America also exports 
wood to the United States and to almost every country in Western Europe. There 
has been a gradual increase in exports to Europe since 1955« and more recently 
(since 1959)i a marked increase in exports to the United States, both shifts 
taking place at the expense of exports to the Caribbean area while total exports 
remained stable (see Table 20). In 1961 the share of total wood exports sent 
to these three areas was approximately b2 percent to the Caribbean, and 25 per-
cent each to the United States and Western Europe compared with 58, 19 and lH 
percent in 1955. Intra-regional exports, primarily to El Salvador, accounted 
for less than 10 percent of the total throughout this period, with a small 
residual quantity sent to other areas, usually Japan* 
5. Meat 
Only Costa Rica of the five Central American nations has been an exporter 
of meat throughout the 1955-62 period; for the region as a whole this is a new 
export product. Meat exports are still small, only $9.0 million, or two per-
cent of total exports in 1961, but the rate of increase in recent years has been 
exceptionally high. The volume exported rose from l̂f tons in 1955 to more than 
14 thousand tons in 1961, with the value increasing from $10.0 thousand to $9.0 . 
million during the same time (see Table 21). 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have all participated in this 
expansion. Scarcity of land causes El Salvador to remain a net importer. Prior 
to 1958 Costa Rica was, in effect, the only exporter.of meat. Honduras began 
exporting in 1958 and Nicaragua and Guatemalâ followed its example in 1959» The 
high growth rates of 1959 and i960 were not maintained in 1961, however, as 
Nicaragua in mid-196l found it necessary to prohibit the export of live cattle. 
This led to a reduction in meat exports from Costa Rica, which had relied heav-
ily on imported Nicaraguan cattle for the expansion of its beef herds. Nicaragua 
output, on the other hand, continued to rise rapidly. 
/Table 19 
Table 19 
CENTRAL AMERICAN WOOD EXPORTS - TOTAL AND BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1955-62 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962* 
Value (in thousands of dollars) 






































































Unit Value (in dollars per ton) 
Total Central Americâ / 36.10 36.65 42.37 if 2. if 5 41.95 42.50 43.11 
Less than US$500 or 50 metric tons. 
a. Excluding Nicaragua. 
b. Converted from York tons at the rate of 790 metric tons per York ton (the 1957-58 average). 
C. Metric ton figure estimated on the basis of data in square feet. 
• 
Sources: National sources listed in Table 2, 
Table 
CENTRAL AMERICAN WOOD EXPORTS BY DESTINATION, 1955-61 
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Panama, Canal Zone, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Puerto Bico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
British West Indies, Dutch and French Antilles. 
Sources: National sourcés listed in Table 2. 
Table 
CENTRAL AMERICAN  MEAT EXPORTS - TOTAL AND BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1955-62 
Value 

































(in metric tons) 
58 2 014 
4 25 
5Í 1 
(in dollars per ton) 













































— Less than $500 or .5 metric tons. 
a. Estimated from  import data of  U.S., El Salvador and Honduras. 
Sources: National sources listed in Table 2» 
At present the United States market absorbs more than 95 percent of 
Central American meat exports (see Tablè 22).  Intra-regional exports have 
risen but remain small and exports to other Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, although also increasing, originate only in Costa Rica and represent 
less than 3 percent of  total regional exports. 
6. Sugar 
Within total regional exports sugar remains a minor item, contributing 
approximately 12 million dollars, or 2.5 percent in 1962. The period 
1955-62 was one of  rapid increase,' however, during which the value of  sugar 
exports rose sixfold.  Because of  the dominant position of  the United States 
market, where the import price of  sugar is tied to the domestic price, histo-
rically stable and—until recently—considerably higher than the world price, 
the unit value of  Central American sugar exports has also tended to be rela-
tively stable and above the world price. The total value of  Central American 
exports increased steadily during the 1955-62 period paralleling a rapid rise 
in export volume, which was itself  largely induced by the availability of  the 
United States market (see Tables 23, 2h and 25) . ' ' 
Prior to I960 Nicaragua and Costa Rica were the only exporters outside 
the region. On occasion each sold large quantities of  its sugar exports on 
the world market, Costa Rica shipping more than'50 percèat.of  its exports 
to Holland, Jordan and France in 1955, 1959 and i960, respectively, and 
Nicaragua sending more than half  its sugai» exports to Jápan in 1959. But 
in general the higher-priced United States market was preferred  and these 
overseas contacts were not maintained. Beginning in i960, when the Cuban share 
of  the U.S. market was reallocated to other producers, developments in that* 
market became almost the sole factor  to affect  the trend of  Central American 
sugar exports. 
Under the ad hoc reallocation of  the Cuban share that took place in i960 
and 1961, El Salvador and Guatemala were granted U.S. import quotas for  the 
first  time, and the quotas of  Costa Rica and Nicaragua Were considerably en-
larged. The Central American producers were then awarded st i l l larger shares 
of  the U.S. sugar market in virtue of  the new sugar legislation adopted by 
the U.S. Congress in 1962. Broadly speaking, the new law incorporated about 
half  of  the former  Cuban quota into the permanent quotas of  other suppliers. 
The remainder was placed into a "global quota" to be filled  with sugar from 
any foreign  supplier on a first-come,  first-served  basis. Central America 
benefited  on both counts, raising the volume of  its 1962 sugar exports to the 
U.S. nearly 50 percent above the already high 'level reached in 1961. 
While permitting the import of  larger volumes of  sugar from  foreign  sup-
pliers other than Cuba, the new U.S. legislation also aimed to reduce the 
price premium earned by these countries in the U.S. market in relation to 
the world sugar price. Sugar coming in under the global quota was to be pur-
chased at a price approximating the world market price, This was to be 
achieved by collecting a special import levy, fixed  from  time to time by the 
U.S. Department of  Agriculture at a level corresponding more or less to the 
difference  between the world and the U.S. price. 
/Table 25 
Table 
CENTRAL AMERICAN  SUGAR EXPORTS - TOTAL AND BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1955-62 
Value 














Total Central America 



























































































- Less than US$500 or 50 metric tons. 
Note: 1961 exports from  Guatemala and total ejqjorts in 1962 were estimated on the basis of  U.S. 
imports. 
Sources: National sources listed in Table 2. 
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Table 2k 
RAW CANE SUGAR SPOT PRICE, 1955-1963 
(in U.S. cents per pound) 
World market U.S. market 
U.S. quota 
Premium or discount 
L955 3.2if 5.95 
+1.70 (1955-56 aver.) 
1956 3.̂ 7 6.09 
1957 5.16 6.25 +0.lk 
1958 3.50 6.27 +1.91 
1959 2.97 6.2^ +2.38 
I960 3.10 6.30 +2.21 
1961 2.91 6.30 +2.1*5 
1962 2.98 +2.58 
1963 (Jan.-May) 1.22 7.98 -0,13 (Jan.-Apr.aver.] 
Sources: U.S. Department of  Agriculture, Sugar Reports; and Merrill, Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Weekly Sugar Letter. 
The 1963 quotations are based on average daily quotations for  January-April 
and an average of  Thursday quotations for  May. 
World market: Prior to 1961, spot price based on No. k Contract which was 
bagged sugar f.a.s.  Cuba. Beginning with 1961, spot price under No.8 
Contract, which is also for  bagged sugar but f.o.b.  and stowed at greater 
Caribbean ports (including Brazil), 
U.S. market: Prior to 1961, spot price for  sugar in bags under Contract No. 6 
plus 50 cents per pound duty (Cuban). Beginning with 1961, spot price for  bulk 
sugar under Contract No. 7» the terms of  which are duty paid or duty free. 
U.S. quota premium or discount: Net differential  between U.S. and world price 
quotations, once they are reduced to a Comparable basis and allowance is made 




CENTRAL AMERICAN  SUGAR EXPORTS BY DESTINATION 1955-62 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1961 1962 





(in thousand metric tons) 
6.6 
















































a. Estimated on the basis of  U.S. import data 
Sources: National sources listed in Table 2. 
- Nil or less than 50 metric tons or .05 percent 
/Moreover, 
- 4 9 -
Moreover, sugar sold under the exporting countries' individual quotas was also 
to pay an import fee which, although much lower than the levy on global quota 
sugar, was to rise gradually to 30 percent of this levy by 1964, when the law 
comes up for review. These two measures would normally have resulted in 
gradually falling unit values for Central American sugar exports. So far, 
however, the opposite has happened. The development of a sugar shortage began 
in the second half of 1962 to lift the world market price substantially above 
its depressed level of recent years, The reversal of the U.S. world market 
price differential for the time being undermined the U.S. import levy system, 
which had been based on it (see Table 24), In February 1963» the import 
levies were suspended to insure an adequate flow of sugar imports into the U.S., 
and in subsequent months the spot price rose to almost unprecedented heights 
in both the U.S. and the world markets, heralding substantial increases in the 
unit and the total value of Central American sugar exports for the current year* 
7« Cocoa 
Cocoa accounts for only about one percent of Central American export 
receipts. The only important producer is Costa Ricg., though email amounts of 
cocoa beans are also exported by Guatemala and Nicaragua. The total value of 
Central American cocoa exports has varied from as little as S3 million to as 
much as million in recent years (see Table 26). This is attributable both 
to large fluctuations in the size of the Costa Rican crop from year to year, 
and to the ups and downs of coCoa prices in the world market. Between 1958 
and 1962, for instance, the export unit value of Costa Rican cocoa dropped 
about one-third. The maintenance of high export volumes first helped slow 
down the resulting decline in exhange receipts, but by 1961-62 both volume . 
and unit values were relatively depressed. Oyer the 1955-62 -period, cocoa has 
been an export of irregular importance for Costa Rica, its share ranging from 
4 to 10 percent of the total (see Table 27). 
Cocoa from Guatemala and Nicaragua is largely consumed locally or exported 
within the Central American region. The bulk of Costa Rica's cocoa production, 
on the other hand, is shipped to the outside world, Substantially more than 
half goes to the United States and about one-fourth to the Canal Zone and 
Panama (see Table 28). Other American importers are Chile and Colombia. The 
EEC countries* tor their part, purchase only a very small amount* This pattern 
seems to have been rather stable throughout the period under study. 
Aable 26 
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Table 26 
VOLUME AND VALUE OF CENTRAL AMERICAN COCOA EXPORTS 
1955-62 

















































(in thousand metric tons) 
hi 8,4 12.? 
7 A 7.7 11.5 11.8 
.2 .6 .6 .4 
.1 .1 >2 .3 
(in dollars per ton) 
11.0^ 
10.2 
558 762 642 514 j*73 
a. Estimated  on the basis of Costa Rican exports only. 
Sources: Volume:  FAO Cocoa Statistics, January 1963» 
Value: Costa Rica: IMF In t erna t i ona1_Finan cia1 Sta ti s ti cs. 
Guatemala: Dirección General de Estadística, Anuario de Comercio 
Exterior. Nicaragua: Recaudación General de Aduanas, Memoria. 
/Table 
Table 
COSTA SICAN COCOA STATISTICS, 1955-62 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962*-
Production (in thousand 
metric tons) 10.0 7.0 7.4 8.2 11.0 10.7 13.4 9.9 
Exports 
Value (in million dollars) 5.9 2.9 4.0 : 5.9 7.3 5.9 4.8 4.6 
Volume (in thousand metric 
tons) 9.7 6.2 7.4 7.7 11.5 11.8 10.2 8.8 
Unit value (in dollars 
per ton) 613 477 544 768 .. 630 495 467 523 
Share of cocoa in total 
exports receipts (in 
percent) 
7 4 5 6 10 7 6 5 
a* Crop year ending in September* 
Sources: International Monetary Fond, lAf»̂ patjjonal Fiae¡̂ff|̂"' ̂ tisticgj and FAO, Cocoa Statistics. 
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Table 28 
COSTA RICAN COCOA EXPORTS BY DESTINATION IN 1961 
Volume 
(in metric tons) Percent 
United States 5 965 58.4 
Canal Zone 1 859 18.2 
Panama 644 6.3 
Colombia 657 6.4 
Chile 3M 3.3 
EEC 444 4.3" 
Japan 212 2.1 
Others 92 0.9 
Total 10 214 100.0 
Source: Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, Comercio Exterior. 
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B. PROSPECTS IN 1963-67 FOR EXPORTS OUTSIDE OF 
CENTRAL AMERICA 
Export projections for  an area such as Central America can only be very 
tentative, even when they cover a time span as short as that between 1962 and 
1967. The main reason for  this is that Central America earns most of  its ex-
port income .in primary product markets which are per se rather unstable. 
Because of  its small size, moreovery Central America constitutes only a very 
marginal supplier and therefore  cannot hope to influence  in any significant  way 
the evolution of  the over-all supply and demand. The high degree of  concentra-
tion of  Central American exports in a few  major products and its dependence on 
a few  major importing countries also enhances the probability that some unex-
pected isolated trend or event, which would have only a minor irnpact on an area 
endowed with a more balanced export structure, might have a profound  effect  on 
the value of  its total export earnings. To these permanent factors  of  uncer-
tain ty must be added, for  the period under review, two important question 
marks: that of  the impact that the gradual implementation of.  the European Eco-
nomic Community's policies will have on the pattern of  international trade in 
tropical products; and that of  the trend in international commodity prices, 
which may now be reaching a turning point in their long postwar downswing and 
whose future  behavior might henceforth  reflect  a different,  and as yet undis-
cernible set of  basic forces.  ' 
Such a combination of  factors  might be enough to discourage any attempt at 
forecasting  the future  trend of  Central American exports. Neither .does the 
erratic pattern of  these exports in recent years offer  much encouragement. A 
few  guiding threads do emerge, however, from  the analysis of  this pattern in 
Section A above, and it is possible to extrapolate them in the light of  the, 
various, though scanty, clues that are available on future  conditions in major 
commodity markets, future  trends and patterns of  world demand,- and other rele-
vant considerations. Crude as these projections may be, however, they may nev-
ertheless be taken—with a great deal of  caution—as a rough indication of  what 
might be expected to happen to Central American exports under a given set of 
assumptions, which have been chosen as realistically as possible although nec-
essarily not without some arbitrariness among the various alternatives that 
appear relatively reasonable at the present time. 
1. Assumptions 
Because Central American exports st i l l consist mainly of  a few  primary 
products—namely, coffee,  cotton, bananas; wood,meat, sugar and cocoa—the 
major effort  was devoted to an analysis of  the export prospects of  each one of 
those products. An ad hoc method was adopted in each case. For the two big 
traditional exports, coffee  and bananas, where Central America's productive 
capacity is ample in relation to demand, the projection of  exports is based 
entirely on the anticipated trend of  demand in major markets. The estimates 
for  two other traditional products, sugar and cocoa, rest essentially on ex-
pectations concerning eventual marketing arrangements (arrangements affecting 
only the U.S. in the case of  sugar, but the world market in the case of  cocoa). 
/Supply considerations 
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Supply connici- : ' .;.••.• -¡ <y yrlevnnt when coming to projections 
of the trend oi .»' r /voori can t-xporto. The cotton estimates, for 
instance, are o.lo.v.o;.!;; r«lated t o expected tr̂ nds in land acreage and yields, 
with only crude assumptions about world demand brought into the picture. Final-
ly, in the case of  wood and meat exports, for which foreign markets are readi-
ly available, the major factor considered is the potential growth of Central 
American output of these products in the next few years. 
The most important assumptions made to arrive at the present projections 
are those relating to future price trends, the impact of EEC policies on the 
West German market for Central American coffee, and the evolution of the tex-
tile industry in Central America's major cotton market, Japan. In keeping with 
prevailing market tendencies and current efforts to establish more effective 
international agreements for some key commodities (coffee and cocoa), fairly 
stable prices have been assumed for Central America's major exports in the next 
few years. Cotton prices, for instance, have been postulated to decline by 
only about one per cent a year between 1962 and 1967, and coffee, banana, wood 
and meat prices to remain approximately unchanged. Similarly, it is not ex-
pected that cocoa prices will go below their present floor (they are more like-
ly to rise if the recent improvement in supply-demand balance persists, as it 
may, especially if an International Cocoa Agreement actually comes into exist-
ence). in sugar, the world market price is expected in the model here employed 
to come down sharply from its recent peaks, as the transitory factors which 
have caused them are corrected, but it is assumed to remain substantially above 
the depressed 1959-62 level. On the other hand, in the U.S. market, which is 
more directly relevant for Central America, by 1967 the price of sugar is ex-
pected to be brought back down to its 1955-56 level of 5 cents per .pound, as 
the U.S. is assumed to pursue insofar as possible its policy, of narrowing the 
differential with the world price both before and after the 1964 expiratiçn 
date of the current Sugar Act. 
With regard to the influence of EEC policies on tropical products, it is 
assumed that there will be little impact on Central America's cocoa and banana 
exports, in view of the marginal nature of the European market for these two 
products and in view of the establishment of a duty-free quota for the importa-
tion of Central American bananas in West Germany. The case of coffee, however, 
is expected to be entirely different and the present projections are based on 
the assumption of a substantial improvement in the position of African coffee 
and a substantial deterioration in that of Central America in the important 
West German market, which may completely stifle the growth of Central American 
coffee exports to Europe, if it does not actually force some decline in theée 
exports. 
Other important assumptions about foreign demand include a fairly steady 
economic expansion in industrialized countries at something near the current 
rates (real rise in per capita gross product at about 2 - 2.5. percent a year 
in the United States and 4-5 percent a year in most of Western Europe); thé 
continued exclusion of Cuba from the U.S. sugar market; and the maintenance of 
a high level of activity in the Japanese cotton textile industry, which has 
been the major factor behind the growth of Central American cotton exports in 
/recent years. 
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recent years. On the whole, however, .it was thought prudent not to anticipate 
the opening up of  any major new markets for  Central America's basic exports, 
which will thus, according to these estimates, continue to be highly concen-
trated in the United States, Western Europe and Japan. 
On the supply side, as mentioned above, no limitations were assumed on 
Central America's capacity to satisfy  forthcoming  demands for  coffee,  bananas, 
or sugar. In the case of  cocoa cultivation, a continuation of  the present un-
satisfactory  state of  technique through the next few  years is expected to keep 
Costa Rica's exportable supply well within any ceilings that might be imposed 
by an eventual International Cocoa Agreement. For cotton, on the other hand, 
continued strong government encouragement and rapid technological progress are 
postulated. It is similarly assumed that, in line with recent trends, rapid 
advances in meat production are feasible»  In the development of  wood exports, 
on the other hand, transportation difficulties  and the need for  investment in 
new processing facilities  are expected to hold back progress somewhat in the 
near future. 
On the basis of  these various assumptions, separate projections have been 
made of  the trend of  each one of  the major primary product exports from  Central 
America to the outside world between 1962 and 1967 (see Table 29, column A). 
Since it has not been possible, however»to avoid considerable arbitrariness in 
the selection of  the assumptions and since a high degree of  Uncertainty is 
clearly attached to some of  the most crucial choices, it has been decided to 
make alternative high and low projections, under different  sets of  assumptions 
for  the three most important products, coffee,  bananas, and cotton. In the 
case of  coffee,  the low estimate is based on the assumption that severe over-
production would depress world prices substantially further  in the next féw 
years (price declines of  3 to 3.5 percent a year are postulated) and that 
Central America would lose a particularly important portion of  its West German 
Market as a result of  the adoption of  the EEC common external tariff.  The high 
projection, on the other hand, is founded  on the assumption of  a somewhat 
faster  expansion of  U.S. demand for  coffee  between 1962 and 1967 and the remov-
al of  internal taxes on coffee  in the EEC countries. For bananas, the deriva-
tion of  the high and low estimates only involves dropping the assumption of 
price stability, and postulating instead a 10 percent rise or fall  between now 
and 1967. Finally, in the cotton projections, the crucial factor,  as mentioned 
above, is Japanese demand, which is assumed to grow at a particularly rapid 
rate to yield the high projection, while a virtual stagnation of  this demand 
and a 2.5 percent annual drop in cotton prices are incorporated in the low 
projection. While the "preferred"  projections represent . what appears to be 
the best choice at the time of  writing, the assumptions embodied in the low 
and high estimates are far  from  being ruled out, and the low and high estimates 
are given here as an illustration of  the extent to which actual exports could 
easily be expected to vary from  the "preferred"  projection figures  by 1967» 
/Table 
Table 29, 
PROJECTED TRERD IS VALUE OF CENTRAL AMERICA'S MAJOR PRIXART PRODUCT EXPORTS 
OUTSIDE OF DTCSGRAIICS AREA U 1962-67 
Preferred projection Alternative project 10ns 
Value of 1967 Percent annual I. £ w H I G H 
exports in in $ rate of change 1967 Percent 1967 Percent 
1961* million in 1962-67 b/ in $ annual in $ annual 
in $ million rate of million rate of 
million 2/ change change 
in in 
1962-67 1962-67 
(A) (B). (C) 
Coffee 210 205 -0.4 160 -4.2 220 1.2 
Bananas 70 78 1.8 70 - 86 3.5 
Cotton 51 (85) 85 8.9 (-) 50 -0.3 115 14.5 
Wood 11 15 5.3 
Meat 9 25 \ .18.6 . 
Sugar 8 14 12.2 
Cocoa " 5 6_ 3.1 
Total 364 (393) 428 2.7 (1.7) 340 -1.1 481 4.8 
a. 1962 estijnates for cotton exports and total are given in parentheses. 
b. percent, annual rate of change in 1969-67 given in parentheses for cotton exports and total on the basis of 
1962 estimates. 
Hfllftj All figures exclude Central American intra-regional trade. 
Sourcet A detailed description of -the assumptions and methods used to arrive at the projections for eaoh product 
xs presented in Section C of this Chapter. 
- 5 7 -
2. Projections 
If  international commodity prices stabilize, the depression that has af-
fected  Central American exports outside of  the integration area in recent year 
may be at an end (see Table 29). The present projections also suggest, how-
ever, that in the next few  years the area's major primary product exports to 
its traditional markets are likely to grow only slowly. Under the "preferred" 
set of  assumptions, export income from  these products would increase by about 
$65 million between I 9 6 I and 1967 (see Table 29, Column A). This would repre-
sent a distinct improvement over the downward trend that prevailed in the pre-
ceding six-year period. The average annual rate of  growth during the 1 9 6 2 - 6 7 
period, however, would only amount to 2.7 percent Moreover, as Central 
American primary product exports are estimated to have increased sharply in 
1962, the area, according to this projection, could in fact  look forward  only 
to a 1.7 percent annual rate of  growth in these exports for  the remainder of 
the period. 
On a product-by-product basis, the present study projects virtually no 
change in coffee  export receipts between now and 1967, a slow growth of  banana 
exports, and moderate annual increases in income from  wood and cocoa. Rapid 
growth would characterize sugary and above all meat exportŝ , but the relative 
importance of  these two items is too small for  their expansion of  itself  to 
have much impact on over-all export trends. ' 
Under these conditions, a really decisive impetus to faster  export growth 
in Central America could come only from  further  expansion of  cotton exports or 
from  significant  advances in the conquest of  new markets and the development, 
of  new and secondary exports. As regards cotton exports, their spectacular 
growth was the major factor  behind the exceptional performance  of  Central 
American exports in 1962. Income from  this product, however, is more likely 
to stabilize in the next few  years than to continue its upward course, in view 
of  the unfavorable  over-all demand-supply situation in the world market and 
the competition from  synthetics. This is what has been assumed in Column A of 
Table 29 which shows cotton exports rlèing at an average annual rate of  8.9 
percent in 1962-67, but undergoing1 no change in 1963-67» A further  large in-
crease in Central American cotton eStpbrts in I 9 6 3 - 6 7 , , which is embodied in the 
"high" alternative projection appeaf-thg  in Column C, could easily lift  the 
rate of  growth of  Central American exports to 5 percent à year in the next -
few  years. Such increased dependence on cotton exports, however (and presum-
ably on the Japanese market which alone could absorb' them), would leave Central 
America in a precarious position over the longer rún unless significant  head-
way is made at the same time in diversifying  the area's over-all export pat-
tern by developing minor exports, such as shrimp, soluble coffee,  copper, lead, 
zincj and simple manufactures  (in addition to wood and meat products). The 
need for  such export diversification  would, of  course, appear all the more 
pressing if  the "low" projection shown in Column B should be accepted, since, 
in that alternative,, which embodies in particular the assumption of  a contin-
ued marked downtrend in coffee  prices in the next few  years, Central America's 
export income from  itajor primary products would decline by about one percent 




PROJECTION OF THE VALUE OF CENTRAL AMERICA'S MAJOR PRIMARY 
PRODUCT EXPORTS IN 1967 
1. Coffee 
a. Exports to the U.S.A. 
Total U.S. imports of green coffee are expected to rise only slowly. Per 
capita consumption of coffee is already high (more than 7 kilograms per year) 
and appears stable. The income and price elasticities of the demand for coffee 
are rather low and it is generally considered that U.S. consumption will rise 
only a little faster than population. As a rough approximation a two percent 
annual rate of increase in U.S. coffee consumption could be selected. In this 
study, an FAO projection of United States coffee imports for 1965 was adopted; 
this assumes an annual increase of about two percent in real GNP per capita, 
and a price elasticity of -0.29 in the demand for Coffee. Assuming, further, 
that the income elasticity of the dèmand for coffee ranges between 0.25 and 
0.52, the FAO estimates that U.S. coffee imports in 196$ will rahge between 
1 400 and 1 490 thousand tons if coffee prices fall 30 cents belo* their 1958 
level, and between 1 430 and 1 530 thousand tohs if prices drop by 40 per-
cent.l/ These figures imply an annual rate of growth of 1 to 3 percent a 
year in U.S. coffee demand and yield a range of 1 43Ò tb 1 620 thousand tons 
as estimated U.S. coffee imports by 1967 (see Table 30). Hiis appears to be 
in close agreement with a slightly more recent FAO estimate that by 1970-72, 
North American coffee consumption (i.e., U.S.A. and Canada) may rise to 1 800 
thousand tons if real per capita GNP rises by 2.5 percent a year and coffee 
prices continue to fall. i r — 
Assuming no drastic change in Central America's share of the U.S. coffee 
market, which has fluctuated around 10 percent for an extended period, it can 
be estimated, on the basis of the above figúres, that Central America's coffee 
exports to the United States, which amounted to 130 thousand tons in 1961, 
could range between 143 and l62 thousand tons by 1967• 
Within this range, perhaps the best estimate would be based on the low 
income-elasticity assumption. The two alternative price assumptions yield 
very similar result, in view of the low-price-elasticity assumption adopted 
at the outset. 
1. FAO, Ia Economia Mundial del Café» 1961. In terms of 1961 export unit 
values, the FAO price assumptions imply a 10 to 25 percent decline for Central 




PROJECTION OF VOLUME OF CENTRAL AMERICA» COFFEE BüfilfS TO THE 
UNITED STATES IN I967 
1 Actual exports Alternative projections for 196? 
1 I960 1961 1962-67 price change: -10 percent -25 percent 
Low High Low High 
Total U.S. coffee imports 
(in thousand metric tons) 1324 1348 1430 1580 1460 1620 
Share of Central America in 
U.S. market (in percent ) 9 10 10 10 10 10 
Volume of Central American 
coffee exports to U.S. 
(in thousand metric tons) 124 130 143 158 146 162 
Note» The low and high estimates correspond to the alternative income elas-
ticity assumptions of 0.25 and 0.52 
/b. Exports 
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b. Exports to Western Europe 
Projections of Central American coffee exports to Western Europe can only 
be very tentative. European demand for coffee is expected to continue rising 
at a rapid rate. It is difficult, however, to forecast the extent to which 
Central American coffee will benefit, in view of the fact that the area's posi-
tion in most European markets is extremely marginal. In West Germany, where 
Central American coffee does hold a substantial share of the market, a large 
element of uncertainty prevails regarding the potential impact of the Common 
external tariff on coffee, the introduction of preference for EEC associated 
overseas states, and possible modifications in the present regime of high 
internal taxes on coffee. 
On the basis of the abovementioned FAO projections for 1970, which assume 
a 3.9 to 4.7 percent annual increase in real per capita expenditure, a price 
elasticity of demand for coffee similar to that of the""U.S., and a somewhat 
greater income elasticity, EEC totàlcoffee imports côít bé expected to range 
roughly between 720 and 7̂ 5 thousand metric tons by 1967 if coffee prices fall 
30 to 40 percent from their 1958 level (see Table 31» projection (1) ). This 
assumes no change in the high Internal taxes on çoffôe that aife restricting con-
sumption in Italy, France and West Germany* Should these taxes be abolished, 
the FAO calculates on the basis of 1958 imports that EEC imports might rise 
43 thousand tons.3/ If it can be assumed that at higher import levels the 
impact of the tax removal would be correspondingly greater, the application of 
the individual percentage increases to each of the three countries i» question 
yields total EEC import estimates of approximately 780 to 805 thousand tons for 
1967 in the event internal coffee taxes are removed (see Table 31» projection 
(2) ). • 
How much of this can be expected to be supplied by Central America will 
depend almost entirely on what happens in the German market. West Germany 
currently accounts for roughly one third of total EEC coffee imports. This is 
likely to remain approximately unchanged in the next few years, if all three 
major coffee markets in the EEC (France, Germany and Italy) expand at about the 
same rate between 1962 and 1967 (or, which is moreprobable,if the Italian mar-
ket expands somewhat more and the French somewhat less rapidly than the German). 
On this basis it can be expected that in 1967 West German coffee imports will 
amount to 240-248 thousand tons if internal taxes are Maintained, and 260-268 
thousand tons if they are removed. A drop in Centré!• àté&Lto&è• (Ésft • 'Of this 
market should probably be expected when the full margin of EEC tariff prefer-
ence is established in favor of associated African producers (by 1966). Bie 
anticipated level of the common external tariff (9.6 percent ) might possibly 
not be high enough per se to offset Germanpreference for the milder Central 
American coffees over the African ones. However, it must be noted that at 
present West Germany imposes a high speciffíiç clufcy on, coffee,.. the 





PROJECTION OF VOLUME OF CENTRAL AMERICAN COFFEE EXPORTS TO 
WESTERN EUROPE IN 1967 
(in thousand metric tons) 
Actual exports Alternative projections 
L 9 6 O 1961 for 1967 
Total EEC coffee imports 612 6̂ 8 
(1) 
720 - 7k5 
(2) 
780 - 805 
West German coffee imports 197 212 240 - 248 260 - 268 
Coffee imports of other EEC 
countries 420 446 480 - 497 520 - 537 
Central American coffee 
exports to;: (1A) (IB) (2A) (2B) 
West Germany 86 78 . 73 53 79 
Other EEC countries 25 24 24 24 , 26 26 
Rest of Western Europe 11 io 20 20 20 . 20 
Total Central American Coffee 
exports to Western Europe 122 112 93 117 99- 125 
Note: The ranges given for total coffee imports by the EEC countries correspond 
to the alternative assumption of 3*9 and 4.7 percent annual increases in real 
per capita expenditure» The two alternative price assumptions yield very similar 
results, and have therefore not been listed separately. Additional assumptions 
for projection of Central American coffee exports to the EEC: 
EEC internal coffee taxes are maintained and 
(IA) Central America's share of the West German market drops to 20 percent 
(IB) Central America's share of the West Gprman market drops to 30 percent 
EEC internal coffee taxes are removed and 
(2A) Central America's share of the West German market drops to 20 percent 
(2B) Central America's share of the West German market drops to 30 percent 
/effect of 
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effect of discriminating in favor of higher quality coffee, for the ad valorem 
equivalent of this duty is 25-50 percent depending on the price of the coffee. 
The adoption of the common external tariff, which is ad valorem, would eliminate 
this bias, from which Central American coffee has undoubtedly benefited so far 
at the expense of the cheaper African grades. The removal of internal taxes 
would have somewhat the same effect, since they are also large and specific, 
hence weigh more heavily on the lower-priced coffees. 
Assuming a drop in Central America's share in the Qensan market from about 
hO to only 30 percent yields projectlons o^ ̂  tons as 
coffee sales to this market in 1967 under our alternative internal ta* assump-
tions (see Table 31» projections IB and 2B). This would represent no 
major change from current levels a&d-wouldBrtwiiy. • tí^^-jnçnduç.era • outside 
of Central America would get all the benefit from the anticipated growth of the 
German market between now and 1967. Conceivably, however, the implementation 
of the EEC policies affecting coffee «igfct push the share of Central American 
coffee in the German market down to th» X) percent level th#fc prevails in cow-
tries like Austria and Switzerland. In this case, the projected exports of 
Central American coffee to Western G»«nafiy wouldonly rcpgl̂ l̂  49 or 53 thou-
sand tons, which would imply a sharp drop from currant level» (see Table 31, 
projections 1A and 2A). 
Elsewhere in the EEC area, where Central America supplies only about five 
percent of total coffee imports, EEC developments a*e rw»£ likftly to have much 
practical impact. In Italy, preferential treatment of the African associated 
states is expected to work somewhat to the detriment of Latin American coffee 
producers, but the brunt of the burden is expected to be felt by Brazilian cof-
fee, whose quality is most directly in competition with Africa. In France, 
tariff preference for African coffee will actually be lessened by the move to 
the external common  tariff, which will be significantly lower than the present 
duties on Latin American coffee, but this will have little effect in view of 
the fact that coffee imports from outside the associated states are severely 
restricted by quotas anyway. For these reasons, it is assumed (that Central American coffee imports to the EEC outside of Germany will remain about five 
percent; of total imports, and show virtually no changefram their current 
24-25 thousand ton level. 
Outside of the EEC, Central American coffee exports are very small. They 
doubled from 5 to 10 thousand tons in 1955-61 and ,ean perhaps be expected to 
double again to 20 thousand tons by 1967» since coffee consumption is also 
rising rapidly in the rest of Western Europe. 
c. Total exports 
To sum up (see Bable 32), in terms of volume, the projected range for 
Central American coffee exports in 1967 is wide; 250 to 290 thousand metric 
tons if it is assumed that Central America finds no new major market for its 
coffee outside of Europe and the United States in the next few years. Within 
/Table 
Tabla 52 
SUMMARY  OF PROJECTIOH OP CENTRAL AMERICAN UR ROASTED COFFEE EXPORTS IH 1967 
CK) ® 
/olume (in thousandaetrie toas) 
Exports to United States 
Exports to Western Europe 
Total exports 
Export unit value (in dollars 
per ton) 

















Alternative projections for 196? 




a) 10 percent decline 
in 1962-67 
b) 25 percent decline 
in 1962-67 630 
a) at S 755 per ton 
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Hote: Tbe figures projected for 1967 are for'exports outside of the Central American Common Market area. The 1960-62 
figures given here include intra—regional trade in unroasted coffee| the value of this trade «as less than Si million 
in each of these years. 
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this range, the best single estimate is probably one based on the low assump-
tion for the U.S. (income elasticity of demand 0.25) and for Western Europe on 
the assumption that EEC internal taxés ón coffee are maintained but Central 
America's share in the West Germah fflbrket does not drop below 30 percent from 
its present kO percent level. Hiis means total exports would reach about 
270 thousand tons, which re presentís ho major change from present levels and 
agrees rather closely with the size tíí the basic quota assigned to the five 
Central American countries together in the new International Coffee Agreement.kj 
On the basis of present production levels in Central America—300 thousand tons 
in the 1961/62 crop year and 325 thousand tons forecast for 1962/63—a 270 thou-
sand ton export level implies that if attempts are not made to slow the growth 
of coffee production in some of the Central American producers, the area may be 
faced with a substantial accumulation of stocks by 1967• 
The selection of a price assumption! which has haid relatively little Impact 
on the volume projections, becomes crucial when coming to. estimate the total 
value of Central American coffee exports in 1967» A drop in coffee prices by 
30 to kO percent of their 1958 level, that is to say à decline of about 10 to 
2ci percent of the 1961 export unit value of Central American coffee, has been 
incorporated in the volume estimates. The assumption of some continuing decline 
in coffee prices appears fairly reasonable since the current situation of over-
production is expected to prevail throughout the world for several more years 
merely as a result of the plantings undertaken in the «id*195G's before the 
break in coffee prices. On the other hand, the new coffee agreement should help 
stabilize prices, but in the immediate future it may be handicapped by the size 
of the present accumulated coffee stocks. It is difficult, therefore, to deter-
mine whether the lower or the higher of the percentage of price reductions that 
were considered above should be used in contjfating the value of Central American 
coffee exports in 1967. Since the price of most types of coffees (excluding 
African robustas) dropped 5 to 10 perceiit in 1962, the assumption of a 10 per-
cent fall from I96I would imply virtual!̂  no further change by 1967. The 
alternative hypothesis of a 25 percent fall in price in 1962-67 would leave 
room for substantial further price drops after 1962 (at an annual rate of 3 
to 3*5 per cent). 
Under the more favorable assumptions, there would be no further declines 
in coffee prices after 1962, and the volume of coffee exports would expand to 
290 thousand tons by 1 9 I n that case, coffee export receipts would rise to 
$220 million between now and 1967 (see again Table 32). In the eventuality of 
continued price declines, on the other hand, and of a ¿50 thousand ton export 
volume, the value of coffee export recéipts in Central America would drop 
sharply in the next few years. But perhaps -the best estimate at this time is 
that by 196? the price of coffee will have stabilized at about the preèent 
level, and that the volume of Central American coffee exports will approximate 
the size of the region's present quota under the new International Coffee 
H.266 thousand metric tons. 
/Agreement. This 
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Agreement. This would imply an export volume of 270 thousand tons, a unit 
value of something like $755 per ton, and no change in total coffee export re-
ceipts over 1962. 
2. Bananas 
a. Export volume 
The general outlook for Central American banana exports depends basically 
on demand in the major importing countries. A review of these markets suggests 
that their expansion is not likely to be of such magnitude as to exceed the 
region's export capability. As the supply in any one year, however, may be 
greatly affected by disease or poor weather, the estimate of 1967 exports 
should be considered rather as an attainable average for 1967-68.¿/ 
Both the United States and Canadian markets, which offer the largest out-
lets for Central American bananas, have been for some time saturated in terms 
of per capita consumption. As there is no indication of a change in this situ-
ation in the near future, total banana imports in 1967 have been assumed to 
increase only in response to the growth of population, that is, by an average 
annual rate of two percent (see Table 33)• Assuming further that Central 
America continues to supply the same proportion of these imports, exports to 
the United States and Canadá would also increase two percent a year to 835 i 
thousand metric tons by 1967. 
* Guatemala and Honduras, and to a lesser extent Costa Rica, have also 
found an outlet for their bananas in Europe. Within the European Economic 
Community the French and Italian markets are virtually closed to Latin American 
bananas and are supplied solely by the African countries associated with the 
EEC. In view of the 20 percent tariff to be imposed on banana imports from 
third countries by 1967, the Benelux market may also be expected to rely in-
creasingly on the African suppliers. West Germany, however, is allowed a duty-
free quota for import from third countries and, as per capita consumption is 
still rising, there remains room for Latin American exports to Germany to con-
tinue. Nevertheless the restrictive effects of the quota arrangement will 
undoubtedly be reflected in a relative deterioration of the Latin American 
export position; as presently calculated, the quota for 1967 is lower than 
that for 1961. Consequently, although German banana imports have been esti-
mated to rise by between 2.4 percent and percent a year in the next few 
years,6/ Central American exports to Germany are projected to increase by only 
one percent annually through 1967 (see again Table 33). 
5» It has also been assumed that while Guatemalan banana' production may 
continue to be relatively depressed, increased production elsewhere will per-
mit the total regional production to increase by the amount projected here. 
6. See OAS, The Impact of Trade Restrictions in Europe on the Banana 




PROJECTED TREND IN VOLUME OF BANANA IMPORTS FROM CENTRAL AMERICA 










Projected annual rate of 
increase of banana imports 
from Central America 
_ in 1962-67 „ 
(in percent) 
United States 10.1 1.7 r 
<2.0 
Canada 9.0 2.6 L 
West Germany 8 A 1.3 1.0 
Netherlands 5.9 1.2 -
Norway 7.6 0.9 . f 




Sources: Per Capita banana consumption: OAS Group to Prepare a Plan for 
Action Concerning Banana Exports, Working Paper (UP/G. 27/6/Add.), January 




Aside from  occasional exports of  small quantities of  bananas to other 
countries, the remainder of  Central American banana exports go to Norway and 
Sweden. Central American exports to this area might be assumed to maintain, 
but not expand substantially, their share of  a market in which per capita con-
sumption remains constant; that is, on the basis of  tñe relatively low rate of 
population increase in these countries and a decline in per capita consumption 
of  bananas in Sweden between 1955 and 1960,7/ they would rise only by one per-
cent a year. On the other hand, current per capita consumption of  bananas is' 
lower than in most other European countries and the United States, and should 
the decline noted recently in Sweden have been attributable to temporary fac-
tors no longer relevant, imports might increase considerably faster  than popu-
lation in the next few  years. A more plausible assumption would therefore  be 
an increase of  four  percent a year in Central American exports to these coun-
tries. No new important markets are anticipated in these projections of  1967 
exports although Denmark and Japan are two specific  possibilities. 
b. Unit value 
While export unit values vary among the Central American republics depend-
ing on the proportions of  different  varieties of  bananas exported, they have 
shown a similar tendency to decline during the 1950's. Given the saturation 
of  per capita demand in the largest market and the competition of  African  sup-
pliers for  the European market, a rising price is not anticipated in the next 
few  years. Neither does any substantial further  price decline appear likely 
at this time. • Central American production is well established, its markets 
fairly  well defined  and its exports closely controlled by a few  companies; 
although the volume of  exports fluctuates  widely from  year to year, it is. doubt-
ful  that present U.S. market prospects will inspire increases in acreage plan-
ted to bananas substantial enough to cause a glut. However, if  several of  the 
newly independen African  nations, encouraged by their prospects in the expand-
ing European market, launch overoptimistic production programs, an over-all 
excess of  supply could force  world banana prices st i l l lower. For the present 
projections, three alternative assumptions have been made regarding the unit 
value of  Central American banana exports in 1967. They are: stability; a 10 
percent decline from  the 1961 level; and 10 percent increase in export unit 
value over its 1961 level. 
c. Total value of  exports 
On the basis of  the export volume estimates for  each major market (derived 
from  Table 33)» a projected value of  banana exports in 1967 is derived for 
each of  the three alternative price assumptions (see Table 3^). The preferred 
projection, embodying the assumption of  price stability, suggests that banana 
export receipts may rise slightly between now and 1967, and the high estimate 
based on a price increase shows a more substantial improvement. On the .other 
hand, the low estimate, based on a 10 percent drop in unit value, implies 
no change in total value over I96O-6I, despite rising export volumes. 
7. U.S. Department of  Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, 
"Bananas" (FAS - M - 128) April 1962. 
/Table 
SUMMARY  OF PROJECTION OF CENTRAL AMERICAN BANANA EXPORTS IN 1967 
Anaual Exports Alternative Projections in 1967 
I960 1961 1962, i Preferred Low High 
Volume (in thousand metric tons) '833 821 736 910 910 910 
Unit value (in dollars per ton) 83 86 87 86 77 99 
Value (in millions of dollars 69 71 6k 78 70 86 





a. Exportable supply 
Cotton is a relatively new crop in Central America. Compared with 
1948-52, Central American cotton production has grown almost tenfold  as a 
result of  a quadrupling of  the land area under cultivation and a near doubling 
of  yields per hectare (see Table 35)• Though yields are-now. among the highest 
in the world, they could st i l l rise, and the implementation of  various irriga-
tion projects in the major producing countries will tend to increase both the 
volume and stability of  annual output (otherwise subjected to the vagaries of 
weather conditions). Whether or not the area under cotton cultivation will 
continue to increase through 1967, however, depends to a large extent on the 
trend of  prices in the world market. As a working hypothesis it can be assumed 
that prices will either remain the same or drop only moderately from  their pre-
sent levels. In the long run, cotton prices, which have fallen  by more than 
one-third since their 1950/51 peak, should continue to suffer  from  the growing 
competition of  synthetic fibers.  But drastic declines are not expected for  a 
substantial widening of  the price differential  with synthetics would induce a 
shift  of  demand back to cotton.8/ 
If  prices stabilize at their present level, which h&ve stimulated the 
most recent spurt in output, Central American cotton acreage can probably be 
expected to expand by another 25 percent or so between now and 19Ô7 (see 
Table 35, projection (B)). A decline in price on the world market, on the other 
hand, would undoubtedly inhibit such growth, but acreage might remain about 
unchanged (see Table 35, projection (A) ) as long as the price decline was 
moderate. 
In El Salvador, where cotton acreage rose sharply in 1 9 6 1 / 6 2 , some cut-
backs have been anticipated in the 1 9 6 2 / 6 3 season and a somewhat lower level 
of  plantings might continue to prevail in subsequent years if  prices fall. 
However, if  prices are maintained and markets available, there is little rea-
son to believe that cotton plantings in a few  years' time will be substantially 
below 80 thousand hectares. On the other hand, presumably only rising cotton 
prices could induce a further  extension of  the area devoted to that crop from 
its 1 9 6 1 / 6 2 high, in view of  the over-all shortage of  land resources. 
There is no shortage of  land in Guatemala and Nicaragua, and the govern-
ments in both countries are currently making intensive efforts  to stimulate 
cotton production by providing irrigation, roads and credits as well as techni-
cal assistance to cotton farmers.  In Guatemala, cotton acreage, which rose 
26 thousand hectares in 1 9 6 0 / 6 1 to 46 thousand hectares in the following  year, 
has probably reached 60 to 6 5 thousand hectares in the 1 9 6 2 / 6 3 crop year. In 




CENTRAL AMERICAN COTTON PRODUCTION STATISTICS, 1955-63= AND PROJECTIONS FOR 1967 
1948-52 195V55 1955/56 1956/57 1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63^ 1966/67 
(average) projection.— 
Production (ia. thousand metric tons) (A) (B) 
El Salvador 8 20 30 32 36 39 30 40 56 61 63 72 
Guatemala 2 9 10 10 14 16 14 21 31 54 54 72 Honduras — - 1 1 3 4 1 1 4 6 Nicaragua 8 44 35 42 48 ' 47 28 33 61 68 90 
Total 18 73 76 85 101 106 73 95 146 182 185 234 
Area (in thousand hectares) 
EL Salvador 21 30 46 38 40 53 38 51 81 70 80 
Guatemala 5 16 21 13 18 28 18 26 46 60 80 
Honduras 1 2 2 5 10 8 2 2 » • • 
Nicaragua 21 86 _8Z 70 61 Jb -ÍZ .61 JZZ JE 100 
Total 48 134 156 126 129 163 125 140 204* 205 260 
Yield (in ki los per lectare) 
El Salvador 360 685 665 834 891 .732 786 789 696 900 
Guatemala 300 562 449 772 785 583. 791 794 690 900 Honduras 290 300 390 270 380 440 780 770 • • • Nicaragua 580 Si 400 602 778 630 423 2it 700 
- - _ / 
900 
Average 375 545 487 675 785 650 585 680 695^ 900 
Central America (indices 1954/5̂  ? = 100) (A) (B) .  
Production 25 100 104 ' 116 138 145 100 130 200 , 249 253 320 
Area . 36 100 116 94 96 122 93 104 153 194 




... Less than 500 tons, 
á. Crop years ending in August 
b. Estimated on the basis of. ginnings within.season 
c. Excluding Honduras 
Note: Projection (B) assumes no drop in price from 1962 level. 
Projection (A) assumes prices decline up to 10 percent froa 1962 level. 
Sources: International Cotton Advisory Committee, Cotton-World Statistics and FAO 
Production Yearbook. 
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the light of these increases, it might even be conservative to forecast 80 
thousand hectares under cotton cultivation in Guatemala by 1967 under the as-
sumption of stable world prices. Falling prices might restrain net increases 
in planted area after 1962/63, with the bulk of the government effort being 
devoted to the retirement of less productive lands and their replacement by 
irrigated or otherwise more suitable plots. In Nicaragua, where cotton culti-
vation was depressed for several years in a row by bad weather, unfavorable 
world prices and credit shortages, the firming world price situation has re-
portedly induced sharply increased plantings in the past two years. By 1967, 
cotton acreage might have increased substantially beyond its record extension 
of the mid-1950's, if prices stabilize, but presumably no further gains could 
be expected in the event of a price decline. 
Central American cotton yields, as mentioned above, are among the highest 
in the world. However, government efforts to introduce irrigation, more ad-
vanced cultivation techniques and better varieties of cotton are likely to 
result in still higher yield levels in the next few years. Though in Nicaragua 
yields have lagged behind those of El Salvador and Guatemala in most recent 
years, the intensity of the effort now reportedly being made in this area may 
enable it to catch up with the rest of Central America. It is therefore as-
sumed that by 1967 yields will rise everywhere to 900 kilos per hectare, a re-
sult which was already achieved by ÉL Salvador during the 1957/58 crop and 
should therefore not be beyond the reaòh of any producing country in the 
region. 
On the basis of these assumptions, cotton output in the three major 
Central American producing countries in 1966/67 can be projected at I85 to 234 
thousand tons, depending on whether prices fall or stabilize between now and 
then. The size of the allowance that should be made for Hçmduras depends* on 
whether or not that country can be expected within the next few years to de-
velop cotton cultivation beyond its present small scale. Assuming that it 
does not,the present projections yield a range of about 190 to 240 thousand 
tons for total Central American cotton production by 1967. 
How much of this output will be available for export depends on the trend 
of local consumption. Central American consumption of raw cotton has more or 
less doubled between 1957 and 1962, to a level of about 15 thousand tons à 
year. The evolution of the textile industry in Central America will determine 
how fast this growth can continue in the next few years. There is considera-
ble scope for import substitution in the industry. According to a special 
study by the International Cotton Advisory Committee, however, total fiber 
consumption in Central America is only expected to rise to about 35 thousand 
tons by 1965 and 44 thousand tons by 1970.9/ This would imply that local con-
sumption of raw cotton is not likely to do more than double between now and 
• 9 . International Cotton Advisory Committee, Prospective Trends in 




1967 to approximately 30 thousand tons. Under these circumstances exportable 
production would amount to l60 to 210 thousand tons on the basis of our pro-
duction estimates. Under either price hypothesis, the 196? figure could thus 
show a substantial increase over the export volumes of 90 thousand tons in 1961 
and 135 thousand tons in 1962 (see Table 3 6 ) . 
b. World demand 
It is very difficult to say whether demand will be sufficient to absorb 
such a large volume of exports from Central America in 1967» World demand for 
cotton is expected to rise only slowly—perhaps at an annual rate of 1 percent 
a year in Western Europe and 2 or 2.5 percent a year in Japan. 10/ It might 
not even rise that fast, in view of the competition from synthetic fibers. On 
the whole, it seems reasonable to assume that between now and 1967 there will 
be little change in the level of Cjittr&L..^itpteiti;-. Its traditional 
markets in Western Europe, where the textilevinduetíySdme e»t®«t a de-
pressed sector. This means exports to Western Europe would remain in the 20-̂ 0 
thousand ton range where they have fluctuated in the past three or four years. 
The crucial question, however, will concern the evolution of the Japanese tex-
tile industry, for if its growth is checked as a result Of restrictive develop-
ment in world trade for manufactured cotton textiles, Central America is not 
likely to find adequate markets for the rising cotton output that has been pro-
jected here. On the assumption that Japanese demand for cotton is maintained 
at high levels, on the other hand and that Central America continues to improve 
its relative position on that market, exports to Japan could continue to rise 
as rapidly as they have in the past. Only this, together with the opening up 
of new markets elsewhere in the world, could sustain the growth of Central. 
American cotton production at the levels the region will be -capable of in the 
next few years. If this assumption is not acceptable, it should probably..be 
expected that at best exports to Japan can be maintained at their present rate 
of 60 to 70 thousand tons, and total exports óf cotton at little more than 100 
thousand tons—in other words there would be no further expansion (see again 
Table 3 6 ) . 
c. Value of exports 
The 1967 value projections corresponding to these different sets of alter-
natives are summarized in Table 36. The low projection corresponds to the most 
pessimistic assumption of virtual stagnation in world demand for Central American 
cotton, and assumes a return of export unit value to its 1959 low. If this 
should occur i the high cotton export receipts of 1962 would appear as a tempo-
rary departure from an otherwise stagnant trend in the value of cotton exports 
after 1 9 6 I . The high projection, on the other hand, assumes that the buoyant 
price situation which has induced the record crops of 1 9 6 1 / 6 2 and 1 9 6 2 / 6 3 will 
continue to prevail and that demand for cotton will be high, particularly in 
Japan. Under that hypothesis, Central American cotton export earnings could 
rise very rapidly in the next few years and top by 35 percent their 1962 
record. Perhaps the most prudent single estimate, however, should be 




SUMMARY  OF PROJECTION OF CENTRAL AMERICAN RAW COTTON EXPORTS 
IN 1967 
Alternative projection 
Actual exnort. for 1967 
I960 1961 1962?" Low High ' Preferred 
Volume of exporto (in 68 90 152 100 210 160 
thousand metric tons) 
Export unit value 
565 560 (in dollars per ton) 5̂ 5 500 550 525 
Total value of exporta (in 85 50 115 1 85 millions of dollars) 37 51 
Wot»» The figures projected for 1967 «re for exports outside of the Central 
American Common Market area. The 1960-62 figures given here inolude intra-
regional trade in raw cotton, but the value of this trade was less than 
$1 million In each year. 
/should be 
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should be based on the assumption that export unit value will fall somewhat 
from present levels, and that, though markets will be available for Central 
American cotton in Japan and elsewhere, demand will not be so high as to stimu-
late much further increases in production after 1962/63. In that case, Centra] 
American cotton export receipts can b# expected to remain at their present high 
level, but the next few years would be a period of consolidation rather than 
one of further advances. 
4. Wood 
The prospects for increased exports of wood products from Central America 
are encouraging, but the rate of growth of these exports is likely to be held 
back by the high demand for wood for local consumption 11/ as well as by the 
diminishing accessibility of coniferous timbers for which foreign demand is 
greatest. The wood-processing industry is in the first stages of development 
and will require considerable planning and investment for expansion. Thus, 
although the resource is plentiful and demand in the Latin American and 
Caribbean markets is expected to grow rapidly,12/ the extent to which exports 
increase during the next five years will depend largely on deliberate government 
action in that direction. 
El Salvador posesses limited quantities of a variety of woods, which it 
exports to other Central American republics. Costa Rioa and Guatemala have 
considerable resources as yet unexploited. Wood exports from these two coun-
tries declined,from 1955 to 1959» but increased in I960 and 1961 although 
remaining below the levels exported in 1955* Assuming that road construction 
11. Per capita consumption of sawn wood in Central America exceeds that , 
of all other Latin American countries but Brazil, and increased 70 perceiit '•"' 
between 19̂ 8-51 an(* 1956-59» faster than in any other subregion of Latin America. 
Per capita consumption of timber in logs is also among the highest in Latin 
America, and wood continues to be an important form of fuel through Central 
America. Boards and sheets of wood are new products to the area, produced only 
in Guatemala and not yet widely available. Consumption demand for wood in 
Central America, British Honduras and Panama has been projected for 1970 in 
United Nations, BCLA and FAO Tendencias y Perspectivas de los Productos Fores-
tales en América Latina, Santiago de Chile, 1962. The data are as follows: 
1956-59 1970 
Actual consumption Estimated consumption 
(in thousand cubic meters) 
Sawn 910 J 430 
Logs 610 760 
Firewood 15 000 18 200 
Boards, sheets 14 82 
12. United Nations, FAO, Agricultural Commodities - Projections for 
1970. 1962. 
/will permit 
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will permit access to 6ome forest areas previously unexploited, and that some 
technological improvements will take place during the next five years, the 
volume of wood exports from Costa Hica and Guatemala is assumed to recover the 
levels of 1955 by 1967. A recent study by FAO and ECLA points out that Honduras, 
the only major producer of sawn wood in the region, was operating its sawmills 
at full capacity in 1959 and is unlikely to be able to maintain this peak level 
in the near future. Nevertheless, Honduras offers the most optimistic outlook 
for wood exports of the Central American countries; numerous studies attest to 
this potential and plans have been drafted for a major industrial project 
destined to speed up the development of the country's forest resources and 
expand production of both sawn wood and more elaborated products based on this 
raw materia1.13/ Assuming that this or a similar project is implemented in the 
next few years, Honduran wood exports can presumably be expected to continue 
increasing over the peak levels of 1959-60, although at a much slower rate (5 
percent a year) than that attained in the period 19̂ 5-59 ( 25 percent +), due , 
to the difficulty of constructing new coordinated facilities in a short period 
of time and to the possible effects of past overextraction in a country where 
forest resources, although extensive, are already largely *(74 percent) 14/ in use. 
Nicaragua shares the problem of uneconomic exploitation of forest resources. 
On the basis of overextraction in the recent past of FAO-ECLA study mentioned 
above predicts a decline in wood exports from Nicaragua in the 1960's. The 
slightly more optimistic viewpoint has been adopted here that the volume of 
wood exports will be maintained at the average level of 1955-60 through 1967» 
This presupposes some increase in investment to open new forest areas as those 
now accessible are fully in use. 
On the assumption that prices will not change, the value of wood exports 
outside the integration area is estimated at about $15 million in 1967 (see 
Table 37). 
5. Heat 
Heat is one of the most promising newer export products of the Central 
American republics.15/ The market̂  for these exports is at present almost, ex-
clusively the United States, with occasional small shipments to South America,., 
As the Central Americans are low-cost producers of this product, there is a 
good possiblity that certain varieties of frozen meats may be sent in the 
future to Europe and to Japan. But even for the present, the market appears 
to be ample and the export situation to depend primarily on conditions of 
supply . 
13. ECLA, El Desarrollo Económico de Honduras, i960. ' 
14. United Nations, ECLA and FAO, o£. cit. 
15* "Meat" includes beef, veal, pork and poultry, fresh chilled or frozen. 
As exports outside Central America consist predominantly of beef and veal, the 
projections are based on estimates of the growth of exports of those products. 
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Table 37 
SUMMARY  OF PROJECTION OF CENTRAL AMERICAN WOOD EXPORTS IN 196? 
Actual exports Projection 
for 1967 I960 1961 
Volume 
Nicaragua (in million >5.8 27.1 36 
board feet) 
Other four countries (in 174.4 160.7 233 thousand metric tons) 
Unit value 
Nicaragua (in dollars 
per board foot) : 0.10 0.11 1 oao 
Other four countries (in dollars per ton) 48.8 48.4 48.5 
Value (in millions of dollars) 11.47 10.68 * 15.00 
Note: jtntra-regional exports of wood are excluded both from the 1967 projec-
tion and from the I96O-6I figures. 
/EL Salvador 
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El Salvador has little opportunity to take advantage of this ready market 
as pasture land is already fully used. The other four countries are exporters 
of meat outside the region, however. With the completion of its first packing 
plant at the end of 1961, Guatemala increased its prospects for higher meat 
exports. The outlook is even more favorable in Costa Rica, Honduras and Nica-
ragua where the interest in expansion is prompting the import of pedigreed 
breeding cattle and extension of pasturage, as well as the construction of new 
slaughterhouse and packing facilities. Assuming that the recent fall in Costa ' 
Rican exports, due to the inability to import Nicaraguan cattle, will be reme-
died in the next year or two, meat exports from the region may be expected to 
continue to show a vigorous rate of increase through the 1962-67 period. 
The estimates of 1967 beef exports are based on certain rough statistical 
relationships found to prevail in Central America in recent years, concerning 
the rate of slaughter and average meat content per animal. The size of herd, 
which in 1961 varied between 1.0 and 1.6 million head in each of the five coun-
tries, is assumed to increase by 4 percent ayear through 1967» the rate of 
slaughter to rise slightly from the 8-10 percent level of 1960-61 to 11-13 per-
cent in 1967-68 and consumption to increase k percent annually. Although the 
conditions governing the livestock industry vary among the several countries, 
projections on an individual basis differ little in result from those obtained 
by treating the region as a whole. The results for beef exports are summarized 
in Table 38. 
Assuming that total meat exports will change in the same proportion, the 
estimated volume of exports in I967 is about 40 thousand tons. Aside from the 
crude method of arriving at this figure, the possibility of attaining an export 
volume of such a magnitude, which implies an annual rate of increase of qlose 
to 20 percent, depends primarily on careful planning of the expansion necessary 
and on the extent to which domestic consumption increases. Demand conditions 
appear to be highly favorable. A United Nations.(FAO) study points out that on 
the basis of a high and a low income-growth assumption for the economies of 
Western Europe and the United States, the demand of these countries for meat in 
1970 could either absorb all of the estimated world supply at that time or fall 
slightly short of supply.16/ In the latter case as the demand for meat is highly 
elastic with respect to price, as well as to income, a moderate price decline 
would easily clear the market. In either case the outlook for Central American 
meat exporters is favorable; as relatively low cost producers of chilled and 
frozen meats, they may be able to sell at a lower price and also to more dis-
tant markets should their present advantage of proximity to the United States 
market not be sufficient to absorb increasing supplies in the future. 
On the. assumption of constant prices (of 1960-61), an export volume of 40 
thousand tons of meat in 1967-68 would bring in export receipts of $25 million 
(see Table 39). * 
6. Sugar 
Central American exports of sugar are directed primarily to the United 
States market as regulated by the quota system for United States imports of 




PROJECTED VOLUME OF CENTRAL AMERICAN EXPORTS 
OF BEEF IN 1967 
Actual exports Projections for 
I96O-6I 1967-68 
(average) (average) 
Size of herd (number of heads) 5 600 000 7 100 000 
Number of heads slaughtered 570 OOOS/ 860 000 
Consumption (number of heads) 465 000^ 590 000 
Exports (number of heads) 105 000 270 000 
Average meat content per animal 
exported (Kg.) 1302/ 140 
Volume of beef exports (in metric tons) 13 600 37 800 
a* Somewhat higher than usual as a proportion of total slaughter as Guatemala 
did not yet have packing facilities in operation so almost the total 
slaughter was attributed to consumption, 
b. A weighted average, based on 1960-61 estimates of the volume of export.s 
and estimated boneless equivalent meat content of 92 kg. in Honduras and 
135 kg. in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua. 
Note: Intra-regional exports of meat are excluded both from the projections 
and the actual figures. 
Sources: Size of herd, slaughter and consumption from: Costa Bica, Banco 
Central de Costa Rica, Informe Anual; Guatemala, Banco de Guatemala, Boletín 
Estadístico} United Nations, Análisis y Proyecciones del Desarrollo Económico. 
XI: El Desarrollo Económico de Honduras ( E/CN.12/549). I960} Nicaragua, Di-
rección General de Estadística y Censos, Boletín de Estadísticas; and United 
Nations, FAO, Production Yearbook. 1961» Also: United Nations. ECLA, La Gana-




SUMMARY  OF PROJECTION OF CENTRAL AMERICAN  MEAT EXPORTS IN I967 
Actual exports Projection 
I960 1961* for  1967 
Volume (in thousand metric tons) 13.8 14.2 40.0 
Unit value (in dollars per ton) 6l8 638 628 
Value (in millions of  dollars) 8.5 9.1 25.O 
*Note: ¡Entra-regional meat exports are excluded both from  the 1967 projection 
and the: 1960-61 figures. 
/that commodity. 
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that commodity. Under the present legislation, effective until December 31, 
1964, the basic annual quota allocated to the five Central American countries 
taken together is 72.6 thousand tons. As of early 1963, allocations under the 
global quota for that year and additional amounts prorated in proportion to 
the basic quotas or awarded as a result of supply deficiencies in other produc-
ing countries totaled 4-3.3 thousand tons, so that Central America's total al-
lowance for export to the United States during the year reached nearly 116 
thousand tons, and was likely to be increased still further before the end of 
the year. 
A substantial part of this amount corresponds to the reallocation of the 
Cuban quota. A major assumption in estimating Central America's probable U.S. 
quota in 1967 is, therefore, that Cuba will continue to be excluded from the . 
U.S. market. In addition, it is assumed that while neither total U.S. sugar 
consumption nor the share of imports in total consumption is likely to rise 
considerably, some inorease in Central America's allotment is politically fea-
sible, as well as consistent with the production conditions in the countries 
themselves. The 1963 import allocation so far is only moderately higher than 
aotual exports in 1962. On the basis of these asumptions, the I967 allocation 
is estimated at 145 thousand tons, with the increase expected to acorue largely 
to El Salvador, which needs a larger foreign market now that. Honduras has be-
come self-sufficient in sugar, and to a lesser extent to Nicaragua, the largest 
of the Central American sugar exporters. 
This is an optimistic estimate, dependent on the assumption that Central 
American sugar production will continue to show the vigoruos increase which 
followed the announcement of the i960 quotas, at which time El Salvador and 
Guatemala obtained an import allotment for the first time. As stocks are'cur-
rently low and prices very high, large increases in production are indicated 
in the next year or two; after that both the volume exported and the destina-
tion will depend on the rate at which domestic consumption rises and on the 
course of prices from their present peaks. Assuming that domestic consumption 
rises slowly, relative to production, the surplus available for export may 
allow some additional quantities for sale above the U.S. import quota. Only 
a small increase in total exports to 155 thousand tons is estimated here, 
although sales on the world market could increase at the expense of sales "to 
the U.S. if the U.S. price premium should vanish for any extended period. 
The future course of sugar prices is extremely difficult to predict. 
Historically the United States price has exceeded the world price of sugar by 
a considerable margin. As mentioned in the analysis of recent trends in sugar 
exports appearing in Section A above, the current sugar legislation provides 
for the elimination of this premium on all sugar imported under the global 
quota and for its gradual reduction on sugar imported under the individual 
countries' basic quotas, but the import levy system through which this was to 
be achieved has been temporarily suspended because of the present perturbations 
in the world sugar market. However, the extraordinarily rapid rise of the 
world price for sugar in 1963 is attributed to temporary factors, such as the 
effects of a severe winter on the European beet crop and production cutbacks 
in some Latin American exporting countries where heavy stock had accumulated. 




Furthermore, additional sugar beet acreage is being planned in Europe, and the 
European Economic Community is expected to be fully self-sufficient in sugar 
by 1965* Assuming that the world price will have declined from its present 
peak by 196?, although remaining above the average of the last five years, it 
should again be below the United States price. If this does ocour and the 
United States renews its policy of reducing the U.S. market price premium 
through import fees, the United States price paid to the exporter may be ex-
pected to drop below the 1961-62 level. Eiis is what has been assumed here. 
For the purposes of this projection the U.S. price is assumed to have declined 
20 percent below the 1961 level by 196? and the unit value of exports on the 
world market is arbitrarily estimated at 3.60 cents per pound, about 25 per-
cent higher than in i960. 
Under these assumptions, the projected value of Central American sugar 
exports in 196? would be #14 million (see Table 40). 
7. Coooa 
Costa Bioan productivity is low. Cocoa plants are mostly old and culti-
vation is done on a small scale by farmers reluctant to adopt modern tech-
niques. Overcoming this resistance could reportedly lead to considerable in-
creases in yields within a very short time (two to three years), and would 
both improve the quality and stabilize the volume of the Costa Bican cocoa 
crop. Barring such a development, however, there is no reason to expect sub-
stantial increases in the level of Costa Bican cocoa production in the next 
few years. 
Under these circumstances, Costa Bican cocoa exports* should not be much 
affected by the forthcoming International Cocoa Agreement. Whether or not 
Costa Bica finally comes under the denomination of small producers, (for which 
there will be no export quotas) depends upon the selection of two thousand 
tons or ten thousand tons annual export maximum  as the criterium. But even if 
the former limit is selected, and Costa Bica must be subjected to an export 
quota, this quota is likely to be ample, in biew of the fact that it would 
apply only to exports of "bulk" cocoa, and that one-quarter of Costa Bican 
exports would be exempt as "fine." Preliminary calculations indicate that, 
should Costa Bica not be given small producer status, its basio quota for bulk 
cocoa is likely to be set at nine to ten thousand tons. Adding fine.cocoa 
. exports of about three thousand tons to this figure it appears that Costa Rica 
would be allowed an annual export level pf 12 to 13 thousand tons, which would 
be quite adequate at the present production rates. 
On the demand side, the maintenance of Costa Bican coooa exports at a 
level of about 12 thousand tons a year merely implies that present markets 
remain available. There is no reason why this should not be so. United 
States imports of Costa Rican coooa have been rather stable in recent years. 
Prospects are not particularly bright in the Colombian market, but Japanese 
purchases may grow in importance. The discrimination to be established by 
/Table kO 
Table 4 
SUMMARY  OF PROJECTION OF CENTRAL AMERICAN SUGAR EXPORTS IN 1967 
Volume (in thousand 
metrio tons) 
Unit value (in U.S. 
cents per pound) 
Value (in millions of 
dollars) 
Actu al expor ts U.S. quota 
for 1963 
Projection 










115.9 Exports to U.S. 
145.0 
Other 10.0 




*Note i Intra-regional trade in raw sugar has been excluded from both the 1967 
projection and the 1960-62 actual export figures. 
/the EEC 
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the EEC in favor of African suppliers should have little direct impact on Costa 
Rican exports, in view of the very marginal nature of the European market. 
As far as cocoa prices are concerned, they should begin to stabilize, par-
ticularly with the help of the minimum  price mechanisms contemplated by the 
draft Cocoa Agreement. While no minimum  price has been negotiated yet, there 
are indications that the price levels that have prevailed in 1962 are consid-
ered low by both consuming and producing countries. We can therefore expect 
that in the next few years prices will at worst be no lower, and probably 
slightly higher. On the assumption that for Costa Rica by 1967 the unit value 
of cocoa exports is at about its 1960-1961 levels, we have a value projection 
of $5.5 -6,0 million for 12 thousand tons—or a little less if export volume 





SUMMARY  OF PROJECTION OF COSTA RICAN COCOA EXPORTS IN 1967 
Actual exports 
I960 1961 1962* 
Projection 
for 1967 
Volume (in thousand metrio 
tons) 11 8 10 2 8 8 12 0 
Unit value (In dollars per 
ton) 495 467 523 
• 
465 - 500 
Value (in million dollars) 59 4 8 4 6 5 5 - 6 0 
Note» The 1967 projection is for exports outside of the Central American 






PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN 
PRODUCTIVE STRUCTURE 
A. STRUCTURE OF THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
I. Structure of the output by major sectors 
of economic activity 
In order to evaluate properly the range of Central American economic di-
versification, it must be considered both in global terms —with a view toward 
appraising the general features of the structural development— and in its 
more important details, among which those relating to industrialization and 
foreign trade are especially outstanding. 
The purpose of this section is to shed some light on recent trends in cur-
rent production of goods and services as represented by major sectors of eco-
nomic activity, with the focus on the changes that have occurred in the sec-
toral composition of output during the last decade. Variations in the produc-
tive structure are, of course, the consequence of the different rates of 
growth in the several sectors; hence, the analysis will alsé be extended to 
the varying progress of sectoral growth and the changing pattern of the forces 
that determine" it. 1/ 
The most prominent characteristic of the combined productive structure of 
the five Central American countries lies in the fact that the sector of primary 
activities, which as early as 1950 was somewhat below half the total product, 
had dropped by i960 to levels below 40 percent (see Table 42). 2/  It should be 
noted that the relative position of this sector —which almost entirely repre-
sents the agricultural and livestock sector, since the importance of fisheries 
and mining is small— is slightly outstripped by the position of the tertiary 
group, consisting of services of all kinds. 
T7 The problems of the manufacturing structure will be: discussed in the 
two following sections, and the composition of imports, another important indi-
cator of structural changes, will be examined in Chapter III. 
2. It is appropriate to observe that because of various statistical prob-
lems relating to both the national macroeconomia estimates used in the calcula-
tions and the effort to consolidate the pertinent data for the entire area, the 
figures in the table may be regarded only as approximations. Nonetheless, there 
are reasons to think —and a certain internal consistency of the figures seems 
to confirm this— that the margins of error are not so great às to distort the 
essential features of the present structure, and still less the long-range 
trends shown during the ten years in question. Aside from this, the statisti-
cal aspects first mentioned will not be commented upon except in global terms 
or to point out the reservations that must be kept in mind in interpreting 
them, and only the latter aspects —with respect to the development time has 
brought— will be analyzed in greater detail. 
5. According to recent preliminary studies, the prospects of the fishery 
sector look quite encouraging for the area and apparently will make possible a 
marked increase in exports in this line, as well as an increased domestic supply. 
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Table 42 
CENTRAL AMERICAN ISTHMUS: STRUCTURE OF THE COMBINED OUTPUT 
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA, EXCLUDING AND INCLUDING PANAMA, 
BY SECTORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1950, 1955. AND i960 
(In percentages of the gross domestic product) 
Central America Central American 
Sectors (historic) a/ Isthmus b/ 
1950 1955 i960 I95O 1955 I960 
Agriculture-stock raising, 
forestry, hunting, fisheries 41.9 36.3 42.1 39.9 3̂ .1 
Mining (including quarrying) 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.1 
Subtotal (I): Primary sector 46.7 43.1 43.4 41.0 
Manufacturing industry 11.7 12.3 . 1̂ .3 11.5 11.8 13.̂  
Construction 4.0 4.2 3.9 4.4 
Electric power, gas, and water 0.5 . 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.1 
Subtotal (II): Secondary sector 16.2 17.5 19.̂  16.1 17.0 19.0 
(I+II): Sectors producing goods 62.9 60.6 ?6.9 59.5 57.1 ?4.2 
Transportation and communications 4.5 5.2 4.4 •5.2 
Commerce 12.2 13.3 12.8 12.0 13.I 12.7 
Banking and insurance 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.5 
Government 5.6 7.6 8.0 5.8 6.6 6.8 
Personal services 7.5 7.3 8.6 10.1 10.0 11.6 
Income from property 5.4 5.8 4.8 4.7 6.0 
Other services 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.8 1.0 
Subtotal (III): Tertiary sector 37.1 39.4 43.1 40.5 42.0 45.8 
Total: Gross Domestic Product 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a. Includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. b. In addition to countries named in a/, also includes Panama. 
Sources: The computations shown in the table were based on figures in the fol-
lowing publications and reports: United Nations, Yearbook of Nation-
al Accounts Statistics (1957, 1961); United Nations,_ECLA, Boletín 
Econ6mico de América Latina, Suplemento Estadístico (i960, 1961, 
1962); Desarrollo Económico y Social de El Salvador, Desarrollo Eco-
nômico y Social de Guatemala, Desarrollo Econômico y Social de 
Honduras, Desarrollo Econômico y Social de Nicaragua, and Desarrollo 
Econômico y Social de Panamá, reports submitted by the respective 




October 1962 (OAS, Docs. Nos. 25, 33, 30, Jl, and 22); U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Investment in Central America (1956); direct in-
formation from the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador; the basic 
data referring to the Guatemalan productive structure for 1950 were 
estimated on the basis of fragmentary reports, and those for 1955, 
on the basis of the 1956 productive structure. 
In the computations an effort was made to make certain adjust-
ments in the basic figures, mainly for the purpose of eliminating or 
lessening the conceptual differences that exist in the matter of sec-
toral classification. For example, it was endeavored to transfer, 
the product of state enterprises, including public utilities and 
nationalized banking, to the appropriate lines of economic activity; 
in doing this recourse was taken to fragmentary information and, in 
the absence of better indicators, to estimates by analogy. For El 
Salvador the figures used were for 1959 instead of i960, since the 
data prepared by ECLA for that series come up Only to 1959» although 
on the other hand they go back to 1950 and. also include 1955. Al-
though the Salvadora» figures on the output of the construction and 
manufacturing industries and agriculture In 1959 were slightly ad-
justed, in the sense that they indicate the data of the new national 
series, it is possible that, even so, the proportion Shown for con-
struction —which was slightly decreased in the process of the adjust-
ment— may still be somewhat high with respect to the real situation. 
Constant values were then found for all the amounts and, finally, 
they were converted into dollars of 1950 in order to add them to-
gether for the entire area; in making the conversion the method de-
scribed in the Boletín Econômico de América Latina (ECLA, 1956, No. 
1-2) was used. Possible deficiencies in the parities used may have 
had some influence on the weighted value, bat there are reasons to 
believe that the proportions in the consolidated structure have not 
been distorted to any major degree, since the probable errors of 
weighting have tended to compensate themselves between the more de-
veloped and the less developed countries of the area. 
When the principal structural characteristics of historic Central America . 
are compared with those of the Central American Isthmus as a whole, it is noted 
that the proportions do not differ substantially, although the inclusion of 
Panama, with its special situation resulting from the Canal Zone economy, in-
creases the- relative importance of services to some extent and at the same time 
slightly lowers the position of the primary activities, h/ 
Furthermore, this latter effect is also the consequence of the fact 
that the agriculture of Panama has no export component of as niueh importance as those 
of the other states of the area, and that agricultural output for domestic con-
sumption is usually lower, in terms of value, than that of production for export. 
While in a number of countries of the Isthmus the share of the export component 
is around half of the agricultural output, in Panama it is one third. 
/With respect 
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With respect to the relative importance of the primary Bector of the econ-
omy, the highest is found in Honduras, the only country where such activities 
represented more than half of the total at the beginning of the decade and 
where they still are not much below that level (see Table 43). The lowest pro-
portion for these activities is in Panama, where they account for only one-
fourth of output, while in El Salvador, Costa Rica and Nicaragua they exceed 
one-third and are almost that high in Guatemala. 
On the other hand, the share of the tertiary sector is relatively higher 
in the output of Panama, although it is likewise marked in the products of 
Costa Rica and Guatemala. 
With respect to the recent position of the secondary activities, the 
figures given seem to indicate coefficients for the six countries that range 
between 15 and 22 percent. These figures, however, require certain qualifica-
tions. The national data used in preparing this table do not refer to identi-
cal variants of the concept of gross national product, and this fact particu-
larly affects the relative position of industry. Following the necessary ad-
justments, the range of variation of these national coefficients is restricted 
to a spread between 15 and 19 percent. At the same time, after such adjust-
ments, the shares of the manufacturing sector vary only between 10 and 13»5 
percent. 
A study of the development that has taken place by sectors reveals a 
marked decline in the rate of growth in the agricultural sector, which dropped from 
more than 3.5 percent per year during the first five years to little more than one or 
a half of one percent during the second five years, chiefly because of the less than 
favorable development of the world market for the area's principal export products 
(see Table 44). 
5. Although the original data available for.Costa Rica, Honduras and 
Panama give the output "at factor cost," the data for the other countries give 
it "at market prices"; that is, they include indirect taxes which are levied 
mostly on manufactured goods, although they also affect certain tertiary activi-
ties. In order to obtain the adjusted sectoral percentages mentioned above, an 
effort has been made on the basis of the partial information available, espe-
cially in the case of El Salvador, to convert the national data that indicated 
the output "at market prices" to figures that would represent it "at factor 
cost." This procedure means that the relative position of some sectors de-
creases as a result of the elimination of the net indirect tax, while the 
share of the other increases. In the cases considered, the relative position 
of the entire tertiary sector has scarcely varied, since the decreases in some 
of its subdivisions —transportation, commerce—  were offset by automatic in-
creases in the share of other components of the group. On the other hand, the 
proportion of the secondary sector, and particularly of the manufacturing in-
-j dustry in the total, decreased, and agriculture's proportion increased by about 
the same amount. But increases in the share of the agricultural sector are 
less significant if they are viewed in the light of the earlier shares of this 
sector, which were characterized by quite high figures. 
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Table 
CENTRAL  AMERICAN ISTHMUS: STRUCTURE OF THE PRODUCT BY MAJOR SECTORS 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF THE SIX COUNTRIES OF THE AREA, SEPARATELY, 
1950 AND I960 a/ 
(In percentages of the gross domestic product) 
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama 
1950 1960 1950 1959 1950 i960 1950 I960 1950 I960 I95O I960 
Agriculture-stock raising, 
forestry, hunting, fisheries 45.2 35.8 43.4 37.9 41.2 31.1 55.1 44.1 45.4 37.6 26.9 24.3 
Entire primary sector 45.9 36.3 44.1 38.3 42.9 32.8 56.5 45.I 47.8 39.3 27.4 25.0 
Manufacturing industry 10.7 11.0 11.4 14.9 14.9 17.3 8.1 12.0 10.1 12.3 10.4 9.6 
Entire secondary sector 14.6 15.0 17.1 22.2 19.6 22.2 12.2 16.0 13.2 17.4 15.4 16.9 
Tertiary sector 39.5 48.7 ; m & 1 59.0 ..Í3U2 57.2 58.1 
Gross domestic product 
(Total of the three sectors) 100.0 100.0 100.0 lOO.O 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1CC.C 1CC.C 
' • • : A. • -
al 1950 and 1959 for El Salvador. 
Sources: The publications and data mentioned in the reference note and thé methodology of Table 42. Although the 
figures cannot be regarded as precise within one decimal ppint, thè decimal points were kept in order not to increase 
the possibilities of error by rounding the relatively small quantities. 
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Table 
CENTRAL AMERICAN ISTHMUS: GROWTH RATE OF THE VARIOUS SECTORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
IN THE CONSOLIDATED GROSS PRODUCT OF THE AREA, EXCLUDING AND INCLUDING PANAMA 
1950-55, 1955-60, AND 1950-60 
(Cumulative annual rates of growth) 
Central America (historic) Central American Isthmus 
1950-55 1955-60 1950-60 1950-55 1955-60 1950-60 
Agriculture, stock raising, 
0.6 4.0 0.8 forestry, hunting, fisheries 3.7 2.1 2.4 
Mining (including quarrying) a/ 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.7 3.3 3.0 
Subtotal (I): Primary sector hi 0.6 2.1 hi 0.9 
Manufacturing industry 6.3 6.7 6.5 5.7 6.8 6.2 
Construction 8.0 2.0 5.0 7.7 4.4 6.0 Electric power, gas, water 8.8 13.3 ll.o 7.6 11.0 9.3 
Subtotal (II): Secondary sector 6¿8 hi 6̂ 2 6.4 
> Goods-producing; segmente (I-II) irl 2.2 hi 4.6 2.6 lá 
Transport and communications 6.1 6.5 6.3 5.7 7.0 6.4 
Commerce 7.2 2.8 6.7 - 3^ 5.5 
Banking and insurance 8.1 5.4 6.7 7.3 6.2 6.8 
Government 8.3 4.6 6.4 . 8.1 4.8 6.4 
Personal services 4.9 6.8 5.9 h.7 7.2 6.0 
Income from property 5.0 9.7 7.3 4.8 9.2 7.0 
Other services 14.9 V 14.3 V 14.6 V -3.9 8.9 2.3 
Subtotal (III): Tertiary sector 6̂ 6 hJt 6.0 hi hi hi 
Total: Gross Domestic Product hi hi 4.4 5.1 4.1 4¿6 
a. Since the share of mining was estimated in some cases on the basis of somewhat un-
certain indicators and since small amounts are concerned, it may be that the rates 
oí growth shown are not very exact. , 
b. These rates are very high, owing to the fact that thfey have been computed on the basis 
of small initial quantities; furthermore, this item refers only to Costa Rica and 
represents the residual that could not be incorporated into the other sectors. 
Source: The basic data indicated in the footnote to Table 42 were used. 
/Meanwhile, 
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Meanwhile, the growth of the manufacturing sector, with an annual rate of 
increase of around 6.5 percent, followed a more or less even course throughout 
the decade, at least in historic Central America. Since Panama's industrial 
development was less vigorous during the first five years, the inclusion of its 
figures somewhat lowers the coefficient for the first period, and does not much 
increase it for the second period. 
It is appropriate to point oat that the expansion in the secondary sector 
as a whole was not very different from that Shown̂  ̂ metnufactUring industry, 
its most important component. The discrepancies notedar© due to the recent 
less dynamic progress in construction, brought about b¡jF the weak growth of total 
income. The favorable growth rate in the power sector, of 11 and approximately 
9.5 percent, excluding and including Panama, respectively, had little influence 
on the development of the entire secondary sector, because its weight in the 
total product is only one percent. 
As for the expansion of the tertiaèry activitieŝ : wftareih the growth rate 
was slightly higher during the first five-year period than even the rate shown 
by manufacturing industry, it is sufficient for the mòmenlt tp note that during 
the second five years some of the impetus was lost. 
In short, the total growth rate of the Central American economies, both 
with and without Panama, declined from almost 5.5 percent per year in the first 
period to 3.5 percent in the second, thus giving à grt^^ rate of 4.5 percent 
for the entire decade. 
With reference to total output, it may be noted that, the highest 10-year 
increase —between 5 and 6 percent per year— corresponds to Costa Rica, Panama 
and Nicaragua, while the lowest occurred in Honduras, where."development was at 
a standstill during the first five years (see Table 45). With regard to ány in-
creases in the per capita output, attention is called to the fact that the 
extraordinary population increase in Central America has largely neutralized 
the effects of the economic expansion. Thus, for the Isthmus as a whole, there 
was an annual per capita increment of 1.4 percent in the 10-year period, and 
for the area without including Panama, 1.2 percent. FQr the last five years in 
particular, it is noted that the rates declined to 0.8 and 0.3 percent, respec-
tively, having dropped to a negative figure for Nicaragua and remained almost 
stationary for Costa Rica. Panama was the only country that showed a relatively 
favorable growth in its per capita product during this second period. 
Before attempting to interpret the changes that have taken place in the 
composition of the Central American output and to evaluate their significance, 
it is interesting to compare the percentage changes shown in this area with the 
analogous development of productive structures at the world level. To do this, 
data for 51 countries 6/  —omitting the Central American nation's— were 
6. The analysis covers the economic structure Of practically all of those 
countries whose output by sectors is given in the latest edition (I96I) of the 
United Nations Statistical Yearbook, the chief exception being the countries that 
have centrally planned economies, since their special characteristics and the fact 




CENTRAL AMERICAN ISTHMUS: GROWTH RATE OF THE TOTAL PRODUCT 
AND PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE FOR THE SIX COUNTRIES OF THE AREA 
1950-55, 1955-60, AND I95O-6O 
(Cumulative annual growth rates) 
Annual growth 
of total product 
Annual per capita growth 
of the product 
1950-55 1955-60 1950-60 1950-55 1955-60 1950-60 
Costa Rica 7.4 4.5 6.0 3.8 . 0.2 2.0 
El Salvador 4.5 3.1 3.8 1.6 1.2 1.4 
Guatemala 4.9 4.0 4.4 1.7 0.9 l«3 
Honduras 2.3 4.5 3^ -1.1 0.7 -o;3 
Nicaragua 9.3 1.0 5.1 6.4 -2.6 1.8 
Panama 4.0 6.8 5.4 1.2 4.2 2.1 
Central America 
(historic) lã 4¡4 2.2 1.2 
Central American 
Isthmus hi 4a 2.0 0.8 1.4 
Sources; The basic data mentioned in the footnote to Table were Used, as 
well as the publication of the Inter American Statistical Institute entitled 
América en Cifras, I960, Estadísticas Demogr&ficas. 
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classified in seven categories, corresponding to four successive stages of in-
dustrial development, and in each oategory the countries were subdivided into 
large ones and small ones, except for the very earliest stage. 2/ 
If what happened in the rest of the world is compared with the changes 
that took place in the productive structure of Central America, certain inter-
esting conclusions become apparent, despite the limitations of the data. In 
the first two stages of economic development (Categories A and B in Table 46), 
the tertiary sector tends to increase more rapidly than the other >two sectors 
of the economy, and even more rapidly than the primary sector. 8/ The explan-
ation of this phenomenon is fairly clear. While from its very beginning eco-
nomic and social development promotes an increase in and diversification of 
requirements, it is not indispensable that a large part of the goods so re-
quired be produced locally, for, at least to the extent of the capacity to im-
port, they can be purchased abroad. However, this solution is scarcely feasi-
ble with respect to services, and therefore a greater increase in tertiary 
activities is almost inevitable in this phase of development. An accompanying 
circumstance is found in the different investment requirements. While the 
national production of a large part of the new industrial articles, together 
with the generation of electric power, presupposes relatively sizeable fixed 
investments, this requirement is not tied to an equal extent with the expansion 
of various tertiary sectors such as, to give prime examples, commerce and gen-
eral public administration. In turn, various services whose development usu-
ally goes along on a par with an appreciable amount of construction or with 
other relatively heavy physical investments, are more likely to have the neces-
sary funds available; this customarily occurs in the case of banking and de-
fense. The professional services inevitably require certain investments in 
human capital, but if longer periods are considered rather than only a few" 
years, the supply of such services can be relatively elastic, although often 
through various emergency solutions. 
The tertiary sector that generally requires larger fixed investments and 
that frequently fails to obtain them in the first phases of development is 
transportation, and on top of that situation, numerous regulations frequently 
curb the natural development of its prices. Therefore, the participation of 
this sector in the gross product does not usually increase much at the begin-
ning, or, to put it in other words, it tends to increase only after a certain 
degree of industrialization has already been reached. 
7. For this particular phase of economic development, data have been 
found for only one populous country, Nigeria, the other nations included in 
this group having less than 15 million inhabitants. 
8. Actually, this table only shows what the world trend was during the 
last decade. However, other available figures seem to indicate.that similar 
trends also prevailed in preceding periods. For example, see Colin Clark, 
The Conditions of Economic Progresa (London, 1940), or Simon Kuznets, Aspectos 
Cuantitativos del Desarrollo EconSmico (CEMLA, Mexico, 1959)• 
/Table 46 
Table 46 
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE WOULD: CHANGES III TEE STRUCTURE OF THE PRODUCT 
OF SELECTED COUNTRIES, GHOOPED ACCORDING TO DEVELOPMENT AJÍD SIZE, 1950 a/ 
(In percentages of the gross domestic product) 
A. Underde veloped 
countries 6. Less industrialized countries C. Semi-industrialized countries D. Highly industrialed countries Central America 
Small and Large I. Small II. Large I. Small II. Large I. Small II. Large Inclading Pacana Excl uding Panama 
1950 1960 Varia-tion 1950 I960 
Varia-
tion 1950 I960 
Varia-
tion 1950 1960 
Varia-
tion 1950 I960 
Varia-
tion 1950 I960 
Varia-
tion 1950 I960 
Varia-
tion 1950 I960 
Varia-
tion 1950 I960 
Varia-
tion 
Primary sectors 60 52 -8 VI 33 -8 53 <46 -7 33 29 4 J1 29 -2 19 15 -4 19 12 -7 47 57 -10 43 36 -7 
Secondary sectors 11 13 2 19 21 2 14 17 3 24 27 3 23 26 3 40 43 3 39 42 3 16 19 5 16 19 3 
Tertiary sectors 29 35 6 <<0 46 6 33 37 it *»3 Mt 1 46 45 -1 41 42 1 46 4 57 43 6 41 46 5 
TOTAL: 100 100 100 100 100 100 122 100 ICQ 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Manufacturing 
sector only 6 7 1 13 15 2 10 12 2 18 20 2 18 20 2 31 53 2 51 33 2 12 14 2 11 13 2 
nade, first, according to the share of the manufacturing sector in the total product, ranges of 41-26, 25-1*, 13-10, and 9-3® having been set up. Then, the original classification xas slightly 
modified in those casea where othsr indicators of manufacturing development —primarily the per capita national product—werein marked contradiction to the sectoral share. In fact, all the 
categories include seven countries, except C-I, which covers nine. In cases «here the source did not give data for the Initial or final reference year, the figures for a year close thereto, or 
the average for an earlier and later year, equally separated from the reference year, were used. An attempt has been made by the use of such averages to soften, when possible, the effects of 
extraordinary years. In each category the simple averages of the sectoral shares in the gross national product of each country were calculated, except for Central America, where the sectors and 
total product were combined for the entire area. 
Sources: Table 42 and Statistical Yearbook. 1961. United Nations. 
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In the later 6tages of development —Categories C and D in the table— the 
total share of services in the gross product does not generally increase so much. 
Even though it appears to gather new Impetus in the highly industrialized stage, 
a second advance of its relative position is to be seen only in the group of 
large countries. £/ 
As opposed to this fluctuating tendency insofar as the participation of 
services is concerned, the increases in the relative position of the secondary 
sector appear to be remarkably constant. In fact, in almost every category of 
countries, a 3 percent increase in the ratio of secondary ¡activities in the 
total product is seen, except for the really underdeveloped countries (Category 
A), which includes only African and some Asiatic countries, and for the group 
of small countries just beginning to industrialize (B/I). In these two latter 
cases the relative progress of the secondary sector, evidently more difficult 
than in the later stages, was only 2 percent. 
As for the Central American countries, their structural and various other 
characteristics place them in the group just mentioned (B/Í) and the typical 
evolutionary forces for this stage do in fact appear to have predominated in 
the recent structural development of the Isthmus. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that their per capita income and certain of their cultural features 
place them at a slightly higher level than the average of this B/I group. 10/ 
9. A new expansion in the share of the tertiary sector may be attributed 
to various circumstances, such as, for example, the constantly improving rela-
tive remuneration for services in the developed economies and the fact that in 
many modern societies, floodéd with not very costly physical goods, there is a 
certain tendency to consume increasing volumes —and improved qualities— of 
specific cultural, health, communications and recreational services. However, 
in the case of the larger world powers, especially the United States, the de-
cisive factor, in the iiicreased participation of the tertiary sector lies ,in the 
extremely high cost of defense. 
10. The per capita income in the large countries included in Category 
B/II, that is, countries relatively less advanced than those of group B/I, is 
still lower, in average terms, a fact that is also shown by the less developed 
status of their productive structure. 
/Accordingly, 
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Accordingly, the Central American advance in the field of secondary activities 
was also somewhat more rapid than that of the group in reference. 11/ Another 
fact that may be mentioned is that the growth of transportation in Central 
America does not seem to have been much below that of the entire tertiary 
sector, contrary to general experience in this stage of development. Nonethe-
less, it should be borne in mind that the rates of growth of the transportation 
sector shown in Table 44 were derived for a number of countries from somewhat 
precarious indicators of the increase in this item. 
2. Structure of the economically active population 
and of productivity by sectors 
To complete the picture of the economic structure by large sectors, atten-. 
tion must also be drawn to the distribution of the economically active popula-
tion among the various sectors of productive activity. Since population cen-
suses were taken in or around i960 in only three countries of the Isthmus —El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Panama— recent figures are available for these three 
countries only, but there are figures for 1950 for all the countries of the 
area and for the aggregate (see Table 47). 
11. In view of the significance of increases shown in the relative posi-
tion of a specific sector, it must always be kept in mind that such increases 
depend not only on the expansion of the sector concerned but also on the be-
havior and output of the other sectors. However vigorous the growth of one* 
component element may be, its ratio to the total will not increase if all of 
the other components grow more rapidly. For the same reason a sector may also 
increase its share in the total with a modest expansion if the growth rate of 
all the others as a whole are less. 
In less developed economies agricultural output for domestic consumption, 
and particularly of production for home consumption, is normally very low. 
Therefore, despite much greater efficiency in the agricultural component that 
produces for export, the average output of this sector is usually low. If in 
this stage of development the relative position of the agricultural sector is 
high, it is due above all to the small volume of production in the industrial 
sectors. Therefore, in such economies, the relative position of the agricul-
tural sector is not very "resistant" to the possible pressure of the other 
sectors. As somewhat more vigorous activities , which' strictly speaking may not 
be very strong or very efficient, appear and bfegin to strengthen themselves, 
they gain ground relatively easily at the cost of the agricultural sector. 
Relatively modest industrial investments at this phase, even though possibly 
more difficult to carry out than larger investments at later stages, may be 
sufficient to increase the relative position of the secondary sector by various 





CENTRAL AMERICAN ISTHMUS: STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION 
IN THE SIX COUNTRIES AND IN THE AREA AS A WHOLE, 
EXCLUDING AND INCLUDING PANAMA, 1950-60 (OR 1961) 
(In percentages of the total) 
Sector 
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama Central America 
Entir? 
Isthmus a/ 
1950 I960 1950 1961 1950 1961 1950 1961 1950 1961 1950 i960 I95O I960 8/ 1950 i960 
Agriculture 5̂ .7 • • • 63.1 60.2 66.2 ... ÔJ.l 65.8 67.7 • • • 50.6 51.1 69.1 • • • 67.5 « • • 
Primary 
sector 2ti2 • « • 63.fr 60.3 68. fr ... 66.1 68.6 • « • §04 Si¿ 69.fr • • • 67.9 • » • 
Manufacturing 
industry 11.0 11.4 12.5 11.5 ... 5.8 7.7 ll.lt 7.9 7.fr 10.1 • • « 9.9 • • « 
Secondary 
sector • • « lÍLsit 16.9 lfr.3 ... m 1é iíal 11.0 12.8 12.8 e « « 
Tertiary 
sector 39.2 ... 22.2 22.8 Í2i2 ... Stai IZii • • • 37.0 37.8 iz4 • • • 19.fr « • e 
a. On the basis of data interpolated for the year I960, in the case of the 1961 censuses. 
Sources; United Nations, Demographic Yearbook. 1955. for the year 1950. Data received from the Inter American 
Statistical Institute, based on the resulte of the last national censuses for i960 and 1961» 
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It will be noted that the proportion of the population engaged regularly 
in agricultural activities is in all cases much higher than agriculture's share 
in total output (see again Tables k2 and kj>). Furthermore, in no case is the 
population associated with this sector less them half of all the economically 
active population (the figures here referring to the beginning or to the end of 
the decade). The coefficients for Panama and Costa Bica are the only ones that 
do not significantly exceed 50 percent, those of the other countries ranging 
around two-thirds. 
The participation of the economically active population in manufacturing 
industry yields figures which, in all the known cases, are rather less than 
the figures for industry's share in the total output. The sectoral coeffi-
cients of Costa Bica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua Vary between 11 and 
12.5 percent and those of Honduras and Panama between 6 and 8 percent. In 
Central America as a whole, both including and excluding Panama, manufacturing 
has a coefficient of 10 percent, while its share in the product is more than 
12.5 percent. 
The percentage of population engaged in all of the various services in 
most cases ranges between 17 and 29 percent, except for Panama where, because 
of the importance of the sale of services to the Canal Zone, it reaches levels 
of 37 or 38 percent, and Honduras where the coefficient for 1950 is exception-
ally low. 12/ The figures for the area as a whole are 18 percent and a little 
over 19 percent, excluding and including Panama, respectively. It may be de-
duced that the wide differences noted between the participation of the primary 
sector in employment and the total output are mainly compensated by the differ-
ences in the opposite direction that appear in the shares of the tertiary 
sector. . 
Such marked disproportions between the shares of the various economic sec-
tors in output and the corresponding working population emphasize the existence 
of greater discrepancies in productivity, by sectors, of the labor force. 13/ 
Even with the necessary theoretical reservations, it does not seem out of place, 
considering the speoific conditions of Central America, to relate these phenom-
ena in respect of relative productivity to the high degree of hidden unemploy-
ment in the area, which prevails principally in agriculture. There is special 
justification for this, in view of the open unemployment that appears to exist 
in various cities of the Isthmus, even though statistics on the matter are 
scattered. Furthermore, the relationship in this particular case between out-
put and labor also reflects the great importance of coffee production in the 
agricultural sector of the Isthmus, since the coffee-harvest gives employment 
to a large number of people, most of whom are.employed only on a seasonal basis. 
12. Although there may be a certain lack of preciseness in relation to 
the classification of the Honduran data for 1950, there is not much doubt that 
in terms of order of magnitude the figures approach the real situation. 
13. The term "labor force" is used in this context in a wide sense; that 




This does not exclude the possibility that there is an appreciable lack of 
mechanization in certain other fields in this sector, in which the introduc-
tion of more modern methods would substantially increase output, lb/ 
A brief comparison of the relative sectoral productivities of the various 
countries reveals, first of all, that the differences between productivity in 
the agricultural and manufacturing sectors were less pronounced in the case of 
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua, and more marked in Guatemala, Honduras 
and Panama. 15/ On the other hand, with respect to productivity in agriculture 
and services as a whole, relatively less disproportion was found in Costa Rica, 
El Salvador and Panama, and more in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Finally, 
a comparison between manufacturing industry productivity and the tertiary seg-
ment shows that although the latter surpassed the former in all cases, the dis-
crepancy was less in Costa Rica, Panama and El Salvador, and more marked in 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. A summary of the three classifications, 
made in groups of two, brings out the existence of a more balanced pattern of 
productivity in Costa Rica and El Salvador, which is obviously related to the 
relatively greater industrialization of these two countries. On the other hand, 
the relationships here commented upon do not show the industrial advance of 
Guatemala, despite its numerous active manufacturing enterprises in various 
fields. The explanation of this phenomenon is related to certain individual 
aspects of the country's employment structure, deriving from its ethnic charac-
teristics and especially from the largely non-assimilated way of life of the 
Indian element. 16/ 
— w r It should be recalled that fluctuations in the terms of trade may con-
siderably increase the relative prices of industrial goods, thus augmenting the 
value of the sectoral products and contributing to the differences between the 
respective "productivities." 
In relation to the concept of the relative sectoral productivities, it, should 
be noted that since their values are figured through the use of data on a sector's 
output and the labor employed in producing that output and similar data for other 
sectors, the resultant coefficients may accumulate statistical errors from vari-
ous sources. Therefore, in this analysis they have been used only in order to 
compare the sectoral discrepancies within one country with the corresponding 
discrepancies elsewhere in the area. Likewise, it must be noted that in view of 
the incomplete state of information on the more recent period, only the figures 
for the year 1950 have been used in the computations. 
15. It need scarcely be mentioned that such comparisons cannot be used as ele-
ments of judgments as to the greater or lesser absolute efficiency of any given sector 
in any of the countries concerned. On the other hand, the quantitative relationships 
may be interpreted as indications, though certainly rough and approximate ones, of the 
degree of distortion prevailing in the respective economies and, consequently, of 
the opportunities that exist to increase the total product through a better dis-
tribution of the economically active population among the various "sectors. 
16. The high relative position in the industry of this country of rural 
craftsmen —whose productivity is low— even though coexisting with a competent 
factory element, tends to increase the margin between the relative productivity of in-
dustry and of service. At the same time the high proportion of a subsistence rural 
population, living practically outside the monetary economy, lowers the coefficient 
of the agricultural sector and helps to widen the differences shown between it 
on the one hand and industry and services on the other. 
/Finally, 
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Finally, in view of what has been said in the preceding paragraphs, it is 
appropriate to comment on the significance of the continued decline of agricul-
ture's participation in the generation of total product. This is one of the 
outstanding aspects of the structural transformation that is taking place, and 
attention should be focused on its scope from a number of angles, taking into 
account both its possible consequences and its causes. 
On the one hand this process may be regarded as an element of the progres-
sive diversification of production, which is part of the structural transforma-
tion implicit in development and which can help to reduce vulnerability to ex-
ternal forces and at the same time ease internal instability. Thus, this pro-
cess reflects positive factors when it is the consequence of a relatively strong 
development of the secondary and tertiary segments. The contribution of these 
sectors to a reduction of hidden unemployment, concentrated especially in the 
primary segment, certainly merits positive consideration. 
However, since agriculture has to provide these developing economies with 
an increasing volume of foreign exchange resources and insure supplies for con-
stantly increasing food and industrial raw-material requirements, concern may 
arise with respect to the balanced course of the diversification if —as is the 
case in Central America— agricultural expansion does not attain a certain mini-
mum, and especially if its rate of growth does not exceed the•population growth. 
One must also take into account the fact that the prevailing impulse in the in-
dustrial and service sectors of the area —which in any event is not very pro-
nounced— has not been the only reason for the decreasing share of agriculture 
in its total product. In fact, in the structural change noted, a large part 
has been played by the very appreciably worsened situation on the world market 
for the products of this sector, which, despite noticeable official and private 
efforts to adapt the structure to the new conditions, has been unable in all 
cases to attain sufficient flexibility, or at least has not attained it in,the 
short time available. 17/ 
17. The present version of this study will not extend to an analysis of 
the transformation of the Central American agricultural structure, although 
reference will be made to certain changes that have occurred in the composition 




B. MANUFACTURING  STRUCTURE 
1. Potential of  industrial growth and its components 
Since the most dynamic element of economic development is normally the 
growth of manufacturing activities, the potential of development of the indus-
trial sector decisively determines the magnitude of the major changes that are 
likely to occur in the composition of the total product of the entire economy 
during the developing stage. 
This potential of manufacturing development in turn depends not only upon 
the general availability of resources for industrialization but also upon the 
internal and external possibilities of this sector to establish itself in new 
fields. Its advance toward new areas enables it to expand at a faster rate 
than what would apply to it if its activities were limited to their original 
sphere. The most important area for such expansion of the developing manufac-
turing sector —at any rate, the most generally employed and at times abused 
area— is the gradual substitution of imports, especially in the beginning 
stages of industrialization. However, there are also other possible fields 
for industrial expansion besides mere natural growth, such as judicious recourse 
to possibilities for export, the additional market that may result from dynamic 
progress in other sectors (and of the industry itself), and adequate improve-
ment in the distribution of income. 
With regard to import substitution, the manufacturing sector's growth 
potential depends in good measure upon its ability to diversify; that is, upon 
its capacity to provide substitutes for imports not only in the field of in-
dustries producing ordinary consumer goods —which ordinarily occurs during the 
first phase of industrialization— but also, if. the need arises, in other manu-
facturing activities. In this respect it need only be recalled that certain 
industries, especially intermediate and mechanical ones, as a general rule re-
quire broader or more developed markets and greater productive factors, which 
initially are in short supply, but once established on firm and rational bases 
within an economy they tend to expand in a sustained form and, through a series 
of reactions, to give incentive to the expansion of other industries. 18/ 
Industrial exports —excepting those primary products that are exported 
after only slight processing— are not usually very significant in the first 
phases of industrial development and they have not been so in Latin America. 
In Central America, aside from the increasing trade among the countries of the 
area in recent years, such exports to the rest of the.world have been practi-
cally nil. However, it looks very possible —and in fact desirable— that in 
the future the impetus of intra-Central American trade will also stimulate in-
terest in the Isthmus in certain lines of manufacture, now only local, that 
can be exported outside the area, making use of the possible advantages that 
may result from the lower cost of labor, the availability of certain low-cost 
1ST" Reference will be made later to the problem of these incentives at 
the interindustry level, when the elements of the potential of industrial 
growth are considered from the point of view of supply. For further details 
concerning the nature and growth of the various branches of industry in Latin 
America, see: OAS/ECLA, Economic and Social Survey of Latin America, 1961, 
Chapter V. 
/raw materials 
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raw materials or materials of  a specific  kind, and certain other differential 
cost factors.  In short, the need to keep open the possibility of  future  in-
dustrial exports, as well as other important considerations that have recently 
come to be gradually accepted in Latin America, may make it possible to vest 
Central American protectionism with a kind of  selective orientation —without 
detracting from  its effectiveness—  in order not to encourage purely anti-
economic activities or to distort excessively the cost-price system. 
When dynamic expansion in the other sectors is thought of as a factor in 
the industrial growth potential the importance of the development of the pri-
mary sectors which, in appropriate circumstances, can continue to make great 
contributions toward increasing income and the internal market is worth noting. 
Naturally beyond a certain point, the expansion of these sectors becomes diffi-
cult and meets increasingly more rigid limitations, through decreasing returns 
or other progessively restrictive factors. 19/ However, in a large part of the 
Isthmus, the development of agriculture for internal consumption, encouraged 
also by the continual improvement of internal transportation, still offers 
great possibilities for expansion that is free of such barriers. 
As mentioned above, the dimensions of  the growth capacity of  domestic man-
ufacturing  also is related to the distribution of  income. In fact,  a more 
equitable distribution could increase the market for  a great variety of  articles 
and favor  the demand for  industrial products of  local manufacture  at the expense 
of  imported products, which are preferred  by the more affluent  social classes. 20/ 
Although the last three courses indicated for  possible manufacturing  ex-
pansion do not appear to be very promising for  the immediate future,  which 
reaffirms  the fact  that the replacement of  imports is the most important ex-
pression of  present-day Central American industrialization, consideration of 
these elements of  the industrial growth potential, especially the element of 
possible future  exports, leads to certain judgments which perforce  have their 
effect  on an appraisal of  past and future  development. Keeping those in mind, 
the structural diversification  of  manufacturing  production,. especially when 
production is limited to a certain number of  more or less traditional lines, 
continues to be a desideratum, highly important but subject to some qualifica-
tion that will place emphasis on economic efficiency. 
Viewed from  this angle, the recognized advantages of  Central American eco-
nomic integration stand out in sharp relief¿ 
19» Such is the case with the possible exhaustion of mineral deposits. 
The situation is similar when it stems from the necessity of voluntarily lim-
iting certain .primary exports in order to protect their prices. 
20. Of  course, the effect  of  measures taken to lead to a better distribu-
tion is also subject to limitations and at a certain point, when*the average 
tendency to save decreases, forces  contrary to the requirements for  greater in-
vestment and hence the requirements of  industrialization may come into play. 
However, the state may go beyond this critical point in the gradual redistribu-
tion without causing a major drop in savings by taking up the difference  through 
taxation for  purposes of  public investment, although it is understood that the 
effectiveness  of  this type of  intervention also reaches its limits at some 
point by appreciably reducing the incentives of  the entrepreneurial class. 
/In the first 
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In the first  place, despite the stil l existing limitations of  the integra-
ted market, such a step would make possible the establishment of  a eeries of 
new industries which could not possibly have been established before  in con-
formity  with even a minimum of  economic efficiency.  Since ultimately free  trade 
within the Isthmus should likewise afford  incentive to the aggregate of  the 
primary sector, it may be envisaged that the additional income resulting from 
this situation will in turn contribute to a widening of  the market for  indus-
trial goods. 
On the other hand, when one considers the possible impact of  integration 
from  the supply standpoint, it is evident that the future  economic union will 
significantly  expand the field  within which limited resources may be pooled in 
order to undertake activities of  greater scope. 
Furthermore, beneficial  effects  can be expected from  inter-industry rela-
tions. In fact,  a number of  the industries contemplated under the new condi-
tions —especially the intermediate and certain mechanical industries— are 
capable of  exercising "forward  and backward linkage effects,"  21/ or in other 
words, of  encouraging the creation of  or strengthening those industries which 
are their potential consumers or which may be their principal suppliers. In 
principle, it may be considered that the greater the size of  the economy thus 
integrated, the better the possibilities will be for  profitable  combinations 
in the interindustry field,  although sometimes —and this must also be kept in 
mind— it is not so much the size of  the economy that counts in that sense but 
rather the inclusion of  certain countries or areas in the integration, which, 
because of  their complementary characteristics, can offer  more favorable  condi-
tions for  establishing such linkage. 22/ The gradual complementation of  thg 
manufacturing  system with interrelated industries will naturally increase the 
external economies of  all of  them. 
The foreseeable  effects  of  development under these new conditions are of 
course numerous and varied. On the one hand, it can be expected that in the 
case of  industries that can more easily be set up and that are already more or 
less spread throughout the area --and in which the scales of  operation are not 
so important— skill and consequently operational efficiency  will increase. 
On the other hand, it is possible that the establishment of  certain new activi-
ties that place greater demands on scales of  production and limited resources 
may at least temporarily have the effect  of  strengthening the monopolistic 
structure of  the industry. Among other effects  of  integration, it may be ex-
pected that the industrialization of  the area on very broad bases will have a 
favorable  impact on the present unbalanced situation of  productivity among the 
21. For the origin of  this term, see A.O. Hirschman, The Strategy of 
Economic Development, Yale University Press, 1958. p. 100. 
22. It is appropriate to remember that the scope of  these linkage 
effects,  with all their probable ramifications,  also offer  certain at least 
partial elements of  judgment for  determining priorities among projects accord-
ing to their social usefulness. 
/various sectors; 
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various sectors; that is to say, it will alleviate the hidden unemployment sit-
uation, localized chiefly in agriculture although to a lesser extent it is also 
present in some tertiary sectors, or it will at least prevent the situation 
from worsening in line with the population growth. 
2. Structure and development of the industrial output 
The main purpose of the following analysis is to define the present stage 
of development of Central American manufacturing production from the standpoint 
of its structural evolution and to determine the intensity with which this pro-
cess is currently being carried out. This part of the analysis of the struc-
tural changes will be supplemented with a brief study of the growth by lines of 
industry and by groups thereof, and an examination of the development of pro-
duction by principal manufactured articles. 
Data by which the analysis can be brought up to recent years are available 
only with respect to the manufacture of certain selected articles, since infor-
mation on the entire structural development of the manufacturing sector beyond 
the year 195$ is incomplete and of inacceptable quality; in fact, in a number 
of important aspects it is available, or usable, only up to 1955. For this 
latter year, the detailed manufacturing structure of Central America as a whole 
will first be analyzed and, with some consolidation among certain interrelated 
lines, the structure of the six countries of' the area (see Tables 48 and 4-9). 2^ 
2J. It is appropriate to make some comments about the quality of  the data 
used in these tables and to mention the procedures applied to compensate for 
some of  the deficiencies.  In very general terms, it would seem that the tiata 
available in this respect merit a greater degree of  confidence  than the macro-
economic figures  given in the preceding section, since the manufacturing'struc-
tures here noted are based primarily on census data —those for  Panama are the 
result of  a relatively broad survey— and, except in the case of  Guatemala, 
l ittle estimating is involved. Although the extrapolation of  the census data 
has been carried out with production indexes that are subject to a bias that 
increases with the time involved, this operation has been limited in the pre-
sent case to "running" the census structure forward  or backward for  only a 
few  years. However, the census data themselves also suffer  from  various weak-
nesses. Along with the usual problems of  evaluation, difficulties  have been 
found  especially in the matter of  coverage and comparability, and although 
efforts  have been made to clear this obstacle as far  as possible, the final 
figures  stil l must be regarded with reservations iii some respect. With refer-
ence to coverage, an attempt was made to include the handicraft  component in 
so far  as data were available. Somewhat sketchy census data were used for  El 
Salvador and slightly adjusted national estimates for  Guatemala; coverage for 
Panama and Honduras, and possibly also for  Nicaragua, is not so complete, and 
for  Costa Rica the figures  used in certain particular respects —structure and 
capital intensity— exclude repair shops. Another problem was found  in the 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
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The lack of diversification in the transformation industries of the area 
is notable (see Table 48). In 1955» as may be seen in the table, 84 percent of 
the combined manufacturing product of the integration area, both excluding and 
including Panama, pertained to the traditional industries, engaged almost ex-
clusively in the production of common consumer goods and their raw materials, 
excluding the processing of coffee. 24/ Within this industrial group, the most 
important subgroup consists of the preparation of food, beverages and tobacco, 
representing approximately half of the total product of the sector; the food 
industries alone account for close to 27 percent of the product. The industries 
producing textiles, clothing, leather and footwear together account for almost 
29 percent of the total, with textiles alone showing 10 percent. When the 
Panamanian industries are included in the computation, these last two coeffi-
cients drop slightly, to 26 and 9 percent, respectively. In both cases lumber 
and wood products amount to 4 percent and the manufacture of furniture and 
related products 2 percent. 
23. (continuation) 
discrepancies in national censuses with regard to the inclusion of the initial 
processing of certain agricultural products, especially coffee. The figures 
on coffee processing, originally included in the censuses of some countries, 
were eliminated from the data presented in the interests of comparability and 
because they were apparently a major source of errors in evaluation. Finally, 
an attempt was made to moderate the effects of various differences of classifi-
cation that affected certain interrelated lines in particular, increasing some 
to the detriment of others. When the data were consolidated at the inter-area 
level (Table 48), the slight deviations of some censuses from the standard 
classification of the other countries became less important, but in the tabula-
tion of national data (Table 49), they would have continued "to hinder any easy 
appreciation of the differences between the countries. Therefore, in this 
table the items that appeared more susceptible to such reciprocal defects were 
combined among themselves. Certain interrelated items were likewise combined 
in the subsequent table, since it was considered that the data were not suffi-
ciently comparable in time. All in all, the best structural data for the area 
as a whole were those assembled for the year 1955, and it is these that are 
used in Table 48. Similar data for i960 or some other recent year will be-
available for Panama and El Salvador possibly during the current year, since 
their most recent industrial censuses are in the course of being prepared or 
completed. In Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua, new industrial censuses 
will be taken in 1964. 
24. Also included in this large manufacturing-group are the lumber and 
furniture industries, since both are traditional and are similar in their 
behavior. As for coffee processing, it may be observed that in El Salvador 
in 1956 it represented almost 27»5 percent of the total value of manufactures 
according to the census (which total included the processing of coffee), and 
a year later in Costa Rica it accounted for 12.5 percent. It is possible that 
the Salvadorean figure may be somewhat overvalued. 
/Table 4 
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' Table 48 
CENTRAL AMERICAN  ISTHMUS: CONSOLIDATED STRUCTURE 
OF THE MANUFACTURING  OUTPUT OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA, 
EXCLUDING AND INCLUDING PANAMA, 1955 




Industrial groups and branches Central America (historic) 
Central American 
Isthmus 
Traditional industries a/ 83.8 84.0 
20 •Food 26.5 27.9 
21 Beverages 16.4 17.6 
22 Tobacco 6.0 5.9 
23 Textiles 10.0 8.8 
24 Footwear and clothing 17.3 16.0 
25 Lumber and Cork 4.1 4.1 
26 Furniture and accessories 2.1 2.1 
29 Hides and skins 1.4 1.6 
Intermediate industries b/ JlH 9.7 
27 Paper, cardboard, and paper products 0.2 0.2 
30 Rubber products 0.5 0.4 
31 Chemical products b.3 4.0 
32 Petroleum products - -
33 Materials made of nonmetallic minerals 4.1 4.9 . 3̂  Basically processed metals 0.2 0.2 
Mechanical industries c/ 3.4 
35 Simple metal articles 0.9 0.7 
36 Mechanical apparatus and accessories 0.7 0.6 
37 Electrical apparatus and accessories 0.3 0.3 
38 Transport material 1.5 1.5 
Residual industrial group 
28 Printing and publishing 2.2 2.1 
39 Miscellaneous 1.'3 1.1 
a. This group consists almost exclusively of industries engaged in the production of 
ordinary consumer goods and the pertinent raw materials, althoughj because of 
their traditional character and similarity in growth, the lumber and wooden fur-
niture industries are also included here. 
b. The intermediate industries are excluded from the traditional group, but they in-
clude the manufacture of certain common consumer goods, especially in certain 
lines of chemicals, which statistically cannot be separated from the groups of 
intermediate goods. 
c. This group also includes the industries manufacturing simple metallurgical prod-
ucts and the apparatus and equipment repair shops. 
(Sources given on next page) 
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The share of the intermediate industries —excluding those that operate 
principally for the traditional industries— rages between 9 and 10 percent, 
whether or not Panama is included. This figure contrasts sharply with the 
participation of approximately 30 percent attained by this industrial group in 
the manufacturing product of all Latin America. Of course, in the Latin 
American structure, the data of the larger and semi-industrialized countries 
have much weight. In Central America about half of the intermediate group 
consists of the various chemical industries, especially if the rubber industry 
is added to them, as it is in the later tables. The production of construction 
materials of nonmetallic mineral origin has almost as high a share in the total, 
in fact a larger share taking the Isthmus as a whole. Cement manufacture is 
particularly important among these activities, although it does not predominate; 
the manufacture of bricks, largely on a handicraft basis, and of cement and 
asbestos-cement products, is also of some importance. 
It should be noted that the importance of thè intermediate industries in 
the Isthmus is somewhat reduced, not only because of their low volume of pro-
duction but also because of their poor composition. In fact, not only is their 
range very incomplete but various lines shown in this group are really comple-
mentary activities connected with other industries. A significant part of the 
(Continuation of Table 48) 
Sources: For Costa Rica: General Bureau of Statistics and the Census, II 
Censo de Industrias en Costa Rica, 1958, and publications of the University 
of Costa Rica (Institute of Economic Research), El Desarrollo Económico de 
Costa Rica No. 2, Estudio del Sector Industrial, 1959. For̂  El Salvador: * 
General Bureau of Statistics and the Census, Segundo Censo Industrial y Co-
mercial, 1956. For Guatemala: Data of the second industrial and commercial 
census, on the basis of the OAS publication, Censos y Encuestas Industriales 
de las Naciones Americanas (IASI Doc. 3979 Esp.-9/15/59-2600); general results 
of the third industrial census, adopted from the publication of the General 
Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Guatemala, Guatemala en Cifras, I960; 
and estimates with respect to the handicraft segment of the industry, received 
directly from national sources and slightly adjusted by the OAS Secretariat. 
For Honduras: United Nations, El Desarrollo Económico de Honduras, I960 
(E/CN.12/549). For Nicaragua: Direct information from the Central Bank of 
Nicaragua. For Panama: OAS (IASI), op. cit. The figures used for Nicaragua 
are averages of the manufacturing structure in the years 195̂ , 1955, and 1956; 
this was done to reduce the effects of some fluctuations between consecutive 
years. For the same purpose the figures for" Honduras were slightly adjusted, 
taking both earlier and later data into account. In the case of Guatemala, 
an interpolation between the data for 1953 and 1958 was made. .The manufactur-
ing structure of El Salvador, derived from its 1956 census, was weighted for 
the purpose of consolidating it with the manufacturing product of 1955. The 
data for Costa Rica for 1955 were obtained by applying the indèx of production 
given in the above-mentioned study made by the University to the census data 
of 1957. The data were consolidated by following the procedure and methodology 
indicated in the reference notes of Table 42. 
/activities 
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activities classified under the chemical industry more aptly belong to the 
"parachemical" industries, 25/ and another not insignificant part is concerned 
with products made on the basis of simple formulas, with packaging, etc. The 
rubber industries considered here —:aside from some plants that manufacture rubber products such as rubber hose, heels, soles, mats, etc.— consist in good 
part of tire and tube repair shops and some retread shops. In fact, the only 
tire factory in the region, established some years ago in Guatemala, had not 
yet begun to operate at the time under consideration. 
Neither were there any oil refineries in the Isthmus in 1955, although 
one is now functioning in Panama, another in Guatemala, a third, recently in-
stalled, in El Salvador, arid a fourth, likewise recently set up, in Nicaragua. 26/ 
Furthermore, there are some minor semi-integrated: iron and steel plants in 
Panama and El Salvador and some small plants of this kind in Costa Rica, Guate-
mala and Nicaragua, but since in the reference period the two steel plants were 
not yet in operation and the other foundries have very small capacity, the 
figures shown in the table for basically processed metals are very low in value. 27/ 
On the other hand, most of the countries of the Isthmus, except Honduras 
and Costa Rica, were already producing cement in 1955, and later on a cement 
factory was started in Honduras. Furthermore, Guatemala and El Salvador were 
producing paper in that year, although only in very small quantities, and al-
though their production has doubled since then, the volume still remains at a 
low level. 28/ Cellulose paste is not yet produced in the area, but it may 
be noted in this connection that the forest resources of Central America, 
25. Under this heading the principal activities included are those pro-
ducing cleaning materials, toilet goods, candles, paints, matches, and similar 
items which in large part are consumer goods. See OAS/ECLA, op. cit. 
26. There is a similar project for Costa Rica and a less definitive plan 
for Honduras. Although the social usefulness of such dispersion might be open 
to argument in view of the integration of the Central American economies now 
under way, it should also be pointed out that the establishment of refineries 
in all or nearly all of the countries of the area is related to the interests 
of large companies in the matter of distribution, and therefore these compa-
nies provide scarce resources. It is also well to note that recent innovations 
in operational methods have reduced the limits of the economic scales of pro-
duction in this industry. However, it is debatable whether these small refin-
eries will be able to serve in the future as a basis for additional industrial 
development, especially petrochemical complexes. 
27» Actually, even in a current table, no very significant coefficients 
would be shown for this line, since the volumes of production continue to be 
quite low. 
28. Along with the small industries producing paper and cardboard in the 
two countries mentioned, the lines shown in Table 48 and subsequent ones also 
include the manufacture of paper products, such as paper bags, boxes, etc., 
chiefly from imported materials. This activity is developing also in Costa 
Rica and Panama. 
/especially 
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especially its pine forests, are an important potential source of raw material 
for the cellulose industry. The greatest problem facing the entire forestry 
industry of the area is the lack of adequate transportation. 29/ 
Ranking still lower in significance are the incipient mechanical indus-
tries of the Isthmus, in terms of both volume—less than 3-5 percent of the 
manufacturing product, as compared with 18 percent for all of Latin America— 
and composition. In fact, the most important line in this group is the "trans-
port equipment industry", represented almost entirely by the various motor ve-
hicle repair shops; 30/ the product of this line constitutes a little more than 
1.5 percent of the total manufacturing product. Along with this there are sev-
eral industries producing relatively simple metal goods, chiefly ironware, 
nails, containers and similar items. 
In the fourth group, which is a residual group composed of activities 
difficult to classify elsewhere, the relative position of printing and publish-
ing stands out, representing somewhat more than 2 percent of the total manufac-
turing product. 
The manufacturing structures of the sevèral countries of the Isthmus do 
not differ much among themselves in terms of the four principal groups making 
up the primary subdivision of the manufacturing sector, at least not in re-
spect to the ratios of the traditional group to total manufactures in the six 
countries (see Table Despite this great similarity in regard to the im-
portance of the traditional group as a whole, the industrial lines included in 
it show greater variability in so far as their relative positions are concerned. 
This suggests that the uniformly high ratio of the group to the national totals 
of the sector is due primarily to the weakness of the other three groups. 31/ 
29. Furthermore, it should be noted that according to a study made by the 
ECLA-FAO-DOAT  Advisory Group on Paper and Cellulose for  Latin America, ". . . 
the development of  the paper and cellulose industry in these countries is 
closely related to development of  the sawmills. Because of  the nature of  Cen-
tral American forests,  the forestry  industry should be regarded as an integrated 
combination of  activities of  sawmill and pulp manufacture."  (Document E/CN. 
12/570, March 1961.) 
30. In Costa Rica a plant for  the rebuilding of  aircraft  parts is also 
functioning.  This is a good example of  the country's gradual industrializa-
tion. Most of  the plant's activity is directed toward filling  orders from  out-
side the country. 
31. It is well to point out that within the industrial branches or groups 
of  branches shown in the table there is also a notable geographic variability 
which in some instances is greater than the variability between the various 
branches, and, as noted before,  the differences  in the composition of  the var-
ious lines of  manufacture  also lead to discrepancies in the degree of  indus-
trialization of  the area. This analysis of  the structure does not go into such 
details, but the existence of  differences  of  this type among the six indus-





CENTRAL AMERICAN ISTHMUS: STRUCTURE OF THE MANUFACTURING  PRODUCT 
OF THE SIX COUNTRIES OF THE AREA, BY COUNTRY, 1955 






Salvador a/ Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama 
Traditional industries c/ 79-7 79-4 84.0 89.3 89,2 86.0 
Food, beverages, tobacco 
Textiles and clothing; 
leather and footwear 




















Intermediate industries d/ 9.6 10.2 10.2 4.8' 8.0 12^ 
Paper, cardboard, paper 
products 

























Mechanical industries e/ 5.4 5.4 3.0 2.3 ' 0.9 0.7 
Simple metal articles 



















Residual industrial group 5.3 5.0 2.8 3.6 1.9 0.8 
Printing and publishing 












c. According to the concept indicated in footnote a/ of Table 48. 
d. According to the concept indicated in footnote b/ of Table 48. 
e. According to the concept indicated in footnote c/ of Table 48. 
Sources: The basic data listed in the reference note to Table 48 were used. 
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As for the production of food, beverages and tobacco, the coefficients for 
Guatemala and Nicaragua are somewhat less than the average for the area and 
those-'for El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica are somewhat higher, and for 
Panama very much higher. On the other hand, the relative position of the tex-
tile 
i'clothing, leather, and footwear subgroup is relatively prominent in 
Guatemala and Nicaragua but very low in Panama, where at that time the textile 
industry was of practically no importance at all. The lumber and furniture 
industries have a role of some importance in Costa Rica and Honduras,-although 
in the latter country the industry is confined almost exclusively to the pri-
mary,; processing of the lumber. 32/ 
The 
share of the intermediate industries is somewhat more variable; the 
largest is found in Panama and the least in Honduras. The manufacture of 
chemical and related products is most widely developed in Costa Rica and is of 
least significance in Panama, while the processing of materials of nonmetallic 
mineral origin was salient in the 1955 manufacturing structure of Panama and 
remains in the background in Honduras and Costa Rica. 
As for the area's budding mechanical industry, the figures for Costa Rica 
and:;El Salvador stand out, relatively speaking, those for Guatemala and Honduras 
being; less and those for Nicaragua and Panama very low* 33/ 
The change in the combined manufacturing structure of historic Central 
America between the years 1953 an(* 1958 was very reduced (see Table 50). jM/ 
The only change worth noting was a slight increase in the participation of the 
intermediate industries, at the cost of the traditional group. Much of this 
variation resulted from the increase shown in the industrial processing of 
nonmetallic minerals» under which the increase in cement manufacture is 
outstanding. . 
32s, There are reasons to presume that in Costa Rica part of the lumber 
industry was not included in the census. It should be observed in this regard 
that lumber is a very important element in common construction in Costa Rica. 
Accòràtóg' to the 1949 housing' census, almost 70 percent of urban buildings had 
wooden falls, as compared with 22 percent in Honduras. In the other Central 
America® countries the more widely used construction materials are adobe and 
wattles. 
33» It is possible that the very low figures for Nicaragua stem in part 
from the use of a more restricted basis in the primary compilation. 
34. Although the probable biases of the industrial production indexes 
used in extrapolating part of the data may have contributed somewhat to the 
insignificant variations, in the figures, there can really be little doubt that 
the slow transformation reflected therein does portray the actual situation, 




CENTRAL AMERICA: CONSOLIDATED STRUCTURE OF THE MANUFACTURING  PRODUCT 
OF THE FIVE COUNTRIES, 1953 AND 1958; 
GROWTH BY GROUPS AND LINES OF INDUSTRY, 1953-58 
(In percentages of the manufacturing product and cumulative annual growth rates) 
Industrial groups and lines 
Structure of the 
manufacturing product Cumulative annual growth 
1953 1958 1953-58 
Traditional industries a/ 84.9 83.8 M 
Food, beverages, tobacco 50.0 50.8 6.2 
Textiles and clothing; leather 
and footwear 28.3 26.4 4.2 
Lumber, wood furniture and 
accessories 6.6 6.6 5.7 
Intermediate industries b/ 8¿1 hi M 
Paper, cardboard, paper products 0.2 0.2 1.0 
Chemical and rubber products 4.2 4.8 9.1 
Nonmetallic mineral products 3.5 3.9 7.8 
Metals, primary processing 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Mechanical industries c/ 2¡2 2ã  ' hi 
Simple metal articles 0.6 0.7 7.2 
Mechanical and electrical apparatus 1.1 1.1 4.2 
Transport material 1.8 1.6 5.1 
Residual industrial group 2á 111 "hi 
Printing and publishing 2.6 2.8 7.5 
Miscellaneous 0.8 0,9 7.5 
a. According to the concept indicated in footnote af of Table 48. 
b. According to the*concept indicated in footnote b/ of Table 48. 
c. According to the concept indicated in footnote o/ of Table 48. 
Sources: The basic data listed in the reference note to Table 48 were used. 
/The rates of 
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The rates of  growth in the various manufacturing  lines during the five-year 
period concerned (see last column of  Table 50) confirm  the structural changes 
noted above and at the same time reveal certain special features  of  the indus-
trial situation of  the area. The traditional industries showed a growth rate 
of  more than 5«5 percent per year. This progress is clearly higher than the 
usual normal growth of  such industries, according to what has taken place in 
many other areas, and suggests the possibilities for  replacement that stil l 
exists in such fields.  It also reflects  the existence of  effective  incentives 
for  both established enterprises and new investors. 
The subgroup in the traditional industry field  that showed the greatest 
relative growth was the processing of  food,  beverages, and tobacco, similar to 
the growth noted in that line in all Latin America. In fact,  the cumulative 
annual growth of  this activity was over 6 percent, while the rate of  expansion 
of  the combined group of  textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear  was only 
slightly over 4 percent, and the combined lumber and furniture  industries had 
a growth rate of  less than 6 percent. 
The most intensive growth, more than 8 percent, was shown by the interme-
diate industries. However, it must be pointed out that the dynamism of  this 
group was far  from  surpassing that of  the traditional group by the same propor-
tion as occurred in the average for  all Latin America. In fact,  although at 
the Latin American regional level the relation, between the intensity of  expan-
sion of  the two industrial groups was l:2.5i in Central America it was less 
than 1:1.5« Particularly noteworthy in the increment of  the group as a whole 
was the expansion of  its two most important lines, that is, the production of 
construction materials of  nonmetallic mineral origin and of  the combined chem-
ical and rubber industries. In the period concerned the latter showed a v̂ ry 
marked quantitative growth —2k percent— owing to the establishment of  a tire 
factory  in Guatemala, but the high coefficient  is attributable in large part to 
the fact  that the comparison is made with the very small values shown for  the 
beginning of  the period. 
3.. Recent development in the production of  selected products 
and per capita production and consumption levels 
• In order to explain somewhat the industrial development that occurred in 
the years immediately preceding 1958 and to point up certain details that do 
not fall  within the over-all structural analysis, we shall now attempt to 
/combine the 
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combine the above rates of growth in the various industrial branches with the 
coefficients of growth recorded in the manufacture of certain important pro-
ducts, taking into account, at the same time, other information available 
(see Table 51). ¿5/ 
Wheat flour and sugar are among the food products whose production regis-
tered the sharpest rise in the totals for the area in the period 1953-1958. 
According to the figures available for three countries for both products, but 
especially for flour production, the development continued at a healthy rate 
in the course of the next two years, which are the last ones covered by the in-
formation available. It should be noted that the contribution of flour produc-
tion to the aggregate value of the entire it em of foodstuffs is relatively 
small. In contrast, the contribution of the sugar industries is quite large. 
Moreover, isolated data show that the processing of milk products and meats, 
as well as of several canned food products did not increase markedly in the 
five-year period under reference or in the next two years, although it was a 
period of continued development, and it was favored by the prospect of future 
demand. From all of this, it could be concluded that the rate of growth of 
foodstuffs, despite the constant contribution of certain items enjoying a very 
dynamic expansion, did not change substantially in general in Central America 
between 1958 and I960. 
The increase in the production of beer, Which, in the five-year period was 
slightly less than foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco put together, although 
probably somewhat higher than beverages alone, suffered a small net decrease 
in the two following years. The manufacture of cigarettes had been even less 
dynamic in the preceding period, and this trend has not changed much. 36/ 
35. In relating such information  to this subject, it should be remem-
bered that the rates of  growth considered above are derived from  basic data 
expressed in deflated  aggregate values, whereas the coefficients  of  growth 
that are going to be studied below are based on data expressing production ' 
volumes in physical terms. This may lead to certain minor discrepancies, 
chiefly  in the variations in relative prices. Moreover, it should also be 
remembered that one of  the determining criteria in the selection of  the prod-
ucts being considered here was the availability of  statistics on that product, 
in chronological order —and this condition does not' necessarily coincide with 
the importance of  the products under consideration— and that, in any case, the 
exact weights-of  these products in the respective production totals are unknown. 
In view of  all these factors,  the figures  shown cannot be considered to be 
strictly representative of  Central American industrial development, although 
they do appear to be adequate to illustrate several of  the most significant 
aspects of  that development. 
36. This does not mean, of  course, that this item has not had a somewhat 
more pronounced growth, in terms of  value, due to certain increases in the 




CENTRAL AMERICA:  GROWTH IN THE COMBINED PRODUCTION OF 
SELECTED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS BETWEEN 1953 AND 1961 
(Cumulative annual rates of  growth) 
Products 1953-58 1958-60 1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 
Wheat flour a/ 14.5 23.0 12.5 33-5 • • • 
Sugar 15.0 11.8 11.4 12.2 8.9 
Beer 5.7 - 4.5 - 5.8 - 3-2 • • • 
Cigarettes 2.5 3.6 2.1 5.0 • • • 
Cotton cloth h/ 6.8 18.3 8.0 29.6 * * • 
Cement 15.5 4.0 - 2.8 11.2 4.5 
Electric power c/ 10.8 9.9 d/ 9.9 • * • • • • 
a. There is no data for  Costa Rica, since the figures  on this item 
are not very significant. 
b. No data available for  Costa Rica and Guatemala. 
c. Concerns the total generation of  electric power, including public 
service and generation of  power by companies for  their own use. 
These figures  are given as an index of  economic activity, although 
they also include the electricity produced for  consumption. 
d. 1958/59. 
Sources; Most of  the data: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 
(several numbers) and Pan American Union (IASI).América en Cifras 
1961: 3, Estadísticas Económicas - Producción Industrial. Certain 
figures  on El Salvador and Guatemala were obtained from  national sta-




The manufacture  of  cotton cloth --at least in the three countries covered 
by the pertinent series— increased at an annual rate of  about 7 percent in the 
period 1953-1958, and in the last two years of  the decade, the expansion has 
been accelerated considerably. 37/ 
In contrast, the production of  cement, whose marked expansion of  about 15 
percent was definitely  higher than that of  the other building materials of  non-
metallic mineral origin, appears to have lost something of  its impetus in the 
past two years. Such a drop in its rate of  growth is related, among other 
things, to the temporary saturation of  the market in several producing coun-
tries, although a contributing factor  was a simultaneous weakening of  the pur-
chasing power in certain countries of  Central America. 38/ Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that the prospect for  the long-range demand for  cement does not 
appear to be unfavorable,  and therefore  a new impetus in this branch of  produc-
tion is predicted. 
The lumber industry, whose expansion in the past has continued to lag some-
what behind that of  the traditional group as a whole, has recently shown signs 
of  a certain revival of  vigor. At the same time, fragmentary  data indicate an 
even more marked dynamic trend in furniture  manufacturing. 
The paper industry, characterized in this area by a rather slow growth, 
also appears to have gained a certain impetus in recent years, although what is 
expanding is not the basic paper industries, but rather the processing of  paper 
products, an activity included under this heading. 
The information  available on the manufacturing  volume of  these products 
also permits certain interesting comparisons to be made between the countries 
of  Central America, and between them and other areas of  the world regarding 
their respective production levels (see Table 52). 
Inasmuch as the comparison is made in terms of  per capita production, 
differences  in production volumes relating to the influence  of  the size of 
population tend to be eliminated. However, the effect  of  the expansion of 
areas suitable for  certain crops continues to be evidenced in the industrial 
processing of  those agricultural products. Thus, at least relatively speaking, 
wheat milling in Guatemala, the activity of  sawmills in Honduras, and the pro-
cessing of  sugar in Nicaragua and Costa Rica stand out. Moreover, an increase 
37» In evaluating these increases, we should not lose sight of  the fact 
that, at the same time, the cottage industries and crafts  in this industrial 
activity grew at a slower rate. ~ 
38. In El Salvador, the gradual exhaustion of  the ore deposits at the 
Ajacutla plant has also caused problems, leading to the execution of  a new 
project, soon to be installed, whose equipment will be completed later by the 
addition of  two furnaces  from  the above-mentioned plant. 
/Table 
Table 52 
CENTRAL AMERICA AND OTHER AREAS. OF THE WORLD: PER CAPITA PRODUCTION OF SELECTED PRODUCTS, I960 
(Based on figures  expressed in physical units) a/ 




cardboard Cement Steel 
Electric 
power ta/ 
Costa Rica 2.6 51 8 1 023 0.7 93 0.3* 3UO 
El Salvador 2.5 19 5 ' 327 1.7 1 0.4 33 1.2* 93 
Guatemala 13.0 20 4 616 • • • 10 0.2 31 0.0 67 
Honduras 3-5 10 8 533 0.3 141 - 17 - 46 
Nicaragua - 48 2 557 1.4 72 - 22 - 117 
Panama - 24 20 560 ... 20 104 9.3* 212 
Central America (historical) 5.9 ç / 25 5 529 1.1 d/ 5É 0.1 e/ 25 0.4 e/ 105 
Central American Isthmus 5.4 c/ 25 7 532 53 0.1 32 1.2 f / 114 
Latin America 30 73 s / 17 838 2.7 28 9 h/ 86 h/ 26 h/ 4 22 
United States 63 14 59 2 726 9.3 257 167 b/ 310 499 5 292 
European Common  Market 89 28 50 1 055 6.3 78 5 7 430 361 1 471 
European Free Trade Zone 60 21 64 1 8rs 5.2 112 63 ta/ 356 256 2 499 
a. The basic data for  wheat flour,  sugar, cotton cl'oth, cement, paper products, 'and steel are given in kilograms; for 
beer, in liters; cigarettes, in units; and electric power, in kilowatt-hours. 
b. 1959. 
c. The estimate was made by using the production figures  of  the four  producing countries, but the populations of  al l the 
nations of  this area.-
d. Does not include Guatemala. 
e. Although there are actually only two producing countries, the total population of  Central America was taken into 
account in the estimate. 
f.  Although there are only three producing countries, the entire population of  the Isthmus was taken into account in 
making the estimate. 
g. Cuba is included in this figure.  If  Cuban sugar production were omitted, the per capita coefficient  would be 39. 
h. 1961. 
H-
3 3 s 
e 





Sources: For the Central American Isthmus, those indicated in Table 51. l n addition, for  wheat flour,  CEPAL, Situación 
de las Actividades Productoras de Trigo y la Industria Elaboradora de Trigo en Centroamérica, Doc. E/CN.12/CEE/SC.l/7¿; 
with respect to lumber:FAQ, Yearbook of  Forest Products Statistics 1961 and ECLA/FAO, Latin American Timber Trends ar.d 
Prospects, Santiago 1962. (mim.); paper and cardborad: United Nations (ECLA), document E/CN.12/570, 1961, prepared by 
the ECLA/FAO/DOAT Advisory Group on Paper and Cellulose for  Latin America; steel: archives of  the Economic and Social 
Study of  Latin America 1961; and, population, Pan American Union (IASI), América en Cifras  1961; 1, Estadísticas Demográ-
ficas.  Figures prepared for  the other areas of  the world; OEaZcePAL,  Estudio Económico y Social de América Latina l^ól; 
in addition, with respect to electric power: United Nations (CEPAL), Estado Actual y Evolución Reciente de la Industria 
de la Energía Eléctrica en América Latina, Doc. ü/CN.12/560, 1961. The figures  on the per capita production of  electric 
cover in Europe have been computed on the basis of  United Nations figures,  Statistical Yearbook 1961. 
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in manufacturing  is apparent in the figures  on El Salvador for  textile manufac-
ture, and especially, in the Costa Rican figures  for  the generation of  electric-
ity. The existence of  basic paper and steel industries, although, in the infant 
stage, indicates a keen interest in industrialization in Iii Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Panama. 
A comparison of  the figures  of  Central America or those of  the entire Isth-
mus with those of  Latin America as a whole and other areas of  the world shows 
appreciable differences  in a large number of  the items considered. However, it 
should also be pointed out that Central American per capita production of  sugar 
is no lower than that of  the other areas considered, except Latin America, but 
even there, the coefficients  do not differ  substantially if  the figures  for  Cuba 
are omitted from  the totals for  the region. One item for  which the figure  for 
Central American production does not lag much behind Latin America —although it 
does, with respect to the industrialized countries of  the world— is the ciga-
rette; and a product in which the Isthmus surpasses the rest of  Latin American 
in production is lumber. 
In considering also the coefficients  for  per capita consumption (see Table 
53), it can be noted that for  certain products of  the traditional industries, 
such as flour,  textiles —and certainly this is true also of  many other products 
not included owing to a lack of  figures—  there continues to be an appreciable 
margin for  substitution, although such margins are much broader in the inter-
mediate industries considered here than in the regular consumer industries. 39/ 
Finally,' both the results of  the structural analysis of  the Central Ameri-
can manufacturing  industry and the rather brief  survey of  the per capita pro-
duction and consumption of  several important products show that there axte st i l l 
relatively broad margins for  substituting imports in the traditional industries, 
and also in the other manufacturing  activitiés that are not very sensitive to 
scales of  operation. Progress in this direction would probably have permitted 
the countries of  the Isthmus to have a greater industrial growth than mere 
vegetative for  several more years, even without integration. However, it also 
appears likely that the practical utilization of  such margins of  substitution 
would also quite soon —long before  the margins were exhausted— have led to 
increasing problems in production costs and investment incentives. An increas-
ing protectionism, of  course, would have maintained those incentives for  some 
time, but with additional sacrifices  in production costs, which would put an 
increasingly heavy burden on the rest of  the community and be detrimental to 
future  manufactured  exports. 
An attempt to compare the above-mentioned prospects of  an individual indus-
trial development in the Central American states with its potentiality for  in-
tegrated industrial growth —the outlines of  which are already perceptible— 
reveals three promising factors  in the picture: 
39. In any case, it should be remembered that a rather' significant  part 
of  the difference  between production and apparent consumption is covered, in 
the regular consumer items considered, by imports from  other countries in the 
area. More details on this point will be given in the next Chapter. 
/Table 
Table $3 
CENTRAL AMERICA  AND OTHER AREAS  OF THE WORLD: PER CAPITA APPARENT  CONSUMPTION OF SELECTED PRODUCTS, I960 
(On the basis of  figures  expressed in physical units) a/ 








cardboard d/ Cement 
Raw 
steel e/ 
Costa Rica 29.1 35 8.0 1 042 2.2 158.0 8.6 57 
El Salvador 10.8 15 5.5 3̂ 1 (3.3)' 7.5 5.0 39 • • • 
Guatemala 13.4 19 4.5 502 • • • 10.0 4.5 31 • • • 
Honduras 7.8 14 . 7.5 539 1.0 81.8 2.2 12 • • • 
Nicaragua 10.2 24 2.9 569 2.5 50.0 3.2 29 • • • 
Panama 19.3 22 19.9 576 • • • 23.0 9.7 114 • • • 
Central America (historical) 13 21 5.3 536 2.0 f/ 44.0 4.4 31 13 
Central American Isthmus 14 22 6.6 548 • • • 42.0 4.9 33 • • • 
Latin America 32 33 17 848 2.8 34.0 13 82 39 






in liters; and for  cigarettes, in units. 
The figures  on imports and exports have been converted from  tons to units at the rate of  one million ciga-
rettes per ton according to a method used by the IASI. 
In the conversion of  the basic data from  cubic meters to kilograms, the conversion rates used were 730 and 
520 kilograms per cubic meter for  standing broadleaf  and evergreen timber, respectively, following  a method 
described by the FAO in Yearbook of  Forest Products Statistics 1961» 
The basic data refer  to 1959. . 
Includes the imported processed steels with their equivalents in raw steel. 
Does not include Guatemala. 
Sources: For production and population, the same as for  Table 52. For foreign  trade for  Latin America: foreign 
trade yearbooks of  the respective countries, except with respect to paper, the source of  which was ECLA document 
E/CN.I2/57O; for  steel, ECLA document E/CN.12/CCE?245; and for  lumber: FAO, Yearbook of  Forest Products Statis-
tics 1961. With respect to the United States:t United Nations, Yearbook of  International Trade Statistics I960. 
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i . A review of  the principal industrial plans under consideration 
suggests that even the partial execution of  such plans will bring with it 
development of  the new possibilities for  diversification,  even though such 
diversification  is on a selective basis. 40/ 
i i . A marked increase can also be noted in the other new enterprises, 
and in the tendency to invest, although, in this area there is also a de-
sire to maintain a reasonable cost level. 
i i i . Finally —with respect to the two above points— it can be ex-
pected that the rate of  growth in the sector will speed up. This may occur 
especially as the result of  an increase in the replacement of  manufactured 
imports from  other areas, 41/ although the possibility of  certain new ex-
ports of  industrialized products outside the Isthmus is also being con-
sidered. 42/ 
Judging from  recent experience, at least a temporary acceleration can be 
expected, first  of  kll in the field  of  several traditional industries, such as 
foodstuffs,  textiles, lumber, etc., whose impetus is spreading to the branch of 
pharmaceutical products. And, according to the above-mentioned tentative plans 
40.An instrument whose efficacy  has not yet been tested is the integra-
tion industries, which are "chiefly  ^certain/ plants that produce intermediate 
goods or capital that must have the whole Central American market for  profitable 
operation" and to' which are granted, by special instruments, on the condition 
that they meet certain requirements, special free  trade treatment for  their 
products within the area and exemption from  duties on the importation or local 
manufacture  of  the raw materials and semimanufactured  products required for 
their operation for  a period of  ten years. The conditions the companies must 
fulfill  involve the obligation to meet the standards of  quality established 
by ICAITI (Central American Industrial Research and Technology Institute) and 
certain commitments regarding prices, system of  distribution., and market supply. 
(For more details, see: ECLA , Informe  de la Octava Reunión del Comité de 
Cooperación Económica del Istmo Centroamericano, Doc. E/CN.12/CCE/303 Rev. 1. 
Up to the present, the treatment has been applied only to the tire industry . 
(Guatemala) and caustic soda (Nicaragua). 
41. A more systematic examination of  the problem of  substitution based on 
an analysis of  foreign  trade statistics is presented in the next chapter. 
42. Among the existing and planned industries that will include in their 
program possible exports even outside of  the integration area are those of 
Kraft  cellulose, plywood, dried milk products,.canned fruits  and meats, citric 
concentrates, instant coffee,  chocolate, essential oils, medicinal extracts, 
certain kinds of  jewelry, etc. 
/of  the integration 
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of  the integration industries, a more dynamic behavior is to be expected with-
in a few  years, particularly in the new sectors of  the nontraditional groups. 
In this connection, mention should be made of  the plans to establish an inte-
grated paper industry using the abundant local long-fiber  raw materials; to 
broaden the range of  the chemical industries to include the production of  soda, 
chlorine, insecticides, fertilizers,  etc.; to launch the manufacture  of  glass 
bottles and a greater variety of  ceramic articles; and also to undertake, on 
a broader scale, the manufacture  of  basic metal products. Among these, con-
sideration is being given, first  of  all, to the production of  steel rods in 
larger quantities, and the manufacture  of  certain other non-flat  goods (pro-
file  steel and wire) will also be undertaken. In addition, there is a good 
chance that these new manufacturing  activities will soon be complemented by 
several machine and electrical industries, although several will be only at 
the assembling level. At the same time, it is expected that the operations in 
the new refineries  will soon be normalized, and that there will soon be an ex-
pansion in cement production. 
Although the information  available is not sufficient  to permit a projec-
tion, on objective bases, of  the total industrial development of  the integra-
tion area with the new activities and those now expanded, it can be stated, 
with some assurance, that the execution of  most of  the abovç-mentioned projects 
and of  some of  those that are today being considered only tentatively could 
strengthen substantially the development of  the intermediate industries in the 
area, and possibly also that of  certain branches of  the mechanical industries, 
thereby increasing appreciably their share of  the total sector within the next 
15 years. 
Industrial employment and capital structure-; 
productivity and capital intensity 
We shall now attempt to examine Central American industrial development 
from  other standpoints, supplementing the study of  the structural development 
of  its products with a brief  review of  certain aspects of  employment, produc-
tivity, and capital intensity by industrial groups and branches. 
Actually, these topics deserve a much more detailed study, because a sys-
tematic clarification  of  such factors  could help solve several problems of 
great importance to the area. For example, undoubtedly the abundance of  labor, 
inadequately utilized, plus the acute shortage of  capital resources would seem 
to call for  an industrial policy that is best adapted to such a disparity in 
the availability of  certain factors  of  production, that is to say, a policy 
designed to promote, through tax and other incentives, solutions in the combin-
ing of  productive resources and the selecting of  methods that, while consistent 
with the other criteria of  the development planned, would be the most suitable 
from  the standpoint of  maximum joint productivity of  existing resources. A 
/course of 
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course of  action to that end would, in turn, presuppose a thorough knowledge 
of  the elements involved. hj¿/ However, the present lack of  basic statistics 
—which are even scarcer or more deficient  for  employment and especially capi-
tal, than for  production— reduces the possibility of  research on certain as-
pects of  the situation, which can be only partially clarified. 
This being the case, an effort  will be made, above all, to ascertain the 
group of  industrial workers for  which statistical data are available and whose 
characteristics can be examined, and then to relate the figures  for  that group 
—from  the standpoint of  comparability— to those of  the industrial output 
analyzed above, and to the total economically active population in that sector. 
Then, an attempt will be made to ascertain the over-all growth of  the industri-
al employment in the area, examining the employment structure and linking it to 
productivity by groups and branches. The fixed  capital structure and its inten-
sity by groups and branches will be examined only briefly  for  two countries, 
Costa Rica and Honduras. Finally, the problem of  the utilization of  existing 
capital in industry will be considered. 
The figures  considered on employment for  Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras 
and Nicaragua apply to all the workers employed in those industrial establish-
ments whose output was studied in preceding sections (especially in Section 
B,2). Thus, the two types of  figures  are, in this respect, comparable for  those 
countries. 
The case of  Guatemala is different.  As a matter of  fact,  when the charac-
teristics of  its industrial output were examined earlier, the census data re-
ferring  to the manufacturing  component of  its industry were considered along 
with an estimate of  its home industry sector, which had not been included in" 
the census, while the information  available on employment refers  only to the 
"factory"  sector. Therefore,  the figures  on Guatemalan industry will be taken 
up separately and, in those areas where it is desirable to provide a synoptic 
resumê for  all of  Central America, only the figures  covering the other four 
countries will be combined, kk/ 
Çj]The price system is not a sufficiently  reliable index to the relative 
abundance or shortage of  the various factors  of  production in the different 
sectors of  the economic activity, since, especially with respect to the cost of 
these factors,  it is subject to various effects  of  distortion. In this connec-
tion, it is sufficient  to mention the existence of  chronic unemployment, both 
open and hidden, in most of  the countries of  the Isthmus, and the disequilibrium 
in the productivity of  the various sectors. 
kk. However, the presentation of  the statistics on factory  employment in 
Guatemala will be supplemented by a presentation of  the output of  that same in-




To interpret correctly the facts  given below, it should be remembered that 
the figures  on production and employment in the four  countries mentioned are 
for  all the industrial eEstablishments covered by the census and include most of 
the handicraft  sector as far  as industrial employment is concerned. These fig-
ures, however, do not cover the very small handicraft  industries —especially 
those in rural areas, which include mostly family  shops— where self-employment 
and employment without remuneration are important. 
This fact  also helps to explain that, although all the workers included in 
the industrial censuses of  the four  countries only totaled about 120 000 labor-
ers and white-collar workers according to the figures  projected to 1957, 45/ 
their economically active population in the industrial sector, projected to the 
same year, totaled about 100 000 more persons. Naturally, the productivity of 
this additional group —which, moreover, also includes persons who were not em-
ployed during the entire year— was very low. 6̂/ 
Another point of  great interest is the growth in industrial employment in 
the Central American countries. Unfortunately,  the data available permits only 
a very approximate figure  on the subject. Taking into account the incomplete 
census and. other data that are relatively comparable in time, as well as the 
industrial employment indexes of  two countries —the last two, with the reser-
vations necessary owing to their fragamentary  nature— it can only be estimated 
that in the period 1953-57, employment in the establishments covered by the 
census —including that part of  the handicraft  industry covered by the census— 
grew at a rate of  about 5 percent a year. The rate of  growth was higher in the 
manufacturing  sector of  Costa Rica and in the manufacturing  segment of  the 
Guatemalan industry, where it rose to about six percent. However, it appears 
to have been somewhat lower in El Salvador and sti l l lower in Nicaragua and 
Honduras. 
An average growth of  about five  percent in industrial employment for  the 
entire area —accompanied by an increase of  about six percent in the corre-
sponding output— does not suggest a very rapid structural disruption to the 
advantage of  activities requiring a smaller amount of  labor. However, neither 
does it reveal much progress in productivity, which —as will be seen further 
on— is not very closely related to the intensity of  capital in this area. At 
any rate, the total productivity in the sector —that is to say, in industry 
as a whole, including the segment not covered by the census— has registered 
a slight additional increase, owing to the gradual decline in the ratio of 
smaller handicraft  establishments. As a matter of  fact,  there is evidence that 
the expansion of  the latter industries was slower than that of  the establish-
ments for  which figures  were available. Of  course, it also means a somewhat 
slower rate of  increase in employment in the industrial sector as a whole. 
í+5. Õf  that total, 51 000 refer  to El Salvador, 27 000, Costa Rica, 
22 000 to Nicaragua, and almost 20 000 to Honduras. These figures  do not in-
clude the employment in coffee  processing, with a total of  11 000 persons in 
El Salvador arid k 300 in Costa Rica; the figures  for  Honduras and Nicaragua 
are not known. 
46. Its contribution to the total value added by the manufacturing 
sector, which is difficult  to determine, could scarcely have amounted to 15 
percent in all four  countries together. 
/An even more 
- 126 -
An even more difficult task is to establish, through comparison, the aver-
age productivity in the Central American countries. Such an attempt necessar-
ily is impeded by problems of methodology and information that can be solved 
only in part. The most serious obstacle until recently had been the lack of a 
rate of conversion to express in a single unit the manufacturing output of the 
various countries, in conformity with the price level in each of the countries, 
being compared. Nevertheless, using the parity figures of a very recent study, 
certain estimates have been made for the purpose of establishing at least cer-
tain categories of volume in this connection, 47/ 
According to the results of the above-mentioned approximate estimate, it 
appears that productivity —if the added value per worker, in terms of the 
purchasing power of currency, is measured— is quite similar in the industries 
of El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.- In contrast, the average productivity 
of Costa Rican industry is about 50 percent higher than that of the other coun-
tries mentioned. 48/ 
One of the structural aspects of industrv.:: ôyment that deserves 
attention is the breakdown of employment b I <r, u.-! i.--trial groups and 
branches, and its relationship to the fcompocsit J on o i um .sector's output. It 
is possible to compare roughly the employment; and added value structures for 
the region as a whole, by countries. 49/ Such a comparison brings out similar-
ities and differences in various elements. The differences are especially 
apparent in the proportions represented by certain industrial branches in the 
two totals. Nevertheless, there are certain particularities that should be 
noted even in the large manufacturing groups. 
47. The parity figures for the estimates urfiier reference were taken from 
an EC LA study, A Measurement of Price Levels and the Purchasing Power of 
Currencies in Latin America,  1960-62, E /CN.12/653* It should be noted that the 
parities used refer to the purchasing power of currencies in relation to total 
expenditures and not merely to the price for industrial products. 
48. It may be added, for purposes of comparison, that the average produc-
tivity of Chilean industry, in turn, appears to have been 50 percent higher 
than Costa Rican —according to the most recent tentative figures— somewhat 
higher even than the Mexican. It is sufficient to say that such comparisons 
are lacking in accuracy, owing to the uncertainty of both terms and statistics. 
49» With respect to these four countries, as a.whole, the figures for them 
being relatively comparable, the last two columns of Table permit a compari-
son, but for a comparison of the various individual structures of these coun-
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Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a. The figures in the last column of the Table, as indicated in the heading, do not represent employment percentages, but 
percentages of the total added value of the industrial sector. 
b. Figures .for the employment structure in the factory segment of the Guatemalan manufacturing sector that are not suffi-
ciently comparable with the figures contained here are given in Table 55« 
c. The figures for the Costa Rican manufacturing structure in 1953 estimates based on the industrial employment re-
corded by the 1957 census, projected in accordance with the ratio of the industrial employment structures of 1957 to 
that of 1952 in the aforementioned study of the University of Costa Rica, It was necessary to use this procedure owing 
to various inconsistencies between the employment structure recorded in the 1957 census and that reported, for the same 
year, in the atlidy. In that connection, account was taken of the fact that the final preparation of the figures in the 
census came after those figures had been used in making the said study. 
d. The figures under thiB heading, just as in Tables 9̂» and 50, do not include the added value for the processing of 
coffee. 
Sources: The basic figures shown in Table have been used for the four countries for which figures are given here. The 
figures in the aforementioned study of the University of Costa Rica have been used as stated in footnote c. of this table. 
In the two countries where figures were* available for-only one year, the figures for the group of four countries in 1955 were 
computed by projecting the census figures on the basis of the fluctuation in the corresponding output. Since, in one case, 
the original figures preceded 1955* &nd in the other, followed 1955» and tor other reasons, it was ássumed that the resulting 
bias would not be significant. A linear interpolation was made in the case of the other two countries in order to obtain 
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a~. The figure  for  this heading may be somewhat high, 
b. Although the activity in the production of  nonferrous  metals actually appears 
to have decreased between the two periods, it may be that the high figure  for 
1953 is due in part to the inclusion under this heading of  part of  the respec-
tive primary activities. 
Sources of  the basic data: Industrial censuses of  1953 a n d 1957 of  Guatemala, on 
the basis of  publications referred  to in the footnotes  to Table 48. 
/Thus, the 
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Thus, the percentage of  total employment represented by the mechanical in-
dustries (5»7 percent for  the four  countries as a group) is definitely  larger 
than its share of  the output (j.8). This once more points up the fact  that the 
mechanical industries of  the area are operated almost exclusively on the handi-
craft  basis, and their output per person is certainly not high. 50/ It is not 
all surprising that the intermediate industries, in contrast, account for  a 
larger proportion of  the aggregate value than of  employment. In fact,  it is 
surprising that the difference  is not greater. 51/ This situation may be partially 
explained by the fact  that most of  the intermediate industries in the area have 
not yet developed the characteristics of  such activities in the rt.ore industrial-
ized countries, that is to say, large-scale, more mechanized operation. 52/ 
The differences  between the percentages of  employment and output in the 
various manufacturing  branches can be more easily seen from  the standpoint of 
relative productivity, a summary of  which gives a synoptic view of  a greater 
number of  activities (see Table 56). 
A comparison of  relative productivities in the whole sector (see the 
first  column in Table 56) reveals immediately that the branches having the 
largest production are easily the manufacture  of  tobacco and beverages. Since 
this is largely due to the high government monopoly prices and other fiscal 
50. In Brazil, the opposite has happened, since, according to the most 
recent statistics, its machine industries account for  a larger proportion of 
the total output than of  the total employment. 
51. Whereas, in the four  Central American countries as a group, the pro-
ductivity ratio between the traditional industries and the intermediate group 
is 1:1.16, in Chile it is 1:1.6, and in Mexico and Brazil, approximately 1:1.8. 
52. The fact  that certain intermediate industries should be more mechan-
ized for  efficient  operation than several other manufacturing  activities can 
be used as an argument against their establishment, but certainly not an un-
assailable argument, since, in making such a decision, the special conditions 
of  each economy must also be taken into account, and, in the cane under con-
sideration, those of  the Central American area as a whole. In fact,  the 
establishment of  certain industries —especially basic industries, intended to 
stimulate development in the rest of  the sector— may be justified  from  the 
standpoint of  their usefulness  to the public, even though their establishment 
may temporarily increase the average degree of  mechanization within the industri-
al whole instead of  increasing, to the maximum extent, the absorption of  labor. 
But in deciding in favor  of  industries of  this type, it appears in any case to 
be desirable —without going into theoretical considerations here concerning 
the various criteria of  preference  and priority used in evaluating projects— 
to select one having the technical characteristics that, in addition to satis-
fying,  in so far  as possible, the microeconomic principle of  profit-making 
capacity, would ensure the greatest possible utilization of  available resources 
for  the economy, 
53- The relative productivity of  an industrial branch is its productivity 
— expressed in the form  of  an index—' with respect to the average productivity 
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a. The combined statistics on Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua are 
given. The reason for  not including the figures  on Guatemala in the calcula-
tions is stated in footnote  44/ of  the text. The productivity in the manufac-
turing sector and its subdivisions has been calculated at the ratio between the 
statistically recorded values of  the output —aggregate value— and of  employ-
ment —number of  persons employed— in the various units. Relative productivity 
is the productivity of  a group or branch, expressedcas an index based on the 
average productivity of  the entire industrial sector. 
b. The beverages, tobacco, paper, rubber, and basic metal' industries (groups 21, 22, 
27, 30, and 34 of  the CIIU) are omitted for  the reasons indicated in the comments 
in the text. 
c. The coffee-processing  plants are not included. 
d. It could not be calculated because the basic figures,  which were very smáll, 
lost accuracy when rounded off. 
Sources: Those stated in the footnotes  to Tables 48 and 54. 
/surcharges 
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surcharges ¿4/ applied to these products, and possibly also to certain foreign 
profits  that can be classed as royalties, these two branches are excluded from 
the more detailed comparison below, which tends rather to treat the intrinsic 
elements of  the various productivities by branches. Moreover, neither did it 
seem desirable to include in this comparison the paper, rubber, and basic metal 
industries of  the area, since their employment and output figures  are too small 
to show any significant  ratios. On the other hand, it was not necessary to 
eliminate the data for  the first  three machine industry headings entirely, 
although they were very small, since their homogeneity permitted them to be 
considered as a unit. 
If  we now compare the remaining 11 headings with each other and with the 
adjusted average for  the sector (see the second column in Table 56), we see 
that they tend to group themselves into three categories. As a matter of  fact, 
three of  these branches —the textile, chemical, and nonmetallic mineral in-
dustries— stand out because of  their relatively high productivity indexes. 
The miscellaneous industries, printing, and manufacturing  of  shoes and clothing 
have an average index, located somewhat above the adjusted average, although 
below the average for  the whole sector. Finally, low indexes of  relative pro-
ductivity characterize the leather and mechanical (not including those for 
transportation equipment) industries which have very similar coefficients,  and 
the lumber, foodstuff,  and transportation equipment industries, whose statis-
tics are also very concentrated, and finally,  the manufacture  of  wood furniture 
and accessories. 
Since productivity can be attributed somewhat to greater mechanization 
and more efficiency,  or higher relative prices for  the product, 55/ it would 
certainly be of  considerable interest to determine the possible influence  of. 
all these elements on the productivity indexes recorded. However, such an in-
vestigation is not possible on the basis of  the data now available, and so we 
shall present below a summary of  the scant pertinent information  available for 
two countries of  the area. 
The data to be given in the table for  the fixed  renewable capital 56/ 
structure of  the Costa Rican and Honduran industries —taken from  two works on 
the development of  these countries 57/ and supplemented with the pertinent 
estimates— are quite detailed, although, owing to the known difficulties  in 
54.The basic data are given, in most cases, in terms of  the added value 
at market prices and not of  added value at factor  cost, which would be more 
correct for  the analysis used here. This- is one of  the examples of  the statis-
tical discrepancies that make the results of  this analysis inaccurate. 
55* And, for  the reasons given, as a result of  the inflated  prices for 
goods under a government monopoly. 
56. The term fixed  renewable capital in the manufacturing  sector or its 
subdivisions includes buildings and structures, and machinery and equipment, 
less corresponding depreciation. Land, inventories, and intangibles are not 
included. 




COSTA RICA AND HONDURAS: STRUCTURE OF EXISTING. FIXED CAPITAL 
AND CAPITAL INTENSITY IN THE MANUFACTURING  SECTOR 
BY INDUSTRIAL GROUPS AND BRANCHES, 1957 a/ 
(In percentages of totals for capital/output ratios and structure for industry) 
Industrial groups and branches 
Structure of existinf 
fixed capita 
renewable 
y Output structure Capital Intensity c/ 























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
I. Traditional industries 81.2 80.0 B^z 2Ê»é 84.4 iã 1.4 1.0 
Foods tuffs e/ 31.9 29.6 27.7 23.9 14.5 2.4 1.7 1.9 
Beverages 9.6 10.2 17-1 7.5 31.6 1.9 1.6 0.5 
Tobacco 5-1 3-2 5.2 2.9 9.2 1.3 1.0 0.6 
Textiles 8.3 9.6 14.7 4.7 8.7 3.3 3.0 1.6 
Clothing 5.4 5.9 4.7 ' 12.6 8.4 0.8 0.7 0.5 
Lumber and cork 16.7 15.6 12.7 12.9 9.8 2.2 1.6 1.3 
Furniture and accessories 3-9 3.6 1.1 7.9 1.2 1.8 0.6 0.9 
Hideo and leather 2.3 2.3 0.4 4.2 1.0 1*5 1.1 0.4 
II. Intermediate industries M l4.0 èã iiit 1.1 1.0 
Paper, cardboard and paper products 0.8 0.9 - 0.7 - 2.2 1.9 _ Rubber products 1.6 2.0 - 1*2 - 2.4 2.2 -
Chemical products 4.7 . 4.8 5.3 9.9 5.6 1,0 0.8 0.9 
Petroleum derivatives - - - . - - - -Nonmetnllic mineral products 2.6 2.1 1.2 2.2 0.9 1.4 1.3 
III. Mechanical industries f/ ish ¿ 2 lá 2ã hi lã 
Metal products ( 
f  , ! 1.6 j ( ( Mechanical equipment and accessories 1.1 J 2.4 i ' t 1.5 { 1-2 < 0.7 Electrical equipment and accessories t ( I I ( ( ( Transportation equipment 2.3 2.7 1.2 2.1 . 1*6 1.Í 1.7 0.7 
IV. Residual industrial group S&Z kJ 6^2 hi 4,1 lã iii h2 
Printing and publishing 2.9 3-4 3-7 4.6 3-1 1.0 0.9 1.1 
Miscellaneous 2.8 2.9 2.5 l.l 1.0 4.8 3.8 2.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.8 1.4 1.0 
a. The table aleo contains the output structure for the two countries under reference with comparable figures for their capital 
statistics. On the basis of the respective basic data, the capital intensity coefficients contained in the last three 
columns were calculated. Ther»e basic dnta on output differ somewhat from those of previous tables, for the reasons explained 
in footnote 1 on page 87« hut they are the same as, or comparable with the figures used In the next table. 
b. This item includes the buildings and structures in addition to machinery and"equipment. 
c. The numerator of the ratio represents the renewable fixed capital according to footnote (b); the denominator, the added value. 
d. Statistics for 1956. 
e. The Costa Rican figures do not include coffee processing plants, rice-husking mills, and sugar mills. 
f. Including the values for basic processing materials, which are very small* 
Sources: For Costa Rica: Publications of the University of Costa Rica (Economic Research Institute); £1 Desarrollo Económico de 





terms, they may not be very accurate (see Table 57) . 5 § / Therefore,  the f ig -
ures will be used with the necessary reservations, and even so, we shall en-
deavor only to interpret the aspects that appear to show the existence of  one 
characteristic or another with sufficient  distinction. 
In comparing the figures  for  the capital structure of  Costa Rican industry 
with figures  for  the composition of  its output (all this information  is shown, 
along with similar figures  for  Honduras, in the first  five  columns of  Table 57) , 59/ 
one is struck by the fact  that, with respect to the traditional industries, 
their proportion of  the total capital of  the sector is larger than that of 
output. In contrast, in its intermediate industries, the proportion of  total 
capital is definitely  lower than that of  output, which, in this case, is due 
especially to the lack of  capitalization of  the quasichemical industries. The 
comparable figures  for  Honduran industry —where the general capitalization 
level is even lower— do not show such differences  in the traditional and 
intermediate industry groups, although they do show a very low capital inten-
sity for  the machine industry group. These differences,  as is obvious, are 
also apparent in the coefficients  of  capital intensity —or capital-output 
ratios— by groups or branches shown in the last three columns of  Table 57. 60/ 
Although, as already stated, all the fixed  capital figures  should be in-
terpreted with a certain amount of  caution, it appears likely that the coeffi-
cients indicating capital intensity in the totals of  the two manufacturing 
sectors are realistic and have an acceptable degree of  approximation. Accord-
ing to those coefficients,  the capital-output ratio in the Costa Rican industry 
as a whole is somewhat less than two —and, with respect to its machinery and 
equipment, somewhat less than 1.5— while, in Honduran industry it appears to 
be nearly unity. 
58. The same caution is expressed in one of  the above-mentioned studies. 
59. The figures  available for  the capital structure of  Costa Rican indus-
try are aot fully  comparable with the figures  in the preceding tables, but com-
parable figures  for  output —taken from  the same source as the data on capital— 
are included in Table 57. Moreover, these data on output were also used in 
making the calculations on capital intensity, and along with equally comparable 
figures  on employment, in computing the indexes in Table 58. These figures  on 
output differ.in  various aspects of  coverage and valuation from  the census fig-
ures. Among other differences  should be mentioned the fact  that they exclude 
coffee  processing plants, rice-husking mills and sugar mills, as well as almost 
all repair shops. They may also contain adjusted values for  the headings 
beverages and tobacco, and figures  with more complete coverage for  the lumber 
industries, etc. 
60. "Capital intensity" is the ratio of  existing renewable fixed  capital 
in the manufacturing  sector or its subdivisions to the added value of  the respec-
tive production unit. It seemed preferable  not to use the term "capital density" 
here, since this term usually means the ratio of  capital to employment. 
/The manufacturing 
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The manufacturing  sectors that are most highly capitalized in Costa Rica 
—in terms of  their renewable fixed  capital— are the miscellaneous industries, 
textile and rubber 6l/ manufacturing,  and the manufacture  of  foodstuffs,  paper 
products, nonmetallic mineral materials, and lumber. In terms of  machinery and 
equipment, the order of  the more mechanized industries is quite similar with 
the difference  that the rubber and paper products industries are above food-
stuffs,  and the place occupied by lumber is taken by the transportation equip-
ment industries, probably because of  the part that the equipment of  the air-
plane parts plant plays in this branch. 
In Honduras, the groups whose capital coefficients  occupy the first  five 
placed are the miscellaneous industries, foodstuffs,  textiles, lumber, and 
nonmetallic minerals. All these are activities that are also among the rela-
tively more capitalized activities in Costa Rica. 
Moreover, the manufacture  of  clothing and shoes, chemical industries, 
and printing are the chief  activities with little fixed  capital in Costa Rica. 
With respect to printing, it should be borne in mind that its output also in-
cludes the output of  the publishing industry. In machinery and equipment, 
furniture  manufacturing,  chemistry, and printing occupy the last places. In 
Honduras, the lowest capitalization characterizes these industries: leather, 
clothing, beverages, tobacco, transportation equipment and other metallurgical 
products, as well as furniture  manufacturing  and the chemical industry, whose 
coefficients  are less than unity. 
An interesting fact  is the lack of  a clear relationship between relative 
capital intensity and relative productivity by groups and branches (see Table 
58). It is usually assumed that there is a certain correlationship between, 
capital intensity and productivity, and that this relationship is maintained 
when both categories are classified  in order or in relationship to their own 
averages. 
It is not possible to give here a complete explanation, of  the apparent 
anomaly noted, which it is assumed results merely from  statistical errors. 
However, certain observations on this point may be made. 
The importance of  the frequency  with which equipment is replaced in 
several Central American industries should be emphasized. This phenomenon, 
in addition to explaining at least in part the inadequate effect  of  capital 
intensity on productivity in several activities, should be given more atten-
tion in view of  the high cost of  factory  installations, part of  which are 
consistently not being adequately utilized. It is true that part of  the 
machinery that is not being sufficiently  used is made up of  machine units that 
are not very efficient  although sti l l usable, but similar observations have 
been made, though to a lesser extent, also in relatively modern plants. 
This industry is relatively diversified  in Costa Rica and among 




COSTA RICA AND HONDURAS: RELATIVE CAPITAL INTENSITY 
AND RELATIVE PRODUCTIVITY, BY INDUSTRIAL GROUPS AND BRANCHES, 1957 
(Nurrber indexes: average intensity and productivity in the manufacturing  sector = 100) 
Industrial groups and branches 
Relative capital intensity a/ Relative productivity 
Costa Rica b/ Honduras Costa 








U) (2) (k) (5) 
I. Traditional industries 104 99 105 101 
Foodstuffs  d/ 133 124 191 136 52 
Beverages 109 115 54 242 184 
Tobacco 72 7k 57 259 175 
Textiles 186 216 168 131 59 
Clothing 46 51 56 67 179 
Lumber and cork 122 114 129 86 85 
Furniture and accessories 47 43 96 65 104 
Hides and leather 81 81 36 193 280 
II. Intermediate industries 79 80 100 uh. 100 
Paper, cardboard and paper products 120 141 - 119 -
Rubber products 132 163 - 158 -
Chemical products 57 58 94 284 106 
Petroleum derivatives - - - - -
Nonmetallic mineral products 124 100 134 52 75 
III. Mechanical industries 97 109 21 64 1̂ 6 
Simple metal products 
{ 84 1 89 ( fu ( I 136 Mechanical equipment and accessories < 72 { 54 
Electrical equipment and accessories \ ( ( ( ( Transportation equipment 105 122 77 72 139 
IV. Residual industrial groups TL 102 152 112 66 
Printing and publishing 57 66 119 103 84 
Miscellaneous 270 279 250 66 40 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
1 
a. The relative capital intensity of  an industrial group or branch Is the capital-output ratio 
within that group expressed as an index based on the capital-output ratio of  the entire 
manufacturing  sector. 
b. The basic data used in this table are fully  comparable" with those of  the preceding tables, 
except Table 57* More"details are given in footnote  59 in the text. 
c. The figures  for  Costa Rica do not include coffee-processing  plants, rice-rhusking mills, or 
sugar mills. 
d. The figures  for  this heading, which are very small, are included in the next heading, 
metallurgical and mechanical industries. 
Sources: Those stated in the note to Table 54. 
/Although 
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Although there is no over-all information,  even by branches, concerning 
the average degree of  utilization of  manufacturing  equipment in the countries 
of  Central America, some fragmentary  data summed up below can throw some light 
on the situation. 62/ 
In a survey made in Costa Rica in 1957-58, the conclusion was reached that 
several of  the principal factories  for  producing foodstuffs  could have increased 
their production between 20 percent and 25 percent with the equipment they had 
without major technical difficulties.  In some of  the soft-drink  plants, some 
installations were found,  which, to be sure were quite old, that were being 
operated at barely one-third of  their capacity. 63/ While one large textile 
factory  operated at full  capacity, several other plants having equipment of  in-
ferior  quality were operating with varying degrees of  excess capacity. Even 
more serious was the unused capacity in shoe factories,  sometimes amounting to 
one-fifth  of  their total potential capacity, and in sawmills. In sawmills, a 
serious obstacle to better utilization of  equipment were the seasonal difficul-
ties in transportation. When another briefer  survey was made in Costa Rica 
two years ago, i t was again noted that some equipment was far  from  being ade-
quately utilized. 
The report of  a consulting firm,  which made a direct survey in Guatemala 
recently, states that only one-fourth  of  the companies observed operate on more 
than one shift.  Another technical group that went to Nicaragua at almost the 
same time also found  a number of  possibilities for  increasing the production of 
several companies in that country by using existing installations. 
Among the various reasons for  persistent inadequate utilization of  the in-
dustrial capacity, the following,  which appear to be the most important, sh'ould 
be stressed: 6k/ 
i . Certain industries were not able to acquire installations suited 
to the small Central American markets, especially in the previous period 
of  relative isolation, either because equipment of  those sizes are not 
manufactured  or because, owing to certain "indivisibilities," the expecta-
tion of  possible future  expansion made it necessary to purchase much 
larger units than were desired. 
62. Sources of  such information  are: University of  Costa Rica, op. cit . , 
Wolf  Management Engineering Co. (forAID),  Costa Rican Industrial Crossroads, 
1961; Barrington and Co. (for  the Government of  Guatemala and for  AID): Indus-
trial Development of  Guatemala, 1962; International Economic Consultants Inc., 
Incentives to Private Industry in Nicaragua, I96I. 
^ It should be noted, however, that the brewing industry of  the coun-
try showed a high degree of  utilization of  its equipment. 
6k. In this discussion no reference  is made to the temporary inadequate 
utilization of  equipment owing to accidental causes, strikes and others, much 
less to equipment existing in name only, that is to say, installations that 
are so obsolete or in such disrepair that they are useful  only to be held in 
reserve, in other words, for  use for  short emergency periods. 
/ i i . There is 
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i i . There i s strong resistance among factory  operators to running 
their plants in three —often  even in two— shifts .  There are several 
reasons for  this , but one of  the chief  reasons i s the marked shortage of 
administrative, technical, and supervisory personnel —sometimes the most 
important bottleneck in industrialization— which makes i t necessary for 
the operator himself  to perform  a l l these functions  at once, thereby pre-
venting him from  delegating his authority so that the operations might be 
carried on in his absence. 
i i i . In several instances, the equipment could produce a great deal 
more, even with the same number of  hours of  operation, i f  more efficient 
administrative and technical procedures were applied, but the necessary 
knowledge and technical s k i l l s are not yet sufficiently  disseminated. 
iv . In general, there i s also a great lack of  knowledge about the 
operation, maintenance, and repair of  machinery. The result i s premature 
deterioration, and the repairs made are often  quite temporary, with the 
resulting loss of  time. All of  this i s aggravated by difficulty  frequently 
in obtaining spare parts local ly . 
The above points show that some of  the problems, that i s , those relating 
to the size of  the market, can be remedied without great dif f iculty ,  at least 
for  those companies that are sufficiently  efficient  to be able to compete in 
the other countries of  the area, although less "automatically" for  those that 
must make a special effort  in order to be on a competitive footing.  As a result 
of  the new configuration  in Central America, the situation will probably tend to 
be alleviated, at least partial ly , with respect to the local supply of  certain 
spare parts. However, other more important di f f icult ies  can be solved only by 
a significant  advance in technical and administrative training, and this has 
also been contemplated within the framework  of  joint industrialization efforts. 
16% 
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Chapter III 
EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF CENTRAL AMERICAN  IMPORTS AND 
PROSPECTS FOR INTRA-CENTRAL  AMERICAN  TRADE 
A. CHANGES IN IMPORT VOLUME 
About 19^5, the five  Central American countries entered upon a period of  steady 
economic development based primarily on heavier foreign  demand for  their 
traditional exports and supplmented by a certain measure of  diversification  in 
agricultural export commodities for  four  of  the countries, and. the continuation 
of  manufacturing  development initiated in three of  them during the first  half 
of  the 1940*s. Economic development was accompanied by a rapid growth of  urban 
population, which served to diversify  the expansion of  domestic demand. 
Central American production for  sale on the domestic markets also grew 
rapidly, but owing to the difficulties  outlined in the Introduction to this 
study, such output was unable to improve its relative share in the satisfaction 
of  domestic demand during most of  this period of  intensive economic development. 
With reference  to the demand for  capital goods, which had been entirely imported 
in the mid-40's, cement is the only exception to be noted} its production was 
initiated gradually in four  of  the countries. The rest of  Central American 
output aimed at internal supply encountered, in the case of  foodstuffs,  a 
serious obstacle in the rigidity imposed on agricultural production by deficient 
land ownership systems and the lack of  adequate transportation facilities, 
especially secondary roads between the producing areas and the new or expanding 
consumer centers. 
With the exception of  cement and foodstuffs,  the manufacturing  sector 
expanded rapidly, outstripping the growth of  actual demand for  part of  its 
output. Available data on manufacturing  structure and growth are insufficient 
for  even an approximate evaluation of  the extent to which over-all manufactur-
ing production succeeded in satisfying  the demand for  manufactured  goods. 
Information  on changes in manufacturing  and import structures indicates, how-
ever, that the latter must not only have increased rapidly, but also have adapted 
to the diversified  demand for  finished  goods created by the rising urban popula-
tion. Imports must also have supplied the steadily lengthening list of  inter-
mediate products called for  by manufacturing  expansion. 
Accordingly, the volume of imports increased at a very high rate. During 
the ten years prior to 1955» this figure tripled, climbing from l4l million 
dollars in constant currency in 19̂ 5 to 415 million dollars in 1955* This 
increase was not affected by national differences with regard to manufacturing 
expansion and, consequently, to the replacement of imports generated by that 
sector. Thus, for example, in El Salvador and Guatemala, where the increased 
flow of manufactures was steadiest, imports expanded less than in Nicaragua, 
and more than in Honduras, both under-industrialized countries. In like 
maimer, imports by Costa Rica, whose manufacturing sector represents the 
/largest share 
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largest share relative to domestic product, expanded somewhat more than those 
of  Honduras, not only during the ten years in question but since as far  back as 
1937 (see Table 59). 
Between 1955 and 1957, the rate of  expansion for  total imports by the region 
was maintained but on a less general basis. Nicaragua, whose current capacity 
to import was affected  by the decline in international quotations for  its export 
commodities that began in 1956, curtailed its volume of  imports by 11 percent 
in that same year. In the other countries, the gradual deterioration of  these 
prices was partly counteracted by a greater volume of  exports and partly by 
international loans for  public works. Thus, in 1957, Central American imports 
exceeded the 1955 level by 21 percent, despite the scant increase in Costa Rican 
imports. 
Since 1958, however, this balancing factor  proved, in general, insufficient 
to offset  the increasingly sharper drop in world prices. In that year, imports 
declined by 7 percent in El Salvador and to a lesser extent in Guatemala and 
Honduras. Aggregate imports by the five  countries decreased by only 1.5 perr 
cent, however, since Costa Rica and Nicaragua achieved a moderate rise in 
imports owing to the greater volume of  coffee  exported by the former  and the 
reduction in international reserves held by the latter. In 1959, only the first 
of  these two countries showed an increase in import volume; this is partially 
explained by the rapid development of  its meat-freezing  industry based on cattle 
imports. If  this item is balanced out by the re-exportation of  meat, the volume 
of  Costa Rican imports would then decline in a manner similar to that observed 
in the other countries. 
The stepped-up volume of  imports in i960 largely compensated for  the drop 
of  5.2 percent in the preceding year, but in 1961 this level was depressed 
again to almost the 1959 figure. 
In short, aggregate import volume has been at a standstill since 1957» 
The incomplete data available for  1962 indicate a rise that will, at most, 
only recover the decline of  1961. 
B. CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS 
The initial expansion and subsequent contraction of  Central American 
imports in the last ten years have led to moderate changes in their composition. 
It is difficult  to classify  the determining factors  in order of  importance 
because of  their different  impact in each of  the two five-year  periods. 
Nevertheless, one of  the main factors  is the obvious circumstance that the 
years under study are subsequent to or a continuation of  a period of  maximum 
structural transformation  in Central American imports. That is to say, in 1953, 
prior economic development had assured a high level of  the ratio of  capital and 
intermediate goods that would attenuate relative changes in the future.  This 
is clearly shown by a comparison of  the figures  available for  1953, 19 percent 




VOLUME OF IMPORTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA,  SELECTED YEARS 
(In millions of  dollars at 1955 prices) 
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Central America 
1937 29.8 25.7 44.5 27.9 13.9 127.9 
1945 36.8 27.6 34.2 26.7 15.3 140.6 
1950 50.0 53.0 82.7 44.8 30.1 260.6 
1955 87.5 91.9 103.5 62.0 69.6 414.5 
1956 90.7 102.8 130.9 71.8 61.9 458.1 
1957 99.2 111.0 147.3 80.2 66.2 503.9 
1958 99.8 103.7 146.0 79.2 67.8 496.5 
1959 101.1 98.3 139.8 73.7 57.7 470.6 
I960 108.0 116.0 138.0 72.0 59.0 494.0 
1961 103.0 101.2 137.0 73.0 60.0 474.2 • 
Sources and Notes: Up to 1959, Suplemento Estadístico, Boletín Economico de 




to only l6 percent and intermediate goods to only 22 percent of  import value 
calculated at constant prices. Comparatively speaking, consumer goods dropped 
from 63 percent in 1945 to 43 percent in 1950, and to 39 percent in 1953. 
The importance of  these variations shows that import composition in 1953-62 
should not be measured in terms of  reduced volume alone but rather by how 
long-term factors  in the Central American economies were accentuated or 
deemphasized. 
Another factor  to be kept in mind, particularly in considering the future 
activation of  long-term factors,  is that changes in composition have not always 
been identical in the five  countries. The greater industrial development of 
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala has enabled those countries to cut back 
imports of  consumer goods to a greater extent thPn the Central American group 
as a whole, that is, to maintain their relative share of  total imports when 
domestic demand for  these goods spiraled. In the other two countries, in con-
trast, expansion of  this demand in 1953-57 brought an increase in the ratio of 
consumer goods to total imports. In Honduras,!/ for  example, bhis ratio rose 
from  37 percent in 1953 to 54 percent in 1957, thus reducing the decline of  this 
percentage for  Central America as a whole. 
Finally, the most important factor  in the composition of  imports during 
1958-62 has been the rapid development of  reciprocal trade among the five 
countries. This trade differs  sharply as to content from  that of  import trade 
with other areas. The percentage of  capital goods and fuels,  for  example, is 
minimum in reciprocal trade, while the ratio of  intermediate goods, in addition 
to being less than that in trade with other areas, is subject to acute fluctua-
tions that generally respond to climatic variations in the exporting country. 
Reciprocal trade has prevented the relative decline that would otherwise 
have occurred in consumer goods imports following  increased balance of  payments 
difficulties  in 1958. The Treaty of  Association signed by El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras and, especially, the General Treaty of i960, created the 
conditions required for  reciprocal trade to overcome the limitations imposed by 
the system of  bilateral treaties on which i t was based and to go beyond the 
mere transaction of  unprocessed foodstuffs  by which it had been characterized 
up to that time. Although the volume of  such foodstuffs  continued to increase, 
the Treaty permitted a substantial increase in the trade of  Central American 
manufactured  articles, mostly nondurable goods. 
Because of  the moderating effect  of  these three factors,  the analysis of 
changes in the composition of  imports is difficult  and unsatisfactory  when 
based exclusively on a classification  of  great aggregates, such as the economic 
use of  the goods, that is, consumption, investment and industrial processing. 
Accordingly, this study has preferred  to use the Standard Classification  of 
International Trade 2/ (SCIT), which, although it lends itself  less readily 
T.  United Nations, Document E/CN.12/549, p. 107. 
2. United Nations, Statistical Papers, Series M, N° 10, New York, 1958. 
/to possible 
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to possible subdivision of  domestic demand, is fully  compensated for  in this 
case by the criterion of  degree of  elaboration. Classification  by economic 
use is employed, however, as a guide for  relating the SCIT sections to the 
changes in such demand (see Table 60). 
Between 1953 and 1957, the expansion of  imports was relatively uniform 
for  the various SCIT categories. Only Beverages and Tobacco in Section 1 
remained stable, while the growth rates for  the other sections were very 
similar to those obtained for  the total index. This situation changed in the 
next four  years, for  this time the decline in the total index did not result 
from  a general contraction. In contrast, imports of  foodstuffs  (Section 0) 
continued above or level with the 1957 figures. 
During the past four  years, import composition j5/ has varied more rapidly 
and in greater depth than during the preceding five-year  period. Except in the 
very special case of  Section 7 (Machinery and Automotive Equipment), which 
because of  its direct relation to the investment rate sharply parallels short-
term fluctuations  in the Central American economy, changes during the four-
year period merely reflect  an accentuated continuation of  the trends of  the 
previous period. In effect,  sections with a high component of  goods required 
by agricultural production or processed by industry maintain their expansion, 
while those including consumer goods decline in volume even though these goods 
do not directly compete with Central American industry. 
Generally speaking, the sections analyzed can also be divided into three 
main groups: a) fuel  and equipment; b) items consisting principally of  raw 
materials, and c) manufactures  not included in the previous groups. 
The essential fact of this classification is that the first two groups, 
by their very nature, have been far less subject to replacement by domestic 
production than the third group, with reference to the process of import 
replacement in national terms. As will be noted elsewhere, the distinction 
between b) and c) is accentuated when extra-Central American trade is studied 
exclusively by the substantial degree of expansion in intraregional trade of 
the products included under c). 
The sections best suited to replacement reduced their share in imports 
from  41.6 percent in 1953 to 37.5 percent in 1961 (see Table 6l). This 
percentage is based mainly on imports of  intermediate goods and foodstuffs. 
It should be recognized that not all of  the increase in the sections grouped 
under B are the result of  replacement, for  an important share of  the expansion 
in chemical products is the result of  more widespread use of  modern techniques 
in agriculture. 
3. An apparent contradiction exists between the dislocation indicated 
by these trends and the previous statement concerning the gradual nature of 
changes in import composition. As already noted, SCIT is used in order to 




CENTRAL AMERICA:  INDEXES OF PHYSICAL VOLUME OF IMPORTS 
(1955 = 100) 
SCIT DESCRIPTION 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 
A. Primarily consumer goods 
0. Foodstuffs 
1. Beverages and tobacco i 
6. Manufactures  by 
materials 





































B. Primarily capital goods 
7. Machinery and automotive 
equipment 79.4 87.8 100.0 125.9 128.1 110.4 105.5 110.2 106.8 
C. Primarily intermediate goods 
2. Raw materials 
3. Fuels 
Oils and fats 





































Total 83.2 92.0 100.0 110.5 121.6 119.8 113.5 119.2 114.4 
Sources and Notes: The total index corresponds to the ECLA estimate based on official  data. The partial indexes 
have been calculated using quantum indexes for  El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras, and deflating  current values 
for  Guatemala and Nicaragua through unit value indexes based on data by products published in the United Nations 
Yearbook of  International Trade Statistics, several issues. 
- 1^5 -
Table 6l 
CENTRAL AMERICAS  PERCENTAGE OF IMPORTS BY SCIT SECTIONS 
(In percentages of  yearly totals) 
SCIT DESCRIPTION 1953 1957 1961 









Subtotal 30.0 32.2 30.9 
B. HIGH RAW MATERIAL  COMPONENT 
2/4 Raw materials and noncombustible 
oils and fats 







Subtotal 12.3 16.0 18.6 
c. REPLACEABLE  COMPONENTS 
6. Manufactures  by materials 







Subtotal 41.6 39.5 37.5 
SourceI OAS, Department of Economic Affairs, General Studies Unit, calculations 
based on national statistics. 
/I. FQQdfitMffñ 
1. Foodstuffs (SCIT Section 0) 
During the ten years covered by the study, food purchases have accounted 
for about 11 percent of Central American imports. In other words, as in the 
case of imports as a whole, food imports have also undergone a period of 
expansion followed by a period of stagnation. However, the latter period, 
already begun in 1955, appeared to break in 1958, continuing on again in 1959. 
The persistent rise in the volume of imported foodstuffs during 1953-56 can only 
be explained by the negative effect of excessive rural land concentration, the 
cumulative investment deficit in the basic sectors and the lack of marketing 
mechanisms, among others, which prevented Central American agricultural output 
from growing and diversifying to keep pace with demand. During that five-year 
period, the per capita domestic product "maintained its former high growth rate . 
and the urban population responsible for the diversification of demand and 
absorbing most of the imported foodstuffs increased by 5 percent a year. A 
study of Honduras illustrates this point, b/ It showed not only a continued 
increase in the percentage of imported foods consumed by the population but 
also changes in composition which served to diversify consumption. Thus, the 
imported items increased their share in food consumption from 7.2 percent in 
1953 to 11.2 percent in 1957, continuing a long-established trend. Urbaniza-
tion, which made the least progress in the five Central American countries, 
led to a relative displacement of traditional foods, since rice and corn 
consumption rose by only 1.7 percent and 2.1 percent a year respectively, 
as compared to the rate of 3 percent a year recorded for over-all food 
consumption. Available information on Costa Rica 6/ shows similar trends and 
leads to the assumption that, with due regard for the differences involved, 
the situation in Honduras reflected approximately the discrepancy between 
actual demand and production of foodstuffs in Central America. 
The increases registered in 1958 and 1959 were partly the result of the 
drop in output for consumption in Nicaragua and, to a lesser extent, in El 
Salvador and Guatemala. However, the importance of this cut-back in produc-
tion was secondary as compared to the repid development of reciprocal trade 
in foodstuffs resulting from the treaties already cited and from the Multi-
lateral Treaty of 1958. As a consequence of these agreements, reciprocal 
trade in these products continued to expand, doubling by 1961 its value in 
1957. The lack of variation in imports from all sources indicated by the 
preceding indexes was due to the fact that the volume of imports from other 
than Central American sources dropped by 15 percent between those two years. 
These factors have brought about certain modifications in the composition 
of food imports (see Table 62). 
United Nations, Análisis. Proyecciones del Desarrollo Económico, 
XI El Desarrollo Economico de Honduras; Mexico City. December i960. 
5. ECLA, Boletin Economico de America Latina. Volumen 8 t N° 1, Mexico 
City, 1962. 




CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPORTS OF FOOD PRODUCTS 
(In millions of  dollars) 
ITEMS 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 
Volume index (1955=100) 65.2 80.0 100.0 103.8 100.7 110.3 114.0 106.8 100.4 
Livestock 1.9 2.3 2.3 3.0 3.2 3.6 5.9 5 .4 2.9 
Canned milk and cream 3.7 4.0 4.8 5.2 5.3 5.9 5.3 4.8 5.6 
Wheat 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.2 3.3 3.5 4.3 5.8 7.6 
Sice • • • 1.2 2.2 2.5 1.3 1.9 2.2 0.9 0.7 
Corn 0.8 1.7 2.9 4.4 0.4 2.0 2.6 1.3 0.9 
Wheat flour 10.2 11.8 13.0 11.0 11.0 12.2 11.0 10.5 10.4 
Fruits and vegetables 3.4 4.0 5.3 6.6 5.9 6.0 7.2 7.0 7.8 
Sugar 1.0 1.1 1.5 2.8 2.0 2.0 1.6 • • • • • • 
Fodder 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.6 3.1 3.0 
Margarine and lard 3.6 4.2 5.8 5.0 5.2 6.6 3.4 3.7 3.8 
Not classified 11.0 14.0 15.3 13.7 16.0 14.1 14.1 14.6 • • • 
Total 37.8 46.5 56.0 57.7 55.1 59.6 60.7 5 7.7 55.6 
Source: OAS, Department of  Economic Affairs,  General Studies Unit, calculations based on national statistics. 
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Imports of livestock products—livestock and canned milk—have substan-
tially improved their position within the food group; their 1953 value of 5.6 
million dollars doubled to 11.2 million dollars by 1959. The imposition of 
restrictive quotas on cattle exports by Nicaragua in i960 was followed by al-
most total prohibition in 1961, curtailing livestock imports to barely 2.9 
million dollars in 1961, one half of the value recorded in 1959. 
With respect to imports of canned milk and cream, their stable value in 
recent years is partly due to the promotion of dairy cattle production in 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Eica. These three countries are making in-
creasing use of stabling, which has signified a steady increase in the consump-
tion of processed fodder.7/ Although there are by-products from the manufac-
ture of oil and milling of grains available for this purpose, the demand for 
concentrates has exceeded production and led to an increase in the importation 
of fodder between 1953 and i960 amounting to one thousand percent in terms of 
volume and 650 percent in terms of value. 
2. Chemical and pharmaceutical products (SCIT Section 5) 
Central American imports under Section 5 are characterized by almost un-
interrupted growth within the period under study. This steady expansion is 
due to the fact that it includes both raw materials for Central American indus-
try and agriculture and finished goods for which demand usually is unaffected 
by any decrease in the per capita product and which, in the case of Central 
America, are also involved in a relatively recent process of import replacement. 
Despite the fact that the difficulties entailed in this replacement tend to 
maintain a high level of consumer goods in this section, the ratio of interme-
diate goods rose in total value from 51 per cent in 1953 to 58 percent in 
1961 (see Table 63). This relative increase is attenuated by the practical 
difficulty of evaluating quantitatively the component of intermediate goods, 
in the case of pharmaceutical and toiletry products,8/ and by the high volume 
of chemical products, classified as basic by two countries, imported by the 
banana companies at the beginning of the decade, primarily for their campaign 
to eradicate sigatoka disease. 
Import requirements of those companies have decreased as their campaign 
for plant sanitation has prospered, resulting in the declining curve shown by 
basic chemical products up to 1959» In I960, however, the companies operating 
in Costa Rica and Honduras were compelled to renew imports of these and other 
7. In Costa Rica, a high percentage was accounted for in 1959 and i960 
by the fattening of cattle for processing and subsequent exportation. 
8. There are reasons to suppose that part of the items classified under 
54 and 55 should actually be classified as intermediate goods and that these 
were the very products that increased rapidly during the period under study. 
/Table 63 
Table 63 
CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPORTS OF CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
SCIT DESCRIPTION 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 
Volume index (1955 = 100) 65.7 90.6 100.0 106.5 125.1 115.9 114.5 143.2 142.0 
A. Intermediate Roods 20.2 25.1 30.5 33.0 39.7 39.3 35.5 46.1 47.1 
51/52 Basic chemical products 8.8 6.7 8.3 7.4 8.1 4.9 5.4 10.0 9.3 
- 531/2 Tanning extracts and dyes 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.3 
56 Chemical fertilizers 3.7 7 .5 7.3 10.9 14.6 13.9 12.5 13.5 12.9 
59 Other intermediate products 7.3 10.7 14.5 14.1 15.7 19.4 16.3 21.6 23.6 
B. Finished products 19.3 22.6 25.1 25.8 32.4 32.2 32.1 34.7 33.9 
533 Paints 3.0 3-7 3.6 4.0 4.2 4.2 3.9 3.9 3.6 
54 Pharmaceutical products 11.4 13.2 15.7 15.4 20.5 21.1 20.2 22.6 22.0 
55 Toiletry products 4.9 5.7 5.8 6.4 7.7 6.9 8.0 8.2 8.3 
5 Total chemical and 
pharmaceutical products 39.5 47.7 55.6 58.8 72.1 71.5 67.6 80.8 81.0 
Source; OAS, Department of Economic Affairs, General Studies Unit, calculations based on national statistics. 
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similarly classified products. The rise in imports of basic products in i960 
and 1961 was also the result of the growing demand for these products by in-
dustries located in El Salvador and Guatemala. In the first country, this 
volume doubled between 1957 and i960, but the increase was even greater in 
Guatemala because of the demand for lamp black and other chemical inputs for 
the rubber industry.^/ 
Up to 1957» the greater expansion in the importation of intermediate chem-
ical products can be attributed to prepared fertilizers. The available index 
of unit value shows relatively minor variations; it is accepted as an initial 
approximation that current values coincide more or less with those calculated 
at constant prices.10/ It is concluded, therefore, that these imports in-
creased by almost per cent a year between 1953 and 1957, a much higher rate 
than any of the agricultural production indexes of the five countries. This 
is, of course, because intensive use of fertilizer has benefited export prod-
ucts. Up to 1953, most imported fertilizer was used in the cultivation of 
bananas, with a smaller volume earmarked for coffee, cotton and sugarcane 
crops. Since that year, fertilizer for these three crops has absorbed most of 
the increase in this import item since both the cultivated area and the yield 
per hectare have expanded significantly. 
The stable level of volume recorded after 1957 corresponds to the reduc-
tion in area used for growing cotton and to the fact that the low price for 
coffee and bananas has to some extent discouraged intensive use of fertilizer.. 
This stability is, to a lesser degree, the result of recent processing of fer-
tilizers in two countries that use products classified here as basic. 
In the case of Central American imports, SCIT Division 59 (see Table 63) 
includes three types of intermediate products that deserve mention. First are 
the synthetic plastic materials in primary form 11/ whose growth, in terms of 
both volume and value, has been rapid and is mainly due to the recent date of 
its technological development and introduction in Central America. Consequent-
ly, it has continued to expand even during the years of greatest import con-
traction (that is, 1958 and 1959), which suggests an equally intensive growth 
in the corresponding industries. 
9. Although statistical difficulties prevent a numerical demonstration, 
in recent years the Guatemalan rubber industry has expanded rapidly for both 
tires and inner tubes and for other articles. As will be noted elsewhere, 
Guatemala shows a certain degree of specialization in these industrial lines. 
10. Although it is true that the unit price for nitrogen has dropped on 
the international market in the past three years, the lack of mixers has pre-
vented Central America from taking advantage of this circumstance. Thus, the 
unit value index reflects the costs of prepared fertilizers. 
11. Also including artificial resins in primary form and unwoven plastic 
sheets, but excluding rayon and wood pulp. 
/The second 
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The second type of intermediate product in this division are the insecti-
cides, fungicides and disinfectants, most of which are not confined to domestic 
use. The volume of these imports shows an average trend toward rapid expansion 
resulting, as in the case of fertilizer, from their increasing use for export 
crops. In the last five to six years, their growth has been accentuated by 
the extent of the damage caused by pests to cotton production in Nicaragua and 
by the defensive measures adopted by the other producers. This explains why 
these items have, since 1957, accounted for an unusual share, bo percent, of 
Nicaragua's total imports of chemical products, while the maximum  figure for 
the other countries came to only 20 percent. 
The third group of products under SCIT Division 59 is a heterogeneous one, 
including as it does industrial spare parts, sanitation and other services. 
Its value fluctuates sharply and shows no well-defined trend. 
The foregoing outline stresses the impact of the spread of improved agri-
cultural techniques on import demand for intermediate chemical products. 
Since no quantitative analysis is possible over several years, by way of simple 
illustration it has been estimated that in 1961, 5^ percent of these imports, 
or a market of 25 million dollars, corresponded to a comparatively limited 
number of agricultural inputs. It should be emphasized that the number of 
items is limited because of the prospects for their future production in 
Central America and, particularly, because of the need for introducing these 
improved methods in agricultural production for domestic consumption. At 
present, there are biological laboratories in at least three of the countries 
and two have fertilizer mixing plants still operating on a limited scale; 
therefore, it can be noted that there is already a tendency toward replacing 
imports from other areas. 
In mentioning previously the relative ratios of intermediate products and 
finished goods in the section of chemical and pharmaceutical products, an ex-
planation was given for the diminished importance of the second group. It was 
also noted that for statistical reasons it was difficult to separate the com-
ponents of this second group, which, in practice, constitute industrial inputs-
Thus, for example, a distinction could be made in the pharmaceutical products 
between those prepared for retail sale and those imported in bulk. Such a 
distinction would, however, prove inadequate, since the pharmaceutical prod-
ucts received by the retail merchant in bulk are many and varied. It should 
be kept in mind that this group of consumer goods includes a component of in-
termediate products that appears to be on the increase. 
Pharmaceutical products contribute to the bulk of imports Of chemical 
consumer goods. Their value increased by 100 percent between 1955 and 1961, 
representing an even greater increase in real terms, since the percentage of 
antibiotics and vitamins—whose international price has declined steadily—has 
been high and growing.12/ During the last five years, however, these imports 
12. Mention should also be made of the lower sale prices offered by 
European suppliers, whose share of supply has increased relatively more than 
the North Americans,as a factor operating in the same direction. 
/liave remained 
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have remained comparatively stable; it should also be pointed out that inter-
Central American reciprocal trade begem to acquire importance in this case. 
This latter circumstance is also true for toiletry products and prepared 
paints, which have for practical reasons, been defined here as finished goods. 
The decline since 1957 in the import value of paints has been contained by the 
expansion of intraregional trade, for by 1961, half of Honduran and Guatemalan 
imports of this product came from Central America. In the case of toiletry 
articles, this ratio amounted to approximately 15 percent, including not only 
imports by the two countries mentioned, but those by El Salvador and Nicaragua 
as well. In general terms, the value of intraregional trade under this head-
ing can be estimated at slightly over 1.5 million dollars, or 4.5 percent of 
imports of finished chemical products. 
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C. CHANGES IN SOURCES OF IMPORTS 
Over the past decade, fairly substantial changes took place in the sources 
of Central American imports. Among these, beginning in 1958, mention should be 
made of the increase in reciprocal trade, the steady, rapid drop in the ratio 
of imports supplied by the United States, and the rise in the corresponding 
ratios for Japan and the European Economic Community (see Table 64). 
Although trade policy—and particularly the series of bilateral treaties 13/ 
that preceded the Multilateral Treaty of 1958 and the General Treaty of i960— 
accounts for the recent development of reciprocal trade, in the case of other 
areas, changes in the source of imports have not been the consequence of nation-
al discriminatory practices. Except for the "Central American clause", which 
safeguards concessions among Central American countries, the countries of the 
region have posed no obstacles to trade by any country with which they maintain 
normal diplomatic relations. The most notable exception was a minor restriction 
by Guatemala on imports from countries with which it had a deficit trade balance. 
Except in the case of countries where transshipment of foreign trade is compul-
sory, such as Switzerland, the Guatemalan restriction has had no effect on the 
origin of its imports. 
The factors that have led to the changes noted in the direction of imports 
have been related to prevailing conditions in world trade and, to a lesser 
degree, to structural changes in Central American external demand. Generally 
speaking, these factors have varied in both number and importance during the 
past decade. For this reason, they are grouped in the following analysis into 
general categories, relating, where relevant, strictly Central American factors 
with those arising from international participation by the highly industrialized 
countries. 
1. Renewal of trade with Europe and Japan 
In 1938, at least one third of Central American imports were drawn from 
the six countries that today make up the European Economic Community, and al-
most 3 percent of this total from Japan. The value of Central American ex-
ports to those countries was on approximately the same scale. This trade came 
to a standstill at the beginning of the 1940's and was not renewed until the 
end of the same decade. 
13. These treaties include the following: El Salvador-Nicaragua (1951); 
El Salvador-Guatemala (1952), amplified in 1957 and 1959; E 1 Salvador-Costa Rica 
(1954); Guatemala-Costa Rica (1957), and Guatemala-Honduras (1957). It should 
be noted that some of these treaties had already brought about substantial in-
creases in reciprocal trade; for example, between 1950 and 1957, exports from 
El Salvador to Nicaragua and Costa Rica multiplied 8 and 4 times, respectively, 




CENTRAL AMERICA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS 
(In percentages of the total) 
1950 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 1962-^ 
Latin America M 7.7 8.0 8.0 7.7 Zi2 M 11.2 11.0 11.7 • • • 
Central America 3.1 3.2 3.6 3.2 2.9 3.2 4.2 6.1 6.4 7.5 11.0 
Mexico 3.4 2.1 1.9 2.4 2.1 1.8 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.6 • » • 
Others 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.2 2.4 3.4 3.2 2.6 • • • 
North America Zlii 65.8 65.0 64.4 62.7 59.7 57.1 53.2 ^0.6 48.5 
United States 70.4 63.9 63.0 62.1 60.8 57.8 55.0 51.0 48.6 46.5 • • • 
Canada 2.7 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.0 
Western Europe 12.0 18.9 20.7 20.5 21.5 23.4 25.0 27.5 27.6 • • • 
E E C 6.1 12.0 14.2 14.0 14.9 17.4 17.5 17.8 19.8 19.8 • • * 
Germany- 2.6 5.7 7.8 7.4 7.4 8.5 9.2 9.1 10.2 9.6 • • • 
Netherlands 0.7 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.6 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.5 4.0 • • • 
Belux 1.2 2.1 1.8 2.1 2.4 3.0 2.2 2.6 2.8 2.9 • • • 
Italy 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.7 • • • 
France 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.5 • • • 
United Kingdom 3.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.4 • • • 
Japan 0.6 1.7 hà ãjà 2.9 2ã 4v9 6^2 á¿5 • • • 
Others 5.2 5.9 4.4 4.8 5.4 6.1 5.5 5.3 4.7 5.8 • • • 
a. Estimated, Department of Economic Affairs, OAS. 
Source: United Nations, Direction of International Trade, several issues. 
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This renewal was quite rapid, since Central American exports to Europe 
rose from 62 million dollars in 19^8 to 93 million in 1950. Imports, in turn, 
rose from 37 to 68 million dollars respectively for the same years, lb/  In 
the case of the European Economic Community members, Central American imports 
increased from 11 to 32 million dollars and exports from 17 to 35 million. 
However, exports to Europe, and particularly to the Community, were re-
stricted by the balance of payments difficulties of the European countries and 
the fact that the five Central American countries belonged to the dollar area. 
The latter were, therefore, obliged to accept trade or payments agreements that 
entailed a quasi-obligation to purchase in Europe when they wanted to increase 
the volume of their exports. This situation persisted until the mid-1950's, 
although it gradually became less significant as European balances of payments 
improved. 
With respect to Japan, the renewal of trade was gradual and slow up to 
1956. Subsequently, it increased fairly rapidly its relative contribution to 
Central American imports to become, by 1961, the third most important supplier 
for the area. 
2. Variations in prices paid by Central America 
Unit value indexes for the exports of highly industrialized countries 
showed diverse tendencies during the last decade. Especially outstanding was 
the spectacular improvement shown by the Japanese series in comparison to the 
other industrialized countries (see Table 65). While the unit values for ex-
ports by the United States and the United Kingdom increased by 8 and 12 per-
cent respectively, and those of the European Economic Community decreased by 
5 per cent, in 1961, the Japanese values averaged only slightly more than two 
thirds of the same index ten years before. 
These changes are only partly explained by fluctuations in the source of 
purchases for Central American imports. With the exception of Japan, the 
countries that showed the greatest increase in their sales to Central America 
were not those whose indexes of unit value of exportation recorded the greatest 
relative improvement. The maximum  expansion of these sales was achieved by 
Germany, whose prices increased on a level with those of the United States; the 
minimum  was registered by Belgium and Italy, where the indexes of unit value 
of exports dropped by 20 and 25 per cent respectively. 
The disparity in these trends shows the need for a more detailed examina-
tion of these prices in order to verify whether the structure of Central 
American demand for imports can explain the shift to the European Economic 
Community and Japan. As will be indicated below, the prices of certain indus-
tries in these countries have attained a relatively more favorable position 
than that reflected by the unit value indexes for total exports. 
157" United Nations, Estudios del Comercio entre América Latina y Europa, 




INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: INDEXES OF UNIT VALUES OF EXPORTS 
(1958 = 100) 
1951- 1957 1961 
United States 95 100 103 
EEC 105 103 100 
German Federal Republic 96 101 104 
Belgium - Luxembourg 121 107 97 
France 101 109 96 
Italy 123 105 92 
Netherlands 108 104 101 
United Kingdom 91 101 102 
Japan 
i 
145 110 105 
.Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
/3. Sectoral 
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3. Sectoral relative prices 
Chemical products and machinery and automotive equipment were among the 
Central American import items that expanded most rapidly. It should be noted . 
that in both lines the relation of German prices to those of the United States 
improved throughout the entire period. Between 1950 and 1957» wholesale prices 
for German chemical products increased by slightly more than half of the United 
States rate and while the latter remained almost steady after 1957, German 
prices declined (see Tables 66 and 67). The main decline in Central American 
imports of chemical products from the United States affected those groups in 
which consumer goods predominate. These, which had expanded by 5.4 million 
dollars between 1953 a nd 1957» decreased by 6.5 million dollars in the four 
following years. In both periods, however, purchases in other zones increased 
by 7.7 million and 7.0 million respectively, although if reciprocal trade were 
excluded, these figures would drop to 7 million in 1953-57 and k million dollars 
in 1957-61. Consequently, a displacement of North American supplies took place 
.during the latter period due to both greater Central American production and 
trade and increased purchases in other regions (see Table 68). 
The situation with regard to machinery is more complex, with a relative 
advantage for Germany developing only after 1957. Since automotive vehicles 
are a chief component of this heading—where the relative loss of the United 
States was greater—it should be noted that while wholesale prices in the 
United States increased at the rate of J>.k per cent a year between 1950 and 
1957» those of Germany declined slightly. After 1957, this difference in price 
variation disappeared, but other additional factors influenced the Central 
American demand for automobiles, such as heavy, rising taxes on gasoline in 
most of the Isthmus countries, making the European automobiles, which usually 
burn less fuel, more desirable. It should also be pointed out that with refer-
ence to farm machinery and tractors, whose relative prices developed much more 
favorably for the United States, exports to Central America showed no signifi-
cant differences in comparison with those of other regions (see Table 69). In 
the case of paper, cardboard and their manufactures, United States sales in-
creased to 7.3 million dollars between 1953 and 1961. Purchases from other 
zones, primarily Canada and the Scandinavian countries, also increased, by 2.3 
million dollars. 
k. Import substitution 
With regard to the demand for food and beverages imports (SCIT Sections 
0 and 1), whose chief extra-Central American component had also been North 
American, two different factors were at work. Up to approximately 1957, 
imports from other regions exhibited a greater increase, but after 1958, both 
these and imports from the United States dropped off as a result of rapidly 
intraregional trade in these products (see again Table 65). Only continued 
increases in grain exports under Public Law 480 and the greater commercial 
demand for fodder related to the development of meat exports prevented a far 




ANNUAL RATES OF INCREASE FOR WHOLESALE PRICES OF SELECTED GROUPS OF 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED STATES, THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC 



















1.4 • • • 







-3.7 • • • 
• • • 
Iron and steel 7.5 9.8 • • • 0.6 - • • • 
Chemical products 1.9 1.0 -1.2 -0.1 -1.5 -2.3 
Pulp, paper and paper 
products 3.6 4.8 • • • -0.1 -1.3 • • • 
Paper 4.2 3.0 • • • 0.5 2.0 • • • 
Textile products -0.6 -1.0 -6.9 -0.3 -1.9 -1.5 
Clothing 
Leather and leather products -0.7 -2.6 • • • 2.9 2.0 • • • 
Leather products (footgear) 1.8 0.3 • • • 2.5 2.4 • • • 
Capital goods, total • • • 4.0 • • • 0.7 0.2 
Consumer goods, total • • • 0.3 3.2 0.7 
a. Due to the different definitions and groupings employed in national statistics, the 
groups listed here are not fully comparable. However, the differences are not so 
great as to invalidate the comparisons if they are interpreted as merely indicating 
general trends. 
b. lhe period selected was 1951-57, because the value of Japanese exports in 1951 
increased by 50 percent, despite a rise in unit values, which appears to indicate 
that the rate of reconstruction was still the determining factor in trade. 
Source: United States Departments of Commerce.and Labor, Business Statistics of the 
United States and Monthly Labor Review; Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik; 




CENTRAL AMERICA: DIFFERENCE IN IMPORT VALUE OF CHEMICAL 
PRODUCTS BY SUPPLIERS AND SELECTED PERIODS 
(In millions of dollars) 
1953-57 1957-61 1953-61 
U.S.A. Others U.S.A. Others U.S.A. Others 
a/ 
Pharmaceutical products— 3.2 5.9 -2.8 4.3 0.4 10.2 
a/ 
Soap and toiletry articles- 1.2 1.6 -1.1 1.7 0.1 3.3 
Paints^ 1.0 0.2 -1.6 1.0 -0.6 1.2 
Fertilizers 3.3 7.6 -2.0 9.0 -7.9 18.2 
Others 7.5 1.1 0.2 9.0 7.7 10.1 
a. The text refers to these three groups in the discussion on consumer goods. 
Sources; See Table 68. The year 1953 was chosen as the beginning of the period for 
statistical reasons,- since classifications for the preceding years are too heterogeneous. 
/Cuadro 68 
Table 6 
CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPORTS BY SCIT SECTIONS AND SELECTED SOURCES 
1953, 1957 and 1961 
I Geographical distribution of i. -ports 
Volume indexes (Percentages of HI inual value) 
(1953 = 100) Central America United States Other areas 
1957 1961 1953 1957 1961 1953 1957 1961 1953 1957 1961 
Food and drink (O/l) 148 145 16 14 26 58 49 46 26 37 28 
Fuel ( 3 ) 144 166 - 1 16 21 16 84 79 83 
Chemical products ( 5 ) 190 215 2 2 5 67 60 44 31 38 51 
Machinery and 
automotive equipment ( 7 ) 162 135 - - 1 77 72 61 23 28 38 
Other manufactures (6/8) 139 117 2 2 7 60 55 49 38 43 44 
Total 147 137 3.5 3.2 7.5 66.7 59- 6 46.4 29.8 37.2 46.1 
Notes: The FOB values given for  the United States source have been adjusted to CIF by means of  the coefficients 
corresponding to total imports. 
Sources: See Table 60 for  volume indexes. For percentages see Table 6l and U.S. Department of  Commerce, Exports by 




CENTRAL AMERICA; DIFFERENCE IN IMPORT VALUE OF MACHINERY AND 
AUTOMOTIVE EQUIPMENT ACCORDING TO ORIGIN 
(In millions of dollars) 
1953-57 1957-61 195^-61 
U.S.A. ; Others ; U.S.A. Others U.S.A. Others 
Farm machinery 0.7 I 0..8 ' -0.5 [ -0.9 0.2 -0.1 
Tractors 3.9 2.0^ -4.1 -0.2 
Electric machinery 4.2 ! 5^6 i -1.6 1.7 2.6 
Office machinery ¡ -0*2 i 1.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 0.9 
h/ 
Industrial machinery- ; 1.4 -6.9 ! 10.5 4.7 11.9 
Automobiles 7.7 8.2 -8.2 ; 1*2 -0.5 9.4 
a. Including non-agrieultural tractors. 
b. Including die equipment and excavating machinery. 
Source: See Tables 67 and 68. 
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A similar trend could be observed in certain other light industries 1$/ 
that were affected simultaneously by the process of national replacement and 
the increase in intra-Central American trade. Thus, for example, imports from 
the United States of leather and leather products and textiles diminished but 
both reciprocal trade and national production by the countries increased 16/ 
(see Table 70). 
5. Direction of investments 
Another element in the relative displacement of imports from the United 
States was the change in investment structure. Although data in this respect 
are incomplete and t times inconclusive, it appears that since 1958 invest-
ments in agriculture have contracted sharply. Because of the existence of 
large North American agricultural enterprises in Central America, equipment and 
machinery for this type of investment were in the past supplied primarily by 
the United States. Although this country, as already noted, was not placed in 
a disadvantageous position by rising farm machinery prices until 1957» after 
that date, Central American imports of tractors and farm machinery declined 
from 9.3 to 4.6 million dollars, with similar drops for railroad equipment and 
other non-highway transportation machinery used by those companies. 
At the same time, the increased relative importance of the manufacturing 
sector in the use of investments during the last five years also appears to 
have increased the relative importance of Japanese and European investors, with 
a resulting tendency to acquire industrial equipment in those regions. Thus, 
between 1957 and 1961, imports of industrial machinery from the United States 
decreased by slightly less than 7 million dollars, while those from other 
sources increased by more than 10 millions. 
15. For statistical reasons, SCIT Sections 6 and 8 cannot be presented 
separately. In the present analysis, however, the chief components of Central 
American imports of these products are broken down. 





CENTRAL AMERICA: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 1953-57 AND 1957-61 IN VALUE IMPORTED 
FROM THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER SOURCES BY CHIEF COMPONENTS 
OF SCIT SECTIONS 6 AND 8 












leather products O U 0*3 ! 0.5 -O.8 1.3 
Non-metallic mineral 
products 0-9 ! 2.3 
{ 
0.9 O.O 3.2 
Textiles and textiles 
manufactures -4.0 12.4 -9.4 10.4 --13.4 22.8 
Rubber and rubber 
manufactures 4.7 aa 2.2 2r9 2.4 
Paper and cardboard and 
their manufactures 2.2 2.0. 5.1 0.-3 7.3 2.3 
Metals and metal 
manufactures 11.8 13.7 -12.0 3.1 -0.2 16.7 
Sources; See Tables 67 and 68. 
/D. INTRA-CENTRAL 
D. INTRA-CENTRAL AMERICAN TRADE 
The preceding section has reviewed the growth and structural transfor-
mation of foreign demand for the five Central American countries as a whole. 
Reference was also made to changes in the direction of that trade, placing 
certain emphasis on the factors that led to displacement of imports from the 
United States by tlms ' from overseas countries and regions. Central American 
reciprocal trade was mentioned only insofar as it played a significant part 
in that displacement or as it modified or accentuated trends in the structural 
change of imports. This treatment is justified mainly because reciprocal trade 
is still a limited share, 10 per cent, of total imports by the five countries. 
Therefore, in contract to the size of the remaining imports, its changes in 
the past are attenuated and, at certain points and periods, become insignificant. 
However, it would be a mistake to measure the importance of reciprocal 
trade in the past or the immediate future solely by the relation between its 
value and that of total imports. Total volume should increase rapidly and 
steadily in the next few years if the working hypothesis outlined in this study 
is realized: a minimum  growth of per capita domestic product of 2.5 per cent 
a year. The growth rate of reciprocal trade will obviously be higher, but, 
according to the hypothesis, its ratio of total imports will consistently main-
tain a comparatively low level. It should be kept in mind that with a domestic 
product increase of 6 per cent annually, the demand for imports from other areas 
for capital goods, construction materials and raw materials should grow at an 
equal or higher rate, without prejudice to a possible substantial rise in over-
seas purchases of durable consumer goods and fuels. Reciprocal trade, on the 
other hand, may find itself constrained until such time as Central American pro-
duction can provide it with raw materials and mechanical products, in addition 
to the farm commodities and manufactured consumer goods that predominate in cur-
rent trade. 
Its chief importance lies, therefore, in three facts; a)' it has to date 
made possible the use of productive capacity; b) it is giving rise to the study 
or installation of industries operating efficiently in markets with a larger 
volume than those confined within national boundaries; c) it has prevented a 
sharper decline in the importation of consumer goods without unfavorable conse-
quences for balance of payments by the mutual cancellation of balances inherent 
in such trade. 
Generally speaking, it has been difficult to evaluate the first and last 
of these facts. This is largely the result of the unfavorable prospect pre-
sented by the low value of reciprocal trade in comparison to that of total im-
portation or exportation and, to a lesser extent, of statistical problems in 
relating, on the one hand, productive capacity with exports to Central America 
and, on the other, consumption to the pressure on external demand. It should 
be noted, for example, that the increase in exports of vegetables from Guatemala 
has served to expand the volume of this production, which is cultivated by a 
great many small and'intermediate farmers 17/ who do not have easy access to 
other marketable commodities. This exportation doubled between 1956 and 19Ô0, 
17. In the chief producing region, the average area of horticultural 
farms amounted to one thousand square varas (0.07 hectares) in 1950. 
/reaching in 
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reaching in the latter year 14 million pounds with an FOB value of 420,000 
quetzals, a trade that did not require the heavy supplementary investments in 
transportation, refrigeration, quality controls, etc., that would have been 
needed for export to other markets. It is impossible to speculate on what 
would have happened to the income of these farmers without the Central American 
market. However, it is nônetheless interesting to point out that in zones 
where, because of their location, production is utilized solely for the farmers' 
own consumption or exclusively for the national market, there has been a con-
traction in horticultural activities.18/ 
Another example of how reciprocal trade has led to more efficient use and 
to expansion of productive capacity is the case of Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
textile products. Accoi-ding to the Banco Central of El Salvador, the index 
(based On 1956=100) of production for the textile industry increased from 120 
in 1957 to 2J9 in l96l. Production value rose, according to the same source, 
from 19 million ColChea in thè first year mentioned to 36 million in 1961. 
Consolidating these figures ih order to eliminate thè double recount repre-
sented by the inclusion of raw thread and other items used in production gives 
an expansion within that period of 13*2 million colones. 
The value of textile exports from El Salvador to Central America amounted 
to 0.2 million colones and 7.4 million in 1957 and 1961 respectively. It may 
be said that one half of the increased sales by the industry in that period 
were derived from reciprocal tradè 19/ or, too, that 25 per ceflt. of the activi-
ties of the Salvadoran textile industry in 1961 can be directly traced to the 
Central American market. 
These two examples are not unique for these two countries, and additional 
ones can also be cited for the remaining countries. However, a wealth of de-
tail is not necessary to illustrate that although the figures for Central 
American trade are small, they signify a greater impact than those of total 
trade. It is obvious that the benefits derived by the Guatemalan economy from 
a sale of 400,000 quetzals divided among two or three thousand small farmers 
are greater than those resulting from the exportation of an equal value of 
bananas or coffee. The three million dollars in yarn and fabrics exported by 
El Salvador also have an economic and social impact that can hardly be equaled 
by the traditional export products. 
That is to say, reciprocal trade has become significant because at a time 
when factors outside the region were having an unfavorable effect on its eco-
nomic development, it has provided a market for products for which there was 
a surplus capacity and, to a certain extent, has prevented a more serious de-
cline in the Central American economies. This has been achieved with a mini-
mum of additional investments in supplementary services and with greater utili-
zation of previous investments in regional transportation systems. 
1ST" See Banco de Guatemala, Informe Económico, Year IV, No. 7, Guatemala 
City, January 1962. 
19. The difference between ex-factory and port of export values is unknown 
but considered to be relatively insignificant. 
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A brief examination of the composition of reciprocal trade for the region 
in recent years makes it possible to evaluate easily not only the intensity 
and continuity of its growth, but also the diversification that has led to bet-
ter use of existing productive capacity (see Table 71). The expansion of 
Sections 0, 5» 6 and 8 in particular are sufficient proof of the direction 
being taken by effective realization of the 1952 Economic Integration Program. 
Nor has the influence of intra-Central American trade on the structure of 
external demand of the countries in the area received sufficient statistical 
recognition. The contraction of this demand usually affects first consumer 
goods, that is, the reducible margin of importation. In cases such as Central 
America in 1957-61, when such a contraction became necessary because of unfa-
vorable changes in the balance of payments, the decline of these imports led 
to a shorter supply of goods for consumer units. Although in the long run 
national production tends to fill this vacuum, initially it calls for greater 
sacrifice by the low-income urban classes. 
Reciprocal trade has maintained the level of food imports and has contained 
the decrease in other consumer goods (see Table 71 again). The volume of food 
trade rose 2.5 times 20/ between 1957 and 1961, making it possible for external 
supplies in the countries importing such goods to maintain their level and to 
prevent a decline in the already low standards of Central American nutrition.21/ 
Since 1957, the relative size of increases in other consumer goods have been too 
high for proper comparison. An example of the percentages that would have to 
be used is the figure on fabric exports by El Salvador, given in a preceding 
paragraph, which amounts to 3,700 per cent. 
In short, it can be stated that, although reciprocal trade could not of 
itself prevent a decline in consumption, it has at least supplied products that 
could not have been acquired in other regions without accentuating still fur-
ther the negative balances of foreign trade in goods. 
Finally, it is necessary to analyze the impact of reciprocal trade on the 
development of new industries, a factor of maximum  importance. 
Reciprocal trade has passed through three stages. The second corresponds 
to the period between 1951 and 1957 and the current stage to the last five years. 
Recent events point to the initiation of a fourth phase, characterized by forma-
tion of a common market valid not only for one section but for all the countries 
of the region. 
20. Excluding livestock for re-exportation. 
21. Central American rates of morbidity and mortality relating to dietary 
deficiencies are among the highest in Latin America. Reference: WHO Annual 
Epidemiological and Vital Statistics Reports. 
/Table 
Table 71 
CENTRAL AMERICA: RECIPROCAL̂  CIF IMPORTS BY SCIT SECTIONS. 
1955-19Ó2 
(in millions of  dollars) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 b/ 
0 Foodstuffs 6.2 7.0 7.9 9.8 14.4 14.9 14.6 21.5 
1 Beverages and tobacco 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.7 1.1 0.9 0.9 
2 Raw materials 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.0 2.3 
3 Fuels c/ 0.3 0 .1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 .1 0.2 0.2 
4 Oils and fats 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.7 1.6 1.7 1.9 
5 Chemical products 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.9 2.4 3.5 4.5 
6 Manufactures  by materials 1.2 1.2 1.9 2.4 3.2 6.2 8 .1 9.8 
7 Machinery and automotive equipment c/ 0.6 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.2 
8 Other manufactures 0.8 0.8 1.1 2.3 2.0 3.0 4.4 4.8 
Total d/ 12.7 13.4 16.1 20.2 27.5 32.4 36.7 47.0 e/ 
a. FOB and CIF values are considered to be equal. 
b. Based on partial data. 
c. Including a small number of  re-exported products that i t was not possible to excluded. 
d. Excluding SCIT Section 9. It exhibits minor differences  with other totals given here and in other sources. 
See Note c. 
e. 50.9 million, if ,  instead of  using data on Guatemalan exports for  nine months, the total -for  twelve months 
is obtained based on data for  imports by the other countries. 
Sources and Notes: 1960/62 Sieca (Permanent Secretariat of  the General Treaty For Central American 
Integration; 1955-1959, OAS based on official  data of  the countries. 
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What is here designated as the first stage actually represents the period 
of border trade that began in 1838 with the dismembering of the Republic of the 
United Provinces of Central America. Since then, attempts have been made on 
various occasions to form political or economic unions, but such initiatives 
have failed to prosper owing to the lack of communication facilities between 
the interested countries. In 1940, only one public service railroad connected 
Guatemala with El S-'V. 'iaor, and the other facilities were rudimentary except 
when directly au • immediately connected with overseas exportation. 
The status of transportation conditioned trade among these countries, which 
except for exchanges hetween Guatemala and El Salvador, favoring the incipient 
industry of both count -les, was restricted to merchandise that did not require 
developed comrnunicaiion facilities, such as livestock, and to the sale of farm 
surpluses between neighboring areas of bordering countries. Among these areas, 
the most important was the border region between El Salvador and Honduras, where 
traffic was facilitated at the end of the 1940's by development of the highway 
system of El Salvador 22./ and the free trade it maintained with Honduras. 23/ 
These factors contributed to the fact that in 1950 E1 Salvador's trade with 
Guatemala and Honduras represented 75 per cent of Central American exports. 
It should be noted that the limitations of the road network and the scant 
diversification achieved by the manufacturing sector did not enable intra-
Central American trade to expand to the same degree as that shown by trade be-
tween the other Latin American countries in .1940-46. In those years, however, 
Central American industrialization was initiated, resulting in the installation 
of plants utilizing national raw materials and some based on the importation of 
intermediate goods. 
In 1945, construction was begun on the Central American segment of the 
Pan. American Highway, designed to link the 17 continental republics. As in 
the other Latin American countries, the continental goal had to be subordinated 
to the availability of resources and, naturally, to prior satisfaction of local 
needs. Thus, at the end of the '40's, the Central American segment was composed 
of broken national sections unconnected with the Mexican network in the north 
or the Colombian system in the south. 24/ 
At the start of the 1950's, reciprocal trade entered upon a new stage by 
becoming one of the basic instruments in the economic integration policy adopted 
by the Central American countries. In 1952, the Economic Commission for Latin 
American (ECLA), at the request of the five Central American governments, con-
voked the first meeting of the Committee on Economic Cooperation of the Central 
American Isthmus, established the preceding year. At that meeting, the Committee 
agreed to initiate a gradual program of economic integration and asked the 
22. See United Nations, El Transporte en el Istmo Centroamericano, Mexico 
City, September 1953. 
23. See SIECA (Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty for Central 
American Economic Integration), Centroamérica y su Mercado Común, Algunos Datos 
Económicos, Guatemala City, May 1962. 
2^7" The Guatemalan and Mexican networks were connected in the 1960's. 
Still under study is the section that will cross the Darien region in the south. 
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Secretariat of ECLA to make a series of studies in this respect. These studies 
include several directly related to the prospects and possibilities of develop-
ment offered by reciprocal trade 25/ and, among others, one on the deficiencies 
and required improvements in transportation systems. 26/ 
For their part, the governments, utilizing these studies, have multiplied 
their investments in road networks. Such investments not only led to improve-
ments in highway transport at the national level, tout also aimed at the estab-
lishment of a Central American trunk network. JThanks to this effort, in May 
of 1955, the national systems of Nicaragua and'Costa Rica were interconnected, 
uniting at last the automotive transportation systems of the five countries.2?/ 
Expansion and interconnection of the road network was reflected in the stock 
of automotive freight vehicles; trucks in circulation tripled between 1950 and 
1956, while passenger automobiles increased by only 70 per cent. 
In the institutional field, intra-Central American trade received a strong 
incentive through the bilateral treaties signed as of that period-. The prior 
experience of Central America consisted only of the Free Trade Treaty signed 
in 1918 by Honduras and El Salvador and the "Central American clause" with 
which the five republics tacitly complied. The latter made any "most favored 
nation" concessions agreed by any one of the five with countries outside the 
region extensive to all the Central American countries. In 1951, El Salvador 
signed a similar treaty with Nicaragua and, at the beginning of  1952, another 
with Guatemala. In 1954, it completed its system of bilateral agreements by 
signing one with Costa Rica and revising the old treaty with Honduras. In 
1957, free trade treaties between Guatemala and Costa Rica and between Guatemala 
and Honduras were also concluded. 
The effect of these treaties, improved communication facilities and in-
creased automotive stock was almost immediate. The value of reciprocal imports 
rose by 37 per cent between 1950 and 1953, reaching 11.9 million dollars in 
the latter year. In 1957, this figure rose to l6.9 million dollars, practically 
doubling the level of the first year mentioned. 
Despite these increases, the ratio between reciprocal and total imports 
did not vary significantly, and even registered a slight decline. This inca-
pacity to expand in excess of total imports can be partly explained by the 
25. See the following ECLA publications: La Integración Económica de 
Centroamérica, su Evolución y Perspectivas (í/CN.l2/k2.2)\  La Política Tributaria 
y el Desarrollo Economico en Centroamerica ( E/CN.12/486); Los Problemas Actuales 
del Comercio Interlatinoamericano (g/CN.12/423); and El Mercado Común Latinoame-
ricano (E/CN.I2/53I). 
26. United Nations, El Transporte en el Istmo Centroamericano, Mexico City, 
1953. 
27. The aggregate of trunk highways will amount to 5,162 kilometers, of 
which 4,485 were serviceable by 1962. In 1959, the total network of the five 
countries came to 17,000 kilometers firmed or paved. 
/insufficient growth 
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insufficient growth of domestic supply. It should be recalled that reciprocal 
exports include goods that can be used for consumption and are, therefore, only 
channeled into reciprocal trade when surpluses are produced or special factors 
make it necessary.28/ It is not surprising, consequently, that increased trade 
between the Central American countries was based fundamentally on the foodstuffs 
required by El Salvador, which up to 1956 was the only country to have concluded 
bilateral treaties with the other four. 
Although the bilateral treaties provided a strong incentive to reciprocal 
trade, they also gave it a radial direction by which one country served as the 
center. This direction confined additional trade fundamentally to the products 
El Salvador needed to buy or had for sale. The other participating countries 
could not, consequently, make efficient use of the structural improductive ca-
pacity that characterizes underdeveloped countries with a small market.29/ 
Bilateral conventions signed by Guatemala with Costa iiica and Honduras would 
unquestionably have led to a more balanced distribution of reciprocal trade. 
However, in practice, they would have superimposed a new radial direction on 
the former, relegating trade among the other three countries to a marginal 
position in the Central American market. 
In order to remedy this distortion, the Central American governments, at 
the fifth meeting of the Committee on Economic Cooperation, signed the Multi-
lateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central American Economic Integration. This 
treaty provided for the establishment of a common market and, as an initial 
measure, drew up a list of products that, for the purposes of reciprocal trade, 
should be exempt from import or export duties or other charges by which they 
are distinguished in each country from national products. An examination of 
the list, which is in addition to the lists agreed upon bilaterally, shows 
three groups of products: a) those already participating in Central American 
trade, mainly foodstuffs; b) those produced in one or more countries but not 
previously exchanged regularly or in significant volume, and c) articles not 
produced commercially in any Central American country. 
28.For example, Honduran exports of raw cotton for ginning and subse-
quent exportation by El Salvador. 
29. It should be recalled at this point that the installation of indus-
tries in limited markets and with ad hoc protection, as in the case of the 
Central American countries, occurs, as a rule, when capacity exceed possible 
sales. Part of this surplus capacity results from the limited number of sub-
types of products that these installations produce in relation to the greater 
diversity of such output obtainable from the same equipment. As an illus-
tration, this is the case of looms whose operation can be programmed for vari-
ous grades or qualities of fabric and whose productive capacity varies depend-
ing on the number of daily shifts. 
/Therefore,  this 
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Therefore, this treaty was not solely designed to eliminate bilateral 
distortion of reciprocal trade, for which inclusion of the first two groups 
would have sufficed. It is the last group of products that lends added impor-
tance, since it transforms reciprocal trade into a basic instrument for the 
development of new 30/ industries and also of prime importance, for the expansion 
of new sub-types of products by the manufacturing industry. Indirectly, the 
treaty signified a change in the application of industrial protection laws en-
acted by the individual countries. Existing systems extended protection to 
established industries or to those for which specific installation plans were 
available, that is, they were exercised subsequent to the decisions of the 
entrepreneurs, whether or not that group had considered the prospects of the 
Central American market. The lists of the treaty provided the agencies respon-
sible for industrial protection with an essential pattern for channeling invest-
ments into the projects best suited to the interests of national economy. This 
channeling was facilitated by the growing number of applications for protection 
in all the countries, many of which also solicited the category of Central 
.American industries of integration. 
At the seventh meeting of the Committee on Economic Cooperation, held in 
late I960, a second treaty was signed: the General Treaty on Central American 
Economic Integration. This agreement reaffirmed and expanded the stipulations 
of the Multilateral Treaty, establishing total free trade and coordinating 
these provisions with those agreed upon in establishing the special regulations 
governing integration industries, transportation, external charges and other 
instruments provided for by the Program of Central American Economic Integration 
in 1952. 
The clause of the General Treaty of Integration dealing with transitory 
special trade regulations is of particular importance for reciprocal trade in 
the period covered by this study. These regulations led to a broader list of 
merchandise included in the second and third groups already described and speci-
fied the restrictions applicable between pairs of countries in order to prevent 
unfavorable effects on manufacturing sub-sectors. 
30. The Multilateral Treaty has been supplemented, among others, by the 
Agreement on Regulation of Central American Industries of Integration. Such 
industries are considered to be those that require access to the Central American 
market in order to operate efficiently. 
Note that the i960 General Treaty overcame an important limitation of the 
Multilateral Treaty by abolishing the system of lists of products eligible for 
free trade status. In their place, it was established that total free trade 
—except for minor exceptions—was the goal to be reached in a pre-established 
minimum  period by means of general reductions in tariffs with reference to 
reciprocal trade. 
/The impact of 
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The impact of the General Treaty on Integration can only be measured in 
a very preliminary manner, since only a short time has elapsed since its rati-
fication. For the time being, it can be stated that it has accentuated the 
multilateral nature of reciprocal trade as defined by the 1958 treaty. 31/ At 
least, the proportion of this trade corresponding to imports by El Salvador 
declined to 5^ per cent in 1957, to 4l per cent in I960 and, finally, to 39 
per cent in 1961. This decline has been paralleled by an increase, in 1957 
and 1961, of the proportions corresponding to Guatemala from 11 to 25 per cent 
respectively, those of Costa Rica from 5 to 11 per cent, and those of Honduras 
from 15 to 17 per cent. It must be noted that these percentages do not imply 
a displacement unfavorable to El Salvador, since they are exclusively the re-
sult of larger volume participation by the other countries. 
The benefits derived by the Central American countries from the gradual 
and still incomplete 32/ application of these two treaties should be measured, 
first, on the basis of the greater participation by all the countries in re-
ciprocal trade and, second, by the impact these exports have had and will have 
on the utilization of the industrial capacity of the five countries. 
It has been pointed out previously that the initial consequence of the 
Multilateral Treaty was elimination of the radial trend that had restricted 
reciprocal trade in previous years. The recent development of reciprocal 
trade among countries that had formerly traded very little between themselves 
(Honduras-Nicaragua, Honduras-Costa Rica, Nicaragua-Costa Rica) has been rapid 
and is beginning to show a certain regularity, but is limited by the scant 
industrial development of Honduras and Nicaragua, which seriously restricts 
the number of trade products, and by relative withdrawal from the Program of 
Central American Integration in the case of Costa Rica. These three countries 
however, have increased their mutual imports from 1.4 million dollars in 1957 
to 2 million in 1961, despite a decrease of 0.5 million in Nicaraguan imports 
from Costa Rica. 
The figure of value traded among these three countries should not be con-
fused with their total participation in reciprocal trade. In 1953, they re-
ceived 33«3 per cent of intra-Central American imports, a ratio that reached 
35«3 per cent in 1961 (see Table 72). It is also pertinent to note that the 
trade of goods with El Salvador and Guatemala hag consistently resulted in 
positive balances that have served to attenuate the unfavorable impact of their 
deficit balances with the rest of the world in recent years. 
31. The expansion of intrazonal trade also continued. Between 1958 and 
I960, this sector increased by 12.2 million dollars, while the increase between 
I960 and 1962 amounted to between 15 and l8 million (see Table 17). 
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These facts are mentioned in order to confine this problem to the prospects 
offered to Central American trade by the expansion of trade among these three 
countries and their industrialization. The sole adherence of Costa Rica to the 
General Treaty in July 1962, 33/ will bring about a rapid growth of its trade 
with Honduras and Nicaragua. At the same time, there is already a series of 
manufacturing projects in these two countries whose capacity has been planned in 
accordance with the size of the regional market. Their exportable output will 
consequently expand and diversify, thus helping to correct the radial distortion 
still present in intra-Central American trade. 
In short, it can be said that the last two stages through which intra-Central 
American trade has passed have resulted in substantial economic benefits for the 
participating countries. On the one hand, it has made possible the use of agri-
cultural and manufacturing productive capacity which, without the regional market, 
would have been wasted owing to the limitations of national demand. On the other 
hand, it has made possible access by the consumer population to a volume of goods 
whose purchase abroad would teve been smaller without the payments compensation 
implicit in reciprocal trade. These two points were discussed before examining 
evolution of that trade. 
The task of evaluating the influence of reciprocal trade on industrial dev-
elopment presents serious obstacles. There is a lack of up-to-date statistics 
that would be required by the optimum system for such evaluation,that is,a frame-
work relating total sales of the sectors to their destination, whether for 
exportation, additional processing, consumption or stocks. The approximate e-
quivalent of such a framework has been obtained through studies conducted in 
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras by national working groups or joint groups 
in association with international agencies.¿4/ Although these studies furnish 
valuable information, amply utilized in the present study, the most recent is 
provided by the last of these studies, which corresponds to 1959» year of little 
significance for the study of contemporary intra-Central American trade. Since 
it has been impossible to obtain patterns of this type for a sufficiently recent 
year, quantitative evaluations are offered, or in their absence qualitative ones, 
for sectoral production, in discussing statistics on trade classified by sector 
of origin (see Table 73)• The gaps and mistakes occasioned by this substitute 
system can only be corrected in the future with the completion of the study on 
Central American economic development initiated by a joint group of international, 
regional and Central American agencies. 
33. In November of the same year it signed the protocol required for its 
admission to the Central American Common Market. 
34. University of Costa Rica, El Desarrollo Económico de Costa Rica, 
San José, 1958, and United Nations, Análisis y Proyecciones del Desarrollo Eco-
nómico ; VII, El Desarrollo Economico de El Salvador and XI, El Desarrollo Eco-




CENTRAL AMERICA: VALUE OF INTRA-CENTRAL AMERICAN IMPORTS BY EL SALVADOR, 
GUATEMALA  AND HONDURAS BY SECTORS AND INDUSTRIES OF ORIGIN IN 1957 AND 1961 
(In thousands of dollars) 
Sectors and industries of origin 1957 1961 
I. Primary 5 9^8 8 9 765 8 
a) Agriculture 5 794 8 9 413 6 
b) Forestry 98 7 53 6 
c) Mining 55 3 298 6 
II. Secondarŷ - 7 032 1 20 830 7 
a) Food 1 875 5 5 620 1 
b) Textiles 224 6 3 755 3 
c) Footgear, clothing and 
other similar items 1 052 2 2 077 0 
d) Wood and furniture 978 2 1 588 1 
e) Leather and hides 203 3 375 2 
f) Paper and cardboard 284 2 596 7 
g) Printing 61 0 115 1 
h) Rubber 85 7 779 8 
1) Tires and tubes 2 8 481 7 
i) Chemical products 972 2 3 102 7 
1) Paints and dyes 0 8 467 4 
x 2) Toiletries and pharma-
ceutical products 263 6 1 675 9 
j) Mineral products non-metallic 244 3 1 127 8 1) Cement 213 1 722 5 
k) Metallic products 
(except machinery) 63 4 400 9 
Total-/ 12 98O 9 30 596 5 
a. Including non-classified goods. 
Source: Official data. 
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Based on official data on importation by three countries—El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras—it is possible to break down Lhe goods according to the 
industry and sector producing or processing them prior to their entry into intra-
Central American trade. This breakdown shows that such trade has, in general, 
benefited all the sectors (see Table 73 again). The goods of the primary indus-
tries increased in this trade from almost 6 million dollars in 1937 to 9.Ü mil-
lion in 1961, while those of the secondary sectors amounted to 7*0 and 20.8 
million dollars in the same year respectively, A. comparison of these figures 
indicates that there has been a substantial increase in the degree of processing 
of goods traded, since because of the greater processing, those of the secondary 
sector mentioned rose from 54 percent in 1957 to 68 percent of the total in 1961. 
The significance of these proportions and their increases for Central 
American trade is even greater when the industrial groups most benefited are 
examined. Chapter I outlined in some detail the structure of the manufacturing 
sector in these countries, but it is advisible to recall that the Central Ameri-
can manufacturing industries can be divided into those recently established and 
those initiated in the early 1950's or before. A second division might be 
based on a technical level, which varies between production methods only barely 
above the artisan level and the most modern techniques, employing highly pro-
ductive equipment. 
Using these definitions with the latitude required by the statistics, it 
will be noted that trade in the products of the most recent industries was the 
most dynamic. Thus, rubber articles increased 9 times in value; toiletry and 
pharmaceutical products, as well as metallic articles, 6.3 times, and nonmetal-
lic mineral products, excluding cement, 14 times. Among the industries con-
sidered for the system of Central American integration industries, 35/ the 
ures (which are minimal even though they include re-exports in 1957) are too high 
to be significant as percentages. Trade in tires and inner tubes increased from 
3 000 dollars to 482 000 dollars in 1957 and 1961 respectively. For the same 
years, values for trade in paints and dyes amounted to 800 dollars and 46? 000 
dollars. 
With respect to the older industries—here designated as traditional— 
with only one exception the relative increases are less, although in absolute 
terms they are the most important. Thus, food products increased between 1953 
and 1957 by 3.8 million dollars, equivalent to 200 percent, and, among others, 
footgear and clothing expanded by one million dollars, or 100 percent. The 
exception mentioned is textiles, whose import value in 1957 came to 225 000 
dollars and increased 16 times, amounting to 3*8 million dollars in 1961. 
It is difficult to attribute a precise significance to these figures for 
lack of a basis for comparing them quantitatively and in an orderly manner with 
those of the corresponding output. However, based on the substitutive analysis 
by sectors and industries of origin, it is possible to arrive at some prelimi-
nary conclusions with respect to the effect of reciprocal trade on Central 
American production. 
35. This refers to the 1958 Agreement on Regulation of Central American 
Industries of Integration. 
/Unque s ti onably, 
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Unquestionably, this trade has stimulated the industrialization of Central 
America. In the first place„ it has resulted in more efficient use of equipment 
that vías underutilized due to inherent limitations in the size of the national 
markets. In some cases,. this underutilization was due to simple excess capacity 
of equipment;, in others, such limitations influenced the varieties that existing 
equipment could produce with a comparatively small additional investment. As 
a corollary,, the -differences in this equipment and these additional investments 
have resulted in a specialization that includes both the industrial groups and 
the various qualities or other- characteristics of the individual articles. 
Under the influence of this specialization* industrial production has been 
versified and has made- considerable progress; in the- replacement of imports from 
other areas, indicating that in the near future this- process will cover about 
two thirds of the consumer goodis still purchased by Central America. 
In the second place, reciprocal trade has also stimulated the introduction 
of modern techniques in the food industry,, whose importance in the process of 
economic development needs no explanation»^/ It» development in Central America 
has been steady and it has consistently been one of the most vigorous industrial 
branches with regard to both supply of consumer goods and replacement of imports. 
It should be noted that the prices paid by consumer» in the four countries active-
ly participating in reciprocal, trad® of food commodities have dropped, while 
they have increased in Costa. Sica, and the United States, the chief overseas 
supplier. 
Reciprocal trade lias also led to the installation of  new industries and to 
a number of manufacturing projects,, most of which, can. be promptly implemented. 
Among those recently installed are a tire factory in Guatemala, the only invest-
ment to date based on the benefits conceded by the regulations governing Central 
American industries of integration. The same country also has in operation a 
number of plants of various sizes- producing aluminum,, plastic and rubber articles 
and processing or packaging pharmaceutical products* all of which are allocat-
ing and increasing share of their- output to trade with the other countries of 
Central America. In at least twcr> countries paint and varnish plants have been 
installed and are currently operating. En El Salvador, the list of industrial 
products corresponding to- the sample tabulated in 2^61 by the General Bureau of 
Statistics is so diversified thatr for all practical purposes* it has no rela-
tion to that indicated' by the 1956 industrial census. 
As will be noted elsewhere,, these trends have had' different effects on the 
Central American countries and the main groups of secondary industry. 
1 . Reciprocal food  imports 
The coexistence of  backward and modern techniques i s characteristic of  the 
agricultural sector in underdeveloped countries. Generally speaking, modern 
methods are more frequently  found  in export agriculture, while outdated methods 
are used for  domestic consumption crops. Because of  this technological factor, 
i t had been observed in much of  the underdeveloped world, including many of  the 
Latin American countries, that production for  consumption lacks dynamism. 
5b!By the end of the 1950's, the food industry in the United States repre-
sented 12 percent of the value added in manufacturing production, constituting 
the most important industrial group in that country. 
/With regard 
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With regard to foodstuffs (see Table 74), the increase in this trade is 
surprising, since primary production in Central America has followed a more or 
less parallel trend to that of total population and shows a growth of less than 
the 5 P e r cent annual estimated expansion of urban population. Furthermore, if 
consideration is given to the high value of overseas imports, which in the case 
of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras amounted to l8 million dollars in 1961,37/ 
for processed foods (that is, in addition to nonprocessed foods), the recent 
expansion of reciprocal trade in these products is even somewhat contradictory. 
This contradiction, however, is only apparent. In the first place, in certain 
areas consumer-oriented agriculture has been technologically improved in recent 
years, and, in addition, a series of new crops have been introduced. This is 
difficult to evaluate on a statistical basis due to the excessive share of the 
traditional crops in the total value added by agriculture; their technical im-
provement is restricted by their greater vulnerability to the impact of struc-
tural changes. Among the most important new products are milk and its by-
products whose production and industrialization have been favored by expansion 
of the supply of domestic and imported prepared fodder. The same is true for 
poultry meat 38/ and pork, whose dynamism is also concealed by the^ize of es-
timated production for on-farm consumption. 
In the second place, it should be considered that urban consumers demand 
processed foods. For example, only insignificant quantities of the 18 million 
dollars worth imported from overseas by these three countries are Used for 
rural consumption. According to the data presented in the previous section on 
import composition, this figure runs, depending on the country, between 30 and 
70 per cent higher than that for 1953, that is, the market for processed food 
products is still a broad one in these three countries. 
With certain limitations, this broad market area is valid even on the na-
tional level, as shown by the recent rise in this production. Although the 
periods do not cover the same number of years, the indexes of food manufacturing 
output available indicate during the 1950's annual growth rates of 7«4 per cent 
in El Salvador, 4.3 per cent in Guatemala, 4.6 per cent in Honduras, 8.8 per 
cent in Costa Rica and 12.2 per cent in Nicaragua. The rates for agricultural 
consumer production, including cotton seed, register comparatively low levels. 
This industrialization of farm commodities has been based not only on the 
growing demand for processed foods, but also on the supply of raw materials. 
Due to the difference between them there is a certain degree of specialization 
that is reflected in the trade between these countries. Thus, El Salvador has 
sharply increased its production and exportation of vegetable oils and oil-seed 
cakes, for which it has had available expanding volumes of domestic cotton seed 
and the ginning of Honduran cotton. Its milling capacity is also important, 
37. According to the ECLA estimate, this figure came to 40 million dollars 
for the five countries in I960. ECLA, Estado General y Perspectivas del Pro-
grama de Integración Económica del Istmo Centroamericano, Mexico City, 
January 1963. 
38. Part of this production is derived from poultry for fattening imported 
from the Unir-:.! States. Exports from that country to Central America came to 




CENTRAL AMERICA: INTRA-CENTRAL AMERICAN IMPORTS BY EL SALVADOR, 
GUATEMALA  AND HONDURAS BY FOOD INDUSTRY OF ORIGIN IN 
1957 AND 1961 
(In thousands of dollars and percentages) 
1957 1961 
Index 196I 1 
(1957 = 100) 
Thousands of dollars 
1. Meat preparation and curing 17.9 205.1 1 145 
2. Dairy products 342.8 417.4 1 220 
3. Canned goods, except fish 38.5 314.1 815 
4. Milled grains 178.9 5^2.7 304 
5. Sugar and preparations 633.7 339.9 54 
6. Sugar confections and 
chocolate 220.8 944.3 425 
7. Miscellaneous 400.8 2 979.7 7 450 
Total—̂  1 875.5 5 620.1 300 
a/ 
Total,— excluding sugar 1 241.8 5 280.2 425 
a. Including nonclassified industries and marine products. 
Source and Notes: See Table 73* The standard international classification of 
all human activities by the United Nations has been the basis for the classifi-
cation used in this table. The apparent differences are due, on the one hand, 
to the need for reconciling it with more properly Central American definitions 
on what constitutes primary production (green coffee, for example) or secondary 
production and, on the other, to the fact that in the secondary sector subprod-
ucts without subsequent processing were assigned to the principal industry. 
The comparability between the two years is inexact because of changes in 
tariff definitions by the countries. 
/and it has been 
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and it has been able to expand rapidly its output of flour and bran. In both 
cases, part of the expansion has resulted from exports to Central America, 
which in 1961 amounted to 20 per cent of the produced value of oils and 8 per 
cent of milling. 
In Guatemala, the canning industry (except fish) is undergoing a process 
of initial expansion, having utilized to date only a minimum  of the important 
national potential for the production of fruits and vegetables. Expansion in 
both the present and the immediate future is based on the growing importance 
of the Central American market to this sector, whose imports from abroad repre-
sent approximately ten times the value of the corresponding Central American 
trade. 
Honduran exports indicate its livestock potential by the fact that its 
exports of milk and meat by-products expanded. The tonnage of exports of edible 
vegetable oils prepared for consumption rose by 525 per cent between 1958 and 
1961, due to an increase of 50 per cent in the volume allocated to El Salvador 
and 800 per cent in that sold to Guatemala. It is noted that there is a differ-
ence between the Salvadoran product, chiefly oils, and the Honduran, margarines, 
which points up the specialization existing at the level of the industrial 
group. 
It is difficult to judge the potential role of Costa Rica in this trade. 
For the time being, the most important products imported by El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua from Costa Rica are cacao manufactures, including 
cocoa, candy bars and other confections. 
The foregoing shows that the increase in reciprocal trade of processed 
foods has been not only favorable to the Central American nutrition, but has 
also contributed to the industrialization of agricultural production for con-
sumption demanded by the economic development of these countries. Although in 
this case it is difficult to judge its importance by the size of manufacturing 
installations, it has certainly permitted greater development than that offered 
by the national markets individually and has helped to add value to the sub-
products of two main groups. 
2. Reciprocal textile imports 
Manufacturing output of fabric in Central America received considerable 
impetus in the early 19̂ 0's when overseas textile products disappeared almost 
completely from the market. The subsequent renewal of these supplies led to 
a deterioration in this industry, which was not offset by the subsequent ele-
vation of tariffs. Total Central American textile production declined in 
varying degrees, depending on the country and the fiber. The most seriously 
affected sector appeared to be the production of rayon cloth in Guatemala which, 
judging by the census data for 19̂ 6 and 1953, declined by two thirds. 
Production, particularly cotton fabrics, rapidly recovered and even ex-
ceeded its former level at the initiation of a phase of persistent economic 
/growth that 
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growth that led to expanded domestic demand. It also contributed to the expan-
sion of cotton production, which facilitated the rapid rise in spinning capac-
ity. This increased output, however, was based on a very limited variety of 
cloth with little or no finish, and it was thus necessary to import in order to 
satisfy the demand for intermediate and complete finishes. 
This division of supply was due to the fact that although national markets 
permitted the operation of this industry they were, on the other hand, insuffi-
cient for mass production of medium and high quality cloth. Consequently, 
equipment capacity lacked coordination in the different stages of yam and 
fabric processing,39/ since it was ample for the production of raw yarn and 
fabric, insufficient for the intermediate stages and practically nonexistent 
for the final finishing processes. A study 40/ of the Salvadoran textile indus-
try at the start of the 1950*3 shows the influence of market size on this bottle-
neck and the limitations imposed by lack of diversification on replacement of 
imports. 
According to this study, El Salvador lacked at that time machinery to 
polish yarn or mercerize cloth, while most of the plants also lacked equipment 
to dye and give other finishes to the intermediate and final goods. Consequent-
ly, there existed a situation "prejudicial to the sale of Salvadoran textile 
products, thus creating a preference for imported products." However, the 
study found that "it was obviouB that the purchase by individual factories of 
additional equipment" and the costs of operating it were "completely out of 
proportion" to possible sales.kl/ In order to remedy this situation, it sug-
gested the investment of 780 000 dollars in installation of a plant for finished 
textiles of a scale adequate to serve the entire national textile industry. 
This bottleneck in productive capacity was not noticeable in the 1950-57 
period when Salvadoran textile output grew rapidly, at the rate of 2.9 percent 
annually, during the years 1954-57* As in the other countries, this growth was 
not so much the result of improved technology within the sector as of the con-
centration of its production on the most popular qualities of cloth. The most 
important of these was the production of manta, which between the two censuB 
years of 1951 and 1956 expanded by 17*3 percent annually. In addition to manta, 
a coarse unbleached cotton, most fabric production consisted, even up to 1957, 
of manta-denim  and denim. Dyed and printed cloth in that year accounted for 
less than 10 percent of the value of such fabrics. 
The difficulties in diversifying this production described above correspond 
to a period of expansion of the Central American economy and, consequently, of 
demand for cloth.b2j It would be logical to assume that the economic deteriora-
tion after 1956 would have accentuated these problems, as would have the degree 
39• It should be noted that textile equipment is supplied by countries 
where this industry normally operates on an integrated basis. 
bO. United Nations, The Textile Industry in El Salvador, New York, 1954. 
41. Ibid., p. 3b. 
42. A study by the Inter-American Development Bank, La Industria. Textil 
en América Latina, Washington, June 1962, shows a very minor growth in per 
capita cloth consumption. The figures given are expressed in kilos and, conse-
quently, indicate only one aspect of textile demand in Central America. 
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of import replacement that had then been achieved through the production of 
coarse cottons and other popular types of fabric.45/ However, this was not the 
case. Salvadoran production, which, it will be recalled, had been increasing 
up to 1957 at the rate of 2.9 percent a year, began a persistent and rapid ex-
pansion that amounted to a cumulative rate of l8«9 percent between 1957 and 
1961. The index corresponding to Guatemala also shows an acceleration, climbing 
from an average annual increase of 2.2 percent in 1950-57 to 5*8 percent between 
1957 and I96I. The textile industry for Central America as a whole exhibits 
the same trend, increasing its production rate from 2.5 percent in 1950-57 to 
8.7 percent annually in 1957-60. 
It would be a mistake to conclude that reciprocal trade was the sole deci-
sive factor in these trends. In the first place, the size of the national mar-
kets was larger by virtue of the steady economic development prior to 1957» In 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa .Rica it had even made possible additional 
equipment that resulted in a better finished product and, at least in 
El Salvador, the printing of woven and knitted fabrics. Furthermore, the pro-
duction of clothing, rubber footgear and furniture, whose cloth inputs were 
partly drawn from abroad,kk/ continued their rapid growth after 1957 and at the 
same time increased the percentage of Central American textile inputs. 
It is also obvious that the suppression of most restrictions on intra-
Central American trade, resulting from the 1958 Multilateral Treaty, created 
expectations of a broader market and stimulated the additional investments 
required to improve coordination of the stages of production and diversify out-
put. These expectations were fully realized in the two 45/ countries where the 
textile industry had developed most fully and to a lesser extent in the others. 
Reciprocal trade of textile products increased from 225 000 dollars in 1957 to 
3 755 000 dollars in 1961 in the case of Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador; 
to these figures must be added the increment obtained by the rade of products 
with thread and cloth inputs, such as the industries mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph. 
In attempting to show the relation between this trade and production, the 
information on El Salvador is again utilized. Exports of yarn and woven fabrics 
from that country to Central America in 1957 came to 167 thousand dollars, a 
comparatively small figure as related to production for that year. In 1961, 
following a steady increase, this value came to 2.4 million, at a time when 
sales by this industry for consumption, manufacture and export amounted to 
7 million dollars. Accepting the small error of comparability between the two 
values, it follows that one third of its activity was generated in 1961 by sales 
Nicaraguan textile output tripled between 1950 and 1955» declined by 
20 percent in 1956, and has risen slowly and irregularly since then. The drop 
observed in Honduran textile production is due to a fire in its main plant. 
44. In 1956, for example, the El Salvador census showed an input of im-
ported cloth that came to 80 percent of total cloth input for clothing and 
100 percent for the other two industries. In 1961, these ratios had declined 
to 30 percent and 75 percent respectively on the average. 
45. Excluding Costa ¿ü.ca, which in 1957 did not participate to the same 
extent as the others in the Central American market. 
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to the regional market. Although no information is available on additional 
investments in textile finishing, it is interesting to note that in 1961 manta 
represented 33 percent of all cotton cloth produced, as compared to the 54 per-
cent recorded by the 1956 census. An important share of these sales consisted 
of products with a high degree of finish. 
Nevertheless, exports by El Salvador were not the only proof of the demand 
of the Central American market. Guatemalan exports climbed from a minimun 
figure in 1957 to close to 320 000 dollars in fabrics, chiefly rayon, to which 
should be added, also in 1961, 170 000 dollars in knitted cotton and rayon 
fabrics.46/ Honduras is exporting more than 200 000 dollars in ready-made 
clothing, as compared to only 40 thousand dollars in 1957» 
One factor that deserves detailed study is the specialization shown by 
figures on this trade. According to the statistics on foreign trade by 
El Salvador in 1961 (see Table 75) the country imports and exports yarn and 
cloth, with Guatemala as its main Central American supplier and buyer. There 
is, however, a considerable difference between the two cases with respect to 
fiber, type (weight per meter in Table 75) and finish. Thus, El Salvador sup-
plied raw cotton thread and received bleached cotton thread and rayon yarn. 
The differences in type of fabric are also notable. El Salvador exports to 
Guatemala cotton and synthetic fiber fabrics and recives, in turn, rayon and 
heavier cotton fabrics. 
These differences indicate a specialization based on differences in the 
degreee of utilization of basic equipment capacity (spindles and looms) and on 
new investments in additional finishing equipment. In the latter case, it 
indicates that even in an industry such as textiles where there is a certain 
paralellism among the five countries, there is a broad enough margin to justify 
additional investments by Central America as a whole and thus obtain a diversi-
fication aimed at accelerating reciprocal trade and replacing overseas textile 
imports. 





EL SALVADOR: TRADE IN TEXTILE PRODUCTS WITH GUATEMALA,  1961 
(In kilograms) 
Imports Exports 
I. SPINNING PRODUCTS 
1. Cotton 
a. raw - 883 593 
b. bleached, dyed or 
mercerized 3 765 — 
2. Rayon 289 -
II. WOVEN PRODUCTS 
1. Cotton 
a. raw 
less than 80 grams x m̂  14 368 52 864 





l a j > w 2 80 grams x m 7 385 721 
mu r •• ••; ¿ 2 grams x m 10 757 8l 752 
Oli/'r í*,-. '< 2 !jv grams x m 7 415 3 Oil 
d. .'! ' ' If  >f  i.'y.i : . ; ,/rithetic fibers 
rayon 38 356 -
others 705 3 Oil 
Source: Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, Anuario Estadístico, 
•"" Vol. I, Foreign Trade, San Salvador, 1962. 
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E. PROSPECTS FOR INTER-CENTRAL AMERICAN TRADE 
Information currently available and the structural changes likely to occur 
in the near future restrict any analysis of future prospects of intra-regional 
trade to a very exploratory level. These prospects should be considered in the 
light of predictable economic development in Central America, the resulting 
variations in final and derived demand and the effect of these demands on 
domestic supply and imports. 
Basically, intrazonal trade is a dynamic factor in Central American eco-
nomic development, for it has brought a new dimension to the scale of indus-
trialization. Existing industrial installations are generally unable to cover 
the demand of the regional market.4?/ In addition, it enables recent and pro-
posed installations to diversify, which is essential—because of induced 
expansion in derived demand--to the subsequent pursuit of industrial development. 
This new market dimension is, however, very recent, since the Multilateral 
Trade Treaty dates from 1958 and the General Treaty was only signed in December 
i960. Furthermore, Costa Rica participated in reciprocal trade only on the 
basis of bilateral treaties up to 1962} consequently, its effect oh production 
and investment has been only partially felt. In view óf the difficulties in-
volved in determining the index of macroeconomic reference this analysis is 
confined to an exploratory study of the margin of industrialization derived 
from the new market dimension not yet utilized. In order to project regional 
trade, it will be necessary to undertake additional studies based on the oppor-
tunities offered by future economic growth. 
1. Factors delaying reciprocal trade and the 
integration program 
a. Previous integration experience 
Although customs tariffs agreements are now in the operational stage, 
there is no doubt that other institutional aspects are still in a formative and 
experimental phase.48/ The integration agencies are faced by the need to solve 
highly important problems with no precedents to serve as â gaikfe-». -ult is to be 
expected, therefore, that their effectiveness will continn® to increase to the 
extent that they develop pragmaticallly a new and suibáüTe methodology. It 
should be kept in mind that there is a total lack of experience in the ecconomic 
integration of underdeveloped countries. 
W» Practically the only important exception is the wheat milling imdus-
try, whose capacity, partly because of its location arid partly because of the 
institutional barriers that still exist, could duplicate c®mr©nt' prtwàiicitiion 
and more than satisfy the demand for wheat flour. 
48. For example, questions of customs legislation and trademarks. It 
should also be noted that trade is closely tied to tax legislation in general. 
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Outside of Europe, economic integration experience in the tventieh century 
century that might serve as a pattern for Central America is non-existentt Fur-
thermore , the industrialization conditions of the six European countries, their 
advanced level of technology, the massive aid they received from the United 
States during the 19^0's and 1950's, the size of their national domestic 
markets,49/ and their relative independence in the production of capital goods 
make comparison with Central America difficult. 
This information gap makes it essential to continue and accelerate studies 
of the Central American economy as a whole, which should focus on both produc-
tion and the services and regional agencies required to complete the process 
of economic integration. 
Although these agencies were provided for and defined in previous years 
by the Committee on Economic Cooperation of the Central American Isthmus, they 
have only recently been set up. These include the Permanent Secretariat of the 
General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration (SIECA), the Central 
American Committee on Industrial Initiatives, the Central American Chamber of 
Compensation, and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, whose 
effective action has not yet been fully implemented. The last agency commenced 
operation only in September 1961. Mention should also be made of the Central 
American Institute for Industrial Technological Research (ICAITI) and the 
Central American College of Public Administration (ESAPAC). 
b. New demands on managerial capacity in the "manufacturing sector 
The industrialists of a Latin American country know the absorption capac-
ity of the national market and the competitive activities of other entrepre-
neurs. This knowledge, largely the result of extended experience, enables 
them to project their capacity and to regulate their production with an antici-
pated measure of risk. In the case of Central America, this knowledge has 
rapidly transcended national boundaries in certain cases, particularly where 
the industrialists were invited to participate in organization of the bilateral 
free trade treaties. Even so, most of this group, either because the size of 
the enterprise prevented regional-scale operation or because of their lack of 
managerial ability, were unable to analyze market expansion in their particular 
case. Even in such industries as textiles, where increased regional sales have 
been accompanied by a certain degree of specialization, this situation restricts 
sales to the regional market. Thus, for example, despite the fact that the 
demand for cotton poplin multiplied approximately 12 times between 1957 and 
1961 , attaining in the latter year a volume that exceeded optimum plant capac-
ity by 40 percent, existing or projected companies with finishing equipment 
will only be able to satisfy approximately one fifth of this total consumption. 
k9. Note that even the smallest country of the EEC (excepting Luxembourg) 
has almost the same population and a much larger domestic market than all of 
the five Central American countries together. 
/This is due 
- 187 -
This is due in part to the fact that the major share of such consumption corre-
sponds to the derived demand of shirt factories in El Salvador, while direct 
consumer sales—more easily estimated by the producer—show very little change. 
This factor will automatically tend to correct itself, but such a correction 
could be accelerated by means of an advisory agency such as ICAITI, to conduct 
regional market studies, and through a closer relationship between national 
associations of manufacturing entrepreneurs. 
c. Regional trade mechanisms 
Reciprocal trade is not properly wholesale by nature and does not follow 
the same course as traditional foreign trade. Traditional trade possesses a 
relatively efficient organization by which it links overseas buyers and sup-
pliers with the banking systems, transportation and storage facilities and 
wholesale and retail trade. With respect to imports, consumer goods are dis-
tributed in each Central American country according to the geographical struc-
ture of effective demand and intermediate and capital goods, at the direct 
request of the producers. 
This mechanism is still deficient with regard to intra-Central American 
trade. Regional marketing of farm commodities is carried out on a rudimentary 
level that has an unfavorable effect on the volume and form in which these 
goods enter reciprocal trade. In recent years, it has acquired greater effec-
tiveness with the establishment and expansion of official agencies regulating 
the production and trade of grain, but the flow of goods from the producer to 
the wholesaler has been stepped up primarily through massive expansion of the 
transporter, the most common but only initially the most efficient intermediary 
in Latin America.. 
Studies are currently being conducted on farm marketing in Central America; 
those on grain have already been completed in preliminary form.50/ Although 
these studies and the investments in storage facilities recommended constitute 
a long step forward, the introduction of modern technology to the trade of 
other farm commodities is imperative in order to achieve the diversification 
and increased processing required by the Central American demand; for foodstuffs. 
It should be noted that although the replacement of overseas grain imports has 
attained quite a satisfactory margin, in 1961 imports of foods that could be 
produced in Central America were valued at more than 20 million dollars. 
With respect to manufacturing products, there was an almost total lack of 
a Central American marketing mechanism prior to 1957» Since that time, several 
wholesalers have expanded their operations to other national markets and have 
helped to improve regional distribution of consumer goods. Most of this dis-
tribution continued, however, to depend on direct contacts among producers, on 
50. See ECLA, Comité de Cooperación Económica del Istmo Centroamericano, 
Progreso de los Estudios sobre Producción y Mercado Integrado de Granos en 
Centroamérica, Doc. E/CN.12/CCE/271. San Salvador. January 1963. 
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the establishment of sales branches in another country and, for most of the 
small and intermediate producers, on agreements with a wholesaler in the coun-
try receiving the merchandise. Consequently, there is a lack of relation be-
tween the structure of demand and the distribution of Central American produc-
tion, which occasionally leads to assumed saturation of a Central American 
market in which a volume of the same article as that imported from abroad is 
often sold. 
This factor will tend to correct itself in time, since it depends on the 
volume and regularity of the transactions. It is presumed that, prior to 1967, 
it will have acquired an efficiency comparable to that, of overseas trade. 
2. Replacement of overseas imports and reciprocal trade 
The chief characteristic of Central American trade is the regional scope 
it provides for the replacement of overseas imports. This is the basis for 
expectations of its continued growth and the installation and projections of 
new manufacturing plants (see Table 76). It is also the reason for the pro-
nounced expansion of this trade—together with the corresponding investments— 
despite the decline in Central American capacity to import. 
The process of import replacement has been basic to the economic develop-
ment of Latin America, for it has led to more intensive industrial development, 
based primarily on additions to the market, than was possible to the exporting 
sectors because of the variable conditions of demand and prices on the inter-
national market. Except for isolated cases, economic development has been 
accompanied by the replacement of imports, a circumstance also observable in 
the recent past in.Central America. It would be reasonable to expect that this 
process will continue on an individual basis in each country, but that its 
dynamism would be related to market expansion. 
In other words, the actual prospects for growth of reciprocal trade are 
based on the procedure to be adopted and the scope to be achieved by the inte-
gration process. If entrepreneurs persist in installing industries that dupli-
cate existing production, some of the advantages offered by the common market 
with regard to economies of scale will disappear and, in this case, the flow of 
goods to reciprocal trade will be curtailed. On the other hand, if the inte-
gration authorities succeed in preventing the anti-economical duplication of 
investments, this will lead to the advantages inherent in a larger plant, and 
the production resulting from replacement of overseas imports will necessarily 
expand reciprocal trade. 
Estimates on the growth of the latter entail, therefore, an analysis of 




CENTRAL AMERICA: MANUFACTURING  PLANTS RECENTLY COMPLETED 
OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND PLANNED FOR 1963 ¿/ 










Food 26.5 11 3 
Textiles and Clothing 27.3 1 3 
Wood 4.1 — 1 
Furniture 2.1 — 1 
Paper, cardboard and 
their products 0.2 — 3 
Rubber products 0.5 2 1 
Chemical products. 4.3 7 8 
31a ss and ceramics • • • 1 6 
We tal manufactures 
(CIIU 350) 0.9 1 5 
Electrical products 
(CIIU 370) 0.3 3 5 
Miscellaneous 1.3 2 2 
Total 100.0^ 28 38 
a. Excluding expansion of existing capacity and industries protected by the 
agreement on Industries of Integration. 
b. Including other industrial groups. 
Source: Unofficial information. 
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The 1961 Estudio Economico de America Latina gl/ summarized the state of 
that process and classified its phases into the stages of replacement of con-
sumer goods, intermediate goods and, finally, capital goods. It stated that 
a given relation between of the size market and economies of scale corresponds 
to each of these three stages. 
Although this very marked subdivision of the import replacement process 
is real, only if restricted definitions for the three types of goods are ac-
cepted, it does permit a description of industrialization based on the import 
replacement process as a logistic curve by stages that tends to a limit equal 
in size to the corresponding demand.¿2/ That is, at any point on the curve, 
the possibility of replacement at a given time can be evaluated by how much it 
differs from the limit to which it tends or by measuring imports at that time, 
which amounts to the same thing. 
Undoubtedly, this scheme suffers from a certain degree of simplification, 
for, on the one hand, the demands that constitute the limits vary in size and, 
on the other, there are ecological limitations in the case of farm commodities 
and restrictions imposed by economies of scale on manufactures. It is also 
true that, in the latter case, the economies of scale affecting the production 
of intermediate goods can only be utilized once the first stage of import re-
placement has been completed or shows signs of completion, in the forseeable 
future. 
Despite these observations, the simplified scheme is obviously applicable 
to the case of Central America, where economic integration has brought about 
a significant variation in the adjustments made in the past by economies of 
scale with regard to the replacement process. The former subdivision of the 
market was the chief obstacle to industrialization, as shown by the increase 
in reciprocal trade of manufactures in the last five years. 
The expansion of such trade has encountered negative factors preventing 
the growth of both agricultural and manufacturing production in some of the 
branches where the new scope of the market had eliminated the restrictions on 
investments previously imposed by economies of scale. It should be noted that 
there is at present a deferred márgin of overseas import replacement composed 
mainly of farm commodities, consumer and intermediate goods produced by light 
industries and construction materials. Following a comparison of the import 
value of these goods with plant size in other countries, (see Annex 1) it has 
been estimated that one hundred million dollars, or more than one fifth of 
overseas imports, corresponds to goods whose potential replacement was made 
possible by the formation of the common market but whose actual replacement 
has been deferred. 
Elimination of this lag would require a step-up in the growth rate of 
manufactures, which would, of course, depend on the number of years needed to 
OAS/ECLA, Estudio Economico de America Latina, 1961, Washington, 
D. C., 1962. 
52. This simplification is excessive in the case of capital goods. 
Here reference is made only to consumer and intermediate goods. 
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complete the investments required. The magnitude of this rate can be evalu-
ated by the fact that food production at the plant level 53/ would have to 
increase by between 25 and 50 per cent, while textiles and clothing would have 
to double. In the case of  manufacturing groups that are less developed or sim-
ply nonexistent in Central America, there would be very high relative additions 
of particular significance with reference to paper and cardboard, rubber, 
cement and finished construction materials. 
Although the probability of error may be very high, it is estimated that 
investments designed to eliminate the deferred margin of replacement would 
enable the manufacturing growth rate to increase from the current 8 per cent 
a year to 12 per cent, if a term of five years is allowed for completion of 
such investments. Even accepting a greater probability of error, it is dif-
ficult to estimate the amount of such investments, since there is little 
precision with respect to the potential yield of underutilized capacity, an 
other unfavorable consequence of the former subdivision of the market, and to 
the percentage represented by supplementary additions to equipment. In no 
case can be estimated initial figure be less than 150 million dollars in fixed 
equipment used directly for production, a figure which will rise sharply if 
only part of this underutilized capacity can be used. 
One of the reasons for difficulty in determining investment is the pos-
sibility of initiating almost simultaneously productions that would supplement 
the preceding ones. This latent margin of additional replacement is composed 
of raw materials and intermediate manufactures corresponding primarily to the 
chemical and base metal industries. The case of rayon illustrates the differ-
ence between the former category of replaceable articles and the new one of 
products whose replacement is subject to increased manufacturing development. 
In 1959, Central America imported 700 tons of rayon fiber and yarn and 
the equivalent of 4,000 tons of raw rayon in fabric and clothing. A plant 
operating economically and at costs perhaps lower than those on the inter-
national market could produce 1,200 tons of acetate and 3,000 tons of vis-
cose.¿4/ That.is to say, deferred replacement, in this case cloth and cloth-
ing, and latent replacement, fiber, could be carried out separately or simul-
taneously, resulting in different estimates of investment and domestic product 
despite the fact that consumption of the finished product would not change. 
The investment required to replace rayon cloth, at the rate of 4,400 dollars 
per ton of spinning and weaving capacity, may amount to 17.6 million dollars 
plus another 6 million dollars for a finishing plant that could also be used 
to process current outrut of rayon cloth. The addition of a rayon plant would 
require a minimum  of 11 million dollars more and the industry as a whole would 
need a working capital of 7 million. 
In other words, either 22 or 35 million dollars may be invested to supply 
fully production for a consumption whose imports would amount in five years to 
40 million dollars. This investment would increase sixfold the production of 
rayon cloth and, by increasing the domestic supply of textile fibers by one 
53. The processing of parchmant coffee is omitted in this case. 
54. See United Nations, ECLA, Doc. E/CN.12/CEE/245. 
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third, would make it feasible to replace imports of a basic group of chemical 
products, since rayon production requires cellulose, sulphuric acid and caustic 
soda, three products widely used in the manufacturing sector. 
It will be noted that future trade expansion, which would hypothetically 
include two thirds of the production aimed at reducing the deferred margin of 
replacement and perhaps one third to one half in other cases, 55/ depends 
largely on the continued process of Central American industrialization. Its 
location is also important, since the flow of goods to such trade will tend to 
increase with scattered production and to decrease with concentrated production 
unless such concentration should reduce the radial trend of trade and thus help 
to maintain the self-liquidation ¿6/ of current trade balances. 
55» It is assumed here that the producer country would absorb a higher 
percentage than the average of the other countries and that industries satisfy-
ing derived demand would be located preferentially near the purchasers. 
56. Hypothetically, there is a need for an increase in the industrial 
base in Honduras and Nicaragua over and above the regional average in order to 
maintain a balanced flow of goods. The replacement of imports in the case of 
raw foodstuffs that constitute the chief export of these two countries to the 
region is limited in volume and save for an improbable increase of its 
elasticity demand coefficient in the other countries, would not suffice to 




CENTRAL AMERICA: OVERSEAS AND RECIPROCAL IMPORTS IN 196l, IN APPROXIMATE 
RELATION TO REPLACEMENT POTENTIAL 
1961 Imports 
Overseas Reciprocal 
(millions of dollars) 
Observations 





B. Secondary Sector 
1. Existing industries 
Food 
Meat 1.8 
Canned fish 1.2 




Fats, fodder and 
miscellaneous foods 4.4 
Textiles, foorgear and 
ready-made clothing 














These imports would 






More than half are 
cotton. There are no 
apparent limitations 
imposed by economies 
of scale. 






(millions of dollars) 
Observations 
Knitted fabric 2.8 
Apparel 6.1 
Other clothing 6.9 
Footgear 1.7 
Wood and furniture 
Sawmills 1.2 
Wood products 0.8 
Plywood 0.1 
Furniture 1.5 
Paper and cardboard 
products 










Same as above. 





A plant to manufacture 
cardboard boxes was installed 
in 1962. 
Books, magazines and related 
products represent only 0.7 
millions dollars 




Tires and tubes 
Rubber articles 
Chemical products 









A second plant will be 
installed in Costa Rica. 
Plants under construction 
or planned in Honduras, 
El Salvador and Nicaragua. 










2. Industries made possible 






















Oil plant under construc-
tion in Nicaragua 
Overseas imports have 
decreased as milk produc-
tion has expanded. 
Increased replacement 
requires improved dairy 
herds. 
Construction will be 
initiated in 1963 on a 
plant in Nicaragua. 
Investment is planned for 
a cheddar cheese plant. 
The average capacity of a 
canning factory is 1.3 
million dollars in sales 
(1958). Freezing plants 
sell 0.3 million dollars. 
See text. 
Construction will start 
soon on a chlorinated 
insecticide plant in 
Nicaragua. Similar 
projects also exist in 
El Salvador and Guatemala. 
General Note: It is planned to produce caustic soda and chlorine in Nicaragua 
and sulphuric acid in El Salvador; a sodium sulphate plant is currently under con-
struction in Honduras. 
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